Close Encounters of Empire
Writing the Cultural History of U.S.–Latin American Relations

Edited by Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore

With a Foreword by Fernando Coronil

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American Encounters/Global Interactions

A series edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Emily S. Rosenberg

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Foreword

A pathbreaking study of U.S.-Latin American relations, *Clash Encounters of Empire* is also a landmark of postcolonial studies in the Americas. The product of a conference at Yale University, this unusually coherent collection of essays reflects vigorous collective discussions, painstaking scholarship, and skilled editorial work. While the individual cases examine with sophistication a wide range of imperial encounters in the Americas, the introduction and the two concluding interpretive essays relate the studies to each other and discuss their collective achievements. I will exchange the opportunity to comment further on the case studies for the chance to discuss this volume’s theoretical contribution to the broader field of postcolonial studies.

The authors of these essays treat postcolonial encounters in the Americas as complex affairs involving multiple agents, elaborate cultural constructs, and unforeseen outcomes. While evidently inspired by recent developments in social theory associated with cultural and feminist studies, as well as with poststructuralism and postcolonialism, the essays also build on a long tradition of Latin American scholarship on colonialism and imperialism. The book’s theoretical importance results from the diverse ways in which its authors establish, often implicitly, a dialogue among these diverse bodies of scholarship.

In the introduction Gil Joseph highlights the significance of this dialogue, noting that the collection is distinguished by the pioneering use of postmodern approaches to the analysis of U.S.-Latin American relations. As Joseph observes, while the essays are informed by a postmodern sensitivity to the formation of subaltern subjects, the ambiguities of power, and the multistranded character of historical processes, they do not abandon a more traditional concern with large-scale historical contexts and overarching political relations. Through the interplay of these approaches, the essays treat the “encounter” between the United States and Latin America as a complex interaction among unequal social actors, illuminating in new ways their modes of cooperation, subjection, and resistance under changing historical conditions.

This collection’s engagement with modern and postmodern approaches is also underlined by Rosenberg and Roseberry in the two interpretive
essays that close the book. Rosenberg contrasts this volume with studies that take a modernist perspective and emphasizes its affinity with postcolonial theory, postmodern studies of international relations, and culture-centered discussions of U.S. foreign relations. According to her, the recognition of the complexity and ambiguity of power systems has led to studies that reject the positivist conceits of the master narratives of modernism and that opt for the more modest goal of illuminating social reality through partial glimpses, attentiveness to localized context, and sensitivity to multiple stories and protean symbolic systems. For Roseberry, this volume’s theoretical significance lies in its ability to draw on new perspectives while building on earlier modes of analysis. Seeking to bridge rather than to reinforce the gap between political economy and cultural studies that underwrite the modern-postmodern divide, Roseberry suggests that we read this book as effecting not so much a shift as a dialogue between these approaches.

Yet Latin America has been largely absent from the internal dialogue that has established the field of postcolonial studies in the metropolitan centers. Readers familiar with this field may be aware that many fundamental definitions have been fundamentally defined by work produced about northern European colonization in Asia and Africa, and that its critique of dominant historiographies (whether imperial, nationalist, or Marxist) has led to a significant reconceptualization of the making and representation of colonial histories (perhaps best exemplified by the scholarly work of India’s Subaltern Studies Group). However, both postcolonial imperialism and Latin America (as an area of study and as a source of theoretical and empirical work) are fundamentally absent from postcolonial studies’ canonical texts. This volume counters both absences.

The inclusion of the Americas expands the historical referents and theoretical scope of postcolonial studies. The Americas encompass a vast territory where, since the end of the fifteenth century, European imperial powers (not only Spain and Portugal but also England, France, Holland, and Germany) have imposed various modalities of colonial control, learned from each other, and transplanted this learning to other regions. It is also the region where the United States has most forcefully practiced new modes of imperial domination as the world’s major capitalist power. A lengthy postcolonial history has encouraged Latin American and Caribbean thinkers to confront imperialism’s changing forms. From the perspective of the Americas, some of the pitfalls entailed by the post of postcolonialism, such as the notion that it denotes effective decolonization, are perhaps easier to avoid.
Preface

The idea for this book grew out of a series of discussions among the editors in the spring of 1994. Catherine LeGrand and Ricardo Salvatore were Postdoctoral Fellows in the Program in Agrarian Studies at Yale University, where Gil Joseph directed the Council on Latin American Studies. Each of us had done extensive historical research on problems of Latin American political economy and on the United States' formidable presence in the region. Each of us had also been influenced by the recent cultural and linguistic "turn" in the human sciences. In the wake of the avalanche of cultural history and criticism generated by the five-hundredth anniversary of the so-called Columbian encounter, we found it surprising that little scholarship of a similar nature existed for Latin America's postcolonial (or neocolonial) encounter with the United States during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. To be sure, exciting work was under way across several fields and disciplines, but the cultural history of U.S.-Latin American relations remained to be written almost in its entirety. As we speculated on why the field's development had been stunted, we came to appreciate the almost total lack of communication that existed between Latin Americanists and historians of U.S. foreign relations who worked on inter-American affairs: rarely did members of the two groups of scholars attend the same professional meetings, let alone collaborate on joint projects.

As our discussions came to include a broader range of Latin Americanists (from north and south of the Rio Grande) and U.S. foreign relations historians, the three of us began to plan a research conference that would unite scholars working on the cultural history of inter-American relations across fields, disciplines, and regions. We hoped to take stock of the more innovative work being done and, hopefully, to set a future agenda for research. Following a year-and-a-half planning process, an international conference, "Rethinking the Postcolonial Encounter: Transnational Perspectives on the Foreign Presence in Latin America," was held at Yale in October 1995, sponsored by the University's Council on Latin American Studies. The event brought together fifty-two established and younger scholars of hemispheric relations: historians, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, and cultural and literary scholars; a cast that included North Americans, Latin Americans, Europeans, and one Australian. Four days of intense discussion and debate among this diverse,
interdisciplinary cast—one Latin American participant likened the conference's own feisty "encounters" to porcupines making love—expanded and enriched frames of reference and produced a harvest of papers, eight of which have found their way into this volume.

Four-day international conferences are costly affairs. Ours was generously funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities (Conference Grant RX-21583-95), Yale's Office of the Provost, and the Kempf Memorial Fund at Yale. Special thanks go to Associate Provost Arline McCord, for her encouragement of the event from the earliest stages of planning. We are also grateful to Heather Salome, then Senior Administrator of the Council on Latin American Studies, and her assistants, Jonathan Amith, Steve Bachelor, and Delia Patricia Matthews, for ably and cheerfully managing the logistical details of the conference. We also thank the New Haven Colony Historical Society for providing its facilities and services for the working sessions.

Of course, we are particularly indebted to those colleagues whose ideas and energy ensured the success of the 1995 conference, which laid the groundwork for the present volume. Besides the writers whose work appears in these pages, we also wish to thank the following people who contributed research findings and commentaries in New Haven: Ana Maria Alonso, Warwick Anderson, William Beazley, Jefferson Boyer, Jürgen Buchenau, Avi Chomsky, Marcos Cueto, Emília Viotti da Costa, Julie Fratik, Alexandra Garcia Quintana, Paul Gootenberg, Donna Guy, John Hart, Timothy Henderson, Robert Holden, Gladys Jiménez-Muñoz, Friedrich Katz, Alan Knight, Agnes Lugo Orúz, Francine Masiello, Louis Pérez, Daniel Nugent, Gerardo Réqué, Karen Robert, Cristina Rojas de Ferro, Jeffrey Rubin, Kelvin Santiago-Valles, William Schell, Stuart Schwartz, James Scott, Patricia Seed, Doris Sommer, Alexandra Stern, Lynn Stoner, William Taylor, Mauricio Tenorio, and George Yudice.

The present volume is the product of several years of collaboration among the editors, contributors, and individuals mentioned above. Following the 1995 conference, contributors spent the next year revising their papers. William Roseberry and Emily Rosenberg were each invited to submit shorter concluding reflections; Fernando Coronil was asked to write a foreword; and María Suesca Pozas was asked to do a think piece on the visual arts. Joseph's introductory essay and the contributions by LeGrand, Eileen Findlay, Steven Topik, and Lauren Derby, while written more recently, owe a great deal to the stimulating deliberations in New Haven.

Four final acknowledgments are in order. We are grateful to Yale's Center for International and Area Studies, particularly its two most recent directors, Gaddis Smith and Gustav Ranis, for providing funds that supported much of the editorial and clerical costs attending preparation of the book's manuscript. The Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada contributed additional funding. We are indebted to Bill Beazley and Allen Wells for their meticulous readings of the manuscript. Finally, we express our gratitude to Valerie Millholland, our editor at Duke University Press, for her constant encouragement and ability to do the special things that mean so much to editors and authors.

Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. LeGrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore
The Sandino Rebellion Revisited

Civil War, Imperialism, Popular Nationalism, and
State Formation Muddled Up Together in the Segovias of Nicaragua, 1926–1934

What we ought to do is to forget all our family grudges and recognize that our legitimate enemies by race and language are the Yankee invaders.

AUGUSTO C. SANDINO (1927)

Events are the real dialectics of history. They transcend all arguments, all personal judgements, all vague and irresponsible wishes.

ANTONIO GRAMSCI (1921)

Suppression of criticism, I have come to believe, is not the best way of expressing solidarity.

AJAZ AHMAD (1992)

In mid-November 1927, as wary peasants stripped ripened corn from surviving stalks, a mounted and well-armed reconnaissance patrol of five U.S. marines and five Nicaraguan national guardsmen headed north out of the town of Ocotal, capital of the northern Nicaraguan department of Nueva Segovia, toward the Honduran border. "At Las Manos, which is just across the border in Honduras," the patrol commander later reported, "we found 13 or 16 men all armed with revolvers. They seemed to be very much perturbed by our presence. They said we were the first Americans they had ever seen." They were probably members of a local Conservative gang, though they might have been Liberals; such armed gangs flourished in this place and time. For the past year civil war, the first in nearly a generation, had ravaged the region. In the words of one contemporary, the war had left the entire north "in misery and desolation, houses on all sides filled with grief, haciendas ruined, businesses broken, crops destroyed, men mutilated by the most horrible of tortures." Six months earlier, as the corn planting season was commencing, the 1926–1927 Civil or Constitutionalist War had been formally ended in a U.S.-brokered peace accord (the Treaty of Tipitapa, or Espino Negro Accords of 4 May 1927), though the continuing mobilization of armed gangs across the Segovias throughout the rainy "winter" months probably made it hard to tell the difference. Now, from early June 1927, for the first time in history, North Americans and Segovianos were coming into contact on a daily basis. So were two languages, two cultures, and importantly, two very different ways of organizing and practicing violence. Historically, organized violence in the Segovias had been produced by local-regional ejércitos (armies or gangs) in the service of one or another political faction. The power of the central state was mediated through local-regional political bosses or caudillos who, through these private armies, personally controlled the means of
organized violence. Now the people who made up this endlessly complicated and war-torn system suddenly found themselves standing face-to-face with the advance guard of an invading army. It’s no wonder these gang members “seemed very much perturbed.” It’s hard to imagine them reading the signs (as I imagine them) and feeling at ease: the foreign tongue and white skin, the uniforms and insignia, the exotic equipment, the shiny new repeating rifles, the air of calm, arrogant confidence. In this serendipitous encounter one can glimpse the outlines of a larger struggle, as these gang members apparently did, of two profoundly different visions—of morality, politics, violence, and the state—in the process of colliding.

The four groups of actors figuring in this patrol commander’s report can be read as allegories of four of the major historical processes transforming Nicaragua and the Segovias during this period: (1) ongoing civil war between Liberals and Conservatives (represented by the armed gang); (2) intensifying imperialist intervention (the marines); (3) rapidly if unevenly accelerating state formation (the Guardia Nacional); and (4) emergent popular nationalism and protest (the Sandinista rebels, the episode’s invisible presence, and the reason why the marines were in the Segovias in the first place). Similarly, the report’s flavor of irony and contingency can be read as emblematic of the way these four groups of actors and four historical processes interacted over time. The marines and guardia on patrol to Las Manas were not especially looking for gangs like the one they stumbled into. Instead they were “hunting banditos,” or Sandinistas, members of Augusto C. Sandino’s Defending Army of Nicaraguan National Sovereignty, founded only two months before.

Sandino, an ardent patriot and social revolutionary, had returned from exile in Mexico in early 1926 to join the fight against the Conservatives. By April 1927 he had become one of the most powerful Liberal generals in the north. In May, with the Liberals poised to take Managua and oust the unconstitutional Conservative regime of Adolfo Diaz, the United States stepped in and brokered the peace. The treaty called for the Diaz regime to remain in power until U.S.-supervised elections in November 1928. It also called for the establishment of a “non-partisan constabulary” or Guardia Nacional.

Sandino was infuriated. The United States had been directly intervening in Nicaraguan affairs for the better part of two decades, and now, despite the Liberal victory in the field, the “dastardly invaders and the nation’s traitors,” in his words, continued “trampling Nicaragua’s sovereignty underfoot.” His patriotic anger also expressed a broader ideological current of anti-imperialist and leftist nationalism sweeping Central and Latin America in the wake of the First World War and the Mexican and Russian Revolutions. It also embodied a more specifically Nicaraguan anti-imperialist, anti-Yankee nationalist discourse that had emerged in the wake of the William Walker episode of the mid-1850s and had flourished since the U.S.-supported overthrow of the Liberal president Zelaya in late 1909. It resonated as well with many of the grievances and aspirations of diverse groups of Segovianos. Rejecting the terms of the peace accord, Sandino marched his few remaining troops back up to the Segovias to protest the continuing U.S. occupation.

The emergence of Sandino’s rebellion was thus fundamentally ironic, an unintended consequence of U.S. intervention. For the next five and a half years, the peasant-worker-Indian soldiers of his Defending Army, nearly all of them Segovianos, waged a guerrilla war, centered in the Segovias, against the marines, the guardia, and their civilian supporters. In the process, a powerful new narrative of Nicaraguan history would take shape, in mortal opposition to a powerful new army—the Guardia Nacional—an army that in 1934 would crush the rebellion but prove unable to extinguish the narrative it generated. That narrative, as we know, would survive—in texts, memories, songs, stories, legends—and half a century later would provide the inspiration for the Sandinista Revolution.

This essay is offered as a contribution to a larger project devoted to rethinking the “postcolonial encounter” between the United States and Latin America. For Nicaragua, of course, that “encounter” has been shaped most of all by exceedingly lopsided relations of power: the United States has obviously influenced and changed Nicaragua far more than Nicaragua has influenced or changed the United States. The essay is therefore conceived as an intervention in Nicaraguan history and historiography. It is intended, at one level, as a kind of provocation, an effort to muddy the waters of the master narratives of the period. These dominant stories, each informed by its own moral teleology, tend strongly to reduce contradictory social processes to linear sequences of events, shoehorning the making of history into a select handful of actors and forces and plots: U.S. imperial will versus patriotic resistance; heroic patriots versus evil invaders and morally bankrupt vendepatria (country sellers); benevolent marines versus culturally inferior natives; the forces of “order” and “civilization” versus the forces of “disorder” and “barbarism.”

These dominant modes of representing the United States and Sandino, in turn, can be traced to a larger set of liberal-Marxist theoretical frames that especially in the years since World War II have dominated thinking on
imperialism and "Third World" nationalism: on the one hand, "modernization theory" and its kin (most notably, liberalism and neoliberalism); and on the other hand, Marxism, various neo-Marxisms, the dependency school, and world-systems analyses. More recent theoretical interventions intended to transcend these dominant paradigms, that can loosely be called "postcolonialism" (especially "Colonial Discourse Analysis," subaltern studies, feminist theory, cultural studies, and other approaches still in the process of formation), have yet to be applied to Sandino's rebellion and U.S. military intervention in Nicaragua. None of these frameworks, I suggest, is by itself sufficient for understanding the richness and complexity of this period, though the Marxist and postcolonialist approaches have much to offer, and I borrow from them heavily here. Rather than confronting these narratives and their underlying paradigms head-on (which would comprise too large a digression and, for a historian most at home in the documents, a rather tedious exercise), I aim to do so obliquely, by mapping out an alternative and, I hope, more textured account that attends to the multiplicity of contexts, agencies, and subjectivities that shaped this process of social and political-cultural change.

This essay explores how U.S. military intervention entwined with and transformed ongoing social struggles, forms of collective action, and the organization of violence in the Segovias in the 1920s and 1930s. It examines how struggles for power in the region shaped, and were shaped by, the marine intervention, and with what consequences. It shows, among other things, that Segovianos influenced the process of invasion as much as the invaders did; that Segovianos used the marines as much as the marines used them; and that native opposition to Sandino emerged out of the same social milieu and the same process of struggle that produced Sandino's army. In this way the essay also sheds new light on the rebellion's major unintended consequence: the accelerated formation of the Guardia Nacional and the extension of state power into geographic and social spaces hitherto beyond its reach.

The following section offers a brief synopsis of the two major story lines that have dominated thinking on the war between the marines and Sandino, and suggests that a more compelling historical account can be crafted by combining elements of both. The remainder of the essay tries to sketch out that synthesis. It does so, first, by contextualizing struggles for power in the Segovias before the U.S. invasion. It then contextualizes the invasion and occupation, first by exploring the moral vision that informed marine actions in the field, and then by considering the contradictory effects of those actions: to galvanize support for the rebellion on the one hand, and to accelerate the formation of the Guardia Nacional on the other. The essay then explores the varied responses of Segovianos to invasion, occupation, and rebellion, before examining in greater detail the centralization of violence-making in the region as expressed in the progressive empowerment of the guardia. The conclusion briefly situates the essay's principal findings within the broader contours of Nicaraguan history, and its approach within the broader set of literatures and paradigms mentioned above.

Conventional Frames: Amplifications and Erasures

Few would disagree that intense political factionalism and polarization have characterized most of postcolonial Nicaraguan history. In but one expression of those fractures, and with some notable exceptions, the great bulk of the historical and literary representations of the period of Sandino's rebellion tend to adhere to one of two diametrically opposed master narratives. The first (and probably the most familiar to non-Nicaraguans) is what might be termed the heroic or Sandinista narrative. In this story, Sandino and his rebels are represented as selfless patriotic defenders of Nicaraguan national sovereignty and social justice, a ragtag "crazy little army" of barefoot peasants and Indians sacrificing their lives for a free and independent homeland. The marines and their "collaborators" are represented as demonic brutes bent on dominating and oppressing the humble, righteous mountain folk of the region. The second, what might be termed the Somozaist narrative, is epitomized by and anchored in Anastasio Somoza's El verdadero Sandino o el calvario de las Segovias (1936). Somoza's story, which still carries considerable authority across much of Nicaragua, implicitly represents the marines and North Americans (and, by extension, the guardia) as agents of "civilization" and "modernity," bearers of "order" and "progress," while painting Sandino's rebels, in the starkest possible hues, as murderous gang of "bandits," cutthroats, and criminals bent on the destruction of all "social order." (A softer version, common in the liberal press at the time, praised Sandino's ostensible ends, national sovereignty, but decried his means, organized banditry.) While some have worked to occupy a kind of middle ground between these two poles, combining elements of both metaphors, this middling terrain has remained tenuous and sparsely populated.

Both master narratives capture key aspects of the period and elide others. Somoza's basic story—that Sandino and his rebels were motivated
by nothing more than bloodlust and greed—is plainly wrong, and maliciously so (and for reasons that need not detain us here). That said, the catalog of robberies, burnings, atrocities, and murders that is Somoza's book poses some knotty and neglected questions. The documentary evidence on which the story is based compels us to explain the violence, to recognize the extreme opposition to Sandino that emerged quickly and decisively across the region, and finally, to acknowledge that the rebellion was, in part, a regional civil and class war, waged among and between Segovianos, on their own turf and with a timeworn set of locally rooted weapons and strategies.

The Sandinista narrative inverts Somoza's emphases, suppressing or erasing rebel violence against civilians and, more generally, the civil wars embedded in the war against the marines. Instead it stresses the key slice of reality actively denied by Somoza: that the rebellion was a war of popular and national liberation waged against an invading army, a U.S.-imposed national army, local-regional and national notables whose vision of "the nation" excluded the vast majority of the region's inhabitants, and a profoundly oppressive and exploitative social and political system. It is important to emphasize that the evidence supports the heroic narrative at many levels. The U.S. Marines were invaders, and brutally violent ones. The process of armed struggle against that invasion did generate widespread and deeply felt popular patriotism and anti-Yankeeism (imagined and acted out in many different ways). It did serve to propagate a discourse of national sovereignty, social justice, and inalienable human rights among historically subordinate groups. And it did bequeath to the laboring poor an enduring field of potentially emancipatory texts and social memories, a radically new "social imaginary" expressed through a novel vocabulary and practice of popular protest and liberation from many forms of domination, oppression, and exploitation.

In order to create a more historical understanding of this pivotal period of Nicaraguan history, these symmetrical erasures and emphases need to be brought into mutual dialogue. Sandino's struggle can be best understood as many struggles in the process of combining: a continuation and transmutation of ongoing civil wars between Liberals and Conservatives; a peasant-based, anti-Yankee, popular-national liberation movement; a class and racial-ethnic war rooted in extreme inequalities and local traditions of violence; a fight to "exterminate bandits"; a fight to make a state—or two states, as we shall see—and others besides. By exploring how old and new struggles dynamically entwined, one might begin to chart out some new ways of thinking about the historic relationship between Nicaraguan and the United States, and about Sandino's paradigm of national liberation—with all of its inherent limitations and "monumentally self-destructive" qualities, its intended and unintended consequences, and its emancipatory potential.

Segovian Ways of War

Understanding Sandino's ideology and rebellion as something not just springing from its inventor's head but as something acted out and given meaning by men and women living and working in a particular place and time requires some understanding of Segovian history. So does an understanding of the character of the intervention and the formation of the guardia in the region. In particular, one needs to inquire how struggles for power were thought about and practiced in the years before 1927. According to the historical sociologist Michael Mann, all social power ultimately derives from four overlapping sources: economic, political, military, and ideological. Applying this schema to the Segovias, one can say that economic power—derived mainly from the ownership of large tracts of land—was the principal source of political and military power, which were wielded and reproduced mainly through personal control of local and regional offices of the state, family and political networks, and personal control of the means of organized violence. In the reproduction of social and power inequalities, ideological power was clearly of lesser moment than the ownership of productive resources, control of state offices, and the sustained capacity to inflict physical injury.

In the 1920s (as today), the Segovias were a deeply divided and endemic violent place, where different forms of violence sprang from as many sources as there were lines of cleavage. The fault lines of party, class, and ethnicity ran deepest—in that order of consequence, it seems—but multiple fractures also laced community, family, gender, and personal relations. The reasons behind the divisions and violence were partly an expression of the same historical processes that made political anarchy the keywords for Nicaragua's first century of independence, and partly the result of a host of factors uniquely Segovian. Historically, the region's rugged geography and sparse dispersed population imposed severe limits on the reach of the central state. Regional geopolitics also played a key role, a result of the region's strategic location midway between Tegucigalpa and the León-Managua-Granada axis, which made the Segovias a kind of fluid frontier zone and haven for outlaws, smugglers, and "revo-
lutionary" armies on both sides of the border. As in many other frontier regions, relative isolation from global and national markets and power networks led to a fragmentation of political space, a "localization of sovereignties" in which political power was radically decentralized and continually challenged and defended by local-regional caudillos. Political power, in turn, derived from control of the local and regional offices of the state. Such offices were legion, lucrative, and bitterly contested. Battles for control of the state and its sundry offices have historically comprised the principal source of political strife and organized episodic violence in Nicaraguan history, as has long been recognized. So too in the Segovias.

At the same time, battles among and between local-regional caudillos for control of state offices entwined at multiple levels with challenges from below, as subaltern groups contested elite domination in land, labor, and ethnic relations. The popular explosions of the late 1840s, the Matagalpa Indian Uprising of 1881, and related expressions of popular protest in the region revealed the limits of elite dominance and the potential dangers of unrestrained factional squabbling. Localized and caged struggles from below intensified from the 1880s, as the liberal revolution initiated a broad-ranging assault on the land, labor, and lifeways of the rural laboring classes. As the coffee and mining economies boomed, the violence of primitive accumulation spread decisively if unevenly across the region. These rapid, wrenching changes served to further erode the underpinnings of patron-client relations in the region, which were generally weak to begin with (especially compared to the far more densely settled Pacific littoral), as the dynamics of uneven capitalist transformation reinforced the effects of mountainous terrain, sparse population, localized agricultural frontiers, and internal migrations. In sum, there is much to indicate that by the mid-1920s, a substantial proportion of the region's direct rural producers (including many dispossessed Indians), who comprised from 80 to 90 percent of its approximately 100,000 inhabitants, harbored deep and long-standing grievances against landlords, mine owners, coffee growers, cattle ranchers, and local-regional agents of the state.

Here, as elsewhere, moments of rupture worked to disclose the lineaments of social relations during more "normal" times. The Civil War of 1920-1927 was one such period, the latest in a succession of violent civil conflicts in the country and region stretching back at least a century. Civil wars in the Segovias historically had been waged through the organization of private armies or gangs, mobilized in patron-client fashion by local-regional caudillos. The patrons of such gangs, unlike their leaders and members, were invariably members of the dominant classes, though sometimes the lines blurred, as periods of crisis generated challenges to elite dominance both laterally and from below.

If reliable evidence for these processes in the Segovias prior to 1927 is slim, the marine invasion of the Segovias did much to thicken the documentary record. One of the richest stores of evidence for the period after mid-1926 consists of the testimonies produced by the Instituto de Estudio del Sandinismo (IES) in the early 1980s, which provide a compelling glimpse into how civil warfare was thought about and practiced during the 1926-1927 Civil War, and presumably for a long time before.

As Arturo Warman writes of old-timers' memories of Emiliano Zapata's rebellion, "Their narratives are simple and concrete ... [and] rich and prodigal in details. . . . Names play a part in them, as do the little, everyday things." So too the IES testimonies. Such stories of the 1926-1927 Civil War provide a kind of window into how Liberal "revolutionary armies" in the Segovias were mobilized, organized, and culturally constructed. Several key themes are emphasized repeatedly: the importance of personalismo, caudillismo, and localismo in the formation and dissolution of Liberal "revolutionary armies"; the fluid and contradictory nature of political allegiances and identities; and the centrality of political gang violence in the region's history. Here I can do little more than take soundings from this extensive corpus of stories. Pastor Ramírez Mejía, for instance, later a captain in Sandino's Defending Army, told a long and intricate tale of his experiences in the civil war, passages of which follow:

I began serving under the command of Benito López, joining up with him near Santa Maria (around late October 1926). . . . From there two other generals approached our position: Ciriaco Aguillera and Carlos Salgado. . . . They spoke to me, and I departed with five other men and joined up with them. From there I passed my command to [them]. . . . Our chiefs [Aguillera and Salgado] left us in Achupas, and went to reach an understanding (a tener entendimientos) with Francisco Parajón in El Sauce. . . . They returned with an understanding (venían entendidos de él), and from there we went to attack Chinandega. . . . [We were defeated and fled, carrying many wounded.] There was a general, at that time a colonel, José León Díaz, a Salvadoran, and we were friends with him (eramos compañeros de él). He came to help me with my people; he came as their chief. At that time, the organizations, those whom we recognized with their troops, were those of us who had the grade of captain. The colonels were organized in the General Staff. Those who commanded the army were the company captains. I was a company captain. . . . We entered Somoto. This López Irías had been named General in Chief of Somoto, but he had fled to Honduras. . . . So when he returned he wanted
to take power from the others. So, he takes over (de conquista) the columns of Ciriaco Aguilera and Carlos Salgado, but I didn’t stay around for him to take over my troops. . . . I didn’t stick around to be taken over by López Irias.

After a bitter disagreement with General López Irias, Captain Ramírez and Colonel Díaz departed with their men and linked up with Sandino.33

From this and similar stories (and related evidence) emerges a fine-grained portrait of the language and practice of Segovian civil warfare during this period. Organized violence, an exclusively male pursuit, was produced and controlled by bands of armed men, ranging in size from five to fifty (usually around thirty, it seems), each band clustered around an individual strongman or charismatic leader, or jefe. Larger bands, or “armies,” formed through alliances or “understandings,” were basically aggregations of smaller bands. As the size of such groupings increased, cohesion diminished and internal contests for power intensified. Such groups were constantly in the process of forming and reforming, coalescing and dissolving; a band would adhere, loosely and provisionally, to another such band, or band of bands, its autonomy under constant challenge. Alliances between groups were sometimes ephemeral, sometimes long-lived; betrayal was not uncommon. While most such bands were linked in some fashion to the larger Constitutionalist movement led by Juan B. Sacasa and José María Moncada, their mobilization and organization in the Segovias remained a mostly local affair. Expressions of the region’s fractured political field, such collectivities remained, for the most part, small in scale, locally anchored, individually controlled, and functionally autonomous throughout the war and, in several key instances, for some time afterward. Carlos Salgado and José León Díaz, for instance, became major Sandinista jefes after the war, followed into the field by many of their subordinates and allies.

Within such a milieu, the social and political identities of individuals and families were multiple, contingent, and not uncommonly riddled with contradictions. Examples abound. One tale told by ex-Liberal soldier Lizandro Ardon included a Conservative soldier secretly aiding a Liberal friend, a Liberal sympathizer with Conservative patrons, and a Conservative uncle who helped get his Liberal nephew out of a Conservative-controlled jail.34 A declaration from prison by leading Conservative gang leader José Torres emphasized the friction between himself and his intimate Conservative partner’s long-standing Conservative patron, and between that same patron and another gang leader who was in turn described as the chief of the Conservatives in the region.35 Families were often no less divided. After the civil war, Inés Hernández emerged as a leading Sandinista jefe, while his brother Anastacio (who some time before had killed his other brother Francisco) languished in prison for crimes committed as a leading Conservative jefe.36 Such divisions continued through the Sandinista period. In 1929, Sandinista jefe Teodoro Molina reportedly killed three members of the Mejía family of El Roble near Somoto, while two years later three other members of the same family were reported as active Sandinistas under local jefe Julián Gutiérrez. The latter, in turn, once tried to kill a member of the Alvarez family of El Angel south of Somoto, while remaining in alliance with two other members of the same family.37 Across the region, political identities and allegiances, like social relations of all kinds, were rife with manifold fractures and ambiguities.

Intimately related to this was the centrality of locally produced political violence in the region’s history, as it is especially emphasized in the IES testimonies. In a notable confluence of private memories, for instance, nearly sixty years after the fact, the testimonies reveal that after Emiliano Chanorro’s coup d’état of October 1925, Conservative powerholders across the Segovias, most notably in the El Icaro region, unleashed a wave of beatings, attacks, rapes, and murders in a bid to cow or eliminate their enemies among the populace. All this was the prelude to an even severer upsurge of violence a year later.38 These waves of violence, in turn, contributed mightily to a groundswell of organized popular opposition to continuing Conservative rule, and help to explain the mushrooming of Liberal “armies” and soldiers after mid-1926. For instance, the testimonies shed new light on a neglected but crucial feature of the San Albino uprising of October 1926, an event that appears in virtually every account of the origins of Sandino’s rebellion and that has long been mythologized as a pure expression of local anti-Yankee sentiment (an American, Charles Butters, owned San Albino Mine and its mythically wretched company store). According to many who remembered the period firsthand, the San Albino uprising had its origins less in the violence of mine labor or the capitalist avarice of its Yankee proprietor than in the calculated violence perpetrated by local Conservative powerholders against the civilian population in and around San Albino, Murra, and El Icaro. Here José Paul Barnholtz recalls the origins of the uprising: “One day, news arrived at San Albino that the troops of Adolfo Díaz had arrived in Murra and assassinated Inés Ochoa and Lilo Leal; raped two girls, María Salomé and Concepción Cárdenas; burned the house of the old woman Luisa Mendoza; broken the leg of Lisandro Colindres; wounded Rigoberto Colindres, and
captured Filiberto Barahona, who escaped and went to give warning to San Albino. It was then that we began our rebellion.” In outline if not in
detail, Barahona’s recollections are buttressed by many others.9 Liberal-
Conservative and elite-subordinate struggles melded with Sandino’s anti-
imperialism at many levels, as subsequent events made clear.

In short, local and regional powerbrokers across the Segovias routinely
used violence as a political weapon or tool, as a way to wield and main-
tain power. The violence their gangs produced was at once highly public,
personal, political, sexualized, and locally rooted, and based on inter-
secting relations of power, family, class, ethnicity, and gender. Violence
against bodies and families was combined with crimes against property
(theft and destruction) and the system of “guarantees.” The most common
type of Segovian guarantee (garantía) was a formal promise issued by a
gang leader not to attack, injure, or kill its holder, obtained through ac-
quiescence to the gang or patron’s demands; coffee growers often formed
pacts to secure collective guarantees. All of these practices were as much
cultural as political, intended to create power not only through the elimi-
nation of real and potential foes, but through the dispersal of a social
memory and generalized sense of fear.40

Not surprisingly, nearly all of these ways of waging war were appropri-
ated by Sandino’s rebels in their struggle for state power. By seizing
the tools of domination traditionally employed by the ruling elite, the
Sandinistas in a sense “democratized” the use of collective violence by
unmooring it from the vertical patron-client relations to which it had been
historically tied. Yet the same tools that brought strength and empower-
ment also conferred weaknesses and fractures. Despite its fundamentally
different aims (and despite nationalist myths to the contrary), the Defend-
ing Army was more akin to a loose conformation of armed gangs than a
centralized military institution. Such gangs, mobilized by more than one
hundred charismatic and well-connected local jefes, and integrated into
the Defending Army’s structures of authority (sometimes tightly, some-
times loosely), were riddled with factionalism and competition. Cultur-
ally specific forms of violence against the body and family—wounding
and killing by machete, decapitation, and the public display of mutilated
corpses—though, significantly, not rape, were among their most potent
weapons, as were selective property destruction and appropriation, and
the issuance and revocation of guarantees. The emerging Guardia Nacional
engaged in many of the same practices, as did the marines. But before
exploring how the marine intervention entwined with ongoing civil wars
and forms of collective action in the region, it will be useful to explore
something of the moral imagination of the marines.

Benevolent Paternalism and Racist Brutality:
The Marines in the Segovias

“They were the Leathernecks, “The Old Breed’ of American regulars . .
with drilled shoulders and a bone-deep sunburn and a tolerant scorn of
nearly everything else on earth.” With these words Captain J. W. Thom-
son Jr. lovingly described his Marine Corps comrades-in-arms from the
Great War. The historian Bill D. Ross seized on this imagery and applied it
wholesale to the men of the First Marine Division who fought against the
Japanese in World War II, though he might just as well have pinned it on
the marines who served in the Segovias. Indeed, many of the First Di-
vision’s gnarliest old-timers had earned their stripes in that region’s “nasty
little bush war” a decade before.41 Along with their sunburn, the marines
carried with them into the Segovias—as they had carried into the Phil-
ippines, Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic—a “scorn” that could be
either “tolerant” or not, along with a “bone-deep” set of beliefs and
assumptions about the natives, perhaps best described as fundamentally
racist, culturally arrogant in the extreme, and shot through with good in-
tentions.42

Born and bred in a culture awash in racist stereotypes and violence—
recall the wartime and postwar urban race riots, the resurgence of the Ku
Klux Klan, and the virulent nativism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Catholicism
of the 1920s—these “leathernecks” formed a cohesive community of
white males, mostly young, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant, accustomed to
practicing violence against “racially inferior” and culturally “backward”
“bandits.” They were also infused with a powerful sense of missionary
zeal and moralism, a product, in part, of Wilsonianism combined with the
mythologization of the U.S. role in the Great War.43 At the same time, not
all marines were the same, making it necessary to unpack the category.
One especially needs to distinguish between those who believed in the
morality of the intervention and those who did not—and there were some,
at least, who thought the whole thing an immoral sham.44 The average
marine private, it seems clear, did not want to be in Nicaragua at all, and
was especially loathe to be out on patrol “hunting bandits,” which to him
mainly meant going hungry, getting sore feet, and risking injury, pain,
and death. Like most footsoldiers throughout history, the average marine could trace his social origins to the lower echelons of a profoundly unequal class and political system. Most senior officers, in contrast, despite similar lower-class backgrounds, tended to show more enthusiasm for the aims of the U.S. mission.

Despite their differences, however, virtually all marines shared certain presumptions about themselves and the natives they were there to help and, if need be, kill. All the evidence suggests, remained firm in the shared belief in their own cultural and racial superiority. Most conceived of the U.S. mission as a genuinely altruistic and "civilizing" one, a way to introduce "stability" and "order" into a very "barbaric" and "disordered" country. Most also seem to have regarded themselves as a species of moral policemen, benevolent but stern father figures determined to uplift and discipline the primitive, childlike people of the region. To Marine Corps Major Julian C. Smith, for instance, the peculiar "racial psychology" of "the poorer classes of Nicaraguans" made them, among other things, "densely ignorant... little interested in principles... naturally brave and inured to hardships, of phlegmatic temperament, though capable of being aroused to acts of extreme violence... A state of war is to them a normal condition." 48 Colonel Robert L. Denig, Northern Area Commander at Ocotal, in another characteristic expression of marine attitudes, compared himself to "Solomon" after helping to settle a domestic dispute, and offered his assessment of the natives in his personal diary: "They are children... at heart... Life to them is cheap, murder in itself is nothing." 49

Such views percolated from top to bottom, as becomes especially apparent in marine actions in the field. By imagining themselves as fair but firm disciplinarians confronting a childlike, ignorant, and inherently violent native population, the marines legitimated their own extreme violence in their prosecution of the war. "Saw a native running away and shot him dead" accurately paraphrases buried paragraphs from scores of patrol and combat reports. "Patrol killed one native who ran from me," reads one. 50 As in their other "tropical" invasions, the marines killed and terrorized rural folk systematically, deliberately, and often. This extraordinarily high level of marine (and guardia) violence is the overriding context for any understanding of the period. It is impossible to convey in so short a space the extent of the violence wreaked by the marines (and guardia) in their campaigns to annihilate Sandino's rebels and their bases of popular support. The marines' own reports provide a detailed accounting of the thousands of tons of foodstuffs they destroyed; the thousands of peasant huts torched, strafed, and bombed; the thousands of civilians injured and killed—reports that are woefully incomplete and contain marginally reliable estimates at best.

Such "Yankee brutality"—the Black Legend—is one of two major themes that dominate the Sandinista narrative of the rebellion, as expressed in literature of all kinds—memoirs, novels, songs, poems, biographies, polemics, and histories, by ex-rebels and ex-guardia alike—and especially in the 1920s testimonies: "They did nothing but kill the people... They burned our houses, our animals, everything we had... Whoever they grabbed, they killed, the Yankees did." 51 The other dominant theme, conterminous with the first, is the righteousness of the crusade to expel them.

As a nationalist trope, the Black Legend forms a key component in a complex ideological matrix. Yet it erases as much as it reveals, including the fact that the marines were generally as shrewd and pragmatic as they were brutal and ignorant, and, more to the point, that most marine-guardia violence was perpetrated by Nicaraguans serving in the guardia. By early 1930, in a prefiguring of Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor Policy," the marine withdrawal was well under way. In 1929, at its height, there were some 1,300 marines in the Segovias, some 700 in the Northern Area. 52 By February 1930, the Northern Area's contingent had dropped to 350 marines (commanding 498 Nicaraguan guardia), and by November 1930 to 222 marines (commanding 200 Nicaraguan guardia). Over the next two years the number of marines gradually diminished, while the number of guardias hovered between 650 and 800. 53 In terms of troops on patrol, after mid-1928 more than 90 percent of marine-guardia combat patrols were composed of from 5 to 35 native guardias commanded by 1 to 3 marines. The average patrol consisted of 1 marine to every 16 native guardias, and by late 1932 there were no more marines on patrol. 54

For the Black Legend to be "true," however, the violence must be Yankee violence exclusively, or the violence of witless dupes of the Yankees. That it was neither constitutes a prime source of tension and ambiguity in the Sandinista narrative of the rebellion, a critical juncture where private memories and the "official" story collide. In 1984, more than half a century after the fact, former rebel soldier Joaquín Fajardo Arauz captured this tension and the fratricidal nature of the struggle when he was asked about the makeup of the enemy during the Battle of Labranza in 1932. "Only guardia," he at first explained, "because at that time there were few machos [marines]; fifty guardia with one macho chief." He then quickly rethought things: "Better said, they were all macho, because they all fought for the same opinion, even though they were Nicaraguans..."
they were cruel with us, the same Nicaraguans. Like we say nowadays, Nicaragua has had to fight twice, with Nicaraguans and with the Yankees. We are fighting ourselves, with the other Nicaraguans being pushed by the Americans. It was happening then, and the same thing is happening now." 32 This is a rare moment in the 123 testimonies. Most former rebel soldiers, in telling their stories from within the ideological framework of the larger Sandinista narrative that they themselves helped to create, tended to suppress the painful truth that their fight to free their homeland was also, in large part, a civil war with deep roots in local society.

Throughout their invasion and occupation of the Segovias, the marines thus played two very different and contradictory roles. On the one hand they served as a foil against which a new popular-national identity was created—palpable symbols of the continuing foreign domination of the country and region, a visible and often murderous enemy against which diverse social and political grievances could coalesce. It is one of the major ironies of the period (and one certainly not unique to this rebellion) that marine violence worked powerfully, and at many levels, to promote the cause it was intended to destroy. On the other hand, by working to extend the power and authority of the central state, by integrating themselves into the region's social networks in order to direct and assist in the erection of a new structure of authority and law, the marines also opened up many opportunities for diverse groups of Segovianos to exploit for their own ends. The following section explores both faces of this contradictory coin, in the context of the events and processes from which they emerged.

Power Struggles Combined:
Liberals, Conservatives, Sandinistas, Marines, Guardia

Conventional wisdom holds that U.S. intervention ended the 1926–1927 Civil War.33 In fact the terms of the U.S.-brokered peace, while formally ending the war, also served to rechannel ongoing civil wars in new and unpredictable directions. At one level the peace accord infuriated a committed patriot and steeled his determination to resist the continuing U.S. occupation by force of arms. In response, the marines invaded and occupied the region where his troops were operating. The irony, of course, is that had U.S. policymakers simply ignored Sandino, had they let his troops sack and burn a few American properties and left it at that, the rebellion surely would have fizzled and died, leaving no organic social basis for the ideology of Sandinismo. As it turned out, their determination

"to protect American lives and property," and later, "to exterminate bandits," played right into Sandino's hands—for without the invasion, and the marines atrocities that accompanied it, there would have been nothing to mobilize popular support for the rebellion or promote the nationalist and communist-anarchist ideals that inspired it.

A second irony flowed from the first. In response to the rebellion, the Guardia Nacional, also born of the May 1927 peace accords, professionalized more quickly and became larger and more powerful than it surely otherwise would have, a process explored in a later section of this essay. All the while, battles among and between Liberal and Conservative caudillos and their gangs continued. The eighteen months between May 1927 and the U.S.-supervised elections of November 1928 thus saw an intricate interweaving of old and new struggles, among and between Sandino's rebels, the invading marines and still-embryonic guardia, the triumphant (not temporarily "out") Liberals, and the beleaguered (and temporarily "in") Conservatives. The contradictory dynamics of the moment recast the political map, creating both new divisions and new confluences of interest. Most importantly here, both Sandinistas and Conservatives shared a basic interest in stymieing the intervention and preventing the 1928 elections: thus the curious phenomenon of Conservative caudillos actively aiding and abetting Sandino's rebels, who in turn lashed back against local Conservatives in revenge for years of oppression and violence.34 On the other hand, Moncada's Liberals, the marines, and the guardia shared an interest in seeing the 1928 elections through to successful completion; thus the curious phenomenon of Sandino, the former Liberal general, excoriating and attacking his erstwhile comrades-in-arms, who were now warmly embracing the political project of the imperialists they had long denounced. After May 1927, political allegiances and identities in the region entered a state of extreme flux and ambiguity, even by Segovian standards.

As a practical matter, the marines confronted a dual mission: to stamp out both Sandino's challenge and the continuing mobilization of Liberal and Conservative gangs. Their initial successes were mixed. After Moncada's election as president in November 1928, power struggles among and between Liberals and Conservatives were being waged within a substantially transformed political and military context. Liberals now controlled the state and its offices, backed up by the guardia (in turn backed up by the marines), while the guardia aggressively garnered unto itself sole proprietorship over the means of organized violence, at least of the "official" state. Meanwhile, most of the Segovian countryside seethed in rebellion
against all “official” authorities, old and new. People across the region were forced to choose sides, or at least to appear to choose sides. Most appear to have chosen Sandino’s. By this time the marines-guardia and the Sandinistas had reached a kind of “strategic stalemate,” with each side enjoying certain advantages and suffering certain disadvantages, and with neither able to defeat the other. So it would remain till the end of the war.

The marines’ invasion and occupation further divided the already deeply divided region, superimposing new divisions on the old. This was expressed in countless ways, in the most minor of events—as in the June 1939 report of the commanding officer at Somoto, which reported that a Pancho Cerro of Somoto had shot and wounded the guardia voluntario Macario Isaguirre, and that the next day, another voluntario, Isidoro Ponce, shot and killed Pancho Cerro. Whatever the conflict among these men (and the commanding officer at Somoto did not pretend to ask, though he did recommend Isidoro Ponce for commendation), it is apparent that long-simmering disputes were commonly played out under the new authority structure afforded by the guardia and its auxiliaries, including the voluntarios.

More generally, the war provided a way for Segovianos of any party, class, occupation, or gender to attack their personal or political foes by denouncing them as Sandinistas. Members of both parties did it, and often. Spurned lovers sometimes did it. Elaborate ruses were conceived and acted on in order to portray intra- and inter-party violence as Sandinista violence. One Liberal summed it up: “There are all kinds of people around this town and in the small towns committing all kinds of cruelties that they attribute to the Sandinistas, knowing full well it is not so.” People across the Segovias routinely exploited the fight between the marines-guardia and the Sandinistas to advance their own agendas.

As the war dragged on, the region’s social geography became increasingly divided along political-ideological and class lines. The marines and guardia remained anchored in garrisoned towns, ranging out on patrol in search of the elusive “bandits” and returning to the safety of their barracks and cantinas. Most townsfolk, local-regional notables, and many of their clients quickly and provisionally allied with them. Within the confines of garrisoned towns and ranches, and despite a good deal of permeability, the dominant culture’s law, authority, and morality remained dominant.

Most of the Segovian countryside, in contrast, remained “bandit-infested,” that is, Sandinista-controlled, for most of six years (“control” that was constantly contested by the marines-guardia and their allies). Within such contingently carved-out rural spaces, where Sandinismo ruled, people lived and worked in a kind of alternative moral, spiritual, and juridical universe, a sovereign, egalitarian, mystical brotherhood infused with a deeply spiritual sense of “lo maravilloso.” Sandino’s new nation was practiced as much as imagined, implemented as much as felt, and therein lay its mystery and power. There, the historically disempowered became empowered through their active and radical (if selective) inversion and subversion of the dominant culture’s codes of crime and punishment, of law and justice and morality. In the course of events, collective action against Conservative violence had transformed almost seamlessly, through the prism of Sandino’s teachings, into collective action against marines-guardia violence. Political, class, ethnic, and related aspirations all fed into the central motivating and unifying force of the rebellion from beginning to end: the desire to be rid of the murderous Yankee invaders. Sandino’s new nation, embodying the means to this end, was also elastic enough to incorporate many other aspirations—for autonomy, land, justice, vengeance, respect. From the outset, then, the rebellion in the Segovias was as much a cultural and ideological struggle as a political and military one. At one level it was a guerrilla war between small bands of armed men whose basic aim was to kill each other. At another level the struggle centered on fundamentally opposed (if related) structures of authority, legitimacy, sovereignty, honor, morality, property, and law.

In articulating and codifying this alternative structure of authority and law, Sandino was working to create, from the outset, a kind of parallel state, or rebel republic, a juridical and moral order defined by its defiant opposition to the “official” state. Sandinista correspondence and pronouncements are replete with references to “our civil and military authorities,” “the laws of our military institutions,” and “the legal authority” of the Defending Army over all inhabitants of the Segovias. The rebels’ separate nationhood and statehood were also expressed in the rustic gold coins they minted during the first six weeks of rebellion: hefty ten-peso pieces inscribed with the words *Indios de A. C. Sandino* on one side, and on the other side the image of one such “Indio,” standing atop a proselytizing invader, the “Indio’s” foot on the invader’s chest, his right hand holding a machete, arced high in mid-swing, ready to strike down on the invader’s throat.

By identifying themselves as members of a separately constituted structure of authority and law, the rebels also arrogated to themselves one of the principal prerogatives of states: the right to tax, or, in the idiom employed, to levy “contributions.” Over time, notifications for such “contributions” (“extortion” in the eyes of the marines-guardia and most prop-
etty owners) came to be issued with increasing frequency. At one level, these forced contributions reproduced an old feature of Segovian civil conflict. At the same time they added something new: the conjoining of Sandino’s “patriot-traitor” dichotomy to an often bitterly ironic language of social or class protest.

Like all nationalist discourses that emerge in the context of foreign invasion, Sandino confronted an intractable dilemma: How to deal with the invaders’ supporters and allies? Like the North Americans in 1776, the Palestinians in 1969, and most everyone else in between, Sandino’s revolutionary-patriotic response was to define such “collaborators” as “traitors” and thus effectively outside “the nation.” His new story, or vision of the nation, was peopled by three fundamental groups of actors: “patriots” (himself and his army), “invaders” (the marines), and “traitors” (all Nicaraguans who collaborated with or supported the invasion). The category traitor, in turn, was routinely collapsed into that of invader, making traitors and invaders effectively synonymous, and one of the most common phrases in all of early Sandinista discourse. In Sandino’s world, two diametrically opposed moral-political forces were locked in epic, mortal combat: patriots on one side, traitors and invaders on the other.

The pivot on which this “patriot-traitor” dichotomy turned was the notion of “national sovereignty,” or, synonymously and more tellingly, “national honor”: “patriots” defended “the nation’s honor”; “traitors and invaders” violated it. “Honor,” in turn, was (and remains) throughout Hispanic America a deeply gendered ideology, discourse, and set of practices centering on sexuality, male and female rights and obligations, and legitimate and illegitimate authority. In this light, discourses of gender and honor are central to understanding Sandino’s nationalism, its purchase on the hearts and minds of the rural poor, and its relation to contesting Nicaraguan nationalisms. Sandinismo constructed “the homeland” (la patria) as female (“nuestra madre patria”)—a mother-figure being brutally raped and violated by the “invaders,” an image concretized in the realities of marine atrocities. “Traitors,” in turn, were complicit in this despicable act.

For the Segovian laboring poor, Sandino’s aim of “defending the nation’s honor” invoked a language that found deep echoes in locally rooted languages and practices of masculinity, gender, honor, and sexuality. This helps to explain the rebels’ strict codes against rape. In short, preexisting discourses of gender and honor in the Segovias made possible the rebels’ imaginations of their new nation.

This new “nation,” in turn, was conceived as a patriarchal family, with Sandino, el viejo (“the old man”) as father and patriarch. Membership in this family demanded strict adherence to two criteria: (1) membership in the “Indo-Hispanic race” (as defined primarily by language and culture), and (2) opposition to U.S. imperialism and the “Yankee invaders.” In other words, whether you were a “legitimate Nicaraguan” or not depended on where you were born and how you behaved. “Sixteen years ago Adolfo Díaz and Emiliano Chamorro killed their right to nationality,” announced Sandino’s first manifesto, a judgment repeated often enough during the course of the war. Membership in the family-nation was revocable, contingent on actions. And the Supreme Chief was not the only rebel leader who invoked the right to decide who was “in” and who was not.

By focusing attention outward, at the foreign aggressor, Sandino hoped to transcend the historic factionalism of Nicaraguan politics, “to forget all our family grudges” by forging, within the crucible of armed struggle, an entirely new family, morally superior to the old. His deeper aim, as I read it, was to revolutionize the whole of the isthmus through the process of armed struggle against the Yankees and their allies (the latter, it was hoped, would eventually disappear), to create a kind of spiritualized anarcho-communist brotherhood for all “Indo-Hispanics”—a horizontal, limited, sovereign fraternity ruled by the male laboring poor—using the “Yankees” as the external enemy against which this new community would coalesce. As it turned out, part of this vision was achieved, but at a cost: in everyday practice, old “family grudges” were reproduced and new ones created.

If the deconstruction and interpretation of Sandino’s texts became something of a cottage industry after 1979, insufficient attention has been paid to this nationalist idiom of “traitors” and “treason,” not only for Sandino but for the vocabulary of popular protest he helped to spawn. One detects in the words and deeds of Sandinista jefes and their followers, alongside a deep love for Sandino and la patria and a deep hatred of the “Yankee invaders,” a thinly veiled contempt for the wealthy and property, a fusion of angry social protest and popular patriotism—or perhaps more accurately, angry class protest embedded in a nationalist idiom. The war provided a strategic opening for ongoing struggles over labor and the products of labor, for all sides. Coffee growers and others routinely tried to use the marines-guardia for labor control, as discussed below. On the rebel side, consider the following excerpts from Sandinista General Pedro Altamirano’s standard note to native property holders demanding “contributions” to “the cause”: 

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It has been decreed that on this date you will give the sum of $200 as a forced contribution...to help the forces of the Defending Army of Nicaraguan National Sovereignty... If you do not help the cause which we defend, which is the obligation of all honorable Nicaraguans to do for the good of the country, you will be obliged to abandon your property as you will be declared an enemy of the Army, and in this case, you and your family will lose all guarantees and will be subjected to whatever punishment from us that you merit as a traitor to your country. If you do not want to be attacked by our forces, you will pay the required sum, this in order that you may live in peace on your properties. *All orders that this Headquarters issues which are not complied with, obligate me to have them complied with by blood and fire in order that the Army will not be a laughingstock. Think carefully and well because if you do not feel inclined to help us, only God will keep your family from falling into my hands and your properties from being left in ashes. Acknowledge. **

Lacking the nationalist rationale, this was pure brigandage, an ancient practice of the poor against the propertied. It is noteworthy, for instance, that the word property is invoked here three times—once, where marked [*], in a voice that seems marked by inter contempt. It is also significant that the rebels demanded not only money but respect (“not be a laughingstock”). Rooted in popular idioms of honor and masculinity, the demand suggests a larger milieu of disrespect, of powerful men publicly ridiculing and thereby feminizing less powerful men. One senses here a new political vocabulary being grafted onto long-standing practices of rural criminality, of subaltern rejection of a “law” and a “morality” that were seen to serve only the interests of the dominant. The records of the marines and guardia fairly overflow with rebel “crimes” against property and person. This was, without doubt, as much a movement of social protest centered on labor, the products of labor, and profoundly unequal class-ethnic power relations as it was a nationalist rebellion. Early on, one marine analyst captured the “official” line on the rebels, later reproduced by Somoto: “Sandino keeps his ‘cause’ before the people of the countryside by operating small bandit groups under their respective jefes who personally gain by extracting small contributions. This policy, I believe, has encouraged the organization of small independent bands of thieves who are not connected with him but who assume his name in order to relieve themselves of responsibility for their acts of vandalism.” ** Such a portrayal is highly problematic. It erases crucial contexts, such as deep inequalities and marina-guardia violence; it denies any shared aspirations among the rebels (“jefes who personally gain”) and the moral legitimacy of their cause; it separates too starkly nationalist ideology from class plunder, when in fact plundering the rich was often seen as entirely compatible with “offering one’s life in defense of the nation’s honor” and expelling the “Yankee cowards and criminals.” ** Yet pacts of this portrayal are also in keeping with the interpretation being advanced here. Sandino’s struggle did in fact “encourage the organization of [many] small independent bands” (though most were “connected with him” in some fashion), whose members frequently plundered the wealthy, and who employed Sandino’s nationalist language to legitimize their actions. A similar dynamic obtained for family feuds, personal conflicts, and other struggles. In these and many other ways, Sandino’s “patriot-traitor” dichotomy was appropriated by significant segments of the Segovian laboring poor and creatively linked to a host of much older battles—class, ethnic, family, political, personal—reproduced and reconfigured under this new semantic framework. Subaltern collective actions that the dominant culture and official state denounced as “murder and pillage” ** were legitimated through an elastic language of popular nationalism, grafted onto much older popular discourses of honor, masculinity, and resistance to unjust authority—a creative synthesis forged from the rich tapestry of Segovian political culture, Sandino’s leadership and vision, and the exigencies of a vastly unequal guerrilla war against the murderous gangs of a foreign invader.

Sandinismo thus emerged as one response to the marine invasion of the Segovias—one response among many. In untangling the various responses to the invasion and rebellion, one finds, in Michael Mann’s apt phrase, a kind of “patterned mess.” While the evidence itself is partial and often contradictory, broad patterns do emerge. In general terms, it is clear that the rebels enjoyed enormous popular sympathy, and that a large percentage of the region’s laboring poor actively aided the cause. It is also clear that the rebels had many enemies, and that a large percentage of these were not among the elite. While most Segovianos sympathized with the rebellion, a substantial proportion opposed it, as we will see. The dynamics of rebellion and war also created a host of more ambiguous spaces; more than just two polarized sides, the documents reveal many people who seem to be playing both sides of the fence, assisting each whenever necessary and opposing neither whenever possible.

If we step back to consider the full spectrum of social classes in western Nicaragua, however, it is evident that Sandino’s base of support was considerably narrower than that cobbled together by the marines and guardia. In other words, the marines-guardia counted among
their allies and supporters a significant fraction of all social classes and ethnic groups, from all parts of Nicaragua, while Sandino’s rebels did not. This runs contrary to the thesis proposed by the Nicaraguan social scientist Oscar-René Vargas in 1985 and reiterated in his recent book: “Between 1930 and 1932, the petty bourgeoisie, pushed by the general deterioration of the country, began to aid the peasant rebels. This meant that the politico-moral influence of the bourgeoisie was broken: that Moncada’s government did not represent more than a sector of the bourgeoisie; and that large private property and imperialism had lost ground, because their vassals, the small and medium peasants, looked for their salvation on the side of the propertyless.” The evidence compels a contrary conclusion, and a more supple set of categories by which to analyze Segovian (and Nicaraguan) social relations.

Who actively supported Sandino? First, few outside the Segovias and its eastern hinterlands. As Knut Walter correctly observes, “In purely military and political terms, Sandino was a regional phenomenon ... a regional caudillo.” While there were sporadic rebel incursions into the sparsely populated Atlantic Coast region and the more densely settled departments of Chontales, León, and Chinandega, most can be best characterized by Gilbert Joseph's phrase “revolution from without,” and on the whole the rebellion remained regionally confined to the Segovias. If we consider all of Nicaragua and employ the most generous estimates, we might venture that active support for the rebels was limited to around 10 percent of the population. Importantly (and neglected), over nearly six years of war the rebels failed to generate any organic links with the popular classes of the Pacific littoral—perhaps their movement’s most crippling long-term structural weakness. Throughout the war, most of the major newspapers of León, Managua, and Granada routinely denounced Sandino as a “bandit,” his cause perhaps noble but his means deplorable. And while significant segments of the urban artisanal and working classes generally sympathized with Sandino, there emerged no effective linkages through which such sympathies could be translated into organization and action. This regional confinement of the rebellion resulted from a combination of factors: the social origins of Sandino’s Liberal army in the Segovias during the civil war, the emergence of the rebels’ core leadership from that original army, different agrarian histories and patron-client densities in regions adjacent to the Segovias, the geographic distance and deep cultural chasm that separated Pacific urban areas from the Segovian countryside, and a greater capacity for state repression and propagandizing in the cities and their hinterlands.

The Sandino Rebellion Revisited

Turning then to the Segovias, and beginning at the top of the social hierarchy, it is plain that the literate and propertyed, with very few exceptions, despised Sandino—mainly the result of the rebels’ social and cultural “otherness” combined with their incessant demands for “forced contributions.” Not uncommonly, elite perceptions of the Defending Army were laced with spleen and racism. “This is not an organized army or anything, all they are is a bunch of barefooted indians who are too lazy to work,” thundered one landowner. “It would be an easy matter to hunt them up and exterminate them, if only they were shot when captured.” More commonly, property holders’ opposition to the rebels was expressed in less strident terms. One coffee planter expressed the predominant view of his class when he observed that “after living in Nicaragua for sixteen years ... I am in a position to say that the U.S. Marines in Nicaragua have done good to this country, mainly in maintaining peace and order, except in certain areas where the bands of General Sandino are still at large.”

This general antipathy toward the rebel cause extended to what Vargas calls the region’s “petty bourgeoisie.” Here Vargas is pointing to perhaps the region’s most politically important group: that diverse, heterogeneous social class, composed of individuals, families, and family networks, occupying the expanding interstices of a historically castelike class-ethnic structure, in possession of significant cultural or material capital in comparison to the laboring poor. Professionals, merchants and traders, middling coffee growers and cattle ranchers, as well as telegraph operators, artisans, mule-team drivers, and others owning some capital other than land comprised perhaps 10 to 15 percent of the total populace, and more in towns and select subregions. The evidence is compelling that the great majority tended strongly, over time, to reject the rebels’ authority and gravitate toward acceptance of the authority structure being erected by the marines and guardia. The reasons behind this tendency are not difficult to discern: for those not among the capital-less laboring poor, to ally unequivocally with the rebels was to commit the equivalent of class suicide.

Most middling farmers and ranchers fall into this category, men like Moisés González de Darifi, whose political trajectory, like that of his sons, helps reveal the tensions inherent in alliances between rebels and property holders. An old man in his seventies and a relatively prosperous first-generation coffee farmer and cattle rancher, González was a Liberal long before the civil war. At war’s end he allied with Sandino, providing a strategically located base on his ranch at the crossroads of the San Rafael-Jinotepe and Ocotul-Telpaneca regions. His sons Reinaldo and Moisés, and four of his nephews, joined the Defending Army. Soon after,
the marines and guardia began settling into the area. In February 1928, González’s nephew Luis Espinoza was killed in the famous Battle of El Brumadero.64 By April, doubtless in response to the shifting balance of forces, González decided to cut his losses and accept, at least nominally, the authority of the marines. A garrison was established on his ranch, staffed by armed civilian volunteers. His sons applied for and received amnesty. By 1931, after numerous rebel attacks on his ranch-turned-garrison and the rebels’ murder of one of his nephews, González and his sons were reportedly on Sandino’s death list for “treason.” All the while, González continued openly to express a profound distaste for the occupation.65 For farmers like González, whose families comprised around 5 to 10 percent of the region, this political trajectory—from Liberal to Sandinista to reluctant marine-guardia ally—was less common than the more direct route, which bypassed the rebel phase altogether. Over the course of the rebellion, more than a dozen middling farmers and ranchers in the neighborhood of Dariel were attacked or killed for similarly “traitorous” behavior.66 There were, in short, very few rebels among small-to-middling farmers, coffee growers, and cattle ranchers.

The same was true for merchants and professionals (lawyers, doctors, teachers, and others), less than 1 percent of the region’s inhabitants but a powerful and influential group.67 Perhaps some did assist the rebels voluntarily, but as a rule those who did lend assistance did so under duress or, less commonly, in the pursuit of profits.68 Four or five of the biggest merchants with outlets across the Honduran border, for instance, reaped enormous sums battering plundered Segovian property—horses, mules, coffee, clothes, record players, and other loot—for guns, ammunition, medicines, and other badly needed supplies.69 But on the whole the merchant and professional classes deplored the rebels and their constant crimes against property, and the rebels deplored the merchants and professionals back. Even small local merchants with family connections to major rebel leaders, like Clemente Rodríguez de La Concordia, the brother-in-law of Sandino’s wife Blanca Arazu, worked to keep at arm’s length from the rebellion, in his case with mixed success.70 To my knowledge, no merchants and only a small handful of Segovian professionals became Sandinistas, that is, embraced the rebellion’s motivating ideology. The same was true of town artisans (carpenters, mechanics, shoemakers, blacksmiths, clerks, tailors, small traders, and others), perhaps 1 to 2 percent of the region’s inhabitants.71

Similarly, only a small proportion of the permanent laborers on middle-to-large estates allied with the rebels (such laborers probably comprised less than 1 percent of the region’s inhabitants). The marine-guardia archives contain many instances of permanent estate laborers threatened or killed by the rebels and assisting the forces of occupation, and comparatively few instances of their active support. The same is true of estate administrators (mandadores).72

Nor does it appear that most Indians in the surviving comunidades indígenas supported the rebellion. Of the country’s largest comunidades—in the Pacific coastal region and extending across the highlands of Matagalpa, Chontales, and Boaco—none, the evidence indicates, offered the rebels significant or organized support. Things become more complicated in southwestern Jinotega, northwestern Matagalpa, and the western Segovias. Support for the rebels appears to have been strongest in the subregions that had experienced the progressive disintegration of comunidades over the preceding fifty or so years—especially in the zones just east of Yalí and Jinotega, and in the western Segovias near Somoto, Palacaguina, Totogalpa, and Yalagüina. The Jinotega comunidad, for example, had many Sandinista supporters, as did the San Lucas comunidad (south of Somoto); the Mosonc comunidad, on the other hand, did not. While all comunidades worked to exploit the political-military conjuncture to press demands during this period, in the great majority of cases those efforts did not include organized support for Sandino’s rebels.73

In addition, over the course of the war the rebel movement gained very little of what can be described as local-regional literary-intellectual support.74 In fact, the movement enjoyed much more literary-intellectual support outside the Segovias.75 Only a very small percentage of the populace could read or write.76 With one or two brief exceptions, there were no local newspapers.77 Of the one or two thousand people who could be described as culturally literate, none (as far as I can tell) used their skills to promote the rebellion. As in most times and places throughout history, literacy in the Segovias was a tool of the dominant. The Sandinistas struggled to seize that tool, establishing schools in jungle camps, for instance, though till the end of the war most local jefes and the vast majority of their followers could neither read nor write.78

Three examples help to illustrate some larger patterns. Nicanor Espinosa, a leading Liberal lawyer in Tiplineca, published a scathing denunciation of Sandino in 1927 in the Managua newspapers (addressed to “my Segoviano friends and the companions of Sandino”). Two years later he was seized by the rebels and killed; he was last seen alive on the road to Yalagüina as their “prisoner without shoes or trousers.”79 Cipriano Rizo, secretary to the jefe politico in Jinotega, was arrested and interrogated by
the marines in early January 1930, suspected of stealing a mule: "[He has]
a fair education, has been a strong admirer of Sandino, is strongly anti-
American." Three weeks later, Rizo's coffee farm east of Jinotega was
sacked and burned by rebel forces under Sandinista General Pedro Altamirano. Daniel Olivas of Matagalpa, a shoemaker and publisher of a
small newspaper, openly expressed spirited opposition to the intervention
while remaining functionally disconnected from the rebel movement. With the exception of national and transnational literary circuits outside
the place and time that the rebellion was fought, this was not a movement
of literate intellectuals.

In sum, then, Sandino's base of popular support never moved much be-
yond the unlettered and unpropertied of the Segovias. Within this hetero-
genous group—again, from 80 to 90 percent of the region's inhabitants,
consisting mainly of smallholding peasants, squatters, tenants, sharecroppers, seasonal estate laborers, and dispossessed Indians—popular support for the rebels was extremely deep and widespread, but far from universal.

On the flip side of this coin, active allies of the marines and guardia ran
the gamut from barefoot peasants and Indians to wealthy landowners, and
excluded members of no social class. In fact, a significant proportion of
the marines' staunchest allies were poor and illiterate, as were most of
the guardia themselves. "The enlisted men of the Guardia Nacional are
practically all from the lower, uneducated classes," one memorandum ex-
plained. Literacy requirements for enlistees were routinely waived. As Colonel Denig's diary described it, "We have a lot of Guardia [recruits]
here, Indians all. Their shoes hurt. They seem clumsy. Can't read." Enlistment was voluntary, and many who sought to enlist were turned
away. The twelve dollars a month earned by the average enlisted man
was far more than what could be earned in agricultural labor—more than
the thirty cents a day he could make picking coffee, for instance. In
his landmark study, Richard Millett goes a long way toward explaining why
so many lower-class Nicaraguans chose to serve in the guardia: "Regular
pay, improved equipment, and medical care combined to make conditions
for guardia enlisted men much better than the average Nicaraguan. Com-
pared to the majority of his countrymen, the lot of the average guardia
was not bad at all, and he knew it. After the first year, the forces never
lacked recruits." From May 1927 to December 1932, more than 5,200
men served in the guardia. At least half served in the Segovias, and
a substantial proportion of these were locals. Many were Indians; in
fact, Indian recruits were seen to possess some highly desirable quali-
ties, despite their recruiters' deep-seated racism. "[Of the men of the
Guardia . . . those of pure Indian blood are especially proficient in many
ways," wrote one intelligence analyst. "They often are expert in reading
signs on the trail and in this respect are of the highest value on patrol." In
addition to soldiers, the marines recruited as many as several thou-
sand civilian spies, scouts, informants, guides, volunteers, civicos, and
other allies, many from the lowest echelons of rural society. Large num-
bers of people from all walks of life decided to exploit the opportunities
opened up by the marines—people like Macario Martinez, Capitán de
Cañada of Guasaca in Jinotega, "captain of a friendly band of well disci-
plined conservative indians [who] has proved himself to Marine patrols";
like Arcadio Gómez, a local ex-guardia civilian guide who applied for re-
enlistment: "he knows every cowpath in this district and knows a large
number of bandits, the bandits have threatened his life"; and like hun-
dreds of nameable others. Indeed, without widespread civilian support, the marine occupation of the Segovias would scarcely have been possible. From the outset the marines and guardia were completely dependent on local individuals and communities for myriad aspects of their day-to-day operations. Most logistical problems—procuring food, horses, mules, billeting, and office
space—and virtually all of the services deemed necessary, from laun-
dresses and cooks to golf caddies and sexual partners, were generally
resolved by negotiating contracts or establishing relations with local resi-
dents. Not uncommonly, those providing such goods and services came
to see the marine-guardia presence as an interest to be protected. "The at-
titude of individuals varies greatly in accordance with their relations with
the marines," correctly observed one marine officer in late 1930. "Those in
a position to profit financially are glad of the Marines." Those at the
top of the social hierarchy doubtless benefited the most, but there was a market for whoever had something to sell. Spies were paid handsomely
for very dangerous work, for instance, as were guides, mule drivers, and
scouts. The author of another report put it this way: "It is my belief
that the people of this area, although they hate and despise us they realize
our presence means more wealth and greater personal safety and personal
liberties to them." The non sequitur here points not to widespread con-
fusion among the populace but to a conflation of social categories: the
people who hated and despised the marines were generally not the people
who felt themselves wealthier and safer and freer as a result of the marine
occupation.

Over time, the commanding officers of most garrisoned towns were able
to stitch together dense networks of spies and informers from every social class and walk of life. Initially unable to procure even the most basic "dope" on the enemy, by the last years of the occupation the marines and guardia were reaping the benefits of a painstakingly constructed intelligence apparatus that spanned the entire north. Captain J. Ogden Brauer, stationed in Palacagüina, for instance, received regular (and extremely detailed) reports from a small army of personal spies. His methods, like those of his fellows, vacillated continuously between carrot and stick. The stick was generally reserved for the countryside, the carrot for the town.

Still, cultivating friendships in the towns was an arduous task that could take some time, as Captains Frisbie, Shaw, and others learned in Jinotega in 1928. "The people of Jinotega all, or nearly all, profess to be anti-Sandinista, but I doubt it," Captain Frisbie reported in late May. "No one seems willing to talk at all." A few days later he lamented that "No matter how much one tries to keep it from being so, the securing of information from residents is a personal matter." So Frisbie and his fellow officers made it personal. Six weeks later he reported that "two months ago the people were almost sullen and rarely spoke. . . . Now they are openly friendly and, wonder of wonders, some of the officers were asked to an impromptu dance at the club the other night." He added modestly, "I attribute it all to Captain Shaw's considerate and polite treatment of all natives," though his own diplomacy and tact probably played a role.

As marine relations with the "better class" of townsmen warmed, their sources of information and effectiveness grew. Relations between marines and lower-class natives were both mediated through local patron-client networks and established directly. During his first week in Jinotega, for instance, two mozoz (laborers) stopped Captain Frisbie in the street to give him what he considered "true" information. A few months later the mozoz of a prominent Liberal politician and landowner were brought before him with some important "dope." The Sandino Rebellion Revisited

The responses of Segovianos to the marine invasion and occupation, in short, varied enormously. Very few were glad of it, a large majority hated it, large numbers fought against it, and most suffered because of it. As we know, from those sufferings and struggles was forged a new revolutionary political community, a rebel state that effectively controlled and exercised hegemony over large parts of the north, and a new narrative of Nicaraguan history. But everything that was new was also embedded in something old. Social identities and allegiances in the Segovias, as we have seen, tended strongly to be partial, contingent, crosscutting, multilayered, and to feed into Sandino's struggle at many levels. The war, in a sense, ironically worked to simplify things. As in Vietnam, Algeria, and many other places, as the process of war unfolded, divisions sharpened, sides polarized, and any middle ground grew increasingly precarious. Especially after Sandino's return from Mexico in mid-1930, all Segovianos felt increasing pressures, from both sides, to choose sides. Yet the evidence also shows that many people tried to hang on to whatever middle ground they could. A good liberal model here is of two sides squeezing the middle. But from the perspective of those being squeezed, there would seem to be at least three sides, each relentlessly pressing its own demands: (1) the rebels, (2) the marines-guardia, and (3) survival—of oneself and one's family. And in this triangular calculus, the first two sides might easily conflate, merging into a single foe—as they do in Jerónimo Aguilar Cortés's novel, for instance, and in many other texts. For nearly six years, two states, essentially, battled for the allegiance of the civil populace. That populace, in turn—elite and subaltern alike—had a long history of successfully resisting the efforts of states to bring them into the orbit of their authority. Given that history, and the way events seem to have unfolded on the ground during the war, the evidence suggests that a very substantial proportion of Segovianos, following the dictates of survival and their own lights, usually tried to maintain a certain critical distance from both sides.

Relations between marines and guardia were similarly shot through with contradictions and ambiguities. "Due to differences in temperament, edu-
cation, training, and language, close fraternization does not exist." One marine colonel admitted, though "in general" relations seemed to be "friendly." One glowing assessment described "a splendid spirit of friendship... most cordial and mutually beneficial." This was the commonest portrayal, and one most usefully read as bureaucratese for "we're working on it." There is abundant evidence that great social and cultural distances separated marines from native guardia. Patrol commanders, for instance, carefully avoided having too many natives and too few marines out in the bush together. "When a Guardia combat patrol exceeds sixteen men, more than one officer is quite essential," insisted one commander with extensive field experience. "This is a situation of particular pertinency in view of the state of discipline and training of the guardia and the general mediocrity, to say the least, of the non-commissioned personnel. On a long patrol where one is out of communication for days it becomes a rather serious matter." Another commander put it more colorfully: "Taking the field alone with fifteen or twenty natives in bandit-infested country is a sporting proposition to be undertaken only by men not afraid of a sporting chance." Marines had to be gingerly in "handling" enlisted men; too overbearing an attitude or too strict a disciplinary regimen could lead to disaster, as ten guardia mutinies attested. "They handled us like dogs," lamented one Somotillo mutineer, "with blows and kicks, punishment and fines," referring here to both marines and native guardia. By Marine Corps standards, desertion rates from the guardia were "heavy"—12.4 percent by one count—a fact attributed to "the comparatively unstable character of the Nicaraguan, the strenuous duty... [and] the lack of understanding as to the seriousness of the offense." This "seriousness" was intimately linked to one of the principal goals of the marine mission: the inculcation of a sense of "professionalism" and "duty" among the guardia, a sense of allegiance to the "imagined community" of the military, the national government, and the nation. Creating this sense of collective identity, particularly among enlisted men, remained an uphill battle. Most loyalties seem to have been directed toward the jefe and one's fellow soldiers, not to an abstraction called "duty" or "the guardia." "There is not yet MORALE in the Guardia as we understand that term," observed one senior officer in late 1929. "Some men are proud to be in the Guardia but the majority seem to have formed no ideas on the subject." Three months later, another senior officer lamented that "their [the guardia's] loyalty appears almost wholly based on personal loyalty to their officers. Development of loyalty to their government as the duty of a soldier, above everything else, is not apparent in any perceivable degree yet." Several years after the marine withdrawal, another officer mixed mechanical and religious metaphors to make the same point: "The individual guardia proved an active re-agent to the chemistry of leadership... The 'Jefe' became the demigod of his men." In order to counteract this tendency, a policy was soon developed to move enlisted men from post to post. It was hoped that such a practice would inhibit the development of exclusively personal loyalties and promote a more generalized sense of organizational loyalty. Successes were mixed, but on the whole, personal loyalties seem to have continued to outweigh other forms of allegiance.

At the same time, systematic efforts to inculcate a sense of collective identity among the guardia did achieve some partial successes. Traditions were invented, symbols constructed, rituals created—most in explicit opposition to the rebels they were trying to eradicate. Profound Sandinista hatred of the machos and perros (mules and dogs, i.e., marines and guardia) was evidently matched by an equally profound guardia hatred of the bandoleros (bandits). This emergent sense of identity took many forms. It was expressed in the many spontaneous shouts of "Viva la guardia!" that punctuated the whizzing of bullets during battles. Dozens of instances resemble one patrol commander's observation that, "in the course of the fire fight some of the Guardia started a charge and shouted 'Viva la Guardia Nacional!'" He added: "That was a surprise to me." Memorial walls were built to fallen comrades; special grave markers were erected; citations, commendations, and insignia proliferated. One marine detected among enlisted guardia a "delight in all forms of insignia." After mid-1930, a "Guardia Newsletter" was published and circulated among the troops.

There also emerged, in some places and times, considerable common ground between marines and guardia. Billeting, marching, and fighting together, sometimes getting wounded and killed together—it should not be surprising that a sense of common identity and shared sacrifice sometimes took root. Overall, however, the exchanges and borrowings that took place between the two militaries were more organizational and institutional than personal or individual.

In the process of suppressing a peasant rebellion, the guardia and marines combined two very different (yet in some respects hauntingly similar) ways of organizing and practicing violence. In the field, the resulting synthesis can be described as a kind of hybrid Segovian gang. The marines brought into the mix many of their own more "traditional" forms of violence making. Many marines hailed from the U.S. South, where lynchings, family feuds, and other forms of public ritual collective violence satu-
rated the political culture. These were combined with a host of more "modern" military technologies and sensibilities: field tactics, weapons and equipment, uniforms, surveillance techniques, and a sense of "discipline" and "duty." From the Segovian side came a host of traditionally Segovian practices: "guarantees," public ritual gang violence, local caudillos. The combination of all of these ways of inflicting physical injury created a new order of organized violence, the likes of which the Segovian countryside had never seen.

One of the most horrific examples is Hanneken and Escamillo's infamous voluntarios, whose campaigns around Yali in Jinotega department in the spring of 1929 remain legendary in the region. Captain Herman H. Hanneken had learned "hush warfare" in Haiti; the Mexican Juan J. Escamillo had been a Liberal general in the civil war. Their combined efforts cut a swath of destruction and death in the region unprecedented in its magnitude. More "modern" contributions included the rounding up and "reconcentrating" of many hundreds of civilians, accompanied by reams of detailed information on the social networks of the "bandits." More "traditional" aspects included methods of extracting information, summary executions in the bush (complete with transcripts of kangaroo trials), burnings, tortures, beatings, rapes, and murders. In the years to follow, the same region suffered through Puller and Lee's even more infamous "Company M." "Chesty" Puller of World War II fame earned the nom de guerre "the Tiger of the Mountains" among the people he helped to terrorize, while stories still circulate about Lieutenant Lee throwing babies up into the air, spearing them with a bayonet, and eating their hearts.

Such columns resembled Segovian gangs in many ways. The group's cohesion derived from personal loyalty to charismatic individual officers, loyalties most likely created and nurtured, in large part, through shared discourses of masculinity and gender. Company M's effectiveness in the field derived from the combination of modern technologies of warfare and a host of more ancient practices designed to propagate a generalized sense of fear among the populace. Numbers alone would suggest that most of the violence was produced by natives, a conclusion not contradicted by the documentary evidence. Native guardia commonly took the initiative in firefights with rebels, and after mid-1930, green marines commonly deferred to more seasoned native guardia officers.

This interpretation, of course, flies in the face of an important element of the heroic narrative, expressed by Gustavo Alemán Bolaños in 1935: "The Yankee Marines taught cruelty to the Nicaraguan soldier, violating his noble nature. They gave him lessons so he would kill human beings without mercy, so he would break the sacred law of fraternity, killing compatriots. They taught the Guardia to behave like mercenaries in their own land." Compelling myth can make fallacious history. As we have seen, Segovianos required no "lessons" in "cruelty" from North Americans. What members of the guardia needed, both to advance their own individual interests and to suppress the rebellion, was to be integrated into organizational-bureaucratic structures linked fiscally to the state, and access to more modern technologies of warfare. The Nicaraguan government offered the former, the North Americans the latter.

Mapping Mountains, Mapping Bodies: State formation in the Segovias

War making and state making have much in common. Charles Tilly, in his masterful survey of the past thousand years of European history, concludes that "war wove the European network of national states, and preparation for war created the internal structures of the states within it." Much of what I have been describing was in fact part and parcel of a larger process of state formation: the fluid, contingent, and (in retrospect) inexorable process by which the central state extended its reach into social spaces that had hitherto eluded its grasp.

On the other hand, war making and state making are not the same thing. The formation of states is a complicated business, as much an ideological and cultural process as a military, political, or economic one. At one level, state formation is a function of the extension of national and transnational capitalist market networks and the growth of the state's bases of finance and taxation. At the level of culture and ideology, state formation is expressed in the state's active construction of a shared sense of its own moral legitimacy, through ritual, ceremony, iconography, educational systems, and the like. At a related and fundamental level, state formation is defined by the successful monopolization of the legitimate use of violence, the state's garnering unto itself all substantial means of organized coercion. And since states are complicated, heterogeneous, not entirely coherent actors and sites of contestation, state formation is not uncommonly an uneven, asymmetrical process.

Such was the case in Nicaragua and the Segovias. Over the course of the rebellion, market and production relations saw no radical changes; the state's tax base, bureaucracy, and administration all remained rooted to more ancient, patrimonial forms. At the same time, the military arm
of the state became vastly more professionalized and "modern" over the
course of the war, its capacity to regulate, survey, control, and dominate
the populace witnessing quantum leaps forward at virtually every level.
This can be seen in two principal spheres: in the guardia's growing coercive
powers, and in its growing surveillance powers. The growth of both
aspects of state power represents one of the most significant changes of
the entire period.143 I have already discussed the former at some length.
Let us turn to the latter.

Social theorists as diverse as Anthony Giddens and Michel Foucault
have explored some of the ways in which modern states work to control
their citizenry through technologies of surveillance and regulation. They
have observed how the state works to extend its gaze into every aspect
of the citizen's daily life, through what Giddens calls "the accumulation of 'coded information'...[and] the direct supervision of the activities of
some individuals by others in positions of authority over them."144 Perhaps
the most vivid illustration of the state's efforts to better survey and
regulate the populace in the Segovias during this period is Colonel De-
nig's failed recombination program of May and June 1930. In his orders
for the proposed recombination, Denig expressed the paradox that lay at
the heart of the U.S. mission in the Segovias from beginning to end: the
marine-guardia's inability to distinguish between the "honest citizens"
they were trying to protect and the "bandits" they were trying to destroy.
For Colonel Denig, the only logical solution was to more effectively sur-
vey, regulate, and control everyone. "There are potential bandit forces
widely scattered, and over which no surveillance can be exercised," he
explained. His solution was to empty the countrysides into the towns, since
"once having presented themselves in these towns, the natives may be
kept under surveillance."145 In addition, each recombined person was
to receive a card, or boleta. The program was soon abandoned as imprac-
tical and counterproductive, but Denig insisted that "people should be
warned to preserve their cards as evidence that they complied with the
proclamation."146

There were in fact several failed recombination programs and many
types of boletas and efforts to issue boletas (referred to variously as
cards, boletas, Plata boletas [those issued by voluntary General Alejando
Plata in the spring of 1929 around Yalí], boletas de ocupación, cer-
tificates, passes, passports, good conduct papers, good citizenship papers,
and papers). After around mid-1930, possession of such papers was evi-
dently mandatory for all inhabitants of the region, even though no cen-
tralized authority was charged with issuing them. Instead, boletas seem
to have been issued locally, with each department, municipality, or mili-
tary district issuing its own style, rather like "guarantees" issued by the
local offices of the state, and yet another indication of the partial and un-
even nature of the state's extension into the region. Related surveillance
and control techniques appeared around the same time, combining both
civil and military jurisdictions. By 1931, superintending the coffee harvest
on fincas near Yalí evidently required permission from both military and
civilian authorities.147 One marine commander of Tepanapa, surrounded
by a sea of smallholding peasants, even tried to arrogate to the marines the
right to grant permission to plant and harvest crops. He was unsuccess-
ful.148 Around the same time, houses and their inhabitants were routinely
searched and registered in military sweeps.149 This was all a very uneven
and messy process, but the general direction of things is clear: the gaze of
the state was steadily working its way into the social fabric of the region.

One sees the centralization of the state's surveillance capabilities in the
evolution of the form and content of the documents themselves, especially
that vital species known as the intelligence report. In 1927 and early 1928,
the guardia's intelligence apparatus was rudimentary, decentralized, non-
standardized; Jiménez had little idea of what Ocotal was doing. Reports
appeared in different forms and formats and at uneven intervals; jurisdic-
tions overlapped; efforts were duplicated. If we fast forward to 1932, we
now find a single standardized intelligence report, the GN-2, issued on the
first of the month and covering a one-month interval—detailed, lengthy
(some nearly fifty pages), brimming with useful information. By 1932 the
documents have a different, more standardized feel; even the typefaces
nearly all look the same.

One especially sees the extension of the gaze of the state in the marine-
guardia's endless exercises in mapping. Early in the war, maps of the
Segovias were virtually useless. Marines on patrol frequently had little
idea of where they were or where they had been. By late 1932, the labors
of hundreds of patrol commanders and the Mapping Section had com-
bined to produce an astonishingly detailed understanding of the physical
(not to mention the social) landscape. The 1934 U.S. Army Map that even-
tually emerged out of the occupation (and on which my own inescapable
exercises in mapping were based) remains an impressively sophisticated
and accurate text.150 The head of B-2's Intelligence Section summed up the
critical importance of mapmaking: "The compilation and gradual build-
ing up of a good map should be its [the section's] primary and lasting
work."151 So it was.

Conterminous with the mapping of the physical landscape was the map-
movement that would never have existed without an invasion. In a relatively brief time the war against that liberation movement was effectively Nicaraguanized, by means of a new military organization that was both U.S.-imposed and indigenously Nicaraguan. After January 1933, the war once more pitted only Nicaraguans against Nicaraguans, with U.S. troops no longer directly involved, only now with a far stronger, more militarized, and more centralized state. That state soon consolidated its rule, and the result was the next forty-three years of Somocismo.

Conclusion

In recent years, scholars and writers in diverse fields and disciplines have worked to transcend the bipolar paradigm of U.S.-Latin American relations that have long dominated popular and scholarly approaches to the subject. This heterogeneous body of scholarship has sought, among other things, to explore the range of networks, exchanges, borrowings, behaviors, discourses, and meanings through which the internal and external became intermeshed and "through which foreign people, ideas, commodities, and institutions have been received, contested, and appropriated in [modern] Latin America." 148

This essay has aimed to contribute to this growing body of literature by sketching out an alternative to the metanarratives that have dominated thinking on Sandino's rebellion and the marine intervention in Nicaragua. It has focused on the contradictions, ambiguities, and ironies of the processes by which Segovianos and marines interacted, showing that there was much more to this process than heavy-handed U.S. imperial domination and heroic patriotic resistance (or benign U.S. tutelage and lower-class brigandage). It has tried to attend to the nitty-gritty of large historical processes by tracing connections—between the small and the large, the old and the new, the local and regional, and the national and transnational; the worlds of discourse, culture, and meaning; and the worlds of materiality, practice, and violence.

Such tracings reveal that the closer one gets to ground-level, the more the living and working and struggling in the particular place and time, the more complicated, ambiguous, and contingent things become. Yet not all is an ambiguous mess; as processes unfold, patterns emerge. This essay has worked to highlight those patterns, to shed new light on how a series of old struggles in the Segovianos combined with the marine intervention, and with what consequences, intended and not. On the one hand, the dynamics of
the period gave rise to a new popular-nationalist social imaginary and discourse of national sovereignty, popular liberation, and inalienable human rights among historically subordinate groups. On the other hand, those same dynamics also worked to accelerate the successful monopolization of the means of organized violence by the military arm of the central state.

This essay has offered new perspectives on the formation and distinguishing characteristics of Sandino's rebellion and his paradigm of national liberation. It has argued that Sandino's nationalist ideology and practice were at once profoundly emancipatory and profoundly self-destructive. For the subordinate majority, Sandinismo's emancipatory potential lay in its vision of a more just society and a means—armed struggle—to achieve it. Yet that vision and means also carried costs. For Nicaragua as a whole, Sandinismo's self-destructive potential lay in its redivision of the "nation" and "race" it sought to remake: the conflation of "invaders" (foreigners) and "traitors" (natives) served to embed enduring civil conflict into the very core of the rebellion's ideology. Deep class, power, and ethnic inequalities and the exigencies of guerrilla war combined with this patriot-traitor dichotomy to make Sandino's rebellion as much an indigenous civil war and class-ethnic struggle as a patriotic struggle to expel the foreign invader. The moral clarity of the Sandinista vision was rooted in the stark realities of foreign invasion and marine violence. Depthless hatred of the "Yankee invaders" provided a kind of glue that bound together diverse groups and individuals in common purpose. Sandino used that hatred as a means by which to propagate a vocabulary of national sovereignty and social justice among the Segovian laboring poor. Once that foreign aggressor withdrew its troops, however, there was nothing palpable left to hate except the central state and its army. The struggle to expel the invaders provided a strategic opening for subordinate groups to continue old battles under a newly emergent language and structure of authority, while the war against the Sandinistas provided a strategic opening for other individuals and groups, dominant and subordinate alike, to do much the same thing. This paper has worked to more fully understand the interplay of these contradictory effects of U.S. intervention, as part of the same process of social transformation.

In combination with other recent scholarship, the findings presented here also challenge conventional Sandinista understandings of the origins and character of the Somocista state. The Guardia Nacional was not only a U.S. imposition, the blunt instrument of imperialist domination. (At the same time, I would insist that the guardia was very much an imperialist imposition.) From very early on, the guardia was an integral part of Segovian (and Nicaraguan) society, deeply embedded in the social fabric of the region (and country)—its families, communities, towns, farms, ranches, haciendas, indigenous communities, and patronage networks. Sandinismo and the guardia emerged together, out of the same process of struggle.

The story told here necessarily suffers many omissions and silences. Its regional focus has meant that national and international political-economic developments have been pushed largely into the background. A more complete story would link the processes examined here to national and transnational levels, particularly the process of state formation. This essay does not pretend to offer much more than a skeletal regional survey of Nicaraguan state formation during this period. Nor does it argue that Sandino unintentionally caused the consolidation of the central state. That state surely would have consolidated with or without Sandino, though not in the same way or by the same timeline. By the end of the 1926–1927 Civil War, the United States and a critical mass of Nicaragua's political elite were determined to put an end to the country's terminable civil wars by creating the conditions under which a strong central state could and would take shape. The formation of the guardia and the upward displacement of organized violence were going to take place with or without a peasant rebellion in the Segovias. Rather, this essay has tried to show how imperative it was to make a state played out at a regional level, and how Sandino's rebellion propelled the process forward, both regionally and (to a lesser extent) nationally.

The essay has emphasized the role of organized violence in shaping the trajectory of social change in Nicaragua and the Segovias during this period, and has argued that changes and continuities in the organization of violence were key to the historical dynamics of the period. This is not because of some a priori theoretical concern with violence; it is what a protracted (and sometimes rancorous) conversation with the evidence has convinced me was so. Related factors not examined here also shaped the trajectory of Nicaraguan history during this period. The foregoing has not tried, in any sustained way, to connect the centralization of the means of coercion to capitalist transformation, a longer-term process that was also key to the formation of the Nicaraguan state. Nor has it tried to relate the Segovias or Nicaragua to isthmus-wide developments in the 1920s and 1930s, which saw the consolidation of quasi-fascist, bureaucratic-authoritarian states like Somoza's across the isthmus. It has neglected to address as well a series of macrosociological questions about the origins and shifting aims of U.S. imperialism in Nicaragua and elsewhere. These omissions were deliberate: a single essay can't do everything, and
the story is complicated enough as it is. The next step will be to bring the evidence and arguments presented here into dialogue with existing literatures on U.S. imperialism, transitions to capitalism, and state formation at rational and isthmus-wide levels.

Finally, the story told here challenges, at least implicitly, some of the underlying assumptions of the dominant theoretical paradigms in the human sciences. Liberalism's "traditional-modern" bipolarity and implicit teleology not only impede understanding of historical processes, but efface the central political project and contradiction of liberalism (and neoliberalism) in practice: the ideological legitimation of social consensus under conditions of profound class and power inequality. Marxist, neo-Marxist, and related approaches, while contributing to a host of crucial conceptual categories—irony, process, agency, struggle, and material relations in production and exchange—also strongly tend to invert and reconfigure liberalism's bipolarities (bourgeois-proletariat, feudalism-capitalism, imperialism-anti-imperialism, center-periphery), thus reproducing liberalism's teleology and disabling dichotomies. Approaches that can be considered "cultural" or "postcolonial" in one sense or another contribute to a deepened understanding of culture, language, representation, contingency, the pervasiveness and heterogeneity of power, and the social construction of meaning, but tend to reify discourse and thereby efface the manifold connections between the discursive realm and the realities of class power, state power, violence, and the ironies of historical process in on-the-ground struggles. The poststructuralist, postmodern penchant for "decentering the autonomous subject" and "subverting master narratives," part of a salutary project in many ways, needs to confront the reality that people often do find their centers through the agency of such narratives. Any genuinely emancipatory project needs a compelling story to mobilize people into believing that they are capable of creating a more just society. People need to envision a better future in order to create one; perhaps the point is that the narrative and vision need to be the right ones.

The foregoing attempt to muddy up the metanarratives of the period is not, as noted early on, the only one of its kind. There have long been some voices, at the margins, that have worked against the grain of the dominant stories. Juan Cortés, the protagonist in Jerónimo Aguilar Cortés's marvelously textured novel Memorias de los yanquis a Sandino (1972), for instance, joins the guardia to get back at the marines, who in their arrogance and "barbarism" had thrown him in jail for daring to demand his "rights." He is assigned to active duty in the Segovias and, unmolested from his family, friends, and the restraining effects of the city, undergoes a kind of despiritualization, a "transformation from a good man into a criminal guardia," becoming both a witness and active producer of violence, devastation, and death. The realization eventually dawns that guardia and rebels have much in common; the horrors and sufferings that both visit on the humble mountain people serve to conflate the two. "There were times, in truth," confesses Private Cortés, "that I didn't know how to distinguish between us and them." After several bloody encounters with the "bandits," he is wounded, separated from his column, and captured. The "bandits" turn out to be just that—cold-blooded killers and criminals whose nationalist rhetoric is merely a smokescreen for robbery, murder, and mayhem. He eventually escapes, and the novel ends without a clear resolution, only a denunciation of the violence on all sides and a call for reconciliation.162 Aguilar Cortés thus combines elements of both master narratives in some unexpected and ironic ways, whatever one thinks of his portrayal of the ideals motivating the rebels (my own view is that most of it is grossly inaccurate).

Abelardo Cuadra's memoirs, Hombre del Caribe (1977), combine elements of these narratives in a different way. Cuadra was a guardia Second Lieutenant serving in the Segovias during the rebellion.163 Unlike Aguilar Cortés, Cuadra acknowledges the validity of Sandinista patriotism, while also recognizing the morality of the marines and the patriotism of the man who served in the guardia. The guardia's ideals, Cuadra maintains, were corrupted by its jefe director, Anastasio Somoza, leading to Cuadra's involvement in a plot to kill Somoza, and his subsequent imprisonment and exile.

These are but two of the handful of literary interventions that challenge and subvert the dominant narratives of the period.164 It is a subversion that might well continue; marginalized voices need to be brought into dialogue with each other and with those at the center. For it is only in the process of displacing old centers that new ones can be created.

Notes

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the Office of Research and the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Michigan—Flint.


3 “Winter,” the rainy season, generally runs from May to November, according to the many Segovianos I spoke with during my fieldwork in the region in September and October 1990. “The Segovias,” here and in the literature generally, signifies the region of north-central Nicaragua indicated on the accompanying map, embracing all of the departments of Nueva Segovia (divided into Nueva Segovia and Madriz after 1936) and Estelí, the northeastern corner of Chinandega (from Villanueva north) and northern tip of León, southeastern Jinotega, and northwest Matagalpa. Here I extend conventional definitions to include the southwestern part of Honduras stretching from Cifuentes in the northeast to El Triunfo in the southwest and stretching into Honduras for twenty or so miles. The boundaries of this region are necessarily imprecise, and more usefully conceived as geographic, social, and political frontiers, as explored more fully below. Cf. Magnus Mörner, Region and State in Latin America’s Past (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).


10. This has long been recognized. Most of the abundant published literature on the period is structured around this irony, from Emigdio Marboto’s Sandino ante el colono (Mexico City: Editorial Vera Cruz, 1923) to Gregorio Selser’s landmark Sandino, general de hombres libres, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: T. I. Ríosdón, 1958), to Oscar-René Vargas’s La intervención norteamericana y sus conseqüencias, Nicaragua 1910–1925 (Managua: DILESA) and his Floricío el filo de la espada: El movimiento de Sandino, 1926–1939 (Managua: Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Nacional (CEREN), 1995).


12. In addition to published sources, this study depends particularly on two bodies of evidence: more than fifty feet of files produced and collected by the marines and the guards from 1927 to 1932 (a remarkably rich collection that includes thousands of patrol, combat, and intelligence reports, captured Sandinista correspondence, prisoner statements, and a wealth of other material), and a series of more than seventy oral interviews with former soldiers in Sandino’s army, conducted from 1980 to 1984 by the Instituto de Estudio del Sandinismo (currently the Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua, Managua, hereafter cited as the IES testimonies). The testimonies were produced as part of an IES project to recover historical memories of Sandino’s struggle and promote the ideals and ideology of the 1979 Sandinista Revolution.

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hered to) did represent an abrupt departure from past practices; see Schroeder,
"To Defend Our Nation's Honor." 248.

19. The phrase "exterminating bandits" appears in Recommendation for restric-
tion for certain areas of Nueva Segovia, R. L. Denig, 10 May 1930, NA177/202/17/94.


21. A strong current in the literature tends to limit analyses of Sandino's Sandin-
istm to the Supreme Chief's writings, utterances, intellectual formation, and belief systems; most recently, see Alejandro Bendaña, La mística de Sandino (Managua: Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 1994); see also Donald Hodges, Intellectual Foundations, esp. chaps. 1-3, and his Sandino's Communism: Spiritual Politics for the Twenty-first Century (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992); David Nolan, The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution (Coral Gables, Fla.: Institute of Inter-American Studies, University of Miami, 1984); and Hugo Cancino Troncoso, Las raíces históricas e ideológicas del movimiento sandista: Anecedentes de la revolución popular nicaragüense, 1927-70 (Ondense: Odense University Press, 1984). Peter Worsley's admonition seems useful here: "If we focus our eyes exclusively or even primarily upon the leader element in the leader-follower relationship, our attention is distracted from what is socio-
logically [and historically] more important, to wit, the relationship between the


23. Or, in Gramscian terms, the moment of consent was subordinate to the mo-
oment of coercion; Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed.
and trans. Quintina Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International
Publishers, 1971). In Tillyan terms, the Segovias comprised a "coercion-intensive region" as opposed to a "capital-intensive" or "capitalized coerc[ive]" one, see
Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990 (London:

24. The phrase "localization of sovereignties" is from Pedro Francisco de la
-treatment of the "fragmentation of sovereignties" in Europe over a thousand-year
period, see Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States. For Nicaragua and Central
America see Dana Munro, The Five Republics of Central America (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1981); Humberto Belli, "Un ensayo de interpretación sobre las luchas políticas nicaragüenses (de la Independencia hasta la Revolución Cubana)," Revista del pensamiento centroamericano 32 (Oct.-Dec. 1977); Alberto Lameza, Juan Luis Vásquez, Amaru Banchuna, and Amalii Chamosor, Economía y sociedad en la construcción del estado en Nicaragua (San José: ICAP, 1983). On


28. Given the centrality of patron-client relations in structuring social relations of all kinds in Nicaraguan history, the paucity of research on this topic is unfortunate. My strong suspicion is that the principal reason why Sandino's organized social base remained limited to the Segovias lay in the absence of weakness of patron-client relations in the region, and the relative strength of such relations throughout the rest of western Nicaragua. See the provocative essay by Robert H. Holdren, "Constructing the Limits of State Violence in Central America: Towards a New Research Agenda," Journal of Latin American Studies 28, no. 2 (May 1996): 435-59.

29. See Gould, "El café," and "¿Vana ilusión?"; Centro de Investigación y Estudios de la Reforma Agraria (CIERA-MIDINRA), Nicaragua, por esos defensores la frontera (Managua: CIERA-MIDINRA, 1984); and the tes testimonios.

30. On the civil wars of the nineteenth century, see Chamorro Zelaya, "Fruto Chamborro"; Burns, Patriarch and Folk; and José Dolores Gómez, Historia de Nicaragua, and Historia moderna de Nicaragua (Managua: Banco de América, 1975); on struggles from below, see Wheelock Román, Raíces indígenas.

31. For a compelling look at one renowned popular caudillo during the 1926-1927 Civil War, see Miguel Jarquín Valdefllos, La muerte de Caballito (El Viejo, Nicaragua: Colección documentos históricos de El Viejo, 1984); see also Schroeder, "To Defend Our Nation's Honor," chaps. 4-5.


33. Testimony of Pastor Ramírez Mejía, tes cassette no. 094-1-3, pp. 1-3 (hereafter tes cassette number: [page number]). Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from the Spanish are mine. The specifics of Captain Ramírez's account are corroborated by much other evidence, including La Noticia (Managua), 17 Oct. 1926, which reported that 180 Liberal rebels under Ciriaco Aguilar and Carlos Salgado were active in the region south of Somoto. Captain Ramírez's name, and his brother Rubén, also appear sporadically in marine-guardia reports, e.g., B-2 Report, 25 Feb. 1929, NA127/209/1. See also Conrad, Sandino, 136.


35. Declaration of José Rafael Torres, Apr. 1928, NA127/195/13/Torres, José; cf. NA127/195/5/Hernández, Anastasio.

36. NA127/195/5/Hernández, Anastasio; his brother Inés was a well-known rebel jefe, e.g., Report, Denig. 7 July 1930, NA127/209/2.

37. R-2 Report, 16 Sept. 1929, 4, NA127/209/1; and GM-2 Reports, 1 Mar. 1932, 4; 1 Nov. 1931, 13; and 1 Dec. 2031, 14, all in NA127/34A/29. One vivid metaphor for the fluidity, contingency, and multiplicity of Segovian political identities during Sandino's rebellion comes from a marine arrest report (recall that the red and black flag symbolized Sandino's cause): "The [arrested] man wore a wide black hat band. There was found a red ribbon tied with a bow and with a safety pin, which when fitted over the hat gave a red and black band. The ribbon was so tied that it fitted perfectly over the hat and could be slipped on at a moment's notice" (Report of arrest and escape of Gregorio Espinosa [Rivera], Major Rockey, 5 Apr. 1928, NA127/220/5).

38. Some episodes in the latter wave of violence, wrongly blamed on the Sandinistas, are chronicled in Somoto, El verdadero Sandino, 61-77; see below.

39. Including those of José Flores Gradys (tes 095), Calixto Tercero González (tes 095, 097), Camilo Guzmán (in Claribel Alegra and D.J. Flakoll, Nicaragua: La revolución sandinista [Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1982], 57-59), Luciano Gutiérrez Herrera (tes 102), and Angel Martínez Zoza, who recalled, "The days of Conservative control were wretched; if a man was a Liberal, they hanged him; if he had a woman, they raped her; and so everyone was inflamed against the Conservative rule" (tes 060: 1).

40. See Michael J. Schroeder, "Horse Thieves to Rebels to Dogs: Political


44. See the personal diary of Lt. T. J. Kilcourse, USMC, item 2A47-PC169, Personal Papers Collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C. (hereafter MCCP-PPC), which in its moral condemnation of the intervention forebodes much of what would appear forty years later in Vietnam.


48. Quotes from the testimonies of Martín Blandón Rodríguez (1ES 033: 10), Macario Calderón Salinas (1ES 044-2-2: 3), and Cosme Castro Andino (1ES 049: 5), respectively. For accounts of marine atrocities by Nicaraguans who served in the guardia, see Abaelardo Cuadra, Hombre del Caribe; Manolo Cuadra, Contra Sandino en la montaña; and Aguilar Cortés, Memorias de los yanquis a Sandino.

49. Prior to May 1929, “the Segovias” are taken here to include military districts defined as “Department of Nueva Segovia” and “Department of Estelí”; after the guardia reorganization of May 1929, the Segovias are taken to include the Northern Area (Nueva Segovia and Estelí) and the Central Area (Jinotega and Matagalpa). See Smith et al., “A Review of the Organization and Operations of the Guardia,” 7–16. The figure of 1,300 is taken from Macaulay, The Sandino Affair, 151–53; the figures for the two areas are calculated from the average distribution between the two as they appear in the sources given in note 50.

50. Numbers are taken from the following sources: Distribution of Guardia Troops in the Northern Area for the week of 28 Sept. 1930, NA127/198/1; Estimate of the Situation, A. Racicot, 28 Feb. 1930, NA127/205/2/162; Estimate of the Situation in Nicaragua, F. L. Bradman, 11 Nov. 1930, NA127/201/1; Informe consolidado mostrando la distribución de toda tropa de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, 30 Sept. 1931, NA127/43A/30; Reorganization of the Northern Area, T. P. Cheatham, 10 Jan. 1932, NA127/202/1/1.3; Designation of Districts and District Combat Patrols, T. P. Cheatham, 30 May 1932, NA127/202/1/1.3.

51. Calculated from a statistical analysis of 350 patrol and combat reports; see Schroeder, “To Defend Our Nation’s Honor,” chap. 8.

52. 1ES 101-2-2-4.

53. See, for example, Macaulay, The Sandino Affair; and United States Department of State, The United States and Nicaragua.

54. There is abundant evidence for both; see Schroeder, “To Defend Our Nation’s Honor,” chap. 5.


58. As for instance when Ascensión Vargas of Jinotega marched into the marine garrison at Corinto Finca and accused Pedro Ramos of being a Sandinista scout; the marine lieutenant who investigated determined that “the complaint is true, and I believe, to a ‘lovers’ quarrel.” Patrol, T. J. Kilcourse, 12 May 1928, NA127/43A/20. (This is the same Lt. Kilcourse whose personal diary denounced the intervention; see note 44.)

59. For instance, the scheme played out by Conservatives of Somoto on the night of the 1928 presidential elections, where a band of Conservatives shot off guns and shouted “¡Viva Sandino!” a mile from town as they attacked and mortally injured a political foe (Arrest and detention of Salvador Solano and Alfonso Tercero, Stockes, 6 Nov. 1928, NA127/220/2).

60. Paulino Castellon to Pres. Moncada, 8 Apr. 1928, NA127/220/5.

61. Among the most powerful literary representations of the moral energies of Sandinismo in the Segovian countryside are Ramón de Balsausteguiotio, Con

62. See the documents in Besdása, La mística de Sandino, 177–255; see also Schroeder, "To Defend Our Nation’s Honor," 243–54; and Vargas, Floreció al filo de la espada, chap. 7. While Vargas’s “dual power” thesis is, as argued above, basically right, the author goes to rather absurd lengths in trying to quantify the level of popular support enjoyed by the rebels’ parallel state, at one point asserting that “The ‘counter-government’ had political influence over 85 percent of the region’s population” (271).


64. Forced contributions were a common feature of Nicaraguan civil wars since independence; see Chamorro Zelaya, “Puto Chamorro,” 3, 4, 0. On forced contributions during the 1910–1912 civil war, see, e.g., M. Pergrina Mallado to U.S. Consul, 28 Jan. 1910, USBS 171.00/6369.777. For an often tragicomic fictional rendition of the phenomenon, see Adolfo Calero-Cortez, Sangre santa (1946; reprint, Managua: Nueva Nicaragua, 1993).


67. Quoted from “Manifiesto,” 1 July 1937 (Conrad, Sandino, 74).

68. Major and minor rebel chieftains routinely arrogated this right unto themselves; one example of many is General Pedro Altamirano, discussed in note 70.


70. Reprinted in Smith et al., “A Review of the Organization and Operations of the Guardia,” 250; English only. Some originals from Altamirano can be found in MHC-PRC, I. C. Smith, box 7. Many similar letters (many in the original) can be found in the marine-guardia archives, e.g., Fulgence Hernández to Sr. Elena Murguía, 11 Jan. 1931, NA127/109/5; and in Somoza, El verdadero Sandino. A 1931 letter from Sandinista jefe Marcial Rivera to Sandino suggests Altamirano’s original language in referring to being made a laughingstock: “Yo me ful... a quemar la hacienda de los Nogueras para que sepan cómo es que se burlan de mis énteros” (Somoza, El verdadero Sandino, 285).

71. Intelligence Report for the week ending 17 Sept. 1927, G. Hays, NA127/ 190/1.

72. Conrad, Sandino, 100, 82.

73. Recommendation for restriction for certain areas of Nueva Segovia, Denig, 10 May 1930, NA127/202/17/94.

74. Mann, The Sources of Social Power, 2:4. The conclusions advanced in this section are based on my reading of archival and published sources; for a more detailed treatment see Schroeder, “To Defend Our Nation’s Honor.”


79. My best estimate for the population of all zones that saw significantly significant rebel activity is slightly under 100,000; this excludes large parts of Matagalpa and part of Jinotega. The marines figured 73,000 for the Segovias as a whole (General Data, Northern Area, J. A. Rossell, 1 Dec. 1929, NA127/205/2/1623). The 1930 population of Nicaragua stood at 726,000, according to sources cited in Vargas, Floreció al filo de la espada, 297. By these figures, the Segovias contained 13.2 percent of the country’s population. If 90 percent of these could be classed as “laboring poor,” and 90 percent of these actively supported Sandino, then 10.7 percent of Nicaragua’s population was in active support.

80. For example, on microfilm in the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.: El Centroamericano (León), July 1928–1934; La Prensa (Managua), Dec. 1933–1934; and El Diario Nicaragüense (Mar. 1927–June 1932). Newspaper deemed overly critical of the intervention or guards were censored or shut down, e.g., La Tribuna (Managua), 16, 1929.

81. Evidence relating to the Sandinista attack on Chichigalpa in November 1931, for example, reveals considerable popular support for the rebels (GN-2 Reports, 1 Dec. 1931 and 1 Jan. 1932, NA127/43A/29).


83. Guillermo Hupet to USMC, 13 Apr. 1928, NA127/43A/14, for Hupet’s fate a
decade later, see Tomás Borges, *La paciente impaciencia* (Managua: Vanguardia, 1989), 72.


86. These included Filiberto Centeno of Las Rubias, Adrián Reyec of El Tigre, Moisés Pérez of Apayaga, Hipólito Olivas of Las Delicias, Francisco Canseco and Eusebio Fajardo of Guayacal, Ambrosio Calero of Las Cuclillas, Timoteo Pérez of La Naranja near Sanhue, and Doroteo González de Ocootlino near El Tigre; patrol, combat, and intelligence reports, NA217/above.

87. According to the 1920 census, the department of Nueva Segovia boasted 88 merchants (comerciantes) and 10 teachers (maestros) out of a total population of 42,865 (there were no categories for doctors or lawyers); the provisions for Esteli, Jinotega, and Matagalpa were comparable. Oficina Central del Censo, *Censo General de la República de Nicaragua de 1920* (Managua, 1930).

88. The marine assessment of Pastor Lobo of Ocootl was typical: "It is believed that he has aided the bandits in the past, it has been done to protect his property from destruction by bandit groups" (T. P. Chambers, Area Commander, 25 May 1932, NA217/202/1/3).

89. Since such illegal trade was of pressing concern to the marine-guardia, their archives fairly overflow with references to it. See Intelligence Reports, NA217/209/12; O-2 Reports (1930-1932), NA217/43A.

90. Late in 1928, rebels sent him a note asking for "twenty pair of shoes" among other items, adding that "we believe you are in favor of our cause." Four months later, in the course of a marine investigation, Rodríguez declared his friendship for the marines. A month later rebels robbed his store of $50 in cash and $50 in liquor; the marines suspected "an element of retaliation." More than two years later he was reportedly serving as a kind of courier for the rebels. And a year later the rebels reportedly robbed one of his shipments (Pedro Antonio Arazu, "Francisco Estrada" [IEs MS], 2; General Pedro Blandón to Clemente Rodríguez, 28 Dec. 1928, NA217/205/1; declaration of Clemente Rodríguez, 8 Apr. 1929, NA217/43A/24; B-2 Report, 31 May 1929, 3; NA217/209/1; B-2 Report, 4 June 1929, 6, NA217/43A/4; Bandit Activities, E. Matamoros, 31 Aug. 1931, NA217/209/4; and O-2 Report, 1 Oct. 1932, 5, NA217/43A/29).

91. For the department of Nueva Segovia, the 1920 census lists 159 carpenters (carpinteros), 100 shoemakers (zapateros), 90 students (estudiantes), 66 ti-

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lers (sastres), 44 bricklayers (albañiles), 19 clerks (empleados), three mechanics (mechanicos), and a smattering of other artisans, out of a total population of 42,865; again, the numbers in the other northern departments were comparable (Censo General, 128, 156, 242, 269). 92. Investigating such matters was one of the principal tasks of the marines-guardia, and most signs indicate that they did it pretty well.

93. On changes within the comunidades in the Matagalpa-Jinotega highlands and their changing relations to the state in the decades before Sandino, see Gould, "El café" and "Una Ilusión." A mapping of all known armed conflicts between Sandinista rebels and the marines-guardia (n=735), and a careful reading of relevant patrol, combat, and intelligence reports, permit one to identify with some precision the social and geographic frontiers of Sandino’s rebellion. The definition of the Segovias as a region (advanced in note 3) is based, in part, on such an analysis, which reveals that in the zone of intensive coffee cultivation just north of Matagalpa and west of Jinotega, popular support for the rebels was very strong; that in the zone south and east of Matagalpa, extending south into Chontales and east into the very sparsely populated Atlantic rain forest zone, the rebels enjoyed very little organized popular support; and that only a handful of military encounters between rebels and the marines-guardia took place in regions where comunidades were most concentrated. See Schroeder, "To Defend Our Nation’s Honor," chap. 8; some of the conclusions advanced in that paragraph are also based on personal communications with Jeffrey Gould.

94. The question of intellectuals in Sandino’s rebellion is clearly a dicey one. Here I draw away from Steven Feierman’s more expanded definition of "peasant intellectuals": peasants “who engage in socially recognized organizational, directive, educative, or expressive activities . . . all people [who] have the social function of intellectuals [as defined above].” See his *Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 17-38. By this definition, Sandino’s rebels obviously counted many intellectuals among their ranks. At the same time, such an expansive definition tends to obscure the connections between intellectual labor and literacy, and in this case, literacy, I would argue, was essential for "propagating the faith" among all but those within earshot of peasant-rebel intellectuals. Since the present section is more concerned with exploring the social frontiers of Sandino’s base of support, Feierman’s otherwise provocative and useful definition is not employed here.

95. Dozens of internationally renowned writers and intellectuals expressed support for Sandino; see the edited collections of the Instituto de Estudio del Sandinismo, *El Sandinismo: Documentos básicos* (Managua: Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 1984), and *Pensamiento antimeriditario en Nicaragua*.

96. According to the 1920 census, literacy rates in the four northern departments (Estelí, Jinotega, Matagalpa, and Nueva Segovia), defined as "seben leer y escribir," stood at 13.2 percent (27,710 out of a total population of 205,740). The census offers no definition of "seben leer y escribir." but the category prob-
ably includes everyone who could write their own name. Functional literacy rates were probably less than one-tenth of the figure given. Calculated from the *Censo General*, 125, 156, 242, 209.

97. Daniel Olivas's *El Demócrata* was a brief exception; see n. 101.

98. Testimonies of Macario Calderón Salinas (1ES 044-2-2: 9), Joaquín Fajardo Aranx (1ES 100-1-2: 3), Francisco Lara López (1ES 059: 15), and Francisco Zapata Galeano (1ES 076-1-2: 12); see also José Rondón, *Maldito pata* (Managua: Editorial Unión, 1938), 140.

99. His indictment is reprinted in Somocua, *El verdadero Sandino*, 65; the account of his capture and murder are in R-2 Report, 31 Oct. 1929, 3; and B-1 Report, 11 Nov. 1920, 5, NA127/209/1; also mentioned in a letter from Luis Fiallos to Pres. Moncada, 25 Nov. 1929, NA127/198/1.


101. Olivas's *El Demócrata* was the only newspaper published in the northern departments (four hundred copies weekly); evidently only a few issues were published. He was described as follows: "I am owner of a shoe shop and cobbler by trade. Formerly a very poor man, but has made good in his business and now owns considerable property. He is a Liberal and is Anti-American and unfriendly to the Guardia" (Information on periodicals, newspapers, etc., D. A. Stafford, 4 Apr. 1930, NA127/43A/3). A thorough search has revealed no evidence linking Olivas to the rebels.

102. Memorandum, 3 Dec. 1929 [no author identified], NA127/43A/30.

103. "The requirement of reading and writing [for enlistees] has had to be waived due to the small number of the population who have this amount of education." Memorandum, 3 Dec. 1929.

104. Denig, "Diary," 19 Nov. 1920; recall that Tom Sawyer's shoes hurt because he usually ran around barefoot.

105. There were many "applicants for enlistment" who were only enlisted after proving themselves in the field as volunteer guides and scouts; e.g., Patrol Report, O'Leary, 5 July 1930, NA127/202/10; and Combat Report, Broderick, 13 Jan. 1931, NA127/202/11.


108. Each guardia was identified by a number; by the end of 1932 these had exceeded 5,200 (Francisco Paniagua, #5224, Patrol Report, Stevens, 9 Oct. 1932, NA127/202/14).

109. Enlistment papers are evidently no longer extant, but the evidence clearly indicates that many guardia who served in the Segovias were local; dozens of patrol and combat reports contain brief references to Segovian-recruited guardia, e.g.: patrol reports of Hakala, 30 Aug. 1929, NA127/202/10/5; and Rimes, 17 July 1929, NA127/212/1. For recruitment policies, see Memorandum [no author identified], 3 Dec. 1929.

110. Estimate of the Situation, A. Racicot, 28 Feb. 1930, NA127/205/2/16-D.


112. Denig, "Diary," from early 1928 Ocalo boasted a rudimentary golf course. The extant marine-guardia archives I have examined contain no direct references to relations between Segovian prostitutes and marines, though many sensitive documents were removed or destroyed a year prior to the marine withdrawal (Jefe Director Sheard, Secret Files, 1 Feb. 1932, NA127/43A/30).


114. "The practice of doling out small sums of money for reliable information should be encouraged. . . . From $25 to $100.00 might be justifiable. One good contact is worth a lot of time and money" (Intelligence Memorandum to all Officers, 9 Oct. 1928, NA127/209/2). See also Memorandum, H. Schmidt, 12 Nov. 1928, NA127/43A/4.

115. General Data, Northern Area, Rossell, 1 Dec. 1929.

116. In June 1931, Brauer reported that "bandit suspect" Ramón Centeno "refused to give any information . . . or divulge the whereabouts of any of his companions. His wife was found and here he was induced to talk." Soon after, Centeno "was shot attempting to escape." Six weeks later, Brauer supervised the surrender of Sandinista jefe Castilano and Marcon Olivas: "We did not harry them with questions, as they were very timorous but instead attempted to inculcate in their minds that we were their friends, that we were sent here to help them in every possible way" (I. Molina R. to Brauer, July-Aug. 1931; Special Report, 26 June 1931; Presentation of Castilano Olivas, bandit chief, 13 Aug. 1931; The body of M. A. Ortig, 20 Aug. 1931; and Intelligence, same date; all from NA127/202/1/3 and 209/8).

117. Frisbie to Schmidt, 22 and 31 May: 1, 13, and 20 July; and 8 and 11 Aug. 1928, NA127/220/11.


119. On 11 Apr. 1928, La Noctiluc reported that "Major Parker . . . showed us a large file of petitions from all parts of the Republic requesting the presence of the Guardia Nacional," a claim supported by much archival evidence: e.g., a letter from "workers and natives" of Mozonte to Jefe Director G.N., 27 Dec. 1930, NA127/201/1/3; letters from citizens of Jinotega and La Conchita, 14 and 15 May 1939, NA127/202/3; a letter from "citizens and agriculturalists" of Jalapa, 15 Nov. 1928, NA127/43A/15/6: 5; and Matagalpa coffee growers resolution and response, Apr. 1930, NA127/198/misc. 1930.

120. Matagalpa coffee growers resolution and responses, Mar.-Apr. 1930.

121. From a vast and growing literature, two older studies remain useful here: Frances FitzGerald, *Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Viet-
nam (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972); and Peter Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indo-China to Algeria: The Analysis of a Political and Military Doctrine (New York: Center for International Studies, Princeton University, 1964).

123. Jerónimo Aguilar Cortés, Memorias de los yanquis a Sandino. The level of detail and the unpredictable, spontaneous quality of marine-guardia patrol and combat reports make them fascinating windows into Segovian society and the process of war; the conclusions advanced here are based, in significant measure, on a critical reading (and rereading) of these and related documents. Sponsorship has yet to be secured for an effort to publish the choicest excerpts from these reports in a single medium-sized volume.

124. General Data, Northern Area, Rossell, 1 Dec. 1929.
125. Estimate of the Situation, Bradman, 11 Nov. 1930.
130. Memorandum [no author identified], 3 Dec. 1929.
131. General Data, Northern Area, Rossell, 1 Dec. 1929.
135. Report of Contani, Carlson, 10 July 1930, NA717/202/10. During another firefight, "Raso Daniel Figuero displayed courage, coolness, and initiative ... when orders were given to advance he rushed forward shouting 'Viva La Guardia!'" (Contact with Bandits, Graves, 20 Aug. 1930, NA717/202/10).
137. Copies can be found in USDS microform no. 1273, rolls 21–23.
140. More than ten testimonies contain stories of Lieutenant Lee's brutality; see Schroeder, "To Defend Our Nation's Honor," 428–34.
141. I owe this latter insight to Eileen Findlay's incisive commentary on an earlier draft of this essay.

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141. For example, Contact Report, Maynard, 9 Aug. 1930, NA717/202/10. In his recent book, Oscar-René Vargas claims that "in the military sphere, the characteristics of the Guardia Nacional were passivity, timidity, and waiting. Their movements were slow and conservative. . . the troops lacked combative spirit, they were campesinos incorporated by forced drafts who saw no objective in their fight and were subject to a brutal discipline by 'drunken, dirty, illiterate officers'" (Floreció al filo de la espada, 403). I would submit that all of these assertions, stemming from a larger political commitment to propagating the Sandinista faith and demonizing the guardia, are entirely wrong.

142. Gustavo Alemán Bolaños, Sandino, el libertador, biografía del héroe americano (1951; Managua: Nueva Nicaragua, 1980), 191 where the author notes that this passage was excerpted from a series of newspaper articles published in La Nueva Prensa in 1935.

143. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, 76. Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Zelaya's survey of state-making in 1840s and 1850s Nicaragua illustrates the contingent ebb and flows of this process; "Fruto Chamorro."

144. Oscar-René Vargas, Floreció al filo de la espada, makes much too much of the impact of the Great Depression on the Segovians and in fueling rebellion; while the depression did serve to dampen market-oriented economic activities across the region, it is also clear, as we have seen, that the Segovians were only partially integrated into the structures of global capitalism during this period. In fact, the basic features of market and production relations in the region were scarcely altered as a result of the downturn. Most rural folk simply devoted less time to seasonal wage labor and more to subsistence—hardly a radical change.

145. See, e.g., Sergio Ramirez, introduction to Cuadra, Hombre del Caribe; and Salvatierra, Sandino o la tragedia de un pueblo, 76–79.


147. Restriction for certain areas of Nueva Segovia, 10 May 1930.
148. Telegram, Denig to Ife Director, all GN Northern Area, 9 June 1930, NA717/202/2.
149. For instance, Carlos Herrera in Patrol Report, Bales, 10 Jan. 1931, NA717/202/13.
150. Lt. Satterfield claimed that "[the] Alcalde of Telpancea . . . has not the authority to grant permission to cultivate nor harvest in this district, same is granted at this headquarters" (Report of Contact, Satterfield, 20 Feb. 1931, NA717/202/11).
151. An especially egregious example is Reporte de Parulla, Subteniente Balzar Navarrete, 7 May 1931, NA717/202/14.
152. Memorandum, H. Schmidt, 12 Nov. 1928, NA717/43A/4. The 1934 U.S. Army Map can be found in the Map Room of Hatcher Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
154. Estimate of the Situation, Bradman, 11 Nov. 1930. According to one report, from June 1930 to Dec. 1932, 172 cadets had reached the grade of second lieutenant; no figures are given for higher ranks (Vargas, Floreció al filo de la espada, 414 n. 79).


157. Pedro Antonio Arauz, “Luz y sombra” (185 n.s.); testimonies of Carlos Blandón Umanzor (185 035), Luciano Gutiérrez Herrera (185 102), Cosme Castro Andino (185 049), Joaquín Fajardo Arauz (185 100), Juan Bautista Tercero García (185 093), Sixto Hernández Blandón (185 036), Secundino Hernández Blandón (185 047), and Ascensión Iglesias Rivero (185 065).

158. See Gilbert M. Joseph’s introduction to this volume.

159. Sandino repeatedly stressed the importance of hatred in binding his forces together, e.g.: “Because of the tremendous crimes of these human brutes [the marines], hatred exists, much hatred, the simple hatred of the patriots of Nicaragua.” Conrad. Sandino. 154–55. So did many of his followers, e.g.: “The organization (Defending Army) maintained itself because there is no glue stronger in life than that of hate … hatred of the Yankees” (Testimony of Alfonso Alexander 185 008: 11).

160. Major contributions to this critique include Walter, The Regime of Anastasio Somoza; Gould, To Lead as Equals; Hale, Resistance and Contradiction; and Paul Cox Clark JR., The United States and Somoza, 1933–1936: A Revisionist Look (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993).


162. Aguiles Cortés, Memorias de los yanquis a Sandino; quotes are from p. 60.

163. Cuadra’s unit was instrumental in repelling Sandinista advances into León and Chinandega in July and Nov. 1931 (Report of Contact, 2d Lt. Abelardo Cuadra, 1 Aug. 1931, NA127/202/11).

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