1.  Jan. 28, 1929.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.    "SANDINO SITUATION. ¶ Attached are a copy and a translation of a letter in which Sandino accepts the resignation of Froylan Turcios as his Representative on the American Continent. ¶ Tenorio secured the original letter from the messenger on the morning of January 25th. Turcios has not yet seen it and knows nothing of it having reached here. I sent a copy by plane to the Marines on the 27th. ¶ Tenorio has arranged to have the letter published simultaneously here, in Salvador, and in Guatemala, and for the messenger to deliver it to Turcios on the day it is published here. We believe that in this way Turcios will believe Sandino had it published and realize that he is out of things for good. ¶ We are watching carefully for the men sent to get the papers from Turcios and hope to get possession of them. ¶ Report No.87. ¶ Tegucigalpa--January 28, 1929. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Major, G.S. ¶ M.A."

2.  Jan. 7, 1929.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation: Translation of Letter from Sandino Accepting the Resignation of Froylán Turcios as his Agent of the American Continent, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.    "TRANSLATION OF LETTER FROM SANDINO ACCEPTING THE RESIGNATION OF FROYLAN TURCIOS AS HIS AGENT ON THE AMERICAN CONTINENT. ¶ El Chipotón, Nicaragua, ¶ January 7th, 1929. ¶ Mr. Froylan Turcios, ¶ Tegucigalpa--Honduras. ¶ Sir: ¶ I have at hand your letter, dated in the above city the 28th of last December, and in which you submit to this Supreme Command your resignation as the Representative of our Army on the Continent. ¶ I have the honor to inform you that your resignation has this date been accepted, with the understanding that you are to make no use of the documents concerning our Army which are now in your possession, but are to be prepared to duly account for them to whomever this High Command of the Army may designate to receive them. ¶ Until then, we do not desire to receive any further communications from you in our cantonments. ¶ When I consider cases such as yours I am reminded of DIOGENES the philosopher. ¶ You forgot that while the bazaars are full of wooden soldiers the men who are fighting in the SEGOVIAS have ideas that are worthy of such men. ¶ Be so kind as to inform the press of the world, by radio, of our attitude. ¶ PATRIA Y LIBERTAD. ¶ (Signed) Augusto C. Sandino. ¶ (Seal.) ¶ Certified a correct translation of the original letter. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Major, G.S."

3.  February 4, 1929.  Cable on Sandino Situation, US Consul R. M. de Lambert, San Salvador, to Sec. State, p. 1.     "San Salvador, February 4, 1929. ¶ No. 1496 ¶ The Honorable ¶ The Secretary of State, ¶ Washington. ¶ Sir: ¶ Referring to despatch No. 1487 of January 26, 1929, with regard to Sandino, I have the honor to report that most of the local papers have during the past week carried various and sometimes contradictory articles in regard to the men and the situation in Nicaragua. As was stated in the above mentioned despatch it was reported here that Froylán Turcios had endeavored to have Sandino come to terms with President Moncada. It has more recently been stated that not only was this endeavor unsuccessful but that Sandino, being convinced of the incompatability of the present interests of himself ¶ and . . . "

4.  February 4, 1929.  Cable on Sandino Situation, US Consul R. M. de Lambert, San Salvador, to Sec. State, p. 2.     " . . . and Turcios, has removed the latter from his former position as representative of the rebel leader abroad. Most of the papers carried the announcement that “all are abandoning Sandino”, and LA PRENSA of January 29th stated that President Moncada would send Dr. Julián Irías with special instructions to solicit the good offices of Turcios to have Sandino lay down his arms. ¶ It is perhaps significant that most of the local papers now are beginning to leave off the title “General” when referring to Sandino. ¶ A despatch from Managua states that “Sandino is now the most serious problem for Nicaragua”, and that the pacification of the Segovias will be one of the first problems to be attacked by President Moncada. In the DIARIO DEL SALVADOR of February 3rd it is stated that Captain Paredes, a member of Sandino’s army, visited San Salvador several days ago and had with him an order from Sandino directing him to make known that the resignation of Turcios had been accepted by Sandino. Copy of this article is herewith enclosed. ¶ The same DIARIO DEL SALVADOR of February 3rd reported that the Nicaraguan Autonomist Association has sent a letter to the President of Salvador, (copy and translation of which are herewith enclosed) requesting President Romero Bosque to join the other Central American Presidents in an effort to find a solution of the Nicaraguan situation. ¶ I . . . "

5.  February 4, 1929.  Cable on Sandino Situation, US Consul R. M. de Lambert, San Salvador, to Sec. State, p. 3.     " . . . I have the honor to be, Sir, ¶ Your obedient servant, ¶ R. M. de Lambert ¶ RMdeL:S ¶ 800 N ¶ Enclosures: ¶ 1. Two clippings from DIARIO DEL SALVADOR marked 1 and 2. (1 copy each). ¶ 2. Translation of portion of clipping marked 2."

6.  February 4, 1929.  Cable on Sandino Situation, Enclosure No. 2, Diario del Salvador, Feb. 3, 1929 (English Translation), US Consul R. M. de Lambert, San Salvador, to Sec. State, p. 4.     "Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 1496, dated February 4, 1929, from San Salvador. ¶ (DIARIO DEL SALVADOR – Feb. 3) ¶ Sir: ¶ Knowing as you do of the internal conflict which Nicaragua is suffering, we pray you for humanity and patriotism, in the name of the Nicaraguan Autonomist Association, to lend your valuable support to the other Central American Presidents for the purpose of arriving at an honorable solution of that serious situation. ¶ If General Moncada accepts the conference proposed by General Sandino upon a basis of national dignity and under the moral auspices of the Central American Governments we do not doubt that the lamentable situation of sister Nicaragua will terminate in a short time. ¶ Your participation will be beneficial in order to make an international precedent in the internal affairs of the weak countries and will be a propitious opportunity to perform an act of justice upon the initiative of El Salvador, especially with regard to arriving at a solution of Central American problems through the joining of the brother countries. ¶ Hoping for the kind acceptance of our proposal, we remain sincerely yours. ¶ /s/ J. de J. Zamora ¶ President of the Association ¶ His Excellency ¶ Sr. Dr. don Pio Romero Bosque, ¶ President of the Republic of El Salvador, ¶ E.S.D.O."

7.  February 8, 1929.  Cable on Sandino Situation, US Consul R. M. de Lambert, San Salvador, to Sec. State, p. 1.    "San Salvador, February 8, 1929. ¶ No. 1502 ¶ The Honorable ¶ The Secretary of State, ¶ Washington. ¶ Sir: ¶ Referring to this Legation’s despatch No. 1376 of November 2, 1928, with regard to one José L. Paredes, who had presented himself at this Legation as having formerly been a member of Sandino’s forces, who was on his way to Mexico, and believed that he might find some way of securing peace, I have the honor to report that the same man recently again has passed through this capital apparently en route to Mexico – which would seem to indicate that he rejoined Sandino after his visit here in October last. ¶ “Captain Paredes of the Staff of General Sandino” did not visit this Legation on this trip but seems ¶ to . . . "

8.  February 8, 1929.  Cable on Sandino Situation, US Consul R. M. de Lambert, San Salvador, to Sec. State, p. 2.    " . . . to have been in close relation with the DIARIO DEL SALVADOR. In one of its articles the DIARIO DEL SALVADOR quoted Paredes as stating that the following Salvadoreans still are in the service of Sandino: ¶ Augustin F. Marti, Secretary of Sandino, native of Teotepeque, student of the National University where he founded the anti-imperialist league. ¶ General José León Díaz, who has under him the column in Chontales. ¶ Adam González ¶ Guillermo Ajuria ¶ Luis Marin ¶ José Augustin González ¶ and one other. ¶ Paredes further stated that “the woman of Sandino in bivouac”, Teresa Espinol, also is a native of San Salvador. ¶ Paredes also mentioned Gregorio Gilbert of the Dominican Republic; José Jiron Ruano, Ex-governor of Petén of Guatemala (recently reported captured by the marines); Carlos Aponte of Venezuela, and General Montoya and Colonel Manuel Lagos of Honduras, as now figuring in the service of Sandino. ¶ I have the honor to be, Sir, ¶ Your obedient servant, ¶ R. M. de Lambert ¶ RMdeL:S ¶ 800N"

9.  February 12, 1929.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.   "SANDINO SITUATION. ¶ CAPTURE OF GENERAL JIRON. ¶ General Manuel Maria Jiron Ruano, Sandino’s Chief of Staff since the middle of August, and former commander of the field force, was captured on February 3d near San Albino. When taken he was alone, riding on a mule toward the south. ¶ When I left Nicaragua no further details were available, but I am quite sure than Jiron, who was with Sandino solely for the excitement of the affair, got tired of inaction and pulled out. ¶ The Marines offered him his freedom if he would lead them to Sandino, and on Feb. 4th he was leading a patrol in an effort to carry out this plan. This fact, and the complete wreck of the outside connections through Turcios, leave Sandino nothing but a discredited fugitive. ¶ When I left Tegucigalpa Tenorio urged me to tell General Feland to keep the Marines absolutely out of it. If Moncada’s volunteers or men of the Guardia are killed there will be no propaganda, but every time a Marine is killed it gives the whole affair new life. This is sound policy and will probably be put into effect. ¶ Finally, President Moncada informed me that the new administration in Honduras was co-operating willingly and effectively and that he was not worried about the final outcome. ¶ Report No.90. ¶ San Jose--Feb. 12, 1929 ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Major, G.S. ¶ M.A."

10.  January 29, 1929.  “Argentine Paper ‘La Nación’ Against the Rebel of the Segovias,” translation of article from El Comercio of Managua.     "TRANSLATION. ¶ From “EL COMERCIO” of Managua--January 29, 1929. ¶ ARGENTINE PAPER “LA NACION” AGAINST THE REBEL OF THE SEGOVIAS. ¶ Buenos Aires, 27.--The newspaper “La Nacion”, which for many months defended the cause of the Nicaraguan rebel Sandino, in an article of Saturday evening changes its pro-Sandino tone and fiercely criticizes his idea of dividing up the territory of the country for the integrity of the sovereignty of which he was supposed to be fighting. ¶ The same article criticizes the destructive activities of the Sandino hosts in in the North of Nicaragua, where thousands of dollars have been kept from the national Treasury by failure to gather the coffee crop, the base of all the wealth of Nicaragua. ¶ Concluding, the article referred to says that President Moncada has the fullest justification for trying to eliminate Sandino, and calls on the people of the other four Central American republics to help in the pacification of Nicaragua, rooting out all Sandino propaganda, since the cause has degenerated into pure banditry. ¶ Certified a correct translation"

11.  February 1, 1929.  “The Press of Mexico Against Augusto C. Sandino,” translation of article from El Comercio of Managua, p. 1.     "TRANSLATION. ¶ FROM “EL COMERCIO” of Managua--February 1, 1929. ¶ THE PRESS OF MEXICO AGAINST AUGUSTO C. SANDINO. ¶ City of Mexico--31st.--The letters recently given out by Froylan Turcios put the rebel Sandino in the class of a lunatic, according to several local papers in this capital. “El Universal” says that the President of Nicaragua, General José María Moncada, is quite right in his declaration to the Associated Press that the pretensions of the rebel are absurd and that he is a false patriot and a lunatic. The resignation of Turcios is the first heavy blow that that the bandit Sandino has suffered. ¶ Certified a correct translation. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Major, G.S. ¶ M.A."

12.  February 1, 1929.  “Turcios and Sandino break off Relations,” translation of article from El Sol of Tegucigalpa, p. 1.    "TRANSLATION. ¶ From “EL SOL”, of Tegucigalpa--February 1, 1929. ¶ TURCIOS AND SANDINO BREAK OFF RELATIONS. ¶ When the news became public that the poet Froylan Turcios had resigned as the representative of General Sandino on the American Continent, we got together with him in order to get details and give to the readers of EL SOL some idea of the beginning and development of this unextected [unexpected] event. ¶ SENSATIONAL DECLARATIONS TO COME. ¶ Señor Turcios, receiving our emissary with his usual cordiality, informed him that there are sensational details concerning the Sandino affair, which he would be glad to give us at such time as the march of events made suitable. ¶ HAS THE CAMPAIGN TAKEN A NEW COURSE? ¶ Underlying all the conversation of the great Honduran poet, was the indication that the cause so heroically defended by Sandino was about to take a turn with which Turcios was not in accord. ¶ TURCIOS RESENTFUL OF THE HERO’S LETTERS. ¶ Without making any positive declaration, it is evident that Turcios rejects Sandino’s new ideas and is disgusted with the tone of his letters, so that the two men who have in different ways fought the war of Latin Americanism in the Segovias have begun to disagree. ¶ STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE REBEL CHIEF AND POET. ¶ Nevertheless, up to the present it cannot be said that Turcios has broken with Sandino. When asked for some declaration as to the matter the subject of our interview contented himself with saying that until he hears again from the Chief of the Segovias he will have nothing to say, but that when he does he will cover all aspects of the affair. . . . "

13.  February 1, 1929.  “Turcios and Sandino break off Relations,” translation of article from El Sol of Tegucigalpa, p. 2.   ". . . ENEMIES OF THE AUTONOMIST CAUSE.  As long as the affair cannot be presented fully and clearly, it is considered best not to publish anything about it, for fear that enemies might take advantage of it to damage the Cause."

14.  February 3, 1929.  “Cause of the Break between Sandino and Turcios,” translation of article from El Comercio of Managua, p. 1.     "TRANSLATION. ¶ From “EL COMERCIO”--of Managua--February 3d, 1929. ¶ CAUSE OF THE BREAK BETWEEN SANDINO AND TURCIOS. ¶ His Continental Representative Considered Absurd The Plan To Land At Corinto, Overthrow Moncada and Proclaim Pedro José Zepeda As President. ¶ TURCIOS’S LETTER ON THIS PLAN. ¶ In December Sandino wrote a letter to Froylán Turcios, his General Representative, outlining the following new plan. ¶ Sandino would agree to cease fighting provided the Marines evacuated four Departments: Estelí, Matagalpa, Jinotega and Nueva Segovia while Sandino was disarming his men and turning over his arms to Moncada; Sandino, however, would only turn in part of the arms, keeping most of them hidden in the bush; likewise, his men would remain in these four Departments ostensibly engaged in agriculture but in reality ready to gather at the call of Sandino. ¶ Sandino would then go to Mexico, and while the United States troops were completing their evacuation he would be secretly getting together a strong expeditionary force, to move by sea: when all United States troops were out of Nicaragua he would land his expeditionary force, taking Corinto by sea, and with the assistance of his former army, invading Chinandega, Leon and Managua. ¶ Moncada to be put out of power, Pedro J. Zepeda declared Provisional President, and then new elections called, with Sandino as the only presidential candidate. ¶ REPLY OF TURCIOS REJECTING THE PLAN. ¶ Following this plan Sandino has sent various agents to Mexico. Turcios denounced the plan, writing to Sandino that it was foolish, impractical and unpatriotic. ¶ Sandino disregarded the objections of Turcios, and was going ahead with the plan, whereupon Turcios resigned, informing Sandino by letter. Sandino, furious, wrote him the famous letter of the 7th of January, accepting the resignation and breaking off all relations. ¶ Turcios has not yet seen the letter, but knows its contens [contents] . . . " [last line(s) cut off]

15.  February 3, 1929.  “Cause of the Break between Sandino and Turcios,” translation of article from El Comercio of Managua, p. 2.     "SANDINO SITUATION. ¶ General Staff Disbanded. ¶ As a result probably of the capture of General Jirón the General Staff of Sandino’s force has broken up. José Léon Díaz, Salgado and Simeon Montoya have been definitely located in Honduras. The Government immediately informed Dr. Julian Irías, on special mission from Nicaragua to the inauguration of Dr. Mejía Colindres. The former, in a telegram to President Moncada, stated that all Sandino’s jefes had deserted, but Tenorio informs me that Colindres, Aponte Hernandez, and Pedro Altamirano are undoubtedly still with him. However, the field force ceased to exist immediately after the election, and the General Staff is now out of existence. This leaves only Sandino’s personal group. Tenorio insists that this group is still close to Murra, and I have so informed the Marines. ¶ Sandino Situation in Salvador. ¶ One of the members of the Mission sent from Salvador to the inauguration of Dr. Mejía Colindres was Arturo Lara. He is a newspaper man, and I have known him for years. He told me he was the press censor, so in a two-hour talk I gave him all the details of the Sandino campaign. He was amazed at the lack of magnitude of the whole thing. He told me that he, and other responsible men in Salvador, had believed that Sandino had at least 2000 men, that the Marines has lost hundreds of men in the campaign, and that there was every likelihood of Sandino being able to defeat Moncada. I arranged for him to talk with Tenorio, and after the interview he was completely disgusted with the whole affair. He promised to see that the newspaper in Salvador got the truth and he apparently did so, because I am informed that almost overnight they dropped the business, even the violent “Diario Latino” admitting the complete collapse of the whole affair. ¶ Sandino’s Wife Held. ¶ Blanca Arauz, Sandinó’s wife, was brought into Managua on the 12th, and is being held there. The newspapers stated this was because she had been keeping Sandino informed of movements of the Marines and Guardia. It is not likely that she had. I questioned Tenorio very care- . . . "

16.  February 3, 1929.  “Cause of the Break between Sandino and Turcios,” translation of article from El Comercio of Managua, p. 3.     " . . . fully upon his return, as to whether Sandino had ever gone to visit her, and so on. He told me that Sandino paid no attention to her and that the only reason they were ever married was that Sandino had been running with her for years, that at the time he expected to be a great man, and wanted to get things straight before he became Dictator of Nicaragua. ¶ Jirón in the Penitentiary. ¶ General Jirón evidently failed to lead the Marine patrol to Sandino, because he was brought to Managua about ten days ago, and is now in the Penitentiary. ¶ Report No.95. ¶ San José--February 22, 1929. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Major, G.S. ¶ M.A."   [NOTE:  Latter claim on Gen. Girón false; Girón executed in the bush by Hanneken & Escamilla on March  2, 1929: Top 100, p. 27 ]

17.  March 7, 1929.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.     "SANDINO SITUATION. ¶ Propaganda now Against Sandino. ¶ Not only have most of Sandino’s leaders and followers quit, but the widespread and vicious propaganda system has been definitely turned against him. Machado in Mexico may continue for a while to give him some notice in “El Machete”, but even that is not likely. ¶ Turcios, who has just been appointed Honduran Consul in Paris, will certainly give out interviews unfavorable toward Sandino on every occasion, and Dr. Pedro J. Zepeda, who was Sandino agent in Mexico, has resigned, with the announcement that as far as he can see Sandino’s only plan is the complete ruin of the region he occupies, instead of some agreement with Moncada by which he could honorably lay down his arms. ¶ Mafuenic to Succeed Turcios. ¶ In a letter recently published in Mexico Sandino appoints the Central Committee of the organization “Manos Fuera de Nicaragua”, generally referred to as Mafuenic, as his agent on the American Continent. This Committee consists of Machado, Zepeda, Dr. Carlos Leon, and a couple of others. All are pretty thoroughly disillusioned, so the work of the committee will probably not be active. In Salvador, Mexico, Honduras and Nicaragua propaganda is now anti-Sandino. In Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia it is still favorable, at least to the extent of publishing that he still has a large force and is defeating the Government forces. In Guatemala it is uncertain what the reaction to recent events has been, as the revolution has overshadowed anything else. With the material I have I can turn the newspapers here against him, and also those in Panama. Their attitude is largely ignorance and having no other source they publish what they can get, which up to date has all been propaganda from either Turcios or Machado. ¶ Report No.99 ¶ San José--March 7, 1929. ¶ Source--Newspapers and personal knowledge. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Major, G.S. ¶ M.A."

18.  January 18, 1929.  “Sandino nombró su nuevo Representante ante el Continente Americano / Sandino Names his New Representative for the American Continent,” translation of article from El Comercio of Managua.     "Sandino nombró su nuevo Representante ante el Continente Ámericano ¶ Habrá representaciones en todos los países del mundo ¶ La Prensa de San Salvador publica lo siguiente: ¶ Cuartel General del Ejército Defensor de la Soberanía Nacional de Nicaragua. ¶ El suscrito, General y Jefe Supremo del Ejército Defensor de la Soberanía Nacional de Nicaragua, en uso de las facultades conferidas por el mismo Ejército, teniendo en consideración que el señor Froylán Turcios presentó ante este Com[hole in paper]nte General su renuncia de Representante General de nuestro Ejército en el Continente, la cual le fue aceptada con fecha 7 del actual, ¶ Acuerda: ¶ Confiar dicha Representación General en el Continente al Comité Manos Fuera de Nicaragua, con sede en México, D. F, facultando al mismo Comité para designar las representaciones que él juzgue necesarias en el mundo en general, pero siempre en carácter colectivo como la que a él se le confiere, para evitar el monopolio de las noticias procedentes de nuestro Cuartel General, que tanto urge a nuestra Causa que sean conocidas por el mundo civilizado. ¶ El Chipotón, Nicaragda, [Nicaragua,] C.A., enero dieciocho de mil nocientos veintinueve y año décimo séptimo de Lucha Anti Imperialista en Nicaragua. ¶ Patria y Libertad. ¶ A. C. SANDINO. ¶ (Firmada y sellada.) ¶ FROM “EL COMERCIO” MANAGUA. ¶ SANDINO NAMES HIS NEW REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE AMERICAN CONTINENT. ¶ WILL BE REPRESENTED IN ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD. ¶ LA PRENSA, of San Salvador, publishes the following: ¶ Headquarters of The Army of Defense of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua. ¶ The undersigned, General and Supreme Commander of the Army of Defense of the National Sovereignty of Nicaragua, by authority conferred by the said Army, and in view of the fact that Señor Froylan Turcios has resigned as the General Representative of our Army on the Continent, which resignation was accepted under date of January 7th: ¶ It is agreed: ¶ To entrust the said Representation in General on the Continent to the Committee Manos Fuera de Nicaragua, located in Mexico, Distrito Federal, authorizing the said Committee to appoint such representatives to the world at large as they may deem necessary; provided that such representation shall be collective, as in the present case, so that there may be no monopoly on the news from our Headquarters, which for the sake of our Cause must be known to all the civilized world. ¶ El Chipotón, Nicaragua, C.A. ¶ January 18, 1929, and 17th year of the Anti-Imperialistic War in Nicaragua. ¶ Patria y Libertad. ¶ A.C. Sandino. ¶ (Signed and sealed.)"   [NOTE:  see EDSN-Docs 29.01.18a]

19.  ca. March 19, 1929.  “Zepeda dejó también a Sandino / Zepeda has also dropped Sandino,” translation of article from El Comercio of Managua.   "From “El Comercio” of Managua. ¶ Zepeda dejó también a Sandino ¶ Ciudad Mexico – Pedro J. Zepeda, nicaragüense representante de Sandino en esta capital, ha renunciado su cargo en vista de que la resistencia y pretensiones de Sandino, han degenerado en bandolerismo. Parece que Froylán Turcios en una carta, hizo ver a Zepeda que Sandino lo único que pretende es la desolación completa del territorio que ocupa, negándose a un entendimiento favorable con el gobierno del General Moncada para deponer honrosamente las armas. ¶ TRANSLATION. ¶ ZEPEDA HAS ALSO DROPPED SANDINO. ¶ Mexico City--Pedro J. Zepeda, a Nicaraguan and representative of Sandino in this capital, has resigned his position for the reason that the resistance and plans of Sandino have degenerated into banditry. Apparently Froylan Turcios informed Zepeda by letter that all Sandino intends is the complete desolation of the territory which he occupies, with no idea of coming to any agreement with the Government of General Moncada, so that he could honorably lay down his arms."   [NOTE: a false report - Zepeda did not resign ]

20.  February 13, 1929.  “El ídolo de Sandino se derrumbó en Mexico / Sandino the Idol has toppled in Mexico,” translation of article from El Comercio of Managua.     "El ídolo de Sandino se derrumbó en México ¶ Ciudad Mèxico 11. – Desde la renuncia de Froylán Turcios, como representante del rebelde nicaragüense Sandino, todo cuando dice el último se loma como una quijotada en esta capital. Turcios íntimamente ha declarado en sus últimas cartas, que lo que se creía patriotismo en Sandino, ha degenerado en farsa, ya que el rebelde rehusa los esfuerzos que el gobierno de Moncada hace para levantar la triste situación en que desde hace largos dos años se ha sometido la región invadida por él. El triunfo del liberalismo hondureño ha venido si se quiere, virtualmente a terminar con las pretenciones funestas de Sandino ya que ahora no tendrá frónteras donde refugiarse para escapar a los derechos de orden de que se ha investido a Moncada por la voluntad del pueblo concien le de Nicaragua. ¶ From “El Comercio”--of Managua--February 13, 1929. ¶ SANDINO THE IDOL HAS TOPPLED IN MEXICO. ¶ Mexico City--11th.--Since the resignation of Fryolan Turcios as representative of the Nicaraguan rebel Sandino everything the latter says is taken as an absurdity in this capital. Turcios, in private letters has stated confidentially that what was supposed to be patriotism in Sandino has degenerated into farce, since the rebel has rejected all efforts of the Government of Moncada to lighten the sad conditions to which for two long years the region invaded by him has been subjected. The triumph of liberalism in Honduras has really put an end to the pretensions of Sandino since he no longer will have a frontier refuge wherein to escape from the arm of the law, placed in the hands of Moncada by the thinking people of Nicaragua. ¶ Turcios Dice que Sandino es un Verdadero Farsante ¶ CIUDAD MEXICO, 11. – Desde la renuncia de Froylán Turcios como representante del rebelde nicaragüense Sandino, todo cuanto dice el último se toma como una quijotada en esta capital. ¶ Turcios últimamente ha declarado en sus cartas, que lo que se creía patriotismo en Sandino ha degenerado en farsa, ya que el rebelde rehusa los apoyos que el Gobierno de Moncada hace para levantar la triste situación a que desde hace largos dos años se ha sometido la region invadida por él. El Liberalismo hondureño ha venido, si se quiere, virtualmente a terminar con las pretensiones funestas de Sandino, ya que ahora no tendrá fronteras donde refugiarse para escapar a los derechos do orden de que se ha investido a Moncada, por la voluntad consciente del pueblo [paper folded] Nicaragua."

21.  March 9, 1929. “Fué Pasado por las Armas Manuel Ma. Jirón Ruano — Intentó Conducir a las Fuerzas del Gobierno a una Emboscada Sandinista / Manuel Maria Jirón Ruano Shot — Intended to lead Government Forces into Sandino Ambush,” translation of article from El Comercio of Managua.    "Fué Pasado por las Armas Manuel Ma. Jirón Ruano ¶ Intentó Conducir a las Fuerzas del Gobierno a una Emboscada Sandinista ¶ Manuel María Jirón Ruano, recientemente capturado por el teniente Henneken, el mismo que incendió y destruyó las minas <La Luz> y <Los Angeles>, en la región de Pis-Pis y quien ha causado grandes males al país, fue juzgado en consejo de guerra, resultando condenado y pasado inmediatamente por las armas. ¶ El motivo de su muerte ¶ El motivo de tal fusilación fue que Jirón Ruano, que se utilizaba como guía en las operaciones de persecución del bandolerismo en la región del Norte, intentó conducir a las fuerzas voluntarías a una emboscada preparada por íos bandoleros, no obstante que se le guardaba toda clase de consideraciones. Sumados sus delitos anteriores al que intentaba cometer para que mataran impunemente a numerosos soldados, el jefe expedicionario dispuso fusilarlo, con los requisitos de ley. ¶ Donde fué fusilado ¶ Jirón Ruano fué fusilado en las montañas de Murra, hace tres o cuatro dias. Ignórase el nombre del Jefe de las fuerzas que guiaba Jirón Ruano pero se supone que sea el General Caldera o el general Escamilla. ¶ Quien era Jirón Ruano ¶ Este jefe sandinista era guatemalteco, como de 55 años de edad Desempeño importantes cargos públicos en el régimen de Estrada Cabrera; en Honduras fué Director de Policia de Chiquimula en la administración de Estrada Cabrera. ¶ Deja dos niños y una esposa que actualmente reside en ciudad de Guatemala. ¶ MANUEL MARIA JIRON RUANO SHOT. ¶ INTENDED TO LEAD GOVERNMENT FORCES INTO SANDINO AMBUSH. ¶ Manuel María Jirón Ruano, recently captured by Lt. Henneken, and the man who burned and destroyed the “La Luz” and “Los Angeles” mines, in the Pis-Pis region, and who has done great harm to the country, has been tried by a Council of War, condemned, and shot. ¶ It appears that Jirón Ruano, who was being used as a guide in the pursuit of bandits in the North, and who had been treated with every consideration, planned to lead the volunteer forces into an ambush arranged by bandits. This, taken with his previous crimes, was too much for the column commander, who executed him by due process of law. ¶ Jirón Ruano was executed in the mountains near MURRA, three or four days ago. Who was in command of the column that Jirón was guiding is not known, but it is supposed to have been either General Calders or General Escamilla. ¶ Jirón was a Guatemalan, about 55 years old. During the time of Estrada Cabrera he held important Government positions. He has two children and a wife, who are at present residing in Guatemala."

22.  March 20, 1929.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.     "SANDINO SITUATION. ¶ Volunteer forces. ¶ Since early in February two forces of Nicaraguan volunteers have been operating in Nueva Segovia. They are commanded by General Juan Escamilla and General Felipe T. Flores, Each force consists of about two hundred men. Escamilla is a Mexican and was with Sandino until May of last year. These forces have cleaned up the disturbed area quite thoroughly. ¶ Sandino Practically Alone. ¶ The publication of Sandino’s letter accepting Turcios’ resignation proved to be unexpectedly effective. Turcios immediately turned against him and has swung the whole propaganda organization into violent denunciation of him for wrecking the Cause. This was followed early in March by the desertion of the General Staff in a body. They crossed into Honduras and were disarmed. This group included Montoya, Salgado, Ortez, and Porfirio Sánchez. The Government of Honduras is openly anti-Sandino and will give up these men if President Moncada asks it, but I do not believe he will. There now remain with Sandino the following:- ¶ Col. Francisco Estrada. ¶ Col. Coronado Maradiaga. ¶ Dr. Domingo Mairena Hernandez. ¶ Rumors. ¶ The papers in both Nicaragua and Honduras publish an announcement by President Moncada that Sandino has left Nicaragua and gone via Honduras to Salvador. This is not likely, as Tenorio would have known of it and informed me. ¶ Report No.107. ¶ San José--March 20, 1929. ¶ Source--Newspapers: checked with Tenorio. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Major, G.S. ¶ M.A."

23.  ca. April 1, 1929.  “Typical News Items showing how Complete is Collapse of Sandino Cause,” translations of newspaper articles.   "Se confirma que Llego a DanlÍ El Estado Mayor del General Sandino — Danlí es una de las poblaciones importantes del departamento de Paraiso, Honduras, conlindante este con el de Nueva Segovia. Queda dicha ciudad casi en dirección opuesta a Ocotal y como a treinta leguas e distancia una de otra. Ha sido el foco del sandinismo durante todo el tiempo de la cruzada del rebelde segoviano. Ayer se nos afirmó oficialmente la noticia, ya publicada por este diario, de la llegada del Estado Mayor de Sandino a Danlí, después de haber cruzado la frontera por Pedregalitos la semana proxima pasada. Probablemente seguirá para el interior de Honduras."  •  "CAPTURA DE OTRO JEFE SANDINISTA — En el lugar llamado Cifuentes, cerca de la frontera de Honduras se capturó al jefe sandinista Porfirio Sánchez. Vendrá reconcentrado a Managua. A proposito de sandinistas, muchos de estos que ahora se encuentran en Honduras, además de los que permanecen en Encinos, han escrito a personas de Ocotal diciéndoles que interpongan con el Comando Americano sus buenos oficios para que se les permita el regrreso a sus hogares."  •  "Dos cabecillas Sandinistas deponen sus armas en Honduras.  Managua, 6. — Han llegado noticias de Ocotal, dirigidas al Presidente Moncada por el Juez de Distrito, informando que el Jefe sandinista Porfirio Sánchez con otro cabecilla, Simón González, y setenta secuaces, lograron evadir los ataques de una patrulla que los perseguía y escaparon hacia Honduras por la población fronteriza de Jalapa, rindiéndose a la guarnación hondureña a la cual entregaron sus armas."

24.  April 7, 1929.  “Todas las Armas del Cabecilla Salgado Fueron Decomisadas / All the Arms of the Commander Salgado were Confiscated / Capture of Sandino Messenger,” translations of newspaper articles.   "Según el siguiente telegrama trascrito por el Goberno hondureño al de Nicaragua, se le decomisó al cabecilla sandinista Carlos Salgado, un verdadero arsenal de guerra, así:  Tegucigalpa, 1.40 pm., 5 abril 1929.—Excmo. Sr. Presidente, Managua.—Complázcome enviarle trascripción que me ha sido enviada por el Excmo. Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores.  Telegrama: 'Alauca, 3 de abril de 1929. Señor Presidente. Tengo a honra comunicarle a Ud. que estos momentos ingresa a esta la columna del General Carlos Salgado, quien disolvió su gente, las armas y elementos bélicos lo escondió, pero espías que le seguían descrubrieron el lugar donde se [--]laban y hoy a las nueve de la mañana envié a Las Partidas, jurisdicción de este pueblo, se encontraron en un rancho de paja en el fondo de una troja de maicillo, 16 rifles concones, cuatro rifles Lanzabombas, 12 Sprinfields, 9 calibre 7, MM. y una ametralladora Lewis en buen estado. Siete discos para la misma con 40 cartuchos de repuesto para la dicha ametralladora, 27 bombas de dinamita, 47 fulminantes para bomba y dos varas mecha, cincuenetidós cartuchos calibre 11, 18 cartuchos para rifles concones, 50 cartuchos para Sprinfields, un platillo de aluminio de los utilizados por los americanos y 10 salveques viejos, todos estos elementos están aquí y espero sus órdenes. Mañana salgo para El Pedregalito y de alli a Las Manos en persecución de Miguel Ortez, quien aseguarán esta enmontañado. También tengo en mi poder una bomba de las que arrojan los aeroplanos americanos en Limas. Afmo. — José A. Sánchez.

25.  April 17, 1929.  “EL GENERAL SANDINO SALE AL FIN DE NICARAGUA DESPUES DE VARIOS AÑOS DE HEROICA RESISTENCIA - CON AUTORIZACION DEL GOBIERNO DE HONDURAS PASARA POR EL TERRITORIO DE ESE PAIS CON RUMBO A MEXICO / General Sandino at Last to Leave Nicaragua after Several Years of Heroic Resistance,” translation of article from La Tribuna of San José, Costa Rica.     "EL GENERAL SANDINO SALE AL FIN DE NICARAGUA DESPUES DE VARIOS ANOS DE HEROICA RESISTENCIA ¶ CON AUTORIZACION DEL GOBIERNO DE HONDURAS PASARA POR EL TERRITORIO DE ESE PAIS CON RUMBO A MEXICO ¶ El señor Cónsul de Nicaragua, don Elie J. Hazera, se sirvió ayer enterarnos del siguiente despacho telegráfico recibido por él: ¶ Managua, Abril 15.- ¶ Cónsul Hazera, ¶ San José. ¶ El Ministro de Nicaragua en Tegucigalpa, en telegrama de hoy, dice: ¶ “El Gobierno de Honduras acaba de avisarme oficialmente que permitirá el paso de Sandino por el territorio de Honduras, quien irá custodiado para evitar manifestaciones. Se dirige a México. ¶ J. F. Moncada” ¶ Sirvase dar publicidad al tener noticia y decir que el país está en completa tranquilidad, a excepción de pequeña partida de bandoleros que ha quedado diseminada en el departamento de Jinotega. ¶ Relaciones ¶ From “La Tribuna” of San José--Costa Rica. ¶ April 17, 1929. ¶ General Sandino at Last to Leave Nicaragua After Several Years of Heroic Resistance. ¶ With Permission From The Government of Honduras He Will Pass Through That Country Enroute to Mexico. ¶ The Nicaraguan Consul, Don Elie J. Hazera, was kind enough yesterday to show us the following telegraphic information he had received: ¶ Managua, April 15th. Consul Hazera, ¶ San José. ¶ The Minister of Nicaragua in Tegucigalpa, says in a telegram to-day: ¶ The Government of Honduras has just notified me officially that it will permit Sandino to pass through the territory of Honduras, but in custody to prevent any demonstrations. He is going to Mexico. ¶ J.F. Moncada. ¶ Please give publicity to this and state that the country is in complete tranquillity, [tranquility,] with the exception of a small number of bandits scattered in the Department of Jinotega. ¶ Foreign Relations."

26.  September 14, 1930.  Rafael de Nogales, “More Light on ‘Bad Man’ Sandino and How he Fights,” The Sunday Star, Washington D.C., image 1.     "More Light on “Bad Man” SANDINO and How He Fights ¶ This Is the Nicaraguan General’s Own Story of His War Against the United States as Told to Rafael de Nogales, Soldier of Fortune Who Commanded a Division of Turkish Troops for the Germans During the World War and Who Was With Sandino in the Jungles and During His Exile in the Mexican Capital. ¶ By Rafael de Nogales. ¶ Brig. Gen. Logan Feland, U. S. M. C., who commanded the United States’ forces in Nicaragua. ¶ One of the best photos ever taken of Augustino Sandino. He is shown here placing a wreath on the grave of Hidalgo in Mexico City, capital of a free country which Hidalgo helped to release from foreign tyranny. ¶ Rafael de Nogales, author of this article, in Nicaragua. He is shown here with Vice President Sacasa (right) in Puerto Cabezas. ¶ Reminiscent of France. This was no comic-opera warfare, for the whole front of the Marines’ headquarters at Ocotal, is shown here peppered with machine gun and rifle fire. ¶ Capt. Richard Livingston, U. S. M. C. His body was found among 60 American dead, Sandino told Nogales. But here is the Marine captain at the Naval Hospital in Washington, very much alive, though wounded, and there were 5 dead, not 60. ¶ THE purpose of this story is not to picture Augustino Sandino as patriot or hero, but merely to draw a sketch of the man as I know him and to give, as he gave it to me, some account of his campaigns in Nicaragua. The data cited directly from him were given me in Mexico City recently by Sandino himself and by his aide de camp, Capt. Jose de Paredes. ¶ I believe it is very likely that Sandino is going to continue his fight in Nicaragua. He is there now. ¶ Sandino’s retirement to Merida, Yucatan, after his withdrawal from Nicaragua, has been set down by many as an admission of defeat, and by others as the result of a bribe of $60,000. ¶ But Sandino himself told me—and I have every reason to believe him—that he was really calling what he believes is a bluff by President Moncada of Nicaragua. ¶ Moncada has announced that if the rebels would stop fighting the American Marines would be withdrawn and the country would enjoy true democratic government. Sandino simply hid his stores and arms, disbanded his army, and left—temporarily. The Marines are still there. ¶ Perhaps by the time this article is published the whole bloody business may have broken out again. ¶ Sandino is neither a Napoleon nor a Hottentot, but to me he is a born leader of men and a clever tactician after the school of Abd-el-Krim of Morocco fame. Like Abd-el-Krim, Sandino succeeded in adapting modern military tactics to the topographic and climatic conditions of the region in which he was conducting his military operations. ¶ Sandino does not pretend to be a Napoleon. He is just a plain, self-made man, and he is proud of it. He left his native country, Nicaragua, at the age of 16, in order to earn a living abroad as a mechanic—first in Costa Rica and later also in Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico and the United States. In the States he learned to speak English fairly well, while in Mexico he got acquainted with the doctrines of anti-imperialism. ¶ WHAT does Sandino want? Ultimately, of course, the whole Nicaraguan business revolves itself into the matter of a new canal to parallel the canal across Panama, to take up surplus traffic and serve its own military needs. ¶ And Sandino, contrary to general opinion, is not at all opposed to construction of the canal. Being remarkably well versed in such matters as economic pressure and military necessity, he knows at least that it is inevitable, and all his fanatical patriotism will not blind him to that fact. ¶ What he objects to is simply the way in which the matter so far has been planned and carried out. The United States, through the Bryan-Chamorro treaty, has acquired the right to build and operate the canal without taxation for $3,000,000, and, according to Sandino, only half of that sum was actually paid to the Diaz administration in Nicaragua. Of that half, paid to politicians who are now discredited, little, if any, seems to have gone into the country’s treasury, he says. ¶ Sandino, who did his share of fighting to get rid of Diaz, simply claims that the latter was bribed into betraying his people and that Nicaragua’s present President, Moncada, is being bribed with equal success to abide by a bad bargain. ¶ Sandino has several times told me that what he wants for the canal is a joint stock company, half of the stock to be bought by Latin American nations and by Nicaragua in particular, and the other half owned by the United States and other nations. The three million dollars already paid by the United States are to be applied in full to the purchase price of shares. ¶ That would give Nicaragua a steady income with which to build railroads, auto roads, sewers, power plants, etc., without having to appeal to foreign capital and without being subjected to the common humiliation of hearing that American Marines only go into the Latin countries to “clean them up.” ¶ MUCH has been written and said about the “backwardness” of Central American republics and about the “beneficial results” of American occupations. Sandino, however, has an answer to that. He claims that this backwardness has been fostered by American interests, that revolutions and troubles have for years been deliberately stirred up in order to win unlawful concessions from temporary puppet governments. ¶ Roosevelt’s alleged fostering of the Panaman revolution in order to gain the rights to the canal is given as an example. The rebel leader claims that if the unhappy nations of Haiti, Santo Domingo and the rest of Central America had been left alone, instead of being made to wallow in a state or [of?] artificially fostered anarchy, they would have been able to work out their own salvations and follow in the footsteps of Chile, Argentina and Brazil. ¶ The justice of his claims cannot be gauged at the present time. I have seen more of Central American revolutions that the majority of people, and I know that the “inside stories” of most of these uprisings will probably never be generally known. Sandino talks earnestly and well. His arguments, backed up by action, coming from a man of fixed purpose, have won him many fanatical adherents and constitute the greatest menace today to American isthmian supremacy. ¶ Knowing the man as I do, I am convinced that he will fight for his ideals until he is killed. And after that, knowing his tremendous popularity and the indelible stamp his personality leaves wherever he goes, I am certain that somebody else will take up the fight. Not in warfare alone has he trained his lieutenants. ¶ His popularity is not confined to Nicaragua alone. It has spread over all of Central America, to Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico. ¶ While he lived in Merida he was one of the most beloved men there, in spite of the fact that he never showed himself at public festivals or other community gatherings. He and his men lived in a house that was given to them. They slept in hammocks and lived frugally without any show or display whatever. ¶ There was no surplus talk, no swashbuckling, no Napoleonic strutting. From several of the wealthy men of the town he could have had anything he wanted. He refused all local aid from his supporters in Nicaragua, and he took only the barest necessities. ¶ STORIES are heard all over Central America of how he went hungry again and again to give food to poor people who needed it more than he. Perhaps they are untrue in fact, but still they are true of the character of the man as I know him. ¶ His soldiers, many of them mere boys of 16 or 17, worship him with a fanatical zeal, thoroughly convinced that he is always just, even if terribly severe. He himself, in his awkward, clumsy way, is extremely fond of these “children” of his. ¶ Again and again he makes one of those dramatic gestures that stamp him as a leader of men. They have been ascribed to a clever and subtle showmanship, and in effect he is undoubtedly one of the greatest showmen alive today. Personally, however, I am convinced that his actions are prompted by a terrible earnestness, and I doubt if he himself is aware of playing to a gellery. No matter. Whatever the motive, the effect is the same, and the effect is the only thing that counts to the American Marines and the Nicaraguan canal. ¶ While he was operating near El Chipote, for instance, he took possession of the American gold [unreadable] of San Albino, where he had once worked [unreadable] a common laborer and where he had begun to sow the seeds of revolution among his countrymen. ¶ He remembered that in his day, in accordance with a custom widespread throughout Latin America, he had been paid only in “scrips,” tokens that were exchangeable in the company’s commissary. The first thing he did then was to call the seventy-five laborers together and ask them how much the mine owed them in back wages. Every penny of the claimed amount was paid out of the gold on hand, and every one of those men was thereafter a loyal potential fighter for Sandino. ¶ But the mine workers were more valuable where they were. For months Sandino worked the mine for the benefit of his cause and his men. George Williams, the English engineer, coined the metal into $10 gold pieces called “Indios,” which were used as payment of wages and for food bought from neighboring ranchers. They won the leader many volunteers. In Honduras the “Indios” were sold for $20 each, because they were made of pure, unalloyed gold. ¶ When Sandino evacuated the mine he refused to destroy its machinery, partly because he and his army might need it again and partly because his nation might some day need it. ¶ THROUGH such methods he pays his way and wins volunteers and cash subscriptions. He allows no rowdiness or promiscuous looting. Some of his foodstuffs, moreover, are grown for him by his own men. The wounded who are still able to do a bit of work are sent behind the lines and turned into farmers. ¶ The San Albino gold mine was equipped with the best machinery of its kind found in Nicaragua. His sparing that, in spite of the fact that it was American owned, was understood and applauded by his followers. His reasons were plain to them. But not always is he so considerate of foreign property. ¶ When he took possession of the rich La Luz and Los Angeles mine, on April 28,1928, he found there 355 pounds of gold, which he captured, and about four tons of dynamite. The latter he used to blow up the whole works, machinery, galleries, everything, with an explosion so exuberant that people in Honduras thought there had been an earthquake. ¶ Again his action may be interpreted as a shrewd piece of showmanship, as a gesture for mob support. ¶ George B. Marshall, however, the superintendent of the mine, was treated with utmost consideration. He accompanied Sandino for several months as his prisoner, until he died of fever on June 27, 1928. ¶ Where Sandino obtains his arms is still a mystery. At one time he used old rifles that had seen service in Mexico before, but when he ran short of ammunition for them he found several new sources of supply. One of them consisted of captured machine guns, rifles, bullets and other supplies of the U. S. Marine Corps. ¶ But if he is popular for his justness and for his eagerness to pay his way and to spare civil populations any undue burdens, he is equally famous for his great severity. Among his own men discipline must be maintained, and the punishment for infractions is as hard as it is swift. ¶ Punishment, as a rule, means death by the firing squad. There can be no imprisonment, because he can hardly carry a calaboose with him through the jungles. ¶ THE case of Antonio Galeana is famous throughout Central America. Galeana had been one of Sandino’s officers, trusted, loyal and zealous. But when he violated a girl in a newly occupied town the hand of the commander was fearful and swift. Galeana was court-martialed and shot. ¶ And those methods, “guerilla warfare on a large scale,” are eminently suited to his men and to the country in which he operates. To us, accustomed to European tactics that involve enormous “overhead” in the form of large camps, supply depots, etc., they seem like the methods of a loose rabble, hence the term “bandit.” But there is nothing loose about them. The leader is too thorough for that. Every move is carefully planned and commanded—and every command is implicitly obeyed because of a rigid and unrelenting discipline. ¶ During the last Sandino campaign I spent months in Nicaragua as an independent observer. Later I talked to him again and again and checked his statements by those of his aide de camp, a young man, by the way, who for a time went to school in San Francisco. ¶ To a trained military observer it becomes apparent that Sandino’s methods are those of a military leader who, like Abd-el-Krim in the deserts of Morocco, knows how to adapt European methods to local conditions. ¶ In his first fight with the Marines at Ocotal, May 16, 1927, Sandino had only 60 men. Subsequently he built up his force to a probable maximum of 1,500. He could have had many times that number, but he purposely kept his forces low to insure better mobility and ease of supply and to keep the drain on the civil population down to a minimum. ¶ Early in 1927 two widely varied forces opposed each other. The Marines knew nothing of Sandino’s methods of guerrilla warfare and he knew nothing of theirs. Attempts on the part of both sides to adopt the opponent’s tactics proved fatal. ¶ At Las Flores the Nicaraguans made the bad mistake of entrenching themselves and waiting for the enemy to attack—a mistake that was made worse by the fact that they neglected to cover their flanks. The engagement ended in a complete rout and the serious loss to Sandino of about 60 men. ¶ The Las Flores engagement was one of a number near El Chipote that took place between November and the middle of December in 1927. When Sandino noticed that his ammunition was running short and that the Americans were closing in on him, he had several hundred straw dummies made and places in the firing line to deceive the enemy while he quietly retreated with all his men to San Rafael del Norte, over jungle trails they had previously cut in preparation for the move. It was here that he met the American journalist Carlton Beals, whose articles created such a stir in certain American circles. ¶ After that retreat he stuck to his jungle trails, set traps for the Americans wherever possible, and took the offensive. ¶ AGAINST that kind of warfare, conducted in the jungle country by men who know their jungles and who travel light and fast, European tactics are practically useless. ¶ The Americans realized perfectly the shortcomings of their methods, but it was impossible for them to use any other. Napoleon discovered in Spain that guerilla warfare is possible only in a country where the population is friendly. Neither the Boers in South Africa nor Abd-el-Krim in Morocco could have had the slightest measure of success if they had not been in their own native lands. ¶ It is possible to travel light and move fast, in small bands, when every farm, every ranch, is a potential source of shelter and military aid, as they were to Sandino. When the reverse is true, as it was to the Marines, large commissaries and large camps have to be transported, independent and cumbersome systems of liaison and hospital treatment have to be maintained. ¶ The U. S. Marines, rightfully distrustful of the civil population, made matters worse through their strict methods. Again and again they harassed the peasants, hoping to get a “bandit” or two. ¶ At the present writing, with trouble beginning faintly to stir again in Nicaragua, reports are being published that President Moncada has ordered all the inhabitants of the affected districts to concentrate at certain points, with the announcement that everybody found outside of those points after a given date would be regarded with suspicion. The order, to me, demonstrates the insecurity that Moncada feels in his position. ¶ The same move was made by the Marines on several occasions during the last Sandino trouble. In general it may be regarded as a military necessity, used by Kitchener in South Africa, by the French in the Abd-el-Krim campaign and by the Spanish in Cuba in the days before ’98. ¶ BUT it has also a highly undesirable effect from a military point of view. ¶ A hunted man is apt to feel the uncertainty of his position and even become an active enemy. In Nicaragua it alienated friends, made enemies out of neutrals and increased enormously Sandino’s popularity through the simple example of contrast with his methods. ¶ I talk here not as a crusader or a propagandist against the United States. Few men know better than I what brutalities are incident to any war—and those of the Americans were more than equaled, in the time of battle, by the reprisals of the Sandinistas. ¶ When I arrived in Matagalpa, Nicaragua, in 1927, after a hazardous three months’ trip across the swampy jungles of the Mosquito Coast and Central Nicaragua, I warned the Marines to try to reach an agreement with Sandino rather than embark on a war that had no end in sight and that would make the United States more hated than ever in all of Latin America. They treated me with the utmost courtesy and friendliness, but even if they had wanted to heed my advice they had their orders and no choice in the matter. ¶ Sandino’s methods of waging warfare are interesting to study. In his country he can skirmish indefinitely against almost any number of men. ¶ But his methods, while eminently suited to his purpose, have their darker side. They allow for no quarter to prisoners or wounded. Often he is hard enough put to feed his own men, and a prison camp in his rear, or a hospital for Americans when his own wounded often die for lack of proper medical care, would be a physical impossibility. ¶ Sandino has also to reckon with the absolutely essential good will of the civil population. Every soldier knows that the non-combatants, the people behind the lines, are always far more fierce and intolerant in their hatred of the enemy than the fighters themselves. The civil population is perfectly willing to support Sandino and his men—is willing to support many times their number—especially when gold “Indios” pay the way. ¶ SANDINO is not afflicted with blood-lust. But he cannot jeopardize his standing with those on whose help he must depend, and, even if he could, he could not spare the men to guard prisoners and enemy wounded against fanatical non-combatants. ¶ The rebel’s hemmed-in position, his difficulties in getting ammunition, etc., produced that terrible hand-to-hand fighting with machetes that Central America is famous for. Often, no doubt, the Marines found their rifles and their machine guns useless in jungle skirmishes, again and again the machetes did their terrible work, flashing red in the semi-darkness of the tropical forest. ¶ Capt. Paredes, Sandino’s aide de camp, has told me of that cry of the wounded, “Shoot me, but machetes, no!” ¶ Shoot? Ammunition is scarce and must be preserved. Machetes, knives, daggers must take their place whenever possible. Often, when there was dynamite on hand after a raid on some mine, the men used homemade grenades, leather sacks filled with explosives, nails, slugs, bolts, empty shells, anything that would inflict damage and stampede the mules of the enemy. ¶ In a jungle campaign of this sort, where the Sandino forces assemble, attack in a wilderness and melt away after the battle, it is particularly difficult to secure accurate facts about the fighting. ¶ Naturally enough, Sandino’s accounts of his battles are widely at variance with accounts of the same battles as compiled by the United States Marine Corps and the American Government. ¶ Sandino has at times, for instance, given out optimistic estimates of the United States forces which he has defied, as being anywhere from 25,000 to as many as 40,000. ¶ BUT as the entire United States Marine Corps has had a strength of only about 20,000 during the years since the war, it is evident that Sandino’s enthusiasm may have carried him away in some of his statements. ¶ To contrast the accounts of some of the principal battles in Nicaragua as given by Sandino and the official reports of the same battles as compiled by Marine officers, however, is interesting. ¶ For instance, Sandino described to me as follows the fight at Ocotal: ¶ He attacked Ocotal at the head of 60 men on May 16, 1927. Several hundred peasants of the neighborhood sacked the Diaz-Moncada partisans’ shops while Sandino and his men kept blazing away with their eight machine guns at the garrison of Ocotal, composed of about 200 or 300 Marines and a handful of Nicaraguan gendarmes, who had been pressed into service. ¶ Sandino said: “The enemy finally intrenched [entrenched] themselves in a city block where we kept them surrounded and peppered them liberally with our machine guns from the neighboring heights. We could have dynamited the provisory barracks if we had wanted to. But we desisted because we did not want to hurt the town people who were not responsible. ¶ “During the 15 hours which the fight lasted the Americans did not try a single sortie. They continued firing until dawn, wasting lots of good ammunition. After sunrise their fire relented considerably, probably because they were running short of ammunition. That must have been also the reason why they did not try a sortie that morning. ¶ “At 10 a.m. two American airplanes arrived. They bombed and machine-gunned mercilessly the surrounding houses and city blocks, causing many casualties among the defenseless civil population.” ¶ Sandino’s losses, according to Capt. de Paredes, amounted to seven men—three dead (among these Col. Rufo Marin) and four wounded. Two of Sandino’s men who got drunk and fell into the hands of the enemy were exchanged afterward for two American Marines whom the Sandinistas captured near Achoapa [Achuapa?]. ¶ CONTRAST the above with Marine accounts: ¶ The Marines report that the garrison at Ocotal consisted of 40 Marines and 48 Guardia, and that no American Marines were ever exchanged for bandits. Sandino’s force was given by the Marines as 300. ¶ In the campaign against El Chipote again there is great disparity between Sandino’s account and that of the Marines. Capt. De Paredes describes the engagement as follows: ¶ “An American column, proceeding from Telpaneca reached the outskirts of Quilali. Sandino ordered his lieutenant, Francisco Estrada, [unreadable] ambush his forces at Las Trincheras. On December [unreadable] the Americans fell into the trap. They were swept by rifle and machine gun fire at 15 yards. Of the 300 Marines, 60 perished—the Sandinistas having killed also the wounded who had fallen into their hands. ¶ “Ten loaded packmules, three of them carrying ammunition, were captured by the Nicaraguans. The American column retreated in confusion, taking along 18 of their wounded. Half a mile away the Marines intrenched [entrenched] themselves, waiting for reinforcements, probably. Among the dead was found the body of Capt. Livingston, the leader of the column.” So much for Paredes’ version of the affair. ¶ BUT the Marines report that Capt. Livingston is alive and doing very nicely, thank you, though he was wounded in the fight. Five, not 60, Marines were killed, the records at Washington show. ¶ But one of the broadest variations is found in Sandino’s story of the battle on the Cocos River, the last major fight the Marines have had in Nicaragua. Here is Sandino’s version: ¶ “A column of 500 Marines was coming up the river in five large barges. ¶ “After several airplanes had passed over the Sandinistas without noticing them, the five barges fell into an ambuscade. This happened on August 7, 1928. Of the second barge, which was allotted to Capt. de Paredes, only five or six Marines escaped alive by clinging to the opposite side of the barge. ¶ “The rest of the Marines and native rowers were swept clean off the barge by Paredes’ machine guns. Some of the Marines had jumped overboard and tried to drag the barge ashore, firing at the same time at Paredes and his men. But it was of all no avail. They were mowed down to a man. ¶ “Paredes saw the first barge drift by, rudderless. It had been also swept clear of its hundred-odd Marines. The third barge had suffered a similar fate. The fourth and fifth barges had suffered only a few losses because they had managed to land most of their men before they had been properly submitted to the machine gun fire of the Sandinistas. ¶ “The Marines of those two barges, after jumping ashore, intrenched [entrenched] themselves hurriedly in a nearby ranch house which had been occupied only a few minutes before by Sandino himself. The Sandinistas, in the general melee, tried, naturally, to concentrate upstream while the Marines—that is, those who remained alive—assembled downstream. The Sandinistas lost four dead and three wounded; the latter died shortly afterward for lack of proper medical attention. The Marines lost 130 men.” ¶ ONE Marine officer said of this account that “it would be less laughable if it was more accurate.” Marine records indicate that Capt. Merritt A. Edson was in command of this engagement of 47 enlisted men and one officer. It was a definite and complete defeat for the outlaws, the Marines maintain, and Capt. Edson’s official report of his entire loss in the skirmish was one dead and three wounded. ¶ In fact, the official U. S. Marine Corps figures for casualties during the entire Nicaraguan occupation gave 25 dead, only 21 of these as the result of conflict with forces led by Sandino or his subordinates. ¶ Other sharp contrasts like the above are to be found by comparing reports of the two sides. ¶ And while there is expedience in Sandino’s type of warfare, there is no hope of military victory. If he starts again, he and his men, with enormous reserves of man power to draw upon, can keep on fighting and harassing any sized force indefinitely. ¶ (Copyright, [unreadable])"

27.  September 14, 1930.  Rafael de Nogales, “More Light on ‘Bad Man’ Sandino and How he Fights,” The Sunday Star, Washington D.C., image 2.     See transcription above (no. 26).

28.  September 14, 1930.  Rafael de Nogales, “More Light on ‘Bad Man’ Sandino and How he Fights,” The Sunday Star, Washington D.C., image 3.   See transcription above (no. 26).

29.  September 14, 1930.  Rafael de Nogales, “More Light on ‘Bad Man’ Sandino and How he Fights,” The Sunday Star, Washington D.C., image 4.     See transcription above (no. 26).

30.  September 14, 1930.  Rafael de Nogales, “More Light on ‘Bad Man’ Sandino and How he Fights,” The Sunday Star, Washington D.C., image 5.     See transcription above (no. 26).

31.  September 14, 1930.  Rafael de Nogales, “More Light on ‘Bad Man’ Sandino and How he Fights,” The Sunday Star, Washington D.C., image 6.     See transcription above (no. 26).

32.  September 14, 1930.  Rafael de Nogales, “More Light on ‘Bad Man’ Sandino and How he Fights,” The Sunday Star, Washington D.C., image 7.     See transcription above (no. 26).

33.  September 14, 1930.  Rafael de Nogales, “More Light on ‘Bad Man’ Sandino and How he Fights,” The Sunday Star, Washington D.C., image 8.   See transcription above (no. 26).

34.  September 14, 1930.  Rafael de Nogales, “More Light on ‘Bad Man’ Sandino and How he Fights,” The Sunday Star, Washington D.C., image 9.   See transcription above (no. 26).

35.  September 14, 1930.  Rafael de Nogales, “More Light on ‘Bad Man’ Sandino and How he Fights,” The Sunday Star, Washington D.C., image 10.    See transcription above (no. 26).

36.  September 14, 1930.  Rafael de Nogales, “More Light on ‘Bad Man’ Sandino and How he Fights,” The Sunday Star, Washington D.C., image 11.     See transcription above (no. 26).

37.  May 24, 1929.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.   "SANDINO SITUATION. ¶ In spite of all the numerous rumors concerning Sandino being out of Nicaragua I think it certain that he has never left the vicinity of MURRA, in Nueva Segovia. He has certainly not been near Tegucigalpa either openly or secretly, because in the latter case the Chief of Detectives, Francisco Moran would have known of it and he has just informed me that all the reports are rumors. ¶ Tenorio has just cabled the positive statement that Sandino is between MURRA and SANTA CRUZ, on the Poteca River, and the further statement that he has seen a letter from Sandino to a politician in Honduras, dated May 4, in which Sandino makes the following statement apparently in answer to some question:-- ¶ “ The distinguished patriot referred to has returned his allegiance to the burning sphere of politics, forgetting that politics will not remove Marines from our outraged country. I stay here. I will be here, unafraid and untouched, when the last Marine leaves Nicaragua. Then we will consider politics.” ¶ I believe that is Sandino’s intention. I also believe that toward the end of March he was rather desperate and made his plans for getting out, but there are indications that about this time discontented Conservatives began to give him a little help and particularly information, and he cheered up again. ¶ There is one thing certain--as long as Moncada continues to permit persecution of Conservatives Sandino can remain at liberty, because the Conservatives will retaliate by helping him in every way. ¶ Report No.429. ¶ San Jose--May 24, 1929. ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Major, G.S. ¶ M.A."

38.  June 23, 1929.  “Sandino Entrains to Place of Exile,” Washington Post.     "Sandino Entrains to Place of Exile ¶ Former Rebel Chief Says He Will Live Peacefully in Yucatan. ¶ Guatemala City, June 23 (U.P.).—Augustino Sandino, former Nicaraguan rebel leader, and five companions, entrained in a special car at Moran Station, near here, at noon today en route to their place of exile in Mexico. ¶ The former rebel chieftain said he intended to go to Meridi, in Yucatan, where he said he would reside peacefully. He was accompanied by Augusto Marques, Jose Paredes, Gregorio Urbano, Ruben Gomez and Tranquilino Joaquin. The party, which has been granted the privilege of entering Mexico, was scheduled to reach the Mexican frontier town of Ayutia at 8 p. m. ¶ They passed last night at Cuilapa because of the bad roads which hindered their journey from Nicaragua to Guatemala City, via Honduran Salvador. Two automobile loads of Guatemalan police escorted them. There was no demonstration and the trip was made almost in secret. None of the men have passports but the Mexican government has extended border courtesies to them."

39.  June 25, 1919.  “Government of Nicaragua Officially Informed that Sandino has crossed the Frontier enroute to Mexico,” translation of article from Diario de Costa Rica.    "From “DIARIO DE COSTA RICA”---June 25, 1929. ¶ Oficialmente se informa al Gobierno de Nicaragua que Sandino cruzó la frontera de Guatemala rumbo a México ¶ Managua, 25. – El Gobierno de Nicaragua recibió un radiograma informando que Sandino había cruzado ya la frontera de Guatemala, rumbo a México, acompañado por cuatro personas. Los periódicos de Managua expresan su júbilo por la aparente certeza de que Sandino no será más un factor de disturbios en los Departamentos del Norte. ¶ GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA OFFICIALLY INFORMED THAT SANDINO HAS CROSSED THE FRONTIER ENROUTE TO MEXICO. ¶ Managua--25…The Government of Nicaragua has received a radiogram staing [stating] that Sandino had crossed the Guatemalan border, enroute to Mexico, accompanied by four persons. The newspapers of Managua express their delight over the apparent certainty that Sandino will no longer be a troublesome factor in the Northern Departments. ¶ NOTE..This is all that has been published in any paper in Costa Rica. There were not even sub-headlines to this one."

40.  July 5, 1929.  G-2 Report on Sandino, Gordon Johnston, Military Attaché, Mexico City.    "1. Sandino arrived in Vera Cruz on June 28, 1929, with his staff, all armed to the teeth. He had the full intention of coming to Mexico City, and arrangements had been made for a celebration. Having been informed that he was not to come to Mexico City, he demanded airplanes to take him to Merida, Yucatan, stating that he dared not travel on an American boat because they would either poison him, or sink the ship so as to get him out of the way. The Government consented to his delay until the arrival of a French boat, which is expected to sail for Merida today or tomorrow, from Vera Cruz. ¶ 2. Sandino’s physical appearance has created an unfavorable impression here in Mexico. Small in stature, insignificant in appearance, and with a weak voice. ¶ 3. In the press of July 2 Sandino states that his object is to place himself in touch with foreign nations who do not realize that he is still fighting, since Turcios ceased to be his representative. Dr. Machado was appointed his representative but failed to act satisfactorily; so that now he has appointed Dr. Jose Zepeda, who resides in Mexico City. He is publishing a document, sent to the President of Argentina, with copies to all Latin American countries, calling for a general conference for the purpose of securing the independence and sovereignty of these nations and to further their friendship with the United States on a basis of equality. This conference also to consider the important points in regard to the Nicaragua Canal; among these, Nicaragua should not sell the rights but retain them for the freedom of the Canal for all nations, and not make the same mistakes as in the case of the Panama Canal. Also the United States should be bound not to intervene in Latin American affairs nor foment revolution. The about document was sent to Argentina last March."

41.  November 11, 1929.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.    "The enclosed handbills by Sandino appeared at Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas about October 21st. As Sandino was admitted into Mexico upon his agreement not to indulge in political activities, this is a clear violation of that agreement. ¶ In these circular he again attacks Adolfo Diaz, Emiliano Chamorro and Jose Maria Moncada. ¶ Toward the end of October these circulars also appeared in Corinto and Leon."

42.  August 9, 1929.  G-2 Report on Sandino Situation, Major Fred T. Cruse, Military Attaché, Tegucigalpa.    "SANDINO SITUATION ¶ SANDINO AND MEXICO ¶ The morning newspapers state, apparently with Mexico City as a source, that Sandino and his group have disappeared from Merida and are en route for Belize, with the intention of again entering Central America. This is not yet confirmed and I think it is doubtful. However, I think it advisable at this time to sum up the connection between Mexico and the Sandino movement. ¶ The impetus of the whole Sandino movement came from Mexico…not the Government but the communist and anti-imperialist groups in that country. When Gustavo Machado returned from a visit to Sandino’s forces last year he spent several days in Tegucigalpa. During this time he was received and entertained at the Mexican Legation, and when he left for Amapala to take a steamer for Mexico he was accompanied by Mr. Saenz Rico Secretary of the Legation. This was most astonishing as for over a year Machado had been the editor of a communistic newspaper called “El Machete”, every column of every issue of which contained vicious attacks on the Mexican Government. Finally when Sandino decided to get out of Nicaragua he was given, entirely openly, every possible help by the Mexican Legation in Honduras, Salvador and Guatemala. On the night of June 20th Sandino stayed at the Mexican Legation in Tegucigalpa. In a previous report I have stated the help he received in Salvador and Guatemala. ¶ If Mexico has permitted Sandino to return to Central America, it can be nothing else but a deliberately unfriendly act, at least toward the Government of Nicaragua. From my observations during the last year and a half the whole attitude of the Mexican Government in the Sandino affair has been openly unfriendly to the United States. ¶ Report No. 483 ¶ San José--August 9, 1929 ¶ Sources – Personal knowledge ¶ Fred T. Cruse, ¶ Major G.S. ¶ M.A."

43.  January 31, 1930.  G-2 Report on Activities of C. A. Sandino in Mexico City, Gordon Johnston, Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 1.     "(COPY) ¶ 1 Encl. ¶ 2657-P-241 ¶ 179 ¶ G-2 Report ¶ MEXICO ¶ SUBJECT: ¶ Activities of C.A. Sandino in Mexico City. ¶ 1. Sandino arrived in Mexico City January 28th, 1930, coming by plane from Merida, Yucatan, to Tejeria, V.C., and thence by rail to Mexico City. He did not enter the city of Vera Cruz. All papers of January 29th carry reports of his visit, and several reported interviews. A resume of his statements to the press follows: ¶ “I have come to Mexico on personal matters.” ¶ “For us, Mexico is our school.” ¶ “I am now of the opinion, and always will be to my death, that I shall continue fighting for the redemption of the Nicaraguan people. I was obliged to leave Nicaragua, but my army will follow the plans already determined upon. There are four chiefs left in Nicaragua charged with the custody of the arms and ammunition of our army. You will note that none of our arms have fallen into the hands of our enemies.” ¶ “Definitely and categorically, in answer to your question, I shall return to Nicaragua.” ¶ Asked if he understood how much influence the United States had in Mexico, he replied: ¶ “Not only here, but in all parts of the world; but everyone has the right to clean out his own house.” ¶ “I do not intend to visit people of political importance in an official character. Naturally, however, I shall go to call upon Calles, Sr. Portes Gil, and Ortiz Rubio, to pay my respects to them,- no more.” ¶ “Never for a single moment have I abandoned the patriotic cause of my country, the triumph of which the people of Nicaragua seek, and are willing to continue striving for, even at the cost of the greatest sacrifices.” ¶ “We shall never stop until the insolence of Uncle Sam has been punished.” ¶ “Up to now, our fighting for liberty has not met with favorable response from the Latin-American governments, but it has among the people of those countries.” ¶ Asked when he would return to Nicaragua he replied: ¶ From: M.A. Mexico. ¶ Report No. 2735. ¶ Date: Jan. 31, 1930."

44.  January 31, 1930.  G-2 Report on Activities of C. A. Sandino in Mexico City, Gordon Johnston, Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 2.    "G-2 Report ¶ “The circumstances in the case will fix the exact date of my return to Nicaragua. . . . Our army has struggled against the greatest power in the world, without aid, regardless of the sacrifices and the sufferings which they have met.” ¶ “At the time of the negotiations with the United States I first thought of personally killing Chamorro, Diaz, and Moncada, but later thought that this would bring about the useless sacrifice of our people and might have been construed as a personal action of my own; therefore I determined to take upon my shoulders the entire responsibility of the fight and carry the banner of the fatherland which Moncada has cast to the ground, while he occupied himself in rasping the edge of his sword in the replete money-bags of Uncle Sam.” ¶ Asked, in case of his triumph, what he was going to do with those who had sold themselves for American gold, he replied: ¶ “If they come on their knees to me, and weep, and ask forgiveness, I would not be able to order them killed.” ¶ “Furthermore, practically all the people (of Nicaragua) even under the present circumstances where they appear to be pacified, are really armed and have hidden their arms in their own houses.” ¶ “I am satisfied, and it is my intuition, that in the future America (Latin) and Spain will clasp hands again, forgetting all the effects of the Conquest,- naturally when Spain has another Government substituted for the monarchy.” ¶ During his stay in Mexico City, Sandino will be covered by a special agent. ¶ 2. Movements and actions of Sandino January 29, 1930. ¶ Sandino is staying with Dr. Pedro Zepeda, who lives at the corner of Ontario and Alpea Streets, Chapultepec Heights, a suburb of Mexico City. Dr. Zepeda acts as Sandino’s representative in Mexico. ¶ The early part of the morning was spent with Zepeda, Estrada his so-called chief of staff, his secretary Martinez, etc. From 10 o’clock to 12 there were a number of callers,- personal friends, sympathizers, etc.,- most of them unknown. It is reported that no Government officials or politicians of importance were among them. At 12 o’clock Sandino, accompanied by his personal party, deposited a wreath at the Independence Monument, and performed the ceremony of Guard of Honor. After this, they went to the monument to the “Heroes of the Military College” in Chapultepec (graves of those killed by the American troops during the Mexican War). Agent states: “I understand perfectly that he has not visited any official office.” He states that he had enquired in various places and was assured that Sandino had not been there. . . . "

45.  January 31, 1930.  G-2 Report on Activities of C. A. Sandino in Mexico City, Gordon Johnston, Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 3.   " . . . M.A. is reliably informed, however, by an American business man of unquestionable standing, who had an appointment with President Portes Gil at 1 o’clock on January 29th, that he had to wait until nearly two, in the anteroom before his appointment was kept; meanwhile, he saw Sandino and Dr. Zepeda taken into the President’s office, where they remained for three quarters of an hour. Sandino appeared to be in a very happy humor on leaving. No mention was made of this in the press of the following day, January 30th, nor was it apparently known to press correspondents or others, that this visit to the President was paid. ¶ 3. Movements of Sandino on January 30, 1930. ¶ Until 10 o’clock in the morning Sandino was receiving visitors at the home of Dr. Zepeda. At 10 he went to the office of Dr. Zepeda, at Balderas 24, where a considerable number of friends and sympathizers called on him until about noon. After lunch he returned to the same office, where he continued to receive numerous visitors. Agent was informed by Jose Constantino Gonzalez, a member of Sandino’s staff, that some forty or fifty people had visited Sandino during the day, counting among them General Velasco (not on the active list of the army), and various officers of the Mexican army, senators, deputies, and some aviators. He was also interviewed by correspondents of various newspapers. ¶ At the house of President-elect Ortiz Rubio agent was informed that Sandino had not been there. ¶ Sandino was invited to attend a dinner tomorrow (Jan. 31st) at the house of Guillermo Olivares. ¶ 4. A photograph is attached, showing Sandino standing guard after placing the wreath on the Independence Monument. The names of those accompanying him, from left to right, are as follows: ¶ Licenciado Maraviac Morteau, Haitian, representative of the Anti-Imperialists of Haiti. ¶ Col. Agustin Marti, representative of the people of Salvador, and chief of Sandino’s staff. ¶ Gen. Francisco Estrada, Second in Command of Sandino’s Nicaraguan Army. ¶ Agusto Cesar Sandino. ¶ Dr. Pedro J. Zepeda, representative of Sandino in Mexico. ¶ Esteban Pavletish, Peruvian; member of Sandino’s staff. ¶ Jose Constantino Gonzalez, Nicaragua, member of Sandino’s staff. Dr. Enrique Rivera Bertraud, Mexican; President of the Anti-Imperialistic League of the city of Vera Cruz. ¶ Amado Chaverri Matamoros, Costa Rican; director of the publication “Patria Grande”. ¶ 5. The “Democrata”, one of the afternoon dailies of Mexico City, has begun the publication of the history of Sandino, the first instalment appearing in the issue of January 30th. ¶ Gordon Johnston, ¶ Colonel, Cavalry, ¶ Military Attache. ¶ Source: Confidential; ¶ Press. ¶ From: M.A. Mexico. ¶ Report No. 2735. ¶ Date: Jan. 31, 1930."

46.  February 6, 1930.  G-2 Report on Activities of C. A. Sandino in Mexico City, Gordon Johnston, Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 1.     "(COPY) ¶ S E C R E T ¶ G-2 Report ¶ 2657-P-241 ¶ 181 ¶ MEXICO ¶ SUBJECT: Activities of C. A. Sandino in Mexico City. ¶ 1. Reference is made to Report No. 2736 dated February 3, 1930, and to earlier reports, upon above subject. ¶ 2. The special agent reports Sandino’s activities on February 4th, 1930, as follows: In Dr. Zepeda’s office from 11 a.m. to 2 p.m. when he went to lunch, returning to 3 p.m. and remaining there until 8 p.m. Agent was with Sandino from 4 to 8 p.m. ¶ Following is quoted from Agent: ¶ “Sandino placed his files at my disposal. Among the documents which I read today is a project of unification of all the Spanish-American countries, which project Sandino states he will carry out as soon as he takes possession of the Government of Nicaragua, which depends on the success of the conferences he is holding nightly in this Capital. ¶ “According to General Sandino, every night sessions are held between persons most in the so-called ‘anti-imperialistic’ movement. ¶ “From some phrases which Sandino dropped I could observe that they are not on a very good footing with the Mexican Government. In one of the letters which I read, sent by Zepeda (Sandino’s representative in Mexico City) to Sandino, I noted the difficulties which Sandino encountered in donating to Mexico the ‘trophies’ obtained by him in the struggle against the American marines. Said trophies consist of two surgical cases, a rifle and an American flag, which objects, by agreement of the Mexican Government, are now in the Mexican National Museum. ¶ “Upon asking Sandino if the secret sessions were being held with members of the Mexican Government, he appeared a little suspicious, and confined himself to saying that ‘they were with persons interested in the cause of Nicaragua’. ¶ “After showing me air maps, small books, and other objects taken from American prisoners belonging to the 5th Regiment, he told me that in a certain place in Nicaragua he was keeping hidden the remains of the aviator Thomas, of Captain E. A. Rector, chief of the squadron, of a doctor whose name I do not recall at this moment, of Captain William Williamson, of Captain Livingston, of Lieutenant Bruce, and of another aviator whose name also I do not recall, also of Roy A. Johnston, an American engineer who on a certain occasion went to him to propose a conference in order to settle a conflict, with the sole object of assassinating him (Sandino). Sandino himself told me he would return the said remains when Nicaragua was free again. . . ."

47. February 6, 1930.  G-2 Report on Activities of C. A. Sandino in Mexico City, Gordon Johnston, Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 2.      " . . . It is assumed that the usual secret session will be held this evening.” ¶ 3. As to the day of February 5th, Agent reports the usual procedure,- Sandino receiving visitors and going out with Dr. Zepeda for some unknown destination to which Agent was unable to trace him. ¶ 4. Agent’s report for February 6th is to the effect that Sandino remained the entire day in Dr. Zepeda’s office, receiving visitors; that Sandino did not attend the inaugural of President Ortiz Rubio; that he is becoming much less communicative, and does not appear to be in as optimistic a mood as first; that it is not believed he is receiving any aid from the Mexican Government, and it is thought he will soon leave Mexico City. ¶ Gordon Johnston ¶ Colonel, Cavalry ¶ Military Attache. ¶ Source: Confidential. ¶ J/p ¶ From: M.A.Mexico. ¶ Report No. 2743. ¶ Date: Feb. 6, 1930."

48.  February 18, 1930.  G-2 Report on Activities of C. A. Sandino in Mexico City, Gordon Johnston, Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 1.     "G-2 Report ¶ MEXICO ¶ SUBJECT: Activities of C.A. Sandino in Mexico City. ¶ 1. Attached hereto is a report of the special agent regarding the activities of Sandino during the days of February 13, 14, and 15, 1930. ¶ 2. Reference is made to report No. 2759 dated February 13, 1930, and to earlier reports, upon the above subject. ¶ Gordon Johnston, ¶ Colonel, Cavalry. ¶ Military Attaché. ¶ Source: As stated. ¶ J/p ¶ From: M.A.Mexico. ¶ Report No. 2765. ¶ Date: Feb. 18, 1930."

49.  February 18, 1930.  G-2 Report on Activities of C. A. Sandino in Mexico City, Gordon Johnston, Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 2.    "Activities of C.A. Sandino in Mexico City. ¶ The special agent reports Sandino’s movements on February 13th, 14th, and 15th, 1930, as follows: ¶ February 13th: ¶ “Arose at 11, took breakfast, returned to Dr. Zepeda’s office on Balderas St. to receive visitors, increasing in number daily. His afternoon was spent in the same way, and when I called at 6:30 I was unable to talk with him as he was receiving intimate friends, including two or three women who were entertaining him with Mexican songs. I learned, however, that he expects to leave Mexico City at any moment, with all the members of his staff.” ¶ February 14th: ¶ “Nothing of importance. Increasing number of visitors. Sandino is preparing to leave; date uncertain; was unable to talk with him. Most of his time spent in diversion.” ¶ January 15th: ¶ “Sandino rose at 1 p.m., remained in the Balderas St. house until 3 when he went out to eat. At 8 o’clock p.m., when I left said house, he had not yet returned, but was expected at any moment. ¶ “Pavletich (Esteban Pavletich), a member of Sandino’s staff, is missing; left Gen. Sandino’s house, Balderas 24, on February 13th at 2:30 p.m. and has not returned. ¶ “Pavletich was a collaborator of the ‘Nacional Revolucionario’ and Colonel Martí (another of Sandino’s staff) talked with the manager of that paper, Senator Manlio Fabio Altamirano, who promised to order an investigation as to Pavletich’s whereabouts. ¶ “While I was talking with Col. Martí a well-dressed woman of about thirty, called and inquired if Pavletich had been found. She is a Nicaraguan, speaks good English as she has lived fourteen years in the United States. Her first name is Soledad, said to be a good friend of Sandino’s, but I find her suspicious. ¶ “Sandino’s friends have become distrustful and have taken on an attitude of absolute reserve. They believe that their telephone is censored by the police, and they are very cautious in all their acts. They will not report Pavletich’s disappearance to the police, for fear of involving Sandino, as some of them admit that Pavletich, if not actually a communist in affiliation, has communistic ideas. ¶ “Regarding the arrest of Col. Martí, this is not true, as I talked with him last night myself. ¶ “As to Sandino, Martí told me that he (Sandino) was arranging the last details to begin his journey to Mérida, Yucatán, where twenty men of the General’s staff are awaiting him.” ¶ It has been since learned that Pavletich got mixed up in the infringement of a traffic regulation, and was arrested as a witness, but held only a few hours. Now at liberty. . . . "

[This document translated via the kind courtesy of Walter C. Sandino.  //  Este documento traducido a través la amable cortesía de Walter C. Sandino:]    "Actividades de C. A. Sandino en la Ciudad de Méjico  ¶  El agente especial, reporta los movimientos de Sandino del 13 de febrero, 14 y 16, de 1930, a como sigue:  ¶  Febrero 13:  ¶  "Se levanto a las 11 am, tomo desayuno, regreso a la oficina del Dr. Zepeda en la calle Balderas para recibir visitantes, las cuales aumentan en número diariamente.  Su tarde la paso de igual forma y cuando yo llegue a las 6:30 pm, yo no pude hablar con él, ya que estaba recibiendo a amigos íntimos, incluyendo dos o tres mujeres quienes lo estaban divirtiendo con canciones mexicanas.  Yo supe sin embargo, que él espera partir de la Ciudad de Méjico en cualquier momento, con todos los miembros de su personal"  ¶  Febrero 14:  ¶  "Nada de importancia.  Aumentando el número de visitantes.  Sandino está preparándose para marcharse; fecha incierta, no pude hablar con él.  La mayor parte de su tiempo lo pasa divirtiéndose."  ¶  Febrero 15:  ¶  "Sandino se levanto a las 1 pm, permaneció en la casa de la calle Balderas hasta las 3 pm cuando salió a comer.  A las 8 pm cuando yo abandone la mencionada casa, el aun no había regresado, pero se le esperaba en cualquier momento.  ¶  "Pavletich (Esteban Pavletich), un miembro del personal de Sandino esta desaparecido; abandono la casa del general Sandino, Balderas 24, el 13 de febrero a las 2:30 pm y aun no ha regresado.  ¶  "Pavletich era un colaborador del "Nacional Revolucionario" y el coronel Martí (otro del personal de Sandino) hablo con el gerente de ese periódico, Senador Manlio Fabio Altamirano, quien prometió ordenar una investigación para saber sobre el paradero de Pavletich.  ¶  "Mientras conversaba el Coronel Martí una mujer muy buen vestida de unos treinta años, llego y pregunto acerca de Pavletich, su paradero y que si él había sido encontrado. Ella es nicaragüense, habla muy buen ingles, ya que ella ha vivido 14 años en los Estados Unidos.  Su primer nombre es Soledad, dijo ser una buena amiga de Sandino pero yo la encuentro sospechosa.  ¶  "Los amigos de Sandino se han vuelto desconfiados y han tomado una actitud de absoluta reserva.  Ellos creen que su teléfono esta censurado (intervenido) por la policía y están siendo muy cautelosos en todos sus actos.  Ellos no reportaran la desaparición de Pavletich a la Policía, por temor de involucrar a Sandino, ya que algunos de ellos admiten que Pavletich, sino es actualmente un comunista de afiliación, tiene ideas comunistas.  ¶  "Con respecto al arresto del Coronel Martí, esto no es verdad, ya que yo hable con él anoche.  ¶  "Con respecto a Sandino, Martí me dijo que él (Sandino) estaba arreglando los últimos detalles para comenzar su viaje hacia Mérida, Yucatán, donde 20 hombres del personal del General lo están esperando“.  ¶  _____________________ ¶  Se ha sabido últimamente que Pavletich se involucro en la violación de las Leyes del Trafico, y fue arrestado como testigo, pero retenido solo unas pocas horas.  Ahora está en libertad."   

[NOTE: The previous special agent report for Feb. 8-12 can be found on TOP 100, PAGE 95, PAGE 5, DOCS 9 & 10.  //  NOTA: El informe anterior del agente especial de 8 a 12 febrero se encuentra en el TOP 100, PAGE 95, PAGE 5, DOCS 9 & 10.]