1.  July 31, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.   "SANDINO SITUATION. ¶ Attack on POTECA River. ¶ On Wednesday, July 25th, five Corsair planes attacked the Sandino force on the Poteca River. Three planes were struck by rifle bullets, but no one was hurt and no damage done. That region is so wooded that the planes were unable to report on the effect of the attack. However, no messenger has come from Sandino since July 6th, so he is probably in serious state, even if not killed in the raid. ¶ El Ariel Suspended. ¶ Turcios did not issue El Ariel to-day and has no hope of being able to resume publication. He has made all sorts of protests, both personally and in the newspapers, but has received no sympathy and no sincere backing. ¶ Death of GALEANO. ¶ General Esteban Galeano, one of Sandino’s really capable leaders, was killed by one of his own men two weeks ago. He had a band of about forty men and operated mostly in the vicinity of YALI. ¶ Of Sandino’s well-known chiefs this leaves only Girón and Sanchez unaccounted for. ¶ Source: Marine Intelligence-Managua. ¶ Ortez Band. ¶ This is a group of about eighty bandits, who for a long time have been operating in Western Nueva Segovia. About two weeks ago they were located at SUYATAL, southwest of LAS MANOS. Gen. Mondragon moved against them and they scattered. They re-assembled last week and on the 21st were attacked by the Marine planes. The result I do not yet know. ¶ Report No.39. ¶ July 31, 1928 ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Major, G.S."

2.  August 13, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 1.   "SANDINO SITUATION. ¶ General. ¶ Only Sandino is left. His communications with this place are out for good, his armed force is wiped out and he should have great difficulty getting anywhere either through Honduras or Nicaragua. Attached is a letter from Captain Brown, showing that the co-operation on this side is not merely good-will but very effective and practical. ¶ Funds for Sandino. ¶ Since El Ariel, and incidentally Turcios, was put out of business, making communication with Sandino no longer possible, instructions have been received from Mexico that all funds collected for him will be forwarded to Dr. Carlos Leon or Dr. Pedro J. Zepeda in Mexico City, and will there be turned over to SOCRATES SANDINO who will deposit the money in a New York bank, ready for whatever use General Sandino may care to put it to. ¶ Source: D.R. Castillo--Sandino agent now in San Salvador. ¶ Messenger to Sandino. ¶ When the line of communications through here was destroyed and Sandino completely cut off some of his friends here found out that Turcios did not intend to tell him about it, even if he had a chance to do so, but was going to send him the same old false information with a view to encouraging him to stay in the field when nothing could possibly be gained by his doing so. ¶ These friends got together, raised a little money, and decided to make a desperate effort to get a man through to Sandino to tell him the real situation, particularly about Turcios. They selected a man named CONSTANTINO TENORIO and sent him to me to explain what they wanted and that the messenger would make every effort to get Sandino himself to quit and come in. Tenorio showed me some recent letters received by him from Sandino, quite different from the type that Sandino sent to Turcios for publication. I found that Tenorio . . . "

3.  August 13, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 2.   " . . . had a good reputation and I was favorably impressed besides, so I gave him considerable help and he left last Tuesday. He told me he knew how to reach the Madariaga brothers, but the trouble would be to get them to let him talk to Sandino. He said for over two months the Maradiagas had allowed absolutely no one near him and this was apparently confirmed by a letter from Sandino he showed me. I have considerable hopes that Tenorio may reach Sandino, but I very much doubt if he can make him believe how hopeless his situation actually is. ¶ Nicaraguan Commission in Honduras. ¶ A Nicaraguan commission, accompanied by Lt. Col. J.A. Rossell and five armed Marines reached Danlí on the 6th of August to furnish help for Nicaraguan refugees to return to their country. Permission was of course obtained from the Government of Honduras. ¶ Turcios. ¶ Turcios returned yesterday from La Ceiba and immediately held a three-hour conference with Toribio Tijerino. They were apparently planning something to force the government to let El Ariel resume publication. As a result of the talk they sent a cable to a Russian agitator in Havana to come here at once. I have not been able yet to get his name but will send it on later. ¶ Report No.41. ¶ August 13, 1928. ¶ Source: Personal knowledge. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Major, G.S."

4.  August 5, 1928.  Letter on Sandino’s reported evacuation of the Bocay District, from Byron C. Brown, Captain U.S. Army (Ret.) to Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 1.     "COPY. ¶ Puerto Castilla-Honduras ¶ August 5, 1928. ¶ Major Cruse, ¶ U.S. Military Attaché, ¶ Tegucigalpa--Honduras. ¶ Dear Major: ¶ Upon receipt of your message regarding Sandino’s reported evacuation of the Bocay District, I left Puerto Castilla accompanied by Austin Gabourel of Limoncito, Honduras, to make a personal investigation of the situation. ¶ Upon reaching the upper Patuca we crossed over into the Wanks-Awawas District, via the old Wanks-Patuca trail. I found that the Marine outpost, formerly under command of Lt. Carroll, had been removed from the island in the Wanks River to a point on the right bank eight hundred yards further downstream. This outpost is ineffective. As situated it leaves the Wanks-Patuca-(Guanquibila)-Trail open, across which questionable characters are continually passing. The personnel of the outpost is insufficient. The Corporal in charge of this outpost is not qualified to be in command and should be replaced. His personnel consisting of seven men, are all raw recruits. ¶ I strongly advise increasing the personnel of the outpost and placing it under the command of a competent non-commissioned officer or lieutenant. Its present location should be abandoned in favor of a point on the left bank of the Wanks River above the Guanquibila Trail, from which two Cossack posts should be established, one above the main outpost and another stationed at a strategic point on the Trail. All pitpans – (Suma Indian name for the big dugout canoes, F.C.) proceeding both up and down the Wanks River should be stopped and their crews recognized and the cargoes inspected for contraband. The Cossack post stationed on the Trail should halt all parties entering or leaving the zone. ¶ Furthermore I would recommend establishing an outpost at Guanquibila with a Cossack post at a point above the Guampu River to prevent suspicious characters from penetrating into the interior of . . . "

5.  August 5, 1928.  Letter on Sandino’s reported evacuation of the Bocay District, from Byron C. Brown, Captain U.S. Army (Ret.) to Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 2.    " . . . Honduras via the Guampu-Lagarto-Culmi Trail, which enters a district where there is considerable Liberal-(Red)-sympathy and activity. ¶ The upper trail from Nicaragua to the Patuca (Piedra Chata Trail)-is used by many recruits and over which there is no question but what arms and ammunition have been carried. In previous communications I have advised you regarding the suspicious activities of J. Amado Flores, who is operating a Mahogany Camp in this district, and who openly professes to be a Sandino sympathizer. It will be well to add that Flores’ associate, Frank Romero, who is at present in Trujillo, is not above suspicion in this connection. Such men, who are rendering assistance, should be kept under closer surveillance. ¶ Many Indians have reported to me that Sandino is in readiness to cross the border and will use the upper trail; that his men number between six and eight hundred. Consequently I also recommend establishing strong outposts at both ends of this trail. ¶ I have personally established guards at Guanquibila and at a point above the Guampu River, and will be advised by runners in case of any activity. Upon receipt of any information I will communicate the same to you by radio. ¶ I have received much valuable assistance from Mr. W.H. Scott, American Vice-Consul at Puerto Castilla, and from Mr. C.E. Rollins, Manager of the Trujillo Railroad Company, both of whom have shown active interest in the proceedings and are co-operating in all instances. ¶ Most respectfully yours, ¶ Byron C. Brown, ¶ Captain U.S.A. (Retired)"

6.  August 6, 1928.  “An Inexplicable Visit,” translation of article from La Tribuna of Tegucigalpa, p. 1.    "TRANSLATION ¶ AN INEXPLICABLE VISIT. ¶ (From “La Tribuna” of Tegucigalpa – Aug. 6, 1928) ¶ The “Revista Ariel” which is edited in this city, has received the following telegram: ¶ “Danlí, August 4, 1928 – Revista Ariel – Tegucigalpa – Just now, three in the afternoon, there arrived in this city six yankees armed as heavily as those who in 1924 were in the capital – Ibrahim Gamero Idiáquez.” ¶ It is very natural that the inhabitants of that town bordering on Nicaragua should be alarmed over the arrival of the American soldiers seeing that the whole world is watching the outrages committed upon our sister republic by these same soldiers. ¶ We don’t know what business the American soldiers can have in Honduras, nor any foreign soldier nor what right they have to enter the country, completely armed as the quoted telegram states. ¶ The act can by no means be permitted to pass unnoticed. Today there are six, to-morrow, if misfortune falls on the Republic, there may be such a force as we saw in the capital in 1924. ¶ This is no case of a visit of courtesy. When the Marines of one country land in the ports of a friendly country during the visits paid by warships, the established custom is that these marines land unarmed. Such an act alarms no one; on the contrary it is considered as an act of high international courtesy towards the country being visited. The same is to be said with regard to the visits of the military planes. But here is a different thing. These armed American marines have entered the city of Danlí, probably without the diplomatic representatives of ¶ the . . . "

7.  August 6, 1928.  “An Inexplicable Visit,” translation of article from La Tribuna of Tegucigalpa, p. 2.   " . . . the United States having given any notice to the Executive Power or asked its consent, a consent that could not be secured, because the Executive Power, according to the Constitution, cannot give it. ¶ By what right then, do armed American Marines enter our country? ¶ The Executive Power must explain this matter."

8.  August 10, 1928.  “Commission from Nicaragua in Danlí,” translation of article from La Gaceta of Tegucigalpa.   "TRANSLATION ¶ COMMISSION FROM NICARAGUA IN DANLI ¶ (From “La Gaceta” of Tegucigalpa – August 10, 1928) ¶ Various papers having published news of the sending of a Commission of Repatriation for Nicaraguans, to Danlí, there are reproduced below the official notes exchanged on the subject in order that public opinion may understand the true nature and object of the Commission refered to: ¶ Legation of the United States of America. ¶ No. 264 ¶ Tegucigalpa, July 28, 1928. ¶ Excellency: ¶ It has been reported that there are many destitute Nicaraguans near the frontier of Honduras, and I have been advised by the American Minister at Managua that the Nicaraguan Government wishes to send a Commission to Danlí with funds to arrange for their repatriation. It is proposed for a United States Marine Officer to accompany the mission and to supervise the distribution of the funds. I therefore have the honor to request of Your Excellency permission for Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Rossell, accompanied by five armed men, to enter Honduras on this mission. It is also requested that, if possible, the detail, headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Rossell, be met by a representative of Your Excellency’s Government at the border to Danlí and return. ¶ Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration. ¶ GEORGE T. SUMMERLIN. ¶ His Excellency ¶ Doctor Fausto Dávila, ¶ Minister for Foreign Affairs, ¶ Tegucigalpa. ¶ Mr. Minister"

9.  July 31, 1928.  Letter on repatriation of Nicaraguan exiles in Danlí, Honduras, from Augusto C. Coello, Tegucigalpa, to George T. Summerlin, U.S. Minister, Tegucigalpa.   "TRANSLATION ¶ COMMISSION FROM NICARAGUA IN DANLI ¶ (From “La Gaceta” of Tegucigalpa – August 10, 1928) ¶ Various papers having published news of the sending of a Commission of Repatriation for Nicaraguans, to Danlí, there are reproduced below the official notes exchanged on the subject in order that public opinion may understand the true nature and object of the Commission refered to: ¶ Legation of the United States of America. ¶ No. 264 ¶ Tegucigalpa, July 28, 1928. ¶ Excellency: ¶ It has been reported that there are many destitute Nicaraguans near the frontier of Honduras, and I have been advised by the American Minister at Managua that the Nicaraguan Government wishes to send a Commission to Danlí with funds to arrange for their repatriation. It is proposed for a United States Marine Officer to accompany the mission and to supervise the distribution of the funds. I therefore have the honor to request of Your Excellency permission for Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Rossell, accompanied by five armed men, to enter Honduras on this mission. It is also requested that, if possible, the detail, headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Rossell, be met by a representative of Your Excellency’s Government at the border to Danlí and return. ¶ Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration. ¶ GEORGE T. SUMMERLIN. ¶ His Excellency ¶ Doctor Fausto Dávila, ¶ Minister for Foreign Affairs, ¶ Tegucigalpa. ¶ Mr. Minister"

10.  August 11, 1928.  “An Explanation in No Way Satisfactory,” translation of article from La Tribuna of Tegucigalpa, p. 1.    "TRANSLATION ¶ AN EXPLANATION IN NO WAY SATISFACTORY. ¶ (From “La Tribuna” of Tegucigalpa – August 11, 1928) ¶ In the editorial which we published last Monday we referred to a telegram sent from Danlí in which it was stated that six completely armed American Marines had entered that city causing justifiable alarm in the vicinity. ¶ After commenting on this fact we stated that the Executive Power would have to give public opinion some explanation of the entrance into our territory of these foreign soldiers, who cannot have any business whatever in Honduras. ¶ Moved by these complaints the Executive Power caused to be published in yesterday’s “La Gaceta” a note addressed by the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the reply made by our Chancellery. ¶ In his note the diplomat mentioned asked of our Government permission for the entry into Honduras of these soldiers referred to for the purpose of supervising the expenditures to be made by the Commission sent by the Government of Nicaragua to repatriate the Nicaraguans who have sought refuge in our republic. ¶ The same Diplomat also asked, and this causes still more astonishment, that the American detachment referred to should be met on the frontier by Honduran troops and escorted from the frontier to Danlí and on the return trip. ¶ The Government of Honduras gave the permission asked for. ¶ To no country which calls itself sovereign can such a request as that of the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States to the Government of Honduras be addressed ¶ without . . . "

11.  August 11, 1928.  “An Explanation in No Way Satisfactory,” translation of article from La Tribuna of Tegucigalpa, p. 2.   " . . . without grave offense to the National dignity. ¶ It is difficult to understand why it is that the Nicaraguan refugees who fled from the persecutions of this same government of Adolfo Díaz and from the American Marines should be sought after for repatriation in this manner. Neither is there any explanation why there is any necessity for supervision by these well-armed American soldiers of the distribution of funds to be made by a commission entrusted with the repatriation of their fellow-countrymen. And still more strange is the help asked of the Honduran army, an escort for the said soldiers, unless it is that they fear attack from Sandinista troops. And Honduras has no reason to furnish that kind of protection. Nor should she expose her troops to danger without definite reason. ¶ The reason for asking this permission, according to the note from the American Minister, is clearly visible as only a pretext for carrying out plans of an entirely different nature, not permitted by our laws. We believe that the authorization given by the Government of Honduras to affect the entry into our territory of a detachment of the American army occupying Nicaragua, cannot be in any way justified."

12.  August 30, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Extract from Major Rowell's Report, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 1.   "SANDINO SITUATION. ¶ Attack of July 25th, on Poteca River. ¶ Extract from Major Rowell’s Report. ¶ 10:05 – MANAGUA. Took off. ¶ 11.25 – POTECA RIVER: Encountered force of armed outlaws and went into action. ¶ Upon approaching the outlaw camp it was evident that it was fully occupied. Eight or ten men, evidently the last to leave the shacks were seen taking cover. Men, horses, mules and cattle were seen in greater number than heretofore. In spite of the abundance of heavy cover about forty men, fifty horses and mules and fifty head of cattle were observed. When the attack opened one machine-gun was seen in action and scattered rifle fire was noted. Due to the thick foliage the enemy was greatly handicapped in firing at the planes. Our machine-gun fire and bombing was well directed and the pattern covered the objective in a very satisfactory manner. After the leader had delivered the second attack no resistance was noted. The largest enemy group took refuge in the woods immediately NORTH, a smaller group was seen to go SOUTH into some thick brush on the end of the point and seven or eight jumped into the river. It is impossible to report what enemy casualties occurred. If they did not have overhead cover very near, it is certain that they suffered considerably. About twelve horses and mules were lying about the camp, apparently killed by bombs and gunfire. The number of animals present was large, indicating that the group probably numbers at least one hundred and fifty. The animals were widely scattered on both sides of the river, both upstream and downstream. The planes were hit three times. Two of the holes were no doubt made by buckshot, indicating that shotguns were being used against low-flying aircraft. One rocket was fired at the planes. There is every evidence that the camp contained Sandino’s main group. ¶ Ammunition was expended as follows: ¶ 17 lb. fragmentation bombs----- 30 ¶ 50 lb. demolition bombs--------- 8 ¶ Cal.30 ammunition-------------- 5000 rounds. ¶ 12:00 – Broke off action. 14:20 – MANAGUA. Landed at airdrome. ¶ The attack on the cantonment was held off until I had time to get some reliable men down into the vicinity, in the hope of finding out the result of the raid. Following is summary of the report of these men.---- ¶ We saw the attack from a distance of about half a mile. Region extremely dangerous as the bandits had been stealing horses, cattle and supplies and everybody was suspicious of everybody else. In the camp were Jirón, Sanchez and about two hundred men. These were nearly all Hondurans; well-known bad men of all sorts--so the people there dont think much of Sandino. ¶ Thirty men were killed by the planes, most of them by the one that covered the neck of the isthmus.-(Note. The camp was on the end of a tongue of land formed by a big bend in the river.) Twenty wounded men killed by natives of the region. There were about thirty other wounded men who scattered. I dont think many of them got away. After the fight Jirón and about fifty men started for a place called CHIRICAYA, which is apparently near the COCO River and not far from BOCAY. Sanchez with about thirty men headed for the MALACATE region in Honduras. He told General Mondragon as we passed . . . "

13.  August 30, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Extract from Major Rowell's Report, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 2.   " . . . through CIFUENTES and after a talk with the Marine commander across the border he started after Sanchez. Sandino was not in the fight but was somewhere near CHIRICAYA. We heard nothing at all about Marshall. He had certainly never been in the camp. Jiron’s second-in-command is a German. (Note. Since identified as an Austrian named KRIEBEL.) ¶ We could not get near the camp either before or after the fight, as the bandits were very much on the alert and very vicious, and we were strangers both to them and to the inhabitants. ¶ Propaganda dropped from planes. ¶ Attached are specimens of proclamations, etc, which the planes have been dropping over the bandit region. This seems to have been quite effective. It undoubtedly jolted Sandino to have the news of his having shot Sequeira broadcasted in this way, as it was one thing he apparently wanted to keep hushed up. ¶ Emilio Ross. ¶ This is the name of the agitator Turcios cabled to come here from Havana. The address was No.16, Prado, but was two years old. Turcios has had no reply from him. ¶ Report No.42. ¶ August 20, 1928. ¶ Sources:-As stated. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Major, G.S."

14.  ca. August 30, 1928.  Propaganda Sheet:  "A los Seguidores de Sandino."   "A los Seguidores de Sandino ¶ Ya sea Ud. nicaragúense u hondureño debe saber que su país le ha desconocido. Y continuará haciéndolo mientras Ud. continúe en revolución y bandidaje ¶ Su partido político, su prensa y aún sus antiguos aliados les han llamado: Bandidos. Y sus camaradas presentes se les están desertando. El agente principal de Sandino en Honduras se ha retirado. Más de MIL CIEN de sus viejos compañeros se han rendido. Estos recibieron completa amnistía y protección y ahora viven con sus familias, sin ser molestados. ¶ El interés que algunos extranjeros tenían en Uds. ha desaparecido. El prestigio de Sandino se está esfumando más rápidamente de lo que Uds. creen. ¶ Los agentes de Sandino se quedan con la mayor parte del dinero colectado para ustedes. Cuánto dinero reciben Uds? O todavía creen Uds. que están luchando por la libertad? Si es así, están equivocados. Uds. conseguirán la libertad dejando las armas y rindiéndose. ¶ Saben ustedes que Sandino fusiló hece poco al general Sequeira? ¶ Si no logran la oferta de amnistía pronto, puede ser que después sea demasiado tarde. Esta oferta no será eterna. Mas tarde pueden Uds. necesitarla y entonces será muy tarde. ¶ Los marinos se quedarán aquí hasta que Uds. sean muertos, se rindan o se vayan del país. ¶ Los marinos han sido reforzados con más hombres, mejores y mayor número de armas y nuevos aeroplanos. ¶ Tienen nuevos planes y siempre avanzarán sobre ustedes. La seguridad de ustedes depende de su habilidad en enconderse a menos que se rindan. No dejen que Sandino les siga engañando. ¶ Esta Amnistía les ofrece Paz, Protección y Prosperidad. Las gentes felices del interior tienen alimentos, casa, ropa, sus esposas e hijos. ¶ Qué tienen ustedes? ¶ Decídanse ya. Vengan pronto. Después será muy tarde. ¶ Talleres Gráficos Párez---Managua."

15.  August 1930.  Propaganda Sheet:  "A los que Andan Armados."   "A los que Andan Armados ¶ Ultimamente, a los que han buscado volver a la vida pacífica después de estar levantados en contra del Gobierno de Nicaragua, ese Gobierno les ha ofrecido amplia e incondicional amnistía en el nombre de la paz y el orden para evitar más derramamiento inútil de sangre. ¶ El Comando Americano y sus Jefes y Oficiales, que buscan únicamente la pacificación del país, han dado a los que han depuesto las armas toda protección para que ejerciten sus derechos como ciudadanos nicaragüenses. ¶ Cornelio Sandoval, anteriormente un fugitivo en las montañas, aceptó esta oferta el 29 de Mayo y se presentó al Comando Americano en Ocotal con 4 rifles. El 30 de Mayo Santamaría Sevilla con veinte y cuatro (24) hombres siguió el ejemplo y entregó su cuadrilla con once (11) rifles y dos (2) pistolas al Comando Americano en Jinotega. Sevilla y sus hombres fueron puestos inmediatamente en libertad y algunos fueron empleados con buena paga. ¶ A esos que tienen armas, pero que desean la paz y el bienestar de Nicaragua, se les econseja que busquen una oportunidad semejante. Se debieran comunicar con sus amigos en las ciudades más cercanas y ofrecer entregar sus armas al Comando Americano más próximo. Esta amnistía no se efrece a los capturados con armas. Anastacio Hernández y José Torres, que fueron capturados con sus armas, están expiando su falta en la Penitenciaría Nacional, en Managua. ¶ Talleres Gráficos Pérez--Managua."

16.  August 27, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.   "During the week evidence accumulated that not only Sandino, but most of his followers are now out of Nicaragua and in Honduras, but of course still close to the border. Sandino himself, with his usual small group, is near the Nicaraguan end of the Piedra Chata Trail. ¶ This trail starts at J. Amado Flores’ lumber camp, called Piedra Chata, on the Patuca River, and comes cut on the Coco River near Bocay. The Government here realizes that the matter is now largely up to them and as Sandino’s only possible source of supply or communication is the trail to Flores’ place, the President on Saturday ordered Flores brought here. ¶ The intention is to get into communication with Sandino through Flores, and try to get him out of Honduras as quickly and quietly as possible. The Government is perfectly willing to use force against him, but the prospect of a campaign in that region is simply appalling to consider. ¶ A messenger, the first since July 6th, came in on Aug. 23. He brought an unimportant letter from Sandino --no mention at all of the fight on the Poteca River, for instance -- but the usual stuff about uprisings in Nicaragua. I reported the arrival of this messenger to General Pineda, and the police questioned him, getting the information given in the first paragraph. ¶ Turcios is about ready to blow up. In addition to losing the income from his Ariel he gets now more Sandino funds from Mexico. He has made arrangements to have El Ariel published in Guatemala by ¶ J. Constantino Gonzales ¶ and in Salvador also, but I do no know yet by whom. The first issue from Salvador is expected in a few days."

17.  September 10, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 1.   "George Marshall. ¶ The Marines have what is believed to be reliable information that Marshall died of fever about July 21st, at MACALWAS, on the Coco River. ¶ Report of Tosta Scouts on Sandino. ¶ No one here has ever taken Turcios very seriously, but he did have everyone convinced of one thing --that Sandino had a big army and plenty of arms. Otherwise, Turcios said, how could he hold out for months against four thousand Marines? Both Tosta and Anduray have repeatedly asked about this and I told them that Sandino has at the most 200 men. This was considerably different from Turcios’ insistence that he had two thousand. ¶ Tosta finally determined to try to find out for himself, and about a month ago sent out two men to see if they could locate the Sandino force. ¶ These two men returned on Sept. 4th, and in the absence of General Tosta, reported to Manuel Calderon, Manager of “El Cronista.” Dr. Guilbert, a reliable American, heard them. The report was about as follows: ¶ That they had found no trace of Sandino himself, but had been with the two main groups of his force. That the combined strength was less than 150 men, and growing less. That the men were mostly Hondurans, and thugs and bandits of the worst type. That the agents themselves had several times nearly lost their lives, owing to pure wanton viciousness on the part of these bandits. Finally, that anyone who thought Sandino could help them, or who tied up with him in anyway would be a fool. ¶ So far as I can make out, these agents saw Sanchez’ band shortly after the Poteca River fight, and then, some time later, ran into Jirón’s group as it was retreating up the Coco toward the Cua, after being defeated by Bapt. Edson’s patrol. ¶ I believe the report of these agents ends any chance of anyone here trying to ally himself with Sandino. . . . "

18.  September 10, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 2.   " . . . Sandino Forces. ¶ According to the last Marine report- (Sept. 6.)-Jiron with a small band is near the mouth of the CUA River. Mondragon reports Sanchez’ group as having scattered and Sanchez himself probably enroute to join Jiron. The Marines think Sandino is near Totecasinte, but all information here makes me think he is on the Piedra Chata Trail, near Bocay."

19.  September 17, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation:  Translation of letter from Domingo Mairena Hernández to Doctor Timoteo Miralda, Aug. 22, 1928, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 1.    [NOTE: For additional documents on this case see the TOP 100 PAGE 26]   "Attached is a translation of a letter just received here. I do not deal personally with anyone here, so in sending out Tenorio, he got all his money and equipment through Dr. Timoteo Miralda, his lawyer, to whom the letter is addressed. I have known from some time that Tenorio had gotten through all right, but the letter gives interesting details. How long it will be before he can get anything through to the Marines I don’t know -- but he seems to be a top-notch man, and may succeed in ending the business. ¶ Incidentally, Dr. Mairena Hernandez is the fourth man in Sandino’s personal group. We had not been able previously to find out who it was. ¶ El Chipoton. ¶ This location, used as a heading in all Sandino’s correspondence since the capture of CHIPOTE, has been fairly well identified as a hill called EL GARROBO, on the CUA River near its junction with the COCO."

20.  September 17, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation:  Translation of letter from Domingo Mairena Hernández to Doctor Timoteo Miralda, Aug. 22, 1928, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 2.    "El Chipoton  ¶  Wed, August 22, 1928  ¶  To Dr. Miralda  ¶  Tegucigalpa, Honduras.  ¶  Sir:  ¶  I am a soldier who, in the hour of danger takes his rifle and his post in the ranks of the liberators.  After the battles and in the days of trial, I am the Surgeon-Doctor who devotes himself to attending to my sick and wounded comrades.  If this data is not enough it suffices [to say] that I form part of the Army in Defense of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua, whose prowess will certainly be admired in future centuries more earnestly than it is venerated today.  With these preliminary remarks I come to the matter that moves me to write.  ¶  On the 18th of this month the General Staff, with its protecting columns, halted its march toward the west of this country, toward which region it was moving to attack the pirates in the strongholds ceded to them by the soldiers of their country -- halted for the purpose of receiving an emissary coming from your republic to discuss certain matters with the bandits.  The emissary presented himself at 11:47 a.m.  ¶  We had expected to hear from this envoy, the young man Constantino Tenorio, something in praise of the Cause, and that might be uplifting.  But we were greatly disenchanted to hear verbally the conditions of the Yankee proposal, just as though they owned the Nation whose Army of Honor rejects them with loathing.  And when we learned that you -- a citizen of the fatherland of Bonilla -- were the means of enabling this emissary to reach us, even prudence could hardly restrain our indignities.  ¶  If it had not been for Tenorio's know record he would have been placed under arrest immediately, tried by a Council of War as a traitor, a coward; if you had been one of our group, you would at that instant have been hurled out of our communion.  However, as general conditions are not unfavorable to you, I tell you this: 1st:  Tenorio remains with us, because he desires to rectify his unpardonable . . .

21.  September 17, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation:  Translation of letter from Domingo Mairena Hernández to Doctor Timoteo Miralda, Aug. 22, 1928, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 3.  " . . . mistake; 2nd:  That we do not care to treat with the Yankees, nor with Diaz, nor with Moncada, nor with any of their crew.  ¶  Some time ago General Sandino made known the conditions under which he would suspend his activities:  Immediate withdrawal of the invaders; a National Government.  Whoever thinks he is going to deviate from this had better understand that ours is not a revolution in favor of some particular leader, who drops his plans when they meet his price and pay his men.  No.  Ours is the hurricane that is going to tear up the forest by the roots and level right down to the floor the temples of corruption, in order to sow and build anew and let the sun's rays fall on a purified landscape.  If we do not succeed in this, the price we of the Holy War are prepared to pay is Death, with the eternal smile of satisfaction.  ¶  So, Doctor Miralda, your solicitude and that of all the others who think as do the assassins of my country, does nothing more than provoke the anger of the Army, and in the future you can deal with such matters with our Representative, Don Froylan Turcios -- so vilely dealt with by your Government in the suppression of our [publication] Ariel, for it is he who will hear any proposals concerning agreements with us -- if such agreements are in any way honorable.  ¶  The Supreme Commander of this war for autonomy will soon let it be known how little he cares for such insolent, meddling politicians; he will soon explain, to any who may doubt, his final determination; I, interpreting the sentiments of the Army, send you this, urging you to devote a little more effort for Honduras, the next to be delivered to the Medusa, the insatiable devourer of our peoples.  ¶  In the name of the Liberty of the Continent, I am yours very truly,  ¶  Patria y Libertad,  ¶  (signed) Domingo Mairena Hernandez."

22.  September 24, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation: Translation of letter from Dr. Escolástico Lara to Froylán Turcios, Aug. 22, 1928, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 1.   "Following is the translation of the substance of a letter just received by Turcios from Dr. Escolastico Lara, who is supposed to be Sandino’s principal agent in Nicaragua. ----- ¶ What is going on here is heart-breaking, words cannot express it. The intervention is brutal-they are putting on the screws slowly but surely. Their grip on the various branches of the Government is stronger everyday. They control everything, with the stupid approval of both parties. So far as I can see the North Americans are acting with sincerity--they are not to blame--it is us. In Nicaragua there is fearful chaos, bands of outlaws infest no only the country, but the towns as well. Only prompt, appropriate and energetic action can save us, or enable us to treat with them with dignity. I don’t see how we can get out of it in any other way, on account of the degeneracy of both the young fellows and the old. Nobody has any ambition except to the President and have power and fill their pockets with the money of the Fatherland, which they consider their own to exploit. They have all gone to the bad. I am in favor of a dignified settlement with the Americans--we cannot go on any longer. I beg you in my name to write this to General Sandino-- and let him know that my opinion is he should make peace. I would have written him through here, but for days no one has shown up-- I do not know what is happening. If it were in my power to make this settlement, and I could do so, I would do it--to the advantage of both the Americans and ourselves. Frankly, I am no an enemy of the Americans--I am an enemy of intervention--but not of the men nor the race. If we were a strong people we would have done just what they did. I want you to understand that I am for a settlement just as promptly . . . "

23.  September 24, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation: Translation of letter from Dr. Escolástico Lara to Froylán Turcios, Aug. 22, 1928, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 2.   ". . . as it can be brought about.--To continue this is criminal. Don’t think I have gone back on my beliefs, they are unchanged. But it hurts me to see what is happening in Nicaragua. ¶ Tell all this to the General. ¶ I believe this is the severest blow Sandino’s cause has yet received. It means that he is now backed up only by Turcios, and the latter can do nothing."

24.  October 6, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Managua, p. 1.   "From a source which will probably be evident I have the following description of house the Sandino force has operated since the defeat at JALAPA and MURRA in April. ¶ There are three distinct groups: ¶ The field force. ¶ The General Staff. ¶ Sandino’s personal Group. ¶ These three groups are never together. The fighting force never knows where the General Staff is, and cannot communicate with it, except by messengers sent to it from the Staff. The General Staff never knows where Sandino is and can only communicate with him by messengers sent to them. In this way anyone approaching the General Staff group or Sandino is immediately under suspicion. My informant is now with the General Staff, but has not reached Sandino. ¶ Field force. ¶ Formerly under command of Jiron, but for the last six weeks commanded by Montoya, formerly Chief of Staff. Jiron said to have been dismissed by Sandino as a result of the defeats on the Coco River. Also said to have been sent on special mission to Guatemala. Latter is most probable. Force consists of about eighty men, and is now scattered in houses between MURRA and the Poteca River. Marines started carefully organized movement against this area this morning. ¶ General Staff. ¶ Consists of about six General and Colonels, with ten picked men as bodyguard. Orders to the different bands are sent from this group, never direct from Sandino. The Staff moves frequently, but until close to election time expects to remain in Honduras, south of PAREDES ¶ Personal Group. ¶ Sandino, the two Madariaga brothers, Dr. Mairena Hernandez, and a few men are said to be all there are in this group. Nothing else known about it, except that when there is fighting Dr. Mairena . . . "

25.  October 6, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Managua, p. 2.   ". . . Hernandez joins the field force, as he is the only doctor in Sandino’s organization. ¶ Machine guns. ¶ Formerly kept in one group, under command of Montoya, and sent as a group to the field force when action was expected. Now divided among different small bands. Informant thinks this means they realize the main group can never again be united. ¶ Morale. ¶ Of field force-not known. General Staff are all fanatically determined, and no slightest sign of quitting."

26.  October 31, 1928.  Confidential G-2 Report on Alleged Information re Shipment of Arms to Nicaragua, Major Edwin M. Watson, Military Attaché Belgium-Netherlands, p. 1.   "1. Yesterday a Peruvian by the name of Signor Alberto Benites, residing in Brussels at present, where he conducts a School of Languages in the rue Royale, called to see me, saying that he had some information he wished to offer. I listened to his story, which was as follows: ¶ 2. A man by the name of Alfred Royan, of Belgian origin but having spent his life in almost every country except Belgium, had by a coincidence exposed to Benites the fact that he had knowledge of a large order for rifles placed in Germany and about to leave for Nicaragua. It seems that Royan was in South America last year and came to Central America about the time our trouble started with Nicaragua. Royan is said to be extremely efficient and capable, knowing German, French and Spanish thoroughly, and having many relations among tradesmen and industrials at various European ports. Benites claims that Royan was detailed by the Nicaraguans to return to Europe and arrange for transportation of a shipment of 30,000 rifles. This order has been placed in Germany and is at present in Hamburg but the difficulty is to get a carrier, no steamship line wishing to accept it. Benites claims that a certain I. C. Ghoveau, 63 rue Joseph II, Brussels is in direct contact with the firm furnishing the rifles. ¶ 3. Benites insists that the rifles are today “somewhere in Hamburg”, but can give no information as to what Royan is doing to get them to Nicaragua. ¶ 4. As there is always a possibility of this man Benites being out after a reward, I explained to him that this office has no funds with which to pay for information, but that we would of course appreciate anything he might want to give us on a gratis basis. I also stated that it would be particularly interesting to us to have accurate information regarding the whereabouts of the alleged shipment, the marks on the cases, the boat on which they will leave, the port, etc. He left saying he would endeavor to work some further information out of Choveau, whom he knows. . . . "

27.  October 31, 1928.  Confidential G-2 Report on Alleged Information re Shipment of Arms to Nicaragua, Major Edwin M. Watson, Military Attaché Belgium-Netherlands, p. 2.    " . . . In the event of any further developments worth while, I shall make a further report."

28.  October 31, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Propaganda in El Salvador, "Diario Latino Will Commence To Publish the Important Private Correspondence of Sandino Tomorrow," Alex A. Cohen, in absence of Military Attaché Costa Rica.   "Attention is invited to the enclosed clipping from the latest number of the “Diario Latino” of San Salvador received in this office. A translation reads as follows: ¶ “DIARIO LATINO WILL COMMENCE TO PUBLISH THE IMPORTANT PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE OF SANDINO TOMORROW. ¶ Together with next interesting unpublished documents which have been sent exclusively for Diario Latino. ¶ The Ariel review of Tegucigalpa having been suspended, Dario Latino, on account of being considered the most advanced defender of the Latin-American cause has been selected for the publication of the letters of the Hero of the Segovias, general Sandino. For this reason it will publish EXCLUSIVELY these interesting documents.” ¶ With Sandino completely relegated to the background and the known attitude for anti-American articles of the “Diario Latino”, comment is hardly believed necessary.

29.  November 9, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Propaganda in El Salvador, "Alleged Sandino Letters Published by Diario Latino," Alex A. Cohen, in absence of Military Attaché Costa Rica.   "Some of the alleged Sandino letters were published in two issues of the “Diario Latino”. Further publication was stopped by the official government censor. ¶ In commenting upon this action by the sensor, the “Diario Latino” stated: ¶ ***We know that this prohibition originated from the office of the Minister of Government, Dr. Hamel Vicente Meniosa. ¶ Even though obliged by circumstances to suspend the publication of these patriotic letters, DIARIO LATINO wishes to state that under to pretext will it cover or become an accomplice to the abominable attack which is being committed against a weak nation and that it is only silenced because forced by circumstances.*** ¶ The two publications are enclosed herewith. It is regretted that through lack of time it is not possible to include a translation and still include it in this week’s pouch. ¶ In connection of the anti-American campaign of this paper, there is a touch of irony in a cable noticed from Salvador, dated November 6th, that a fire in the center of San Salvador destroyed, among other buildings, the entire plant of paper. Therefore, at least for sometime, the paper probably will not be published."

30.  October 1928.  Propaganda Sheet, Communist Party of Mexico.  "¡AFUERA LA LEGION AMERICANA!  Pershing el General de la 'Punitiva' Encabeza a los Legionarios.  LLAMAMIENTO DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA.  INGRESE AL PARTIDO COMUNISTA.  Propague 'EL MACHETE' Organo del Proletariado Revolucionario. Pídalo al Apartado 2031."   "¡AFUERA LA LEGION AMERICANA! ¶ ¡VIVA SANDINO! ¶ Pershing el General de la ‘Punitiva’ Encabeza a los Legionarios ¶ LLAMAMIENTO DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA ¶ Se encuentra en México un grupo de miembros de la “Legión Americana”, organización militar, integrada por elementos que combatieron en la Guerra Mundial. ¶ Como una advertencia a México estos legionarios acaban de reunirse en [crease in paper] fuera rebado por el naciente imperialismo americano. Y como un insulto a México, estos legionarios vienen comandados por el general John J. Pershing, que hace doce años invadiera nuestro país al frente de la “Expedición Punitiva”. ¶ La Legión Americana es la organización fascista en los Estados Unidos. La integran grandes capitalistas, altos jefes militares e industriales, numerosos ex-combatientes de la guerra de 1914, elementos aventureros que alquilan sus brazos a los ricos y constituyen bandas extra-legales que les ayudan a someter a la clase obrera. Numerosas huelgas de los trabajadores americanos han sido rotas por los miembros de la Legión Americana, que además de prestarse a ejercer de esquiroles en los muelles, en los trenes, en los ómnibus y en otros servicios públicos, atacan por medios terroristas a las uniones y sindicatos obreros. Los fascistas de la Legión Americana se consideran a sí mismos “especialistas” en romper huelgas y en disolver mítines y manifestaciones de la clase trabajadora, como lo hacen en Italia los “camisas negras” de Mussolini. ¶ ¿A qué vienen a México los legionarios de Wall Street? ¿Vienen a traernos “un mensaje de buena voluntad”, como lo afirma traidoramente toda la prensa vendida? ¿Vienen a demostrarnos la fraternidad del pueblo de los Estados Unidos, borrando los rencores creados por las luchas de otros tiempos? ¶ No! No pueden ser portadores de un “mensaje de buena voluntad” los que traen al frente al mismo Pershing que, falto de los tamaños suficientos para enfrentarse con los trabajadores armados después de la experiencia de El Carrizal, estuvo varios meses asesinando campesinos mexica- [crease in paper] villistas. ¶ No pueden traernos un mensaje de buena voluntad - ¡esa famosa “buena voluntad” que ya ha hecho repugnante la sonrisa hipócrita de Mr. Coolidge! - los que en estos momentos apoyan la intervención americana en Nicaragua y se alistan en las tropas mercenarias que van a cubrirse de ignominia luchando contra Sandino; los que el día de mañana, cuando la necesidad de defender nuestra soberanía y los derechos de las clases trabajadoras nos enfrente en una lucha inevitable con el imperialismo del Norte, vendrán a querer repetir en México las cobardes matanzas de Chinandega y Ocotal, asesinando sin piedad a mujeres, ancianos y niños y saqueando y quemando nuestras poblaciones, ya que esto lo consideran útil para el “efecto moral” y es mucho más fácil que entenderse con los hombres que empuñan el fusil en el monte. ¶ No pueden esos legionarios traer entre sus manos manchadas con sangre de trabajadores y de pueblos hermanos, un saludo amistoso del pueblo de los Estados Unidos, [unreadable] ellos representan también al enemigo de ese mismo pueblo americana, al pequeño grupo de banqueros que gobiernan en la Casa Blanca, a la oligarquía de los capitalistas que explotan a millones y millones de hombres en todos los países de América, incluso México. ¶ Con la Legión Americana nos visitan los invasores de ayer y los invasores de mañana. Nos visitan los que robaron a México más de la mitad del territorio en 1848; los que desembarcaron en Veracruz en 1914; los que dos años después entraron por la frontera Norte para llenarse de vergüenza con el alevoso asesinato del general Manuel Gómez – un Sandino [crease and hole in paper] por la espalda – y para llenarse de pánico con la derrota de El Carrizal; los que en 1926 se reconcentraron en la misma frontera para apoyar con una amenaza descarada su exigencia de que se alteraran a conveniencia de las compañias gringas los párrafos del artículo 27 que se refieren al petróleo… ¶ ¡Y a estos bandidos se quiere que los recibamos con los brazos abiertos!... Sería tanto como merecer todo lo que nos han hecho y todo lo que pretenden hacernos. ¶ ¡No, trabajadores de México! Sepamos demostrar a los perros de presa de Wall Street que los conocemos y que en cualquier momento nos encontrarán con el arma al brazo. Los triunfos “diplomáticos” de Mr. Morrow, las complacencias de los que prefieren rendirse para disfrutar una parte del botín de los banqueros, no engañan a los obreros y campesinos de México ni los harán cejar en su lucha a muerte contra el enemigo imperialista. ¶ En la calle, en los espectáculos públicos, dondequiera que encontremos a un miembro de la Legión Americana, escupámosle a la cara nuestro desprecio y gritémosle: ¶ ¡FUERA DE MEXICO LOS ENEMIGOS DE MEXICO! ¶ ¡ABAJO LOS FASCISTAS DE LA LEGION AMERICANA! ¶ ¡VIVA SANDINO! ¶ ¡VIVA LA UNION DE TODOS LOS OBREROS Y CAMPESINOS DE AMERICA, PARA LA LUCHA CONTRA EL IMPERIALISMO YANQUI! ¶ Partido Comunista de México. ¶ Octubre 1928. ¶ INGRESE AL PARTIDO COMUNISTA ¶ Propague “EL MACHETE” Organo del Proletariado Revolucionario. Pídalo al Apartado 2031"

31.  Copy of no. 30, above.

32.  August 11, 1928.  José de Paredes, “Call of a Mexican Who Fights in Nicaragua,” Central Committee's Bulletin "Manos Fuera de Nicaragua," El Chipotón, Aug. 11, 1928 (English translation), p. 1.   "Call of a Mexican Who Fights in Nicaragua. ¶ Jose de Paredes describes the last military operation of Sandino’s Army. ¶ (Central Committee’s Bulletin “Manos Fuera de Nicaragua” [Hands off of Nicaragua]). ¶ El Chipoton, August 11, 1928. ¶ Licentiate Gustavo Machado. ¶ Esteemed Colleague: ¶ Upon the recommendation of my comrade, Carlos Aponte, I am addressing you this letter to inform you that a few weeks ago I sent to “El Libertador”, for publication in that important anti-imperialist organ, an article under my signature reminding my compatriots of Mexico’s moral responsibility in the case of Nicaragua, because Mexicans are the most class-conscious people of Latin America and because the Mexican government is the one which has done the greatest amount of propaganda work in the last eighteen years. ¶ I made a trip from San Francisco, California, for the purpose of enlisting in the army which, under the command of General Sandino, is struggling heroically with the powerful Yankees. On passing through Tegucigalpa I was informed of your presence at this camp, but when I arrived here June 8th, I was sorry to learn that you had already returned to Mexico, and I beg you to do me the favor to send to my mother at San Francisco, U.S.A., a copy of the paper containing the article. ¶ At the same time I avail myself of this occasion to give you some details of the brilliant Liliwas action, launched against the buccaneers on the banks of the Coco river on the 7th and 8th of this . . . "

33.  August 11, 1928.  José de Paredes, “Call of a Mexican Who Fights in Nicaragua,” Central Committee's Bulletin "Manos Fuera de Nicaragua," El Chipotón, Aug. 11, 1928 (English translation), p. 2.   " . . . month, when I received my baptism of blood. Although assigned as secretary among the Adjutants of General Sandino, I asked permission to share the dangers of the battle by the side of my comrade, Carlos Aponte, who received me at once with a “Long live Mexico”, to which I responded with a “Long live Venezuela”, which were repeated by our comrades. ¶ General Sandino proceeded to organize us on one bank of the river, addressing us in a brief speech, declaring that “although we were in the heart of the mountains of Nicaragua the eyes of the world were fixed upon us and that he expected of each soldier the strict fulfilment of his duty”, which called forth the wildest enthusiasm among us. The advance detachment was made up of four numbers of troops, Aponte, who carried a rapid-fire Browning and myself, under the command of Major Julian Montoya, of Honduras. At 7 A. M. we encountered General Giron Ruano, who informed us that the enemy was advancing by land and water. We withdrew to inform General Sandino of the proximity of the enemy, taking position at once at Bolinqui, where the general headquarters were established. The advance detachment was incorporated with the column of Colonel Pedro Altamirano and we were ordered to seek out and detain the filibusters along an old path connecting Bolinqui with Yameles, where the enemy was mobilizing. We arrived and took positions under a hornet’s nest of four airplanes, awaiting with tense nerves the appearance of the northern vandals, the work of whose sappers in opening a path through the underbrush we fully recognized. The enemy ingenuously fell into the trap; the hand grenades, rifles and automatic guns of Aponte did timely work and the enemy dispersed. We confined ourselves to maintaining our firing line and a threatening attitude and awaited instructions. . . . "

34.  August 11, 1928.  José de Paredes, “Call of a Mexican Who Fights in Nicaragua,” Central Committee's Bulletin "Manos Fuera de Nicaragua," El Chipotón, Aug. 11, 1928 (English translation),  p. 3.   " . . . meanwhile both the column of General Giron Ruano, of Guatemala, and that of Colonel Colindres, of Nicaragua, engaged in a hand to hand conflict with the main body of the enemy troops which was proceeding by land, causing it to retreat in complete rout. Colonel Jose Lagos, of Honduras, did great havoc with his rapid fire gun, destroying the enemy which had embarked, in cooperation with the machine guns of Colonel Francisco Altamirano and Lieutenant Alejandro Molina, both of Nicaragua. On the morning of the 8th the triumph of our operations was reached with the retreat of the enemy. General Sandino was active during the entire combat, issuing precise and definite orders from general headquarters at Bolinqui and visiting our positions, in everything showing his vast knowledge of the art of war. ¶ We had the satisfaction of hearing our column cited in the Order of the Day for the discipline displayed by its members, for they remained 24 hours at a stretch in the firing line in the midst of heavy fire. Colonel Pedro Altamirano, of Nicaragua, Major Julian Montoya, of Honduras, and Carlos Aponte, my comrade from Venezuela, were all promoted to the next higher rank. ¶ Yours in the fight against Imperialism. ¶ Country and Liberty. ¶ Jose de Paredes."

35.  July 19, 1928.  José de Paredes, El Chipotón, Letter to Director of El Libertador, Mexico City (English translation), p. 1.   "El Chipoton, July 19, 1928. ¶ Director of “El Libertador”, ¶ Mexico City, Federal District. ¶ Dear Colleague:- ¶ From this bulwark of the defenders of the national sovereignty of Nicaragua and of the honor of the entire Latin-American continent, with the right which the fact of my being the only Mexican who is now fighting under the orders of the illustrious General Augusto C. Sandino gives me, I make a sincere and earnest appeal to my countrymen, to Mexican working-men and particularly to Mexican youth who on so many occasions have given proof of being on the side of just causes. ¶ The Mexican people cannot and must not remain impassive before the present Nicaraguan tragedy. They must either contribute by sending funds to meet the most pressing needs which our army must face, or by helping in some other way to attack Yankee imperialism outside of Nicaragua. I have been a personal witness of the consolation and joy felt by the families of the laboring classes who have been helped by the funds which have been sent to General Sandino from Mexico. Those who contribute to such a noble cause, may be sure that their money has been profitably spent by their Nicaraguan brothers, martyred by the greed of the “blond-haired beasts” who now pillage Nicaragua, and as a Mexican, I have felt justly proud to hear the following words from the lips of General Sandino, which have been repeated again and again to the men:- ¶ “The moral obligation which binds us to the Mexican people grows daily stronger; it is from Mexico that we have received the greatest assistance in the present crisis, followed by Guatemala, . . . "

36.  July 19, 1928.  José de Paredes, El Chipotón, Letter to Director of El Libertador, Mexico City (English translation), p. 2.    " . . . Honduras and Salvador.” ¶ The Mexican people, particularly the laboring classes and students must take an energetic attitude of protest against the criminal intervention of the United States government in the internal affairs of Latin America and so compel our government – as the representative of the popular will of the Mexican people – to make our protest known through diplomatic channels and, if necessary, to break off relations with the United States for this and even go so far as armed conflict; it is better to force it now rather than later when the Yankee imperialists have realized their sinister plans in Nicaragua, when Sandino and the handful of legionaries who surround him have disappeared and a new canal with its “Canal Zone” and respective naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca is open in Nicaragua; when Mexico, isolated from the rest of the world and given up to its own resources, has to face the danger of the construction of a canal across our Isthmus of Tehuantepec. ¶ General Sandino has informed me of his desire to have his Staff formed of the young men of the 21 countries of Latin America, in order to show his sympathy for the whole continent. Mexicans who wish to come must take into consideration the cynical persecution which, against the will of the people, the government of Honduras exercises over those who pass through on their way to Nicaragua, due to the pressure of the Yankee Minister in that country. I myself in crossing the frontier between Honduras and Nicaragua, was seized in Honduran territory on the afternoon of May 10, by General Ramon Mondragon, who commanded a Honduran force operating along the whole length of the frontier for the purpose of capturing Nicaraguan fugitives seeking refuge from the persecutions of the Yankees. When the force reached . . . "

37.  July 19, 1928.  José de Paredes, El Chipotón, Letter to Director of El Libertador, Mexico City (English translation), p. 3.   " . . . the Oslica hacienda where I was, they had 75 Nicaraguan peasants bound as prisoners. In spite of my Mexican passport, issued by the Mexican Consul General at San Francisco, California, and duly visaed by the Honduran authorities, General Mondragon told me that “it would be delivered to the American detachment at Santa Maria the next day”. I made energetic protest, threatening him with the diplomatic intervention of my government and requiring from him, as the military authority of Honduras, guarantees and protection, to which he replied: “I only comply with orders from Tegucigalpa”. A Nicaraguan traitor who accompanied General Mondragon in his march, General Benito Lopez, broke out into insults against Mexico and Mexicans adding that he had a good place in which to put me. General Mondragon, I must confess, showed me consideration, having left me in a house with four sentinels on guard. At night the four soldiers, overcome with fatigue, fell asleep, and I took advantage of it to escape to Nicaragua. It took 35 days across the mountains of Nueva Segovia and Jinotega, owing to the rapidity with which General Sandino mobilized from one point to another, which is the principal tactics employed by our army, which tries to constantly checkmate the Yankees. I had the good fortune to be guided by the same postman who led Mr. Carleton Beals in his famous interview with the General. ¶ Upon reaching general headquarters I was sorry not to have clasped the hand of Gustavo Machado, who I had been informed at Tegucigalpa I would find at camp, as he had already returned to Mexico in company with Colonel Francisco Estrada and Colonel Juan Gregorio Colindres; in compensation I met a loyal comrade in arms in the person of a young Venezuelan, Carlos Aponte H, the most disinterested and sane revolutionary, a genuine type of the modern youth of . . . "

38.  July 19, 1928.  José de Paredes, El Chipotón, Letter to Director of El Libertador, Mexico City (English translation), p. 4.   " . . . Latin America in whom the continent puts all its ambitions and hopes. In the full meaning of the word, he was fraternally welcomed by the whole army and made a part of the staff as secretary to General Sandino. ¶ There has lately joined our ranks a young Colombian, Ruben Ardilo G. [Rubén Ardila Gómez], and in spite of the difficulties, we are hoping for the arrival of other comrades from all parts of Latin America. Those of us who form this sacred and heroic legion which defends with its arms the sovereignty of the entire continent have faith that the sister peoples which form the great Latin-American family may arise and unite with us to present a united front to Yankee imperialism and not wait for it to spit upon us, as it has already done in the case of Porto Rico, Cuba, Panama, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, and as it is now doing in Nicaragua. Don’t wait, fellow countrymen, until our turn comes; let us make a front now and not wait until tomorrow, for it may then be too late. ¶ Hoping you will see fit to publish these lines in the columns of “El Libertador”, I have the honor to place myself at your orders. ¶ Patria y Libertad, ¶ Jose de Paredes."

39.  November 1, 1928.  Strictly Confidential Cable on conversation with José de Paredes, from Chargés d’Affaires ad interim San Salvador, p. 1.   "(COPY) ¶ San Salvador, November 1, 1928. ¶ No. 1375 ¶ STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL ¶ FOR THE ¶ SECRETARY AND UNDERSECRETARY ¶ The Honorable ¶ The Secretary of State, ¶ Washington. ¶ Sir: ¶ I have the honor to inform the Department that this morning Senor Juan B. Saldana, Secretary to the Mexican Legation in this city, called me by phone stating that he would like to bring a young man to speak to me about something very important. He inquired whether he might come late in the afternoon, to which I replied that, I would be happy to receive him at his convenience. ¶ About 4 o’clock Mr. C. Jose L. Paredes arrived at the Legation and said that he had been sent by Mr. Saldana who regretted that at the last minute could not come with him. Mr. Paredes is a Mexican citizen, bearer of Mexican consular passport issued in San Francisco on February 11, 1928. He claims to be an expeditionary officer of the army of General Sandino, Mr. Paredes claims that he has considerable influence with General Sandino and that he believes that if he had not been in Tegucigalpa in the General Hospital at a time when General Sandino was asked to surrender his forces, he believes that he could have influenced him to do so. . . . "

40.  November 1, 1928.  Strictly Confidential Cable on conversation with José de Paredes, from Chargés d’Affaires ad interim San Salvador, p. 2.   " . . . During the time Mr. Paredes has been with Sandino’s forces he has been wounded in two different places and says that the action he took part in, was at El Jovo in August when he was wounded in the right leg. He returned to Chipoton on September 2nd and owing to his physical condition was discharged and sent away as unfit for further military service. He went to Tegucigalpa and on September 9th was taken into the General Hospital by Dr. Palma. He remained in the hospital under Dr. Palma’s care until September 22nd; he left there and lived at the house of one Tibercio Acosta until October 25th, when he started to walk from Tegucigalpa to San Lorenzo, thence by motor-launch to La Union and by train to San Salvador, arriving here on October 30th. ¶ Mr. Paredes says that the army of General Sandino is in very very bad condition; that they are slowly starving; that at present they have nothing to eat except meat, wild vegetables and fruits, not even salt or any other spices; that his army is practically without medical supplies; that he believes that there are not more than 300 men with General Sandino at present. Furthermore, he stated that he is sure that he can arrange with the rebel leader to surrender his arms and those of his men if he were given guarantees of his life and those of his followers. ¶ On leaving the hospital in Tegucigalpa, he made vain attempts to see Sandino’s agent, Toribio Turcios, who told him he was very sorry that he could not see him. Paredes then wrote and asked him for financial aid, Turcios replied that he was very sorry there was no money he had that he could give him, and Paredes is under the impression that not only Dr. Zamoro of this city, mentioned in this Legation’s despatch No. 1266, August 20, 1928, but, that Turcios of Tegucigalpa and others have failed to turn over most of the funds they have collected for Sandino’s cause, saying that he knows Turcios to have diverted the greater part of the funds collected by him to his . . . "

41.  November 1, 1928.  Strictly Confidential Cable on conversation with José de Paredes, from Chargés d’Affaires ad interim San Salvador, p. 3.   " . . . own personal interest. He also said that Sandino at one time received from Mexico the sum of $9,000 gold; that lately he has not been receiving any money; that he knows the warfare he had undertaken was a losing proposition but he was fighting for an ideal and had hoped to divert public opinion in the United States to withdrawing the Marines from Nicaragua; that that was the only thing he had hoped to accomplish in his battles against the Marines. Mr. Paredes is on his way to Mexico City. His passport has been viseed by the Guatemalan authorities. ¶ After Mr. Paredes left the Legation, I had the opportunity of a long conversation with Mr. Saldana, Secretary to the Mexican Legation, who said to me that he hoped I would not misunderstand him in sending Paredes to speak to me; that he is not at all in sympathy with the policy of his Minister, Senor Urquidi, but that he can do nothing to foster Mexican-American friendship which is hindered at every turn by the Mexican Minister in Salvador who is outspokenly anti-American. ¶ Senor Saldana told me that he has known Paredes and his family; that he lived a long time in San Francisco; that he is not anti-American but that he has been rather a dreamer and mislead in following a revolutionary idealist; that Paredes has many admirable qualities; that he is truthful and sincere; that he believes he has influence with Sandino. In view of Mr. Saldana’s information and my conversation with Paredes, I dispatched the following telegram to the Legation at Managua for their information: ¶ “November 1, 4 P.M. Confidential. A Mexican, Jose L. Paredes, claiming to be one of Sandino’s captains arrived here October 30th. Says he believes he can arrange with Sandino to surrender if guarantees given him and his men.” ¶ Mr. Paredes states that he has a number of documents which he wishes to show to me tomorrow before his departure. ¶ I have the honor to be, Sir, ¶ Your obedient servant, ¶ Charge d’Affaires a.i. ¶ D/SE"

42.  November 2, 1928.  Strictly Confidential Cable regarding documents in possession of José de Paredes, from Chargés d’Affaires ad interim San Salvador, p. 1.   "(COPY) ¶ San Salvador, November 2, 1928. ¶ No. 1376 ¶ STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL ¶ FOR THE ¶ SECRETARY AND UNDERSECRETARY ¶ The Honorable ¶ The Secretary of State, ¶ Washington. ¶ Sir: ¶ With reference to this Legation’s strictly confidential despatch No. 1375, November 1, 1928, informing the Department that Jose L. Paredes, a Mexican idealist and former member of the army of Sandino, had promised to bring to me for my perusal certain documents bearing on the state of affairs in Nicaragua, I have the honor to inform the Department that Senor Paredes called this morning and showed me the documents in question and told me that he left Nicaraguan territory in the uniform of an American marine; that upon his arrival in the outskirts of Tegucigalpa he exchanged his uniform for that of a civilian, stating that the clothes he thereupon donned had been given to him by a friendly Honduranean. ¶ None of the documents that Senor Paredes has in his possession would be of interest to the Department except a letter addressed to . . . "

43.  November 2, 1928.  Strictly Confidential Cable regarding documents in possession of José de Paredes, from Chargés d’Affaires ad interim San Salvador, p. 2.   " . . .  Froylan Turcios of Tegucigalpa by General Sandino which recommends Paredes to Turcios, commenting on his bravery and heroism, and stating the reason for his unfitness for further military service and that he thinks Paredes may be of some use to him as his representative in San Francisco, California. Copy of the letter in Spanish is herewith transmitted for the information of the Department. The names of Mercedes Lagos of Tegucigalpa and Olivia Ramirez of Rio Blanquito, San Pedro Sula, Honduras, appear on one of the envelopes submitted by Paredes. I am of the impression that Paredes will not be of much use in the future to Sandino under any circumstances. He appears to be in extremely poor health, and as a result of his wounds will always be more or less physically unfit. ¶ Senor Paredes told me that there are at present three or four Salvadoreans in the army of Sandino; that the only one of any consequence is General Jose Leon Dias; two others are Augustin Marti and Adan Gonzales, young men under 25 years of age, and he says of the peon class from near San Miguel. Furthermore, he says that the only person in Sandino’s forces who speaks English and is able to act as translator for General Sandino is a Guatemalan acting as his Chief of Staff. ¶ Senor Paredes said that on July 3rd he typed a letter for General Sandino to the then President elect of Mexico, General Obregon, with whom Sandino fought, in the revolution during the Carranza regime. In the letter to General Obregon Sandino appealed to him to intervene in the United States-Nicaraguan question; relating his desire to work for a united Central America and hoping that he might be able to count on his aid and friendship in realizing the goal of his ambition. However, with the assassination of General Obregon, Senor Paredes believes that nothing will come of Sandino’s letter. Senor Paredes intends to call on Ambassador Morrow on his arrival in Mexico and tell him more or less the same things he has told to me. ¶ I have the honor to be, Sir, ¶ Your obedient servant, ¶ Charge d’Affaires a.i."

44.  November 2, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.   "SANDINO SITUATION. ¶ Between Oct. 12th and Oct. 25th Marine patrols made a sweep through Eastern Nueva Segovia. There were several contacts with bandits, and camps belonging to Sandino, Madariaga and several other leaders were found and destroyed. All camps were prepared for defense and well stocked with supplies. ¶ The present location of Sandino is not known, but I believe he has again moved over to the Coco River, probably near GUIGUILI. As a result of his failure to interfere with the elections he is losing support rapidly. ¶ For some time I have been unable to get any copies of EL MACHETE, the Mexican Radical paper, and am now informed that it has ceased publication, due to lack of funds. Our attaché in Mexico should verify this. ¶ Turcios is apparently entirely out of touch with Sandino and seems really discouraged. Up to the last minute he insisted that the elections could not be held in Nicaragua, and when they were, he came in for a good deal of criticism. His paper, El Ariel, is being published in Mexico, and I will forward copies of the first issue shortly. ¶ Report No.68. ¶ Tegucigalpa--Nov. 17, 1928. ¶ Sources--Personal observation. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, Major, G.S ¶ M.A."

45.  December 17, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation: Report of Tenorio, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 1.    "SANDINO SITUATION. ¶ Report of Tenorio. ¶ When I returned from Managua on December 11th I found Constantino Tenorio waiting for me here. He makes the following report. ¶ Joined Sandino August 18th, at the Quinta California, near Murra. Left him at Divisiones de Agua, a mountain near Chipote, on November 9th. Was over three weeks returning here, as he had to come all the way on foot. During the first month after his arrival he saw very little of Sandino, so is not sure of his movements, but after that he was taken into Sandino’s personal group. From about the middle of September until he left they moved almost continuously between Murra, California, and Divisiones de Agua--in other words they were not out of the Murra-Chipote region during the period. As this is the same region in which he was moving a year ago, it seems inexplicable that the Marines should not have had it better controlled. ¶ Plan. ¶ Tenorio told Sandino that after the elections he did not understand what could be accomplished by remaining in the field, and Sandino admitted that they themselves had no sort of plan beyond trying to interfere with the elections. At the last minute they abandoned even this, and let the men who were with them voluntarily go to their villages to vote. Tenorio states that probably two-thirds of the men were with Sandino involuntarily, and that very few of them, even those who had been in his forces for months, had even seen him. After the elections, Sandino found himself in an impossible position. He could either continue to fight against Moncada, which would destroy the “Hero of the race” and “Holy War” tradition, or he would have to quit. He told Tenorio he would have quit long ago had it not been for the fact that he had made jefes who joined him sign a written agreement never to quit as long as there was a Marine in Nicaragua, and he didn’t see how he could get around this. In the meantime Tenorio had talked to practically all the jefes, and he reported to Sandino that even General Jirón saw nothing to be gained by continuing. Sandino . . . "

46.  December 17, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation: Report of Tenorio, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 2.    " . . . then--about Nov. 6th--started getting in touch with the principal leaders and also endeavored to establish some sort of direct communication with General Moncada. He failed in this, and on Nov 9th he suddenly told Tenorio, who had not been permitted to leave, to hurry back here and establish communication with Moncada. I held over the plane in which I had come, and sent by it a letter from Tenorio to General Moncada, and the substance of this report to the Marines. Sandino gave no hint of his idea of terms, simply told Tenorio to get him into direct touch with Moncada. ¶ Ammunition. ¶ Tenorio states positively that with the exception of less than a dozen cases of ammunition brought up the Coco River in April that Sandino had received no ammunition from outside. It was all stuff that had been accumulated for the Sacasa revolution and most of it was buried near Murra. That was the reason Sandino continually returned to that area. The constant reports that José Leon Diaz brought ammunition over the western border from Honduras arose from the fact that several times Sandino did not dare to go near Murra, and so sent Diaz, who is a smuggler and had a good packtrain, to get the ammunition. Each time Diaz had to bring his mules from Western Nueva Segovia, where he operated, to Murra, and then on to Sandino, so agents naturally reported he had brought the ammunition all the way. We had heard absolutely nothing of Diaz since July, and it was supposed he was dead, but Tenorio reports he was with Sandino all the time that he himself was there, and is presumably still with him. Tenorio was practically a prisoner with Sandino’s personal group, and so saw only the three machine-guns there. He could give no information as to what the other groups had. ¶ Identifications. ¶ In the picture of Sandino with two men the man on the LEFT of the PICTURE is Colonel Estrada, the other is Colonel Gregorio Colindres. In the picture of a jefe with two guns standing be- . . . "

47. December 17, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation: Report of Tenorio, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 3.   " . . . -tween two men the jefe is Salgado. Colonel Francisco Altamirano committed suicide about two months ago. José de Paredes, Sandino’s secretary, left Oct. 15th for Mexico for an operation. He is now showing the scars as having been made by a bomb fragment. (See copy of El Machete attached.) ¶ San Marcos Murders. ¶ Sandino told Tenorio that Dr. Mendieta and the other Liberals killed at San Marcos about Oct. 1st were murdered by Pedro Altamirano, and that he himself knew nothing of it, and would never have permitted it. ¶ Finally, Tenorio reached Sandino as follows: ¶ In Danlí he met two men who had just been sent there to get some medical supplies, one of whom he knew. These men carried a message from Tenorio to Sandino, and two weeks later one of them came back and guided him to the Quinta California. Sandino was then –August 16th – at Divisiones de Agua, but moved north to meet Tenorio, and so save him the extra trip, all of which had to be made at night and on foot. It should be noted that so far as we know Tenorio is the only outsider who has been able to reach Sandino without a passport from Machado in Mexico, and without previous arrangements being made for his trip. ¶ Report No.71. ¶ Tegucigalpa--December 17, 1928. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Major, G.S. ¶ M.A."

48.  December 25, 1928.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation: Sandino Jefes in Honduras, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.   "SANDINO SITUATION. ¶ Sandino Jefes in Honduras. ¶ Colonel Sanchez, one of Sandino’s best and most active commanders, passed through here early this morning, apparently enroute overland to Salvador. We were on the lookout for him and an agent had a long talk with him, but I will not be able to get this until to-morrow so will put it in a later report. José Leon Diaz and Carlos Quesada are also in Honduras. ¶ Sandino propaganda. ¶ There is attached a copy of the “Workers’ Pictorial”, received yesterday by Turcios and some postcard copies of the pictures I obtained from Machado in June. ¶ Tenorio is in touch with General Moncada and it is probable this whole affair may be ended shortly after the latter takes office on January 1st. ¶ Report No.74. ¶ Tegucigalpa--December 25, 1928. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Major, G.S. ¶ M.A."

49.  January 12, 1929.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 1.   "SANDINO SITUATION. ¶ Immediately after his inauguration President Moncada sent word here that he would be glad to receive Constantino Tenorio on January 8th, but only to discuss matters that might further pacify Nicaragua. Tenorio immediately declined to go, and it seemed as though we were again at a standstill. ¶ However, on the 7th a most unexpected break in our favor occurred. Turcios sent a man to Tenorio with the following information: ¶ That he had resigned as Sandino agent in Honduras. That about November 15th he had word from Sandino saying he would remain entirely passive until after the inauguration of Moncada, and then see what the latter’s attitude would be. Finally, that Turcios wanted Tenorio to work with him. ¶ It was evident that Turcios thought Tenorio was about to end the Sandino business and wanted to break in and retain his prestige as Sandino’s one trusted agent. Tenorio immediately suggested that the thing to do was for President Moncada to send an emissary over here and go after Turcios, to make him have Sandino quit. There was a plane here and I sent a letter to General Feland, giving Tenorio’s views. ¶ The next day Tenorio received the following word from Sandino: ¶ On December 4th Admiral Sellers, through General Feland, suggested conference representatives of President Díaz and myself. Owing to limited time this was impossible but arrangements were made for conference representatives of Moncada and myself, after the former’s inauguration, at San Rafael del Norte, with five men from each side. ¶ I cabled this to Managua on the afternoon of the 10th and yesterday received the following: ¶ From Feland for Cruse. I am working on idea expressed in . . . "

50.  January 12, 1929.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 1.   Attachment:  Press clipping:   "Sandino Breaks With Turcios. TEGUCIGALPA. Honduras, January 28 (AP).--Augusto Sandino, Nicaraguan rebel leader, has formally severed relations with Froylan Turcios, hitherto his representative outside of Nicaragua. A letter was delivered to Turcios by special messenger today, under date of January 7, announcing the break."

51.  January 12, 1929.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 2.   " . . . your letter and believe emissary will be sent there soon. Keep in touch with Tenorio. Your January 10, 4 P.M. substantially correct but no conference arranged as yet and impossible under conditions requested. ¶ My own opinion is that Turcios’ resignation, which he actually sent in, will almost be enough of itself to make Sandino quit, as Turcios was apparently the one man who was going to stick forever. However, a good, determined man from President Moncada can put things up to Turcios in such a way that he will almost have to urge Sandino to quit. Whether the latter will do it is of course uncertain. ¶ Report No.80 ¶ Tegucigalpa--Jan. 12, 1929. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Major, G.S. ¶ M.A."