THIS IS THE THIRD OF THREE PAGES housing documents relating to the Guardia Nacional (Record Group 165, Entry 77, Military Intelligence Division on Nicaragua, 1922-1944) in US National Archives II in College Park, MD.  This page covers the period May 1935 — October 1941, after which the series ends.

     In the interwar years, the Military Intelligence Division was the principal US agency charged with gathering & reporting on military intelligence from around the world.  During World War II it was folded into the newly-created OSS & soon after the CIA.  This collection is especially rich on the period from 1933-1939, from the withdrawal of US military forces from Nicaragua to the outbreak of the war in Europe.  It is housed together here to preserve its original character, though in these pages the documents are organized chronologically.  The original files convey a sense that they have been rifled & culled of their most pointed or potentially controversial reports & memoranda, suggested in part by the seemingly random chronological sequence and haphazard arrangement of the material.  Apparently all that remain are carbon copies and newspaper clippings — no signed originals were found.  (Photo:  main entrance to Archives II in College Park, MD)

      Grateful appreciation is extended to Mr. Brandon Ray, Summa Cum Laude graduate from Ashford University in Iowa (with a B.A. in History and a minor in Political Science) for his meticulous transcriptions of the documents in this collection. Thank you, Brandon!

May 14, 1935.
"The Trial & Sentence of Lt. Abelardo Cuadra," US Military Attaché ad interim Alex Cohen, San José, p. 1.   "G-2 Report. ¶ 6300-a ¶ NICARAGUA – Combat. ¶ Subject: Loyalty & Discipline. ¶ The trial & sentence of Lt. Cuadra. ¶ As already report in No. 2663, April 30, from this office, President Sacasa refused to confirm the death sentence imposed by a General Court Martial upon Lt. Cuadra. ¶ The charges and specifications under which Lt. Cuadra was tried, as well as the reasons given by President Sacasa for refusing to confirm the sentence have just come to hand, and are quoted below: ¶ CHARGE: 1. Violation of article 58, Articles for the Government and Discipline of the Guardia Nacional. SPECIFICATION: That Abelardo Cuadra, Lieutenant, Guardia Nacional, being present among the enlisted men of the Second Battalion, Guardia Nacional, at the Campo de Marte, Managua, Nicaragua, on or about April 17, 1935, did neglect to make every effort to suppress a mutiny of the said Battalion, on account of the recent reduction of pay, nor did he take any steps to take disciplinary action, rather appointing himself as defender and champion (through harangue) of the said organization, for the purpose of conveying personally to the Director in Chief their non-conformity and protest and that afterwards, without previous permission, he placed himself at the head of the Battalion, presenting himself to the Director in Chief, asserting his adhesion and fidelity. ¶ CHARGE: 2. Violation of Art. 67, Articles for the Government and Discipline of the Guardia Nacional. SPECIFICATION: That Abelardo Cuadra, Lieutenant, Guardia Nacional, in Managua, Nicaragua, on or about the 18th of April, 1935, endeavored and commenced to provoke mutiny in the Campo de Marte, inciting the members of the 3rd Company and of the 2nd Battalion to imposed terms by armed force to the effect that the pay of the enlisted men of the Guardia Nacional be not reduced, endeavoring thereby to illegally assume command of the said organizations, voiding [paper in way of text] ¶ 6300-a ¶ [On carbon-copy slip of paper attached:]  Loyalty and Discipline in Guardia Nacional of Nicaragua. Disapproval of Death Sentence Imposed on Lt. Cuadra. ¶ President Sacasa’s strict observance of the constitution was an obligation of his high office. Although his action may weaken the state of discipline in the Guardia, punishment (other than death) is still possible. ¶ . . . no sentence of a Court Martial involving the loss of life may be put into effect until confirmed by the Commander in Chief”. ¶ From: M. A. Costa Rica ¶ Report No. 2879 ¶ Date: May 14, 1935."

May 14, 1935.
"The Trial & Sentence of Lt. Abelardo Cuadra," US Military Attaché ad interim Alex Cohen, San José, p. 1A.   " . . . [voiding] and disregarding the legal military authority of his superiors, an act which was about to be carried out between one and two in the morning of the 19th day of April, 1935, when he was to come to the Campo de Marte, which was to be the signal for the start. ¶ The specifications of both charges having been proven, the Court sentenced Lieut. Cuadra “To be degraded and shot”. ¶ Sub-paragraph d, article 44 or the Regulations for the Discipline and Government of the Guardia Nacional provides that: [“no sentence of a Court Martial involving the loss of life may be put into effect until confirmed by the Commander in Chief”. ¶ From: M. A. Costa Rica ¶ Report No. 2879 ¶ Date: May 14, 1935.]"

May 14, 1935.
"The Trial & Sentence of Lt. Abelardo Cuadra," US Military Attaché ad interim Alex Cohen, San José, p. 2.   " . . . G-2 Report. ¶ 6,300-a ¶ In returning the proceedings of the Court Martial without his approval, President Sacasa made the following observations: ¶ In the chapter on Rights and Guarantees, art. 34 of our political constitution prescribes that in the military branch “The death penalty may only be inflicted for the crime of high treason committed during a foreign war, and when confronted by the enemy”; while article 83 provides that the laws which regulate the carrying into effect of constitutional guarantees shall be void whenever they diminish, restrict or lessen them. ¶ Within these rules, the application of the death penalty being restricted to the military crime stated, it is evident that article 58 of the Regulations for the Government and Discipline of the Guardia Nacional lacks force to impose this penalty in the case of Lieut. Cuadra, notwithstanding the seriousness of the crime committed by him, and no matter how strong may be the arguments given for the infliction of exemplary punishment. The law should guide our reasoning and there is no way other than its due observance. ¶ THEREFORE: In conformity with the laws mentioned and insert (e) of article 44 of the same regulations, this office resolves: To deny confirmation to the sentence condemning Lieut. Abelardo Cuadra, Guardia Nacional, to be shot; and in consequence returns the proceedings to the Director in Chief of the Guardia Nacional so that he may pronounce one which should substitute it. ¶ The foregoing argument by President Sacasa, citing constitutional provisions, would seem to indicate that legally he was entirely within his rights in refusing to confirm the death sentence. ¶ It also would seem to indicate that those who originally prepared the “Regulations for the Government and Discipline of the Guardia Nacional” made the ‘slight’ mistake of disregarding the provisions of the Constitution of Nicaragua, and that consequently article 58 of these regulations is inconstitutional [unconstitutional]. ¶ In this instance, however, it certainly would have been immeasurably better if the President had forgotten legal amenities and permitted the sentence to stand. He certainly would have rendered a greater service to his country by for once and all instilling a little fear in the hearts of that part of the Guardia to whom thoughts of personal gains come before any sense of loyalty or duty. As in the case of the setting aside of the sentence of Lieut. López, it encourages recurrences of this nature and seriously handicaps those in charge of the Guardia from keeping it a dependable organization. ¶ Source: Press & Personal Knowledge. ¶ FOR AND IN THE ABSENCE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE: ¶ Alex A. Cohen, ¶ In charge of office. ¶ From: M. A. Costa Rica ¶ Report No. 2,879 ¶ Date: May 14, 1935"

June 12, 1935.
"Appendix 'A' - General Remarks - Central American Armies," US Military Attaché, San José, p. 1.   "APPENDIX “A” ¶ GENERAL REMARKS – CENTRAL AMERICAN ARMIES ¶ In general it may be said that there are no military forces of any value in Central America as judged by modern standards. There are no well trained officers, no modernly equipped troops, no trained staffs, no services of supply organized for the field, no artillery (except in name), no tanks, and no aviation except a few planes in the three northern Republics. ¶ The officers are usually politicians with military titles and uniforms but no military knowledge. As the officers, except those in El Salvador and Guatemala, lose their jobs with every change of administration, they have no incentive either to improve their military knowledge, or work any more than is necessary during their “incumbency of office.” In general, they cannot be said to be distinguished by their knowledge, ability, energy, honesty or loyalty. ¶ The men soon learn the few simple drills – the only things the officers can teach them – and then lie around doing nothing most of the time. As a class they are lazy and unambitious. In most of the Republics the soldiers in peace time are the poorest type of peon – attracted by the easy and lazy life. ¶ Although poorly trained and poorly led, the average soldier is not a coward, is not afraid to fight, and is not afraid to die. Especially in Nicaragua and Honduras is this true. In these countries the so-called soldiers become most excellent jungle fighters – and in this type of warfare find few superiors. ¶ The Central American soldier fights for no abstract theories, such as right or wrong, national honor or prestige. He fights because his “jefe” or “patron” tells him it is the proper thing to do. In his mind he neither owes nor pays allegiance to any such nebulous idea as a “state.” He blindly follows his “jefe” as long as the latter takes care of him and is successful. But in Central America an unsuccessful “jefe” is considered unlucky, and a poor peon cannot be expected to follow an unlucky leader. An unsuccessful leader soon loses his following, no matter how worthy the cause may be for which he is fighting. ¶ All Central American armies are organized first and last for internal conflict, i.e., the suppression of revolutions. A possible exception to this statement is the Army of El Salvador, as will be pointed out later. Because of this fact the science of artillery is a complete mystery in Central America. Not only is the theoretical and technical knowledge lacking, but the supply of ammunition available for the guns on hand would be sufficient for a few hours of fire only. Also field communication is absolutely unknown. Conspicuous by its absence is also all idea of service of supply in the field. All the armies intend to improvise the supply and evacuation systems in case of war. As none of the generals concerned can visualize an army of over a couple of thousand men, the confusion resulting from the mobilization of a larger force can easily be imagined. ¶ (Source: M. A. Costa Rica, Report No. 2924, June 12, 1935; G-2/265-260/2.) . . . "

June 12, 1935.
"Appendix 'A' - General Remarks - Central American Armies," US Military Attaché, San José, p. 2.   " . . . The number of men in the so-called unorganized reserve of course means practically nothing in Central America. The size of the army in war time depends not on the number of men available, but on the number of rifles, machine guns, etc., on hand, or on the ability of the government to purchase more. ¶ The most difficult information to obtain in Central America is data on the arms in the possession of the government. This information is jealously guarded lest it fall into the hands of the other governments or the internal enemies of the administration. Even in Costa Rica, when new arms or ammunition is purchased, the transaction is kept a deep secret and camouflaged so as not to appear in the budget. ¶ In the event of war between the United States and another world power, all of the Central American Republics could be swung into line behind the United States, if properly handled. If desirable, it is believed they could all be persuaded to declare war. In this case a large number of men would become available – a quarter of a million able bodied men at least. Of course they would have to have assistance in training and equipment – but the man power would be available if required. ¶ (Source: M. A. Costa Rica, Report No. 2924, June 12, 1935; G-2/265-260/2.)"

June 14, 1935.
Translations of articles from La Noticia (Managua) in May 1935, US Military Attaché Major A. R. Harris, San José, p. 1.   "June 14, 1935. ¶ MEMORANDUM TO: Latin American Section, M. I. D. ¶ The following translations from “La Noticia” of Managua are submitted without remark: ¶ “La Noticia”, May 21st. ¶ We have been informed that Lt. Bolivár Cantón – an officer graduated from the Managua Academy – who has been serving in Chontales, is on his way to this capital as a prisoner on account of having expressed himself unsympathetically regarding the Chief of The Guardia, General A. Somoza, in a recent political meeting held in Juigalpa in honor of this military candidate. ¶ Similarly have we been informed that Captain Federico Cabrera, also a graduate of the Managua Academy – has already been or is about to be discharged, not for political, but for moral reasons. ¶ “La Noticia”, May 21st. ¶ The latest number of the “Guardia Nacional” magazine, now out, carries an editorial from the Director, General Somoza, from which we take the following paragraph related with the affaire of ex-Lieut. Abelardo Cuadra. ¶ “In the future the Director will neither by generous nor sentimental as he has been up to the present. He will be a severe and disciplinary judge with his subordinates. The regulations by which we are governed will be applied with all their rigor. Justice will be meted out quickly and effectively in every case of violation of our laws. So let those who not always follow the dictates of honor and precepts of discipline in the service beware!” ¶ “La Noticia”, May 22nd. ¶ The command of the Guardia confirmed a report which appeared in La Noticia yesterday regarding the arrest of Lt. Bolivár Cantón, graduate officer, for “failing in respect due the Director in Chief of the Guardia Nacional”, as stated by the staff officers of the institution. The report regarding the approaching discharge of the officer referred to was also confirmed. ¶ According to details, which are well nigh public knowledge in this capital, Lt. Cantón pronounced himself strongly against the political personality of General Somoza and attacked his presidential candidacy on the occasion of a recent demonstration made in . . . "

June 14, 1935.
Translations of articles from La Noticia (Managua) in May 1935, US Military Attaché Major A. R. Harris, San José, p. 2.   " . . . favor of the military candidate mentioned in the city of Juigalpa, Department of Chontales, where Lt. Canton was serving. ¶ In military circles it is furthermore said that Lt. Cantón flagrantly violated Order 17 of the Guardia Nacional prescribing punishment for alcoholics and that he was under the influence of liquor when he attacked the candidacy of General Somoza, having been placed immediately under arrest in that city. For the purpose of being discharged he will be transferred to the Campo de Marte. Up to the moment it is not known whether he will be tried by a Court-Martial. ¶ Lt. Cantón is the son of don Gustavo Cantón, a conservative, and he received his diploma as cadet-officer during the last course of the Military Academy of Managua held under the command of American officers. ¶ A. R. Harris, ¶ Major, G. S., M. A."

June 1935—Early 1938.
"Abridged Combat Estimate" of Guardia Nacional, compiled from US military attaché reports 1935-1938, p. 1.   "6010-a ¶ 6010-b ¶ N I C A R A G U A ¶ ABRIDGED COMBAT ESTIMATE ¶ I. THE ACTIVE ARMY. ¶ In order to insure Nicaragua’s having an efficient, non-political National Guard – one that would be a credit to the Americans who instructed it – U. S. Marines sweated, worked, fought and died. But today, instead of a smooth functioning, efficient force, working for the good of its country, we find an organization, torn by internal dissention into many discontented factions, each suspicious and jealous of the others, and each working towards its own selfish ends. ¶ The Guardia is divided into Liberal and Conservative factions; Sacasa and Somoza factions; “academic” (trained in military school conducted by Marines), and “political” (appointed for political reasons) factions. One man may belong to two or even three of these groups. There is little cooperation and much unrest in the Guardia. The dream of its organizers, who hoped they were leaving behind a strong, patriotic, stabilizing force, is far from being realized. In fact the exact opposite is what is taking place. The Guardia is now one of the most serious threats to peace and quietude in the country. ¶ In spite of its internal disorganization the Guardia is perhaps the best fighting force in Central America today. Practically all the younger officers and many of the enlisted men have had experience in guerilla warfare. They can handle their rifles, machine guns, sub-machine guns, hand grenades, and rifle grenades very well. They can march long distances, and know the value of cover. But outside of minor tactics in guerilla warfare they of course have had no training. They know nothing of artillery. They have no aviation, signal service or effective services of supply and evacuation. ¶ The Guardia has a staff organization modeled after our own, but it resembles an infantry regimental staff more than a general staff. ¶ The Nicaraguan likes to fight. He is naturally cruel. He values life very lightly. He is strong and can withstand great hardships. He is not disciplined but he will follow his “jefe” blindly. He is brave and often reckless. Properly trained and led he becomes a first class fighting man, probably the best in Central America. ¶ At the present time the Guardia consists of 209 officers and roughly 2,200 men. In addition there are 487 officers and men in the Auxiliaries and Urban Police. The Auxiliaries form an ununiformed body of men which can be expanded in an emergency and reduced after the emergency has passed. The best known officer with this force is “General” Juan Escamilla, a Mexican, reported to be a brave and ruthless fighter. ¶ About 30% of the Guardia is stationed in Managua. Included in the above figure is the Presidential Guard of 200 men and about a . . . "

June 1935—Early 1938.
"Abridged Combat Estimate" of Guardia Nacional, compiled from US military attaché reports 1935-1938, p. 2.

June 1935—Early 1938.
"Abridged Combat Estimate" of Guardia Nacional, compiled from US military attaché reports 1935-1938, p. 3.

May 8, 1936.
Excerpt from Military Attaché's Travel Report on Military Situation in Managua. 

May 29, 1936.
"Five Privates of Guardia Shot for Treason," US Military Attaché ad interim Alex Cohen, San José.   "G-2 Report. ¶ 6,300-a ¶ NICARAGUA – Combat. ¶ Subject: Loyalty, Discipline & Morale. ¶ Five Privates of Guardia Shot for Treason. ¶ Five privates of the Guardia Nacional of Nicaragua, stationed at, or in the vicinity of Cabo Gracias a Dios, on the Atlantic Coast, were on May 27th found guilty of treason by a hastily convened Court Martial and shot the same day. ¶ As far as this office has been able to learn, the circumstances leading to this summary action were the following: ¶ Captain Matute, in charge of the Guardia Detachment at Cabo Gracias learned that five of his men had reached an understanding with a former Sandino lieutenant, “General” Simón González, for the purpose of overpowering the small Cabo Gracias garrison, obtain the three machine guns, some thirty rifles and ammunition on hand there and, once those arms were obtained, go on a marauding expedition into the interior of Nicaragua. It is stated that, during the trial, two of the men confessed their complicity in the plot. ¶ Although the foregoing, of course, is an isolated instance of disloyalty, it would seem to indicate that in the isolated regions loyalty of the enlisted personnel of the Guardia is an uncertain factor. Reductions in pay, lack of uniforms, clothing and footwear combined by the example set by officers in charge of isolated districts in high-handedly recognizing no authority other than General Somoza, the Commanding Officer of the Guardia all are contributory factors towards making the loyalty of the enlisted personnel, especially in outlying districts, a very uncertain factor at its best. ¶ Source: Press, personal knowledge. ¶ FOR AND IN THE ABSENCE OF THE M. A. ¶ Alex A. Cohen, ¶ In charge of office. ¶ From: MA Costa Rica ¶ Report 3477 ¶ Date: May 29, 1936."

October 28, 1937.
"Nicaraguan Army," US Military Attaché's Report, p. 1.

October 28, 1937.
"Nicaraguan Army," US Military Attaché's Report, p. 2.

March 2, 1938.
"Strength and Organization of Troops in Northern Part of Nicaragua," US Military Attaché's Report, p. 1.

March 2, 1938.
"Strength and Organization of Troops in Northern Part of Nicaragua," US Military Attaché's Report, p. 2.

October 4, 1939.
Guardia Nacional Receives 20% Increase in Pay, Report of US Naval Attache.

November 25, 1939.
"Morale of the Guardia Nacional," US Military Attaché Col. J. B. Pate, San José, p. 1.

November 25, 1939.
"Morale of the Guardia Nacional," US Military Attaché Col. J. B. Pate, San José, p. 2.

March 14, 1940.
"Efficiency of the Guardia Nacional of Nicaragua," US Naval Attaché Major F. E. Lamson-Scribner, p. 1.

March 14, 1940.
"Efficiency of the Guardia Nacional of Nicaragua," US Naval Attaché Major F. E. Lamson-Scribner, p. 2.

March 14, 1940.
"Efficiency of the Guardia Nacional of Nicaragua," US Naval Attaché Major F. E. Lamson-Scribner, p. 3.

July 25, 1940.
"President Somoza Announced Redistribution of Guardia Nacional," US Naval Attaché Captain F. M. June.

September 6, 1940.
"Military Training System — Military Mission for Nicaragua," US Naval Attaché Captain F. M. June, p. 1.

September 6, 1940.
"Military Training System — Military Mission for Nicaragua," US Naval Attaché Captain F. M. June, p. 2.

September 27, 1940.
Naval Intelligence Report on "Nicaraguan Army Pay, Enrollments, etc.," US Military Attaché ad interim 1st Sgt. R. M. Hendrickson, p. 1.

September 27, 1940.
Naval Intelligence Report on "Nicaraguan Army Pay, Enrollments, etc.," US Military Attaché ad interim 1st Sgt. R. M. Hendrickson, p. 2.

October 1, 1941.
Extract of Information on General Somoza's Reassignment of All Senior Army Officers.

End of Military Intelligence Division material specifically treating the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua.