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PC27.11.02   chappell

INVENTORY OF PC-DOCS, THRU 1927

24.02.18 BOURKE
24,03,24 BIRNBAUMER
27.05.19 CHAPPELL
27.06.07 SWANSON
27.06.22 RICHAL
27.07.16 HATFIELD
27.07.20 HATFIELD
27.07.28 HATFIELD
27.08.12 FLOYD
27.08.18 BRUCE
27.09.04 O'SHEA
27.09.05 MCQUADE
27.09.08 CHAPPELL
27.09.20 KENYON
27.09.22 PEARD
27.10.12 O'SHEA
27.10.18 SATTERFIELD
27.11.02 CHAPPELL
27.11.02 GOULD
27.11.06 PEARD
27.11.07 BELLINGER
27.11.10 KEIMLING
27.11.11 BROWN
27.11.12 HARBAUGH
27.11.13 CRUM
27.11.14 DARNELL
27.11.19 WELLS
27.11.20 BELLINGER
27.11.26 KEIMLING
27.12.06 PEARD
27.12.07 BROWN
27.12.11 BROWN
27.12.11 KEIMLING
27.12.11 HARBAUGH
27.12.15 BROWN
27.12.17 CRONMILLER
27.12.18 MARTIN
27.12.19 WELLS
27.12.31 GOULD

27.11.02.   Chappell, Operations Report, Quilalí Area

P C - D O C S :      P A T R O L   &   C O M B A T    R E P O R T S
thru 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 +

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QUILALI PATROL
2 November, 1927.

From:

Second Lieutenant C. J. Chappell.

To:

The Commanding Officer, Fifth Regiment.

Via:

The Division Commander, Ocotal.

Subject:

Operations Report

   1.    On October 24, I received orders by plane at 1200 to execute. At 1500 a patrol of one Second Lieutenant, one doctor and twenty four enlisted marines and one guardia lieutenant with fifteen enlisted guardia left Jicaro with seven days rations. The patrol reached Jicarito at 2130 and camped for the night.
 
   2.    The following morning the patrol cleared Jicarito at 0700 arriving near Antonio Lopez's ranch at 1000. The planes directed me to remain there until that afternoon, at Lieut. Gould's patrol was still two miles south of Quilali. At about 1630 the planes dropped a message that Lieut. Gould would reach the scene of the crash that night. As I had heard several dynamite bombs exploded ahead of me, I thought it unwise to travel that night and made camp on a hill for the night.
 
   3.    On October 26 we left for the scene of the crash at 0730. After having travelled about one mile, a bomb was exploded about 800 yards ahead. I had the point proceed very cautious and attempted to cross the saddle on the ridge that we were following. On arriving at the bottom point we reached an open area which lay between us and a very steep hill covered with thick brush and large timbers. Sergeant Shumate with the point discovered bandits on this hill and opened fire before attempting to cross this open area. This drew the bandits fire and they opened up shouting for Sandino, Sacasa and Chamorro. I moved my men into position and a short fight took place. About this time several bombs were fired in our rear followed by rifle fire and yelling. To cross the open area in front and take the hill, could not be accomplished without a great number of casualties and the loss of our animals. To remain in our position where we were located and allow the enemy to hold the hill in our rear, would mean the same result as we had no other cover than light brush. We forced the enemy to the rear and took the hill, losing several animals. To move further to the rear would place us in the same position as before, so I took a position on this hill to wait for the arrival of the planes. Immediately on reaching this hill, a machine gun opened fire on us from our right front where they had been waiting for us to attempt to cross the open area and take the hill on our front. As the enemy was now about 500 yards distance, their fire was high and we had no trouble in fortifying our position.  [p. 2]
 
   4.    At about 1030 all fire had ceased except a few occasional shots and on the approach of the planes the enemy kept quiet and tried to hide. I displayed my panels and the planes opened fire and dropped bombs on the enemy. As the planes gave me no formation in regard to the location of Lieut. Gould's patrol, I decided to remain until that afternoon as I was not certain of the correct trail.

   5.   The planes returned at 1230 and gave me orders from Captain Peard to remain where I was until the arrival of Lieutenant Gould's patrol. The enemy was still located in the brush and any attempt to locate water drew their fire. The planes looked us over again at 1630, giving us water and fireing [sic] at the bandits again.

   6.   During the night a great number of lights and camp fires were located around us and a few stray shots were fired at our location.

   7.   On October 27 everything seemed quiet and a few shots were fired during the day. The planes came over giving us water and quinine and information that the other patrol would join us that day.

   8.   Lieutenant Gould's joined us October 28 about 1300. Very soon after his arrival my patrol took the animals to the rear to be watered. Reaching a point about 500 yds. From the camp a guardia located the enemy in the brush and opened fire. The bandits returned the fire and on the arrival of the planes a few minutes later they fled into the brush. For fear the planes would not recognize the marines and guardia, they did not follow the enemy, but returned to camp.

   9.   The number of enemy estimated to our front and rear was about 175. Due to the thick brush very few could be seen and this estimate is based upon the amount of fire we received.

   10.   The number of bandit casualties is estimated at about fifteen in the first engagement and about five when the patrol attempted to water the animals. A great many are believed to have been killed and wounded by the planes.

   11.   The enemy used only rifles and a machine gun against us as and at no time were we close enough to allow them to throw their dynamite bombs. They seemed to use their bombs as signals and I believe if the planes had not arrived, they would have attempted to take our position during the night with a strong attack of more men. The planes scattered them and kept them from moving up more men until after dark. [p. 3]

   12.   During both engagements the marines and guardia suffered no casualties. At the first of the engagement the guardia and marines used rifle grenades, but upon taking up a position on the hill, the range was 400 to 500 yds. and only rifle fire could be used.

   13.   The help of the planes was a great factor, not only in scattering the bandits, but in directing the line of march. Without the aid of the planes the two patrols would have much more trouble in meeting each other as all hills and roads are covered with dense brush and a network of trails lead in every direction. The country is ideal for ambushing and no patrol that is not large enough to cover the last hill before advancing to the next cannot operate without a great number of casualties.

   14.   The balance of the patrol is covered in the report of Lieutenant Gould as my patrol joined his.

- - - - - - - - - - - /s/ C. J. CHAPPELL - - - - - -

NA127/43A/3

Summary & Notes:

   Describes hard-fought skirmish in zone north of Quilalí near the Sapotillal ridge, where aviators' plane crashed Oct. 8.   EDSN highly motivated & mobilized & well armed, with the number of rebels estimated at 175, versus Lt. Chappell's 25.  Role of airplanes crucial in helping patrols find their way & each other.

   Report should be read in tandem with the next two reports by Gould and Peard.

P C - D O C S :      P A T R O L   &   C O M B A T    R E P O R T S
thru 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 +

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