T  R  A  N  S  C  R  I  P  T  I  O  N

Quilali, Nicaragua,
25 May, 1928,

To: Area Commander, Ocotal.

Subject: Combat report.

     About 3:40 P.M. on 13 May, 1928, while traveling north by west on trail paralleling Bocaycito River and about 15 miles from its mouth we were ambushed, when the column had just cleared a house sitting on the crest of a well-wooded hill from which a native man and some women ran as the column passed by, a shot was fired from the right flank in the vicinity of the point, the point at this time being half way to the bottom of a deep ravine. Patrol deployed along the trail facing to the right, the six men of the point being closed in to the right to a position of some 30 yards above the military crest of the hill. Firing accompanied by a dynamite bomb began along the length of the column from the right side of trail which continued for about ten minutes, this fire being returned by the entire column. Visibility on both sides of trail was limited to about 20 feet and bandit firing line was not visible. Firing ceased for about five minutes, Captain Hunter with Corporal Williamson

[p. 2] came to rear of column, gave orders to burn above-mentioned house and make reconnaissance of territory near house and hill-top to rear. Bandit firing began again at head of column from trail about 150 yards ahead and hill 300 yards ahead, the point calling for reinforcements. The undersigned with three men went forward, reinforced their firing line across the trail and were soon joined by Captain Hunter and Corporal Williamson. At this time the bandits were seen leading away several of our mules below us on the trail. Captain Hunter and I with about six men ran forward and took cover, opening fire. During the forward rush Corporal Williamson was shot and killed instantly. Captain Hunter, upon calling for and finding no automatic weapon on the firing line, ran back, procured Corporal Williamson's Thompson sub-machine gun and was again coming forward when he received his wound and fell. Firing continued until 4:30 P.M. consisting chiefly of Thompson sub-machine gun and rifle fire. During this time bandit fire was returned along our column, a few hundred grenades being thrown by us. Private DuBois sustained

[p. 3] a bullet wound in his left shoulder. At 4:30 P.M. bandit fire ceased completely. The dead and wounded were evacuated to rear to above-mentioned hill, mules brought back and camp made for the night. A grave was dug and Corporal Williamson was buried at 11:25 P.M. It is believed that the place we occupied was surrounded, with ambushes in both directions, and the bandits' intentions could very probably have been to attack us on the 14th, our position being a poor one, there being no water nor field of fire. At daylight on the 14th, a reconnaissance was made of the ground which the bandits had occupied during the ambush, both on ridge to right of the trail and the trail to the front. On the ridge to the right a trail was found about 150 yards distance which paralleled our trail and which no doubt was useful to the bandits in forming their ambush. Due to Captain Hunter's serious condition and to lack of knowledge of country ahead of us, it was decided to evacuate wounded over same trail we had previously covered.

[p. 4]  Captain Hunter having been put on an improvised stretcher, we cleared camp at 8:00 A.M., 14 May. Just as we were clearing the hill a bandit appeared in the trail ahead of us and vanished in the brush, giving us proof that bandits were ahead. A man carrying a Thompson sub-machine gun and a rifle grenadier were put at the head of our column and it was decided to push on. About 8:15 A.M. a group of bandits was seen ahead and fired on by our leading man. Immediately firing began from a heavily-wooded hill on our right and from the hill, we had just cleared, firing consisting of rifle fire, a Thompson sub-machine gun and dynamite bombs, about nine of these being dropped; during the morning combat we made use of rifle grenades. The Guardia, being our rear guard, were rushed, the intention being evidently to obtain our pack animals. The Guardia gave way; the last to rise was Private Rosenberg, who was shot in the head by a dum-dum bullet and instantly killed. Two of the Guardia disappeared from the column and rejoined us after the firing was over and we had marched forward.

[p. 5] Cadet Blackburn tried in every way to prevent the retreat of the Guardia but, being unsuccessful, stood his ground and helped to repel the bandits' rush. Firing ceased about 9:00 A.M. and Private Rosenberg was hastily buried. No other casualties having been suffered, it was decided to go forward once more. The column had just been formed and gotten under way when bandits were seen to the rear and were fired on. Firing again began, this time the bandits' fire coming mostly from our right rear and a few shots from either flank. We again deployed and made use of rifle grenades in returning their fire. Reinforcements were called for and sent to the rear. This was evidently another effort on the part of the bandits to obtain our pack animals. During the firing they yelled unceasingly, "You whores and muleros, we'll cut all your throats before you get out of here, this is out country and we will run it ourselves". This yelling was done in Spanish. Firing ceased about 10:15 A.M., the last firing being done by Marines. Cadet Blackburn fired some well-placed rifle grenades into the hill in out rear, this probably being a big factor in their withdrawal,

[p. 6] the bandits leaving generally to the north. After finding that we had suffered no more casualties, we continued the march.

SUMMARY

It is believed that the bandits opened fire prematurely on the 13th, since had our column all entered the deep ravine ahead, they would have had a much greater advantage. It is also believed that we were fired on by the same force both days, the force attacking on the 14th being reinforced possibly by 25 men and estimated to be at least 75 in number and probably larger. This was possibly an outpost, the main body being along the Boycacito River or in the valley. All bandits seen were well-clothed, well-armed and there were no evidences of a lack of ammunition. Their dynamite bombs were of the concussion type, none of them containing missiles. As mentioned in the report, the attacks on the 14th were evidently to obtain our pack train in which they were totally unsuccessful.  Corporal Williamson and Private Rosenberg (Guardia), being killed, and Captain Hunter, being wounded by apparently

[p. 7] well-aimed shots, also bandit fire appeared in several to be well-aimed against localities where our fire was coming from. We had no way of knowing who the jefe of the bandit groups might have been. It is estimated that during the combats the bandits suffered casualties amounting to approximately fifteen killed and fifteen wounded, those numbers being based on observation and conclusions drawn from enemies' actions. It was noted that two bandits fell before Captain Hunter's fire and also others were seen to fall at different times during the combats. On the thirteenth a hand grenade silenced a part of enemy fire, this place later revealing spots of blood. On the fourteenth, rifle grenades fired by Cadet Blackburn silenced enemy fire and a bandit Thompson sub-machine gun was silenced when one of our own Thompson sub-machine guns fired in its direction. Marine casualties were one Marine killed (Corporal Williamson), one Guardia killed (Private Rosenberg), two Marines seriously wounded (Captain Hunter who later died of wounds, and Private Du Bois) and a few minor scratches due to dirt from dynamite bomb explosions.

[p. 8]  Marine losses: four mules, two complete sets of mule equipment, and one Guardia rifle and one cartridge belt. This rifle and belt were not taken by bandits but were lost due to carelessness on the part of one Guardia who failed to keep them in his possession when told to do so.

               Signed,

                 Earl S. Piper

                   2nd Lt. U.S.M.C.

RG127/113C/12

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Photographs of original hand-drawn maps accompanying Lt. Earl S. Piper's handwritten combat report, evidently dictated to a subordinate, housed in Record Group 127, Entry 113C, Box 12, in the United States National Archives in downtown Washington, D.C.

Sandino's Letter to Froylán Turcios, 15 May 1928, "El Combate de El Zapote" (published in Ariel, No. 12, Año 4, 1928)

Click on thumbnails below for full images, scans of Sergio Ramírez, ed.,  Augusto C. Sandino, El pensamiento vivo (Managua: Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 1984), Tomo 1, 265-267.  Or, read the images below the thumbnails.