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1917

March 15, 1917.  Jack Lemann, Waunta, Nicaragua, to "All," p. 1.   transcription forthcoming.     (From the Lemann Family Papers, Tulane University:   http://specialcollections.tulane.edu/archon/?p=collections/controlcard&id=102).

March 15, 1917.  Jack Lemann, Waunta, Nicaragua, to "All," p. 2.   transcription forthcoming.       (From the Lemann Family Papers, Tulane University:   http://specialcollections.tulane.edu/archon/?p=collections/controlcard&id=102).

March 20, 1917.  Jack Lemann, Waunta, Nicaragua, to "All," p. 1.   transcription forthcoming.      (From the Lemann Family Papers, Tulane University:   http://specialcollections.tulane.edu/archon/?p=collections/controlcard&id=102). 

March 20, 1917.  Jack Lemann, Waunta, Nicaragua, to "All," p. 2.   transcription forthcoming.      (From the Lemann Family Papers, Tulane University:   http://specialcollections.tulane.edu/archon/?p=collections/controlcard&id=102). 

March 23, 1917.  Jack Lemann, Waunta, Nicaragua, to "All."   transcription forthcoming.      (From the Lemann Family Papers, Tulane University:   http://specialcollections.tulane.edu/archon/?p=collections/controlcard&id=102). 

April 7, 1917.  Jack Lemann, Waspook on the Río Coco, to Jack Arthur, p. 1.     transcription forthcoming.      (From the Lemann Family Papers, Tulane University:   http://specialcollections.tulane.edu/archon/?p=collections/controlcard&id=102). 

April 7, 1917.  Jack Lemann, Waspook on the Río Coco, to Jack Arthur, p. 1.     transcription forthcoming.      (From the Lemann Family Papers, Tulane University:   http://specialcollections.tulane.edu/archon/?p=collections/controlcard&id=102). 

February 26, 1920.  Telegram from USS Tacoma to Opnav.   "X-71 ¶ 1-42o7 ¶ McC ¶ TRANSLATION ¶ From: USS TACOMA. ¶ To: Opnav ¶ 1021 Honduras aroused by recent raids by rebels from Nicaraguan territory. Government requested our acting Minister to inform United States that it now learns that the rebels invading Honduras have been armed by Nicaragua and to inquire attitude our State Department in case revolution in Nicaragua concurs with war declared by Honduras. Telephone communication with TEGUCIGALPA temporarily interrupted however interviewed General Cristmas [Christmas?], an American citizen, February 20th who left Tegucigalpa February 20th and martial law declared Teguc Galpa [Tegucigalpa?] February 19 presumably in order to mobilized [mobilize] forces. Reported Honduran rebels from Nicaraguan had captured three towns and Government put Municipal authorities in which located under martial law. Troops being mobilized but no disorder Tegucigalpa but some unrest. About twenty persons imprisoned February 20th at Amapala apparently because of political views including former United States consular agent Zalaya. Christmas thinks present revolution is not formidable but regards Nicaraguan menace serious. ¶ USS TACOMA. ¶ 19 ¶ oo ¶ 1o ¶ 11 ¶ 12 ¶ 13-ORIGINAL ¶ ONI ¶ 2-26-20 ¶ Note:- This message has been serviced for correction."

1.  January 27, 1922.  "Report on Conditions, Managua, Nicaragua."  Captain M. M. Taylor, Commandant, 15th Naval District, Managua, to Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, p. 1.    "AMERICAN LEGATION ¶ Managua, Nicaragua ¶ 27 January 1922. ¶ From: Commandant, 15th Naval District. ¶ To: Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department. ¶ Subject: Report on conditions Managua, Nicaragua. ¶ 1. In obedience to the radio order of the Department I proceeded in the GALVESTON to Corinto, Nicaragua, on 16 December 1921, arriving the 19th and proceeded to Managua, Nicaragua, on 21 December 1921, after having had forwarded to me at the former place the results of the investigation ordered by the Officer in Command of the Legation Guard, as far as they had gone. ¶ 2. The day of arrival at Managua, called on the President of Nicaragua, in company with the Commanding Officer of the Galveston, and explained that I had been ordered to Managua, to investigate the unfortunate occurrence of 8 December 1921 with a view to determining the possible culpability of any members of the Guard with a view to bringing them to trial before a Military Court, which I was empowered to order, and that any assistance the Nicaraguan Government could give in the procurement of testimony or as the result of any investigation they had made would be greatly appreciated. ¶ 3. On arrival found a board of officers ordered by the Commander Detachment in session and on completion of its work ordered a board of Officers from the GALVESTON. The original board had originally met at the Camp and later changed its meeting place to the U. S. Legation as some comment had been made to the effect that witnesses would hesitate to appear at the Camp. It was thought better to separate the board as far as possible from the Guard so meetings were held at the Legation and the officers of the board quartered at the hotel, an interpreter brought from the ship and a stenographer hired, none being available on either the GALVESTON or ASHEVILLE. ¶ 4. The work of the board was interferred [interfered] with by the fact that 23-25 December, was a time of “fiesta”, during which the centenary celebration, which had been postponed from September, due to trouble in the country at that time, and Christmas then celebrated. The officers were invited to certain celebrations which it was thought best they attend, and the attendance of witnesses was impossible to secure. ¶ 5. All witnesses were summoned through the Legation Officials. There was throughout delay in securing their presence, due in part to the natural dilatorniess [dilatoriness] of the people and in part to an apparent lack of interest on the part of the Government. . . . "

2.  January 27, 1922.  "Report on Conditions, Managua, Nicaragua."  Captain M. M. Taylor, Commandant, 15th Naval District, Managua, to Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, p. 2.    " . . . There is no doubt that the attendance of such witnesses as were requested through the Foreign Officer could eaisly [easily] have been assured but it required constantly renewed requests, and finally personal letters from the Secretary of Legation to the individuals desired to secure attendance. Some of the papers were helpful in publishing notices as to the necessity for attendance and the names of those desired. ¶ 6. There were many rumours in circulation as to the cause of the disturbance, statements that it was caused by the Liberals as opponents of the government with a view to discredit it; circulars were issued criticizing the government for not permitting attacks on the marines, but for protecting them when the mob had collected after the fight; when the papers were allowed to carry the occurrence as a news item, attacks were made for the imposing of silence at first, for permitting the marines to be tried by their own courst [courts] under the principle of exterritoriality rather than in the local courts. Much of this criticism was undoubtedly caused by a desire to attack the government rather than by any regard for the dead policemen. After the board of investigation had started its work, every facility was given the papers to obtain news. Considerable space was given the deliberations of the board, at times the board was criticised, and on one occasion where a native witness testified in favor of the marines, one paper commented adversely on such action by a Nicaraguan. ¶ 7. The political situation is roughly as follows: The Government is in the hands of the Conservative Party, comprising probably one-third of the people; this party has its headquarters in Grenada [Granada], Nicaragua, and has as members most of the old established and wealthy families, with their dependants [dependents]. The remaining two-thirds form the Liberal Party compromising many of the liberal professions, artisans and laborers, their headquarters are in Leon. It would seem that the rivalry between the two parties is inspired as much by the rivalry between the two districts, a rivalry existent since the days of Spanish rule, as by any difference in political principles. The two parties are frequently referred to as Grenadinos [Granadinos] and Leonistas. ¶ 8. The financial situation is closely involved with the political. The Conservative Party made an agreement with certain New York banks, Brown Bros., and J.W. Seligman, which practically puts the financial control of the country in the hands of the banks. The banks have established and control, the Banco Nacional, the sole bank of issue and through which pass all governmental monies; own 15% of the stock of the railroad, and manage it through the firm of J.J. White & Co., of New York; collect and allot the customs revenue; and through an affiliated concern, the Companis de Ultramar, enter largely into the commercial business of the country and loan money on the coffee and sugar crops, a large part of which they control. This financial control by the foreign bank is much resented by the Liberals and by some business men with whom I have spoken. They claim, amongst other things, that all profits from the bank’s activities go out of the country. . . . "

3.  January 27, 1922.  "Report on Conditions, Managua, Nicaragua."  Captain M. M. Taylor, Commandant, 15th Naval District, Managua, to Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, p. 3.    " . . . 9. The majority of people with whom I have spoken consider that the withdrawal of the marines would lead to the almost immediate overthrow of the Conservative Government. Many of these are employees of the bank branches, some are business men and one was a mining man who represented large interests in the country. It is also generally considered possible that overthrow of the present government would lead to loss by the bank of its position of control, to a number this would seem to be a good thing, as it is considered by them, that the bank by its operations is hurting the country. It is difficult to say how much sincerity there is in the Liberals [Liberals’] criticism of the presence of the marines and the Conservatives Parties [Party’s] reliance on them for retention of power; the fact probably is that the Liberals would like to see them withdrawn until they had seized the government, and then have them to retain themselves in power. ¶ 10. All this political and financial unrest leads to bitter attacks on the Government, and the marines are used as a means of such attack. The Government permits a freedom of expression in the papers which I am told, is unprecedented, and such articles as they present to their readers, especially the more ignorant ones, cannot but have a great effect in promoting dislike of the marines. ¶ 11. Other causes of friction between the marines and natives are: ¶ (a) The fact that the marines have more money than the native police and soldiers, and can more eaisly [easily] secure the favors of the prostitutes with which the place seems to abound. ¶ (b) The racial feeling which is present here as well as in any place with which I have knowledge, where our enlisted men are thrown into contact with the Latin American. The existence of this feeling is less warranted here than in other places, due to the fact that the natives in western Nicaragua, have little black blood, being predominately Indian and Spanish. A black man is very rarely seen in the streets, and to be classed as black, or negro, is highly resented. ¶ (c) The cheapness and easy procurement of a cheap and vile liquor in the hundreds of cantinas about the town, each of which has as an adjunct, a number of prostitutes. ¶ 12. The conditions under which the marines live, is most unsatisfactory. They are cooped up in a small compound where there is no room for drill or for a base ball diamond. Their quarters are none too comfortable, being a sort of lean-to against the wall of the coumpound [compound], from which the dust so prevalent here in the dry season cannot be excluded. Once outside the gate, ten minutes will avail to see all that is worth seeing in the town. . . . "

4.  January 27, 1922.  "Report on Conditions, Managua, Nicaragua."  Captain M. M. Taylor, Commandant, 15th Naval District, Managua, to Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, p. 4.    " . . . A band concert several times a week and an occasional moving picture show, form the total of decent means of amusement. The record of the board of investigation is a long recounting of wanderings from cantina to cantina, all dirty and unattractive. The result has been that the marines on liberty have been thrown into close contact with the lower class natives, and the causes of friction noted above have had full opportunity to work. The row of 8 December, 1921, was a result of such conditions of living. Investigation shows that a succession of fights between the marines and police, where the latter were in superior force or where the marine was drunk, led to the men taking the matter into their own hands and attacking the police. ¶ 13. It does not seem to me possible, with conditions as above stated, to entirely do away with the possibility of such occurrences. Such can, however, be largely ensured against by removing the marines from their present situation to one more isolated, and where can be obtained the space for drill and recreation. Such a place was, I am informed, at one time considered. It is on the shore of the lake, has ample room, is surrounded by a sparsely settled neighborhood, and the new houses erected in this neighborhood could be controlled by the local authorities, its situation on the shore of the lake with the prevailing winds off the lake ensures freedom from dust, and the lake itself offers opportunity for boating and swimming which are not now existant [existent]. Its great advantages are the removal from a congested district and the additional possibilities for providing the men with amusement in their own territory and removing the desire to go on liberty. Pending the above removal, steps will be taken to enlarge the part of the Campo de Marte now occupied by the Marine Detachment. ¶ 14. It was found that a number of the men, some 15%, were keeping women in town, a large number were non-commissioned officers. In one case a corporal, since discharged, was running a cantina or restaurant in the town, in his native wife’s name, which gave the marines credit and was considerably patronized. The radio gunner, through his wife, was running a public garage, and has left the country owing considerable money. Such practices cannot but have a bad effect in that they give those participating in them too great an interest outside the Camp. The evidence of the board of investigation shows that some of these non-commissioned officers, whose houses were in the vicinity of the trouble shut themselves in with their women until brought in by a patrol. ¶ 15. The record of punishments indicates that not sufficient severity was used in the discouragement of drunkenness. For example: the Gunnery Sergeant was punished for drunkenness on three successive months and then transferred as a Gunnery Sergeant. One sergeant was punished three times for drunkenness as a sergeant and the third time reduced to corporal; he was later tried by general court-martial for drunkenness on patrol and returned to the United States. . . . "

5.  January 27, 1922.  "Report on Conditions, Managua, Nicaragua."  Captain M. M. Taylor, Commandant, 15th Naval District, Managua, to Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, p. 5.    " . . . 16. It appears from the testimony before the board of investigation that there were a number of cases of trouble between the marines and police of which not sufficient note was taken. It appears that the continuance of these fights and lack of protection the men considered their right, led them into the affair of 8 December 1921. One man private Zollner, U. S. Marine Corps, was beaten by the police while on liberty and drunk on the night of 7 December 1921, again on liberty 8 December 1921, nor had the matter been taken up with the authorities. ¶ 17. Men have been permitted to stay here too long. That the present condition is in part due to the fact that grudges were not allowed to die out but were carried on by the long timers, grudges against the natives and against officers who relieved others less strict. This cannot be proven by evidence, but is an opinion soon formed by me and commented on by other experienced officers. A man who for a long time has slept every night with his woman resents being made to spend his nights in Camp, and it is my opinion that some of this resentment is responsible for present conditions. Fifteen months should be the limit of a man’s stay here, the conditions are too demoralizing for him to remain longer, no matter what his importance. ¶ 18. No systematic effort has been made to check up the character of the cantinas with which the town abounds, and place out of bounds those of evil character. In the affair of 8 December 1921, the meeting where the organization for the fight took place was in one cantina and the attack took place at another. This second was of bad character and should have been out of bounds. Nor was there any patrol to assist in the preservation of order. ¶ 19. The racial feeling is strong in this vicinity and the people greatly resent being considered negroes. The greater part are Spanish and Indian, a black face is not as often seen as in most Northern Cities of the United States. Calling them “spigs” and “niggers” leads to intense dislike. Much could be done by association with the better families and including them in social life. ¶ 20. In the early part of the investigation the Government expressed no great desire to assist; it was difficult to obtain witnesses and their presence was only secured after many requests, by the aid of the papers and by letters to individuals from the Legation. Conservations with the employees of the bank, as are practically all Americans, gave the opinion that they did not relish the investigation for fear that it might lead to the withdrawal of the marines. There was little aid obtained from sources which should have been helpful. . . . "

6.  January 27, 1922.  "Report on Conditions, Managua, Nicaragua."  Captain M. M. Taylor, Commandant, 15th Naval District, Managua, to Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, p. 6.    " . . . 21. Men selected for duty here should be chosen with care, both officers and men. Life here for too long a time brings about a lowering of morale due to the surroundings, the constant preaching of the “outs” as to the venality and rottenness of the government, the cheapness of the vile liquor sold and the immoroality [immorality]. No man subject to such influences but will come to grief. ¶ 22. As stated in action on report of board of investigation charges were preferred against two men, whose identification seemed best. It was hoped that this would show the men, already kept in suspense by the long drawn out proceedings, that something had been developed and they were not safe, and to use this in an effort to break down some one with a promise of immunity. This was successful and two participants made confessions under promise of immunity. The result of this will be made subject of a separate report. This step was taken as it was apparent that there was a concerted effort on the part of the enlisted personnel to prevent any action and it seemed the only way to circumvent this. ¶ 23. In view of the fact that one major cause of the condition that has grown up appears to have been the passing on of old grudges by those long on the ground to the new arrivals, so that the sense of injury was gradually growing, it is necessary to break this tradition, and the only apparent way is to make an entire change of personnel. Such change to be effective, and to have proper effect on Nicaragua, must be complete even though some of the personnel suffer. This condition cannot be laid entirely to the present commissioned personnel, they inherited a bad condition, andit [and it] is their misfortune that it broke in their time. This is especially applicable to those who only recently arrived, but their transfer is considered necessary as an evidence of the desire of the Government to prevent such occurrences, and to enable the new personnel to build anew. The diplomatic as well as the military side of this question must be considered. This change was recommended to the Department by radio. ¶ 24. The following is a summary of the conclusions reached and recommendations made for the improvement of conditions: ¶ RECOMMENDATIONS. ¶ (a) That great care be taken in the selection of men to be sent to this command. Only men of good character and who may be expected to resist the many temptations here be selected. ¶ (b) That another site be secured for the location of the post. One where ample ground is available for drills, baseball, etc., and at such a distance from the town as to lessen the desire for liberty and tend to force the men to provide their own recreation. . . . "

7.  January 27, 1922.  "Report on Conditions, Managua, Nicaragua."  Captain M. M. Taylor, Commandant, 15th Naval District, Managua, to Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, p. 7.    " . . . (c) That there be a checking up of the various resorts in the town with a view to placing those with a bad reputation, as the one of Chavela Cruz where the recent trouble started, out of bounds. ¶ (d) The maintenance of a patrol to check up these places so as to ensure the punishment of those who violate the order. ¶ (e) That all men of the command be required to sleep in the post. ¶ (f) That an effort be made to establish some place on the order of a club where the men may go in town for meals and liquor they will get in any case, and to arrange with the police authorities for the supervision of this place. ¶ (g) That more severity should be used in the punishment of men, especially of non-commissioned officers than the reports of punishments would indicate, for drunkenness. Cases of Lamb and Barth. ¶ (h) That an effort should be made to promote better relations with the people by opening up the picture shows and other events to the better class people, and by the promotion of baseball with the local teams. Much can be accomplished by the officers of the command in this direction. ¶ (i) That the Commanding Officer should be given full latitude in the transfer of men to the States who have shown themselves unfitted. ¶ (j) That the limit of fifteen (15) months for the stay of a man in this com and be strictly adhered to, and no man allowed to stay over this time for whatever reason. ¶ (k) That a band be assigned this post. ¶ (l) That a competent officer, preferably chaplain, be assigned to promote amusements within the command. ¶ (m) That the marine personnel be entirely changed. ¶ (n) That means be taken to improve conditions in the marines [marines’] surroundings, preferably by selection of a new site, temporarily by an increase in area now occupied. Latter will be taken in hand. ¶ (o) That effort be made to get the marines out of town on liberty by hikes, visits to estates and points of interest. That the question of furnishing motor sailers on the lake and allowing their use for leave parties be taken up. . . . "

8.  January 27, 1922.  "Report on Conditions, Managua, Nicaragua."  Captain M. M. Taylor, Commandant, 15th Naval District, Managua, to Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, p. 8.    " . . . CONCLUSIONS. ¶ (a) That the situation now occupied by the marines is a bad one. There is insufficient room for the proper activities of the post under the control of the Commanding Officer. ¶ (b) That some of the non-commissioned officers have not a proper sense of their duty, in that they did not keep the Commanding Officer informed as to the existence of the bad feeling evidently existing as shown by the fights between the marines and police. Nor, as shown by the evidence of Sergeant Brady, U.S. Marine Corps, show a proper interest in such occurrences. ¶ (c) That the practice of so many of the command living with women outside the limits of the post is a bad one, in that it gives them too great an interest outside their proper duties. This applies also to those not given all night liberty. ¶ (d) That many men were kept too long, leading to the building up of interests outside the command. ¶ (e) That such cases as that of Corporal Pachinger, who ran a restaurant outside the post while still a member of the command should not be tolerated. ¶ (f) That general liberty after 9:00 or 10:00 p.m., is bad in that the only place men can spend this time is with women or in the cantinas. ¶ (g) That too much leniency was shown in the punishment of non-commissioned officers who showed themselves to be drunkards and by such leniency failing to impress on the command the evil of such conduct. (h) That cases where the marines were involved in fights with the police were not sufficiently considered with a view to taking such cases up with the civil authorities and correcting any abuses by the punishment of one of the other. ¶ (i) That the wearing of civilian clothes by any member of the command should be stopped. Anything which tends to separate a man from the purely military atmosphere is to be condemned. ¶ (j) That the appearance of the men and the camp is excellent and reflects credit on the Commanding Officer; but that the morale of the men was low, that they did not feel themselves supported. ¶ (k) That considerable of the trouble can be laid to the passing on of old grudges to new men by those a long time here so the total is constantly increasing. ¶ M. M. TAYLOR ¶ Captain, U S Navy."

1.  January 28, 1922.  "Events after adjournment of Board of Investigation into affair of 8 December 1921."  Captain M. M. Taylor, Commandant, 15th Naval District, Managua, to Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, p. 1.    " . . . AMERICAN LEGATION ¶ Managua, Nicaragua, ¶ 28 January 1922. ¶ From: Commandant, 15th Naval District. ¶ To: Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department. ¶ Subject: Events after adjournment of Board of Investigation into affair of 8 December 1921. ¶ Enclosures: 2. ¶ (A) Copy of letter to Minister of Gobernacion. ¶ (B) Reply to letter to Minister of Gobernacion. ¶ 1. It was soon realized from the work of the board of investigation that securing of testimony on which to base charges would be difficult, and it was evident that the marines were not telling the truth. The presence of a number of marines at the fight was definitely shown, yet the testimony under oath of those marines on liberty would indicate that none were there. ¶ 2. It was decided to try other measures, to bring charges against some men and try them by general court-martial in the hope that the long session of the board and the suspense due to bringing of some one man to trail would break down the resolution of some individual and bring about a confession. ¶ 3. Charges were preferred against Privates Glasson and Devereaux. The trail of Private Glasson was ordered on 9 January 1922, and the trial took place 17-20 January, 1922. The board of investigation finished taking testimony 17 January 1922, and submitted its report on 19 January 1922, and left the same day for Corinto, Nicaragua. ¶ 4. A partial confession was obtained from Private Devereaux, on 21 January 1922, but a complete confession was obtained from Private Keipp, on 23 January 1922. This gave the names of but twenty-four (24) participants but gave the total number involved as thirty-seven (37). It was decided not to act until all participants were known, keeping secret the fact that a confession had been secured. The following day, 24 January 1922, the remaining names were secured from Private Devereaux. The substance of the confessions was that word had been passed about the Camp that the police of the 2nd District would be beaten up that night and a rendezvous for 7:45 p.m., made at the Cantina of one Comchita Donares where those who desired to participate would meet. At the appointed time roll was called and thirty-seven (37) responded. These were divided into three groups, Corporals Bennett, Russell and Amthor . . . "

2.  January 28, 1922.  "Events after adjournment of Board of Investigation into affair of 8 December 1921."  Captain M. M. Taylor, Commandant, 15th Naval District, Managua, to Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, p. 2.    " . . . each took charge of a group and proceeded by a different route to the Cantina of one Chavela Cruz. The original intention had been to go to the 2nd District Police Station and attack the police there. It does not appear that the majority of the men expected more than a fist fight, but about five were armed. ¶ 5. The first squad to arrive at Chavela Cruz’ Cantina sent three men in to start a fight, they found some officers of the Republican Guard in citizens clothes in the place and assaulted them. This brought the police who as is their custom, blew whistles and fired in the air to bring assistance. These police were fired upon and three of them killed. ¶ 6. Sergeant Lee Henry and Corporal Ray Frey, were at Conchita’s Cantina when the organization took place but took no part in the attack nor did they take any steps to stop it. One man, mounted, was used as a scout to watch for and report the arrival of the police at the scene of the fight. ¶ 7. An inkling of the fact that information had been secured must have leaked out, for about midnight 23 January 1922, Sergeant Henry, who was on guard and Corporals Russell, Bennett and Amthor deserted, taking five automatic pistols and about 500 rounds of ammunition. This was discovered about 1:00 a.m., 24 January 1922. ¶ 8. The authorities were warned, a reward of $50.00 offered for the capture of each man and their assistance requested. Word was soon brought that the men had been seen marching towards Leon, 45 miles west of Managua and a patrol of one officer and four men sent there by train to arrest them or assist the police. ¶ 9. Nothing more was heard until the evening of 25 [originally written “24,” with the “4” crossed out and “5” handwritten above it] January 1922, when word came they had been seen near Diriamba, 22 miles S.W. of Managua. A patrol consisting of Captain N. E. Landon, U.S. Marine Corps, and four men, together with Captain Diego Romero of the Republican Guard as guide was sent by automobile to Diriamba. Just as they were leaving, about 10:00 p.m., word was received that there had been a fight between the deserters and the police early in the evening resulting in the death of one marine and two police, and the serious wounding of two police and less serious wounding of five others. The other marines had escaped. Two police later died. ¶ 10. The following morning the Minister of Communications, acting for the Minister of Gobernacion (police) informed me that Captain Landon was at Diriamba with two prisoners, who had been captured by the police and delivered to him, and the body of the dead marine, who had been shot in the head and was unrecognizable. The third marine had also been captured and was held at Jinotepe on the railroad between Diriamba and Managua. . . . "

3.  January 28, 1922.  "Events after adjournment of Board of Investigation into affair of 8 December 1921."  Captain M. M. Taylor, Commandant, 15th Naval District, Managua, to Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, p. 3.    " . . . 11. The Minister of Communications also stated that reports indicated the people much roused and Captain Landon in some danger, and that troops had been despatched to keep order. It was ascertained that an engine and box car were in Diriamba and effort was made to get word through for the Jefe Politico at Diriamba to see Captain Landon aboard the car with his men, prisoners and dead body, to stop at Jinotepe for the other prisoner and proceed to Managua, where he would be met outside the town and brought to camp. ¶ 12. Before this could be done word came that Captain Landon had left Diriamba in his automobile with the prisoners and left two men to bring the dead body back. Also that he had picked up the other prisoner at Jinotepe. About 12:30 p.m., Captain Landon arrived and the three prisoners were confined, owing to the mutilation of Sergenat [Sergeant] Henry’s face by a bullet it was not known who he was until the others were picked up. On Captain Landon’s return it was found that all talk of trouble between himself and the people was false. That he had been given every assistance and treated with courtesy throughout. The two men left at Diriamba came down in the box car without being molested, bringing the body with them. ¶ 13. At breakfast formation on 24 January 1922, all those known to be implicated were placed in confinement, and when the other names had been secured they were also confined. As it was known that the whole command knew of this affair it was not considered safe to leave their guarding to the rest of the command. ¶ 14. The GALVESTON was due to sail for Panama for fuel with Colonel Charles C. Carpenter, Lieutenant-Colonel Tracy and members of the court. She was held, Colonel Carpenter and Lieutenant-Colonel Tracy ordered back and the marine guard ordered up. They arrived at 2:00 p.m., of 25 January 1922, and the guarding of the prisoners immediately turned over to the GALVESTON’S [GALVESTON’s] guard and no communication allowed between them and the rest of the regular detachment. GALVESTON sailed same day. ¶ 15. Marine patrols were sent in the hope that any contact with the four deserters would be made by them, as it was felt that these men would shoot up anyone attempting to arrest them, and the Nicaraguans cannot shoot and have poor arms. One American here, the Collector of Customs, informed me he had advised the authorities to try only to keep track of the men until a marine patrol arrived and I have been informed the police were ordered not to injure the deserters, this cannot be verified. But it was a surprise that after the loss of so many of their own people the three marines who escaped capture on the 25th were in no way molested when captured the following day and were immediately turned over to the patrol. . . . "

4.  January 28, 1922.  "Events after adjournment of Board of Investigation into affair of 8 December 1921."  Captain M. M. Taylor, Commandant, 15th Naval District, Managua, to Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, p. 4.    " . . . 16. A letter was written by the U.S. Minister, to the Nicaraguan Government thanking them for their assistance and a similar one by me, (copy attached) to the Minister of Gobernacion. The effect of these letters and the immediate steps taken for the capture of these men has had a good effect. It was rumored that these men had been allowed to escape to avoid trial. A Liberal newspaper “La Noticia” came out this morning with an article on the subject to the effect that the U.S. Authorities were more energetic in protecting the people than was the Nicaraguan Government. ¶ 17. It was an error not to confine the men whose names were know [known] as participants on the 23rd, I was influenced by the knowledge that many more equally guilty were in the Camp, and the fear that some of these would compose the guard and release those confined. None of the men could be wholly trusted, though during the time they composed the guard there was no trouble. ¶ 18. Captain Diego Romero of the Republican Guard was of great assistance to Captain Landon on his expedition and it is my intention to express my appreciation to the Government. It is hoped the Department will see its way clear to express to the Government of Nicaragua, its appreciation of the action of the police. ¶ 19. Privates Devereaux and Keipp were promised immunity if they would confess fully. After their confession they expressed fear at remaining here and were sent to the GALVESTON for safe keeping and will return in her from Panama. It was considered they could be secured from bodily harm, but it was feared they might be so influenced as to decline to testify on the trial if kept here[.] ¶ 20. There areat [are at] present thirty-five (35) men confined. Of these three will be tried for murder and scandalous conduct for the affair of 8 December 1921; the same three are liable to trial for murder and desertion for the affair of 25 January 1922. The remaining thirty-two (32) will be tried for scandalous counduct [conduct] for the affair of 8 December, 1921, and it may be that certain of them may be tried for murder or manslaughter if evidence can be produced. ¶ 21. The thirty-five (35) men now confined all testified under oath they had nothing to do with the affair of 8 December 1921, and are liable to trial for perjury. Others who testified they knew nothing of this affair may also be subject to trial for perjury. It seems certain that a number of the non-commissioned officers who took no part in this affair knew of it and were guilty of neglect of duty. . . . "

5.  January 28, 1922.  "Events after adjournment of Board of Investigation into affair of 8 December 1921."  Captain M. M. Taylor, Commandant, 15th Naval District, Managua, to Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, p. 5.    " . . . 22. With the limited number of officers available it will be impossible to try all the above, as Article 139, (b), Naval Courts and Boards, limits the number of cases that can be brought before a court. By trying in joinder it is hoped to cover the more serious offenses of murder (or manslaughter), desertion and for participation in the affair of 8 December 1921. The trials for perjury and neglect of duty will be held in abeyance. ¶ M. M. TAYLOR. ¶ Captain, U.S. Navy."

March 6, 1922.  Report on Trials.  Captain M. M. Taylor, Commandant, 15th Naval District, Managua, to Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department.  "1219 ¶ From: Comdt 15th. ¶ Action: Opnav, Marcorps. ¶ 1006 Trials completed, thirty two men tried, six acquitted. Three sentenced twelve, three ten and twenty to eight years. Three men tried affair twenty fifth January sentenced twenty years. Transferred this date to Denver twenty seven General Court Martial prisoners four men for Haiti for transfer to Nereus at Balboa also ten men and two for discharge to subbase for further transfer Mare Island. Captain Landon and Lieutenant Fellows to Haiti Via [via] Denver and Nereus. Amthor, Bennet [Bennett] and Russell to Boston via Galveston eighth March 1000 ¶ Comdt 15th. ¶ 2 16 pm March 6th, 1922. ¶ S ¶ 19 ¶ 00 ¶ 01 ¶ 11 ¶ 12 ¶ 38 ¶ Bunav ¶ Marcorps – Original. ¶ [handwritten on paper: “Affair of Jan. 25, 1922” ¶ “6 – acquitted” ¶ “20 – 8 yrs.” ¶ “3 – 10 yrs.” ¶ “ 3 – 12 yrs.” ¶ “3 – 20 yrs.” ¶ “32/26 convicted”]"

March 7, 1922.  Letter from Unknown, American Legation, Managua, to "My dear Cole," p. 1.  "AMERICAN LEGATION ¶ Managua, Nicaragua, ¶ 7 March 1922. ¶ My dear Cole: ¶ I am enclosing a letter on conditions here which seem a bit out of my line, but which has been inspired by what seems to me to be the need of informing the Department of conditions here. ¶ The Navy Department carries the cost of the retention of the Marines, both in money and in the loss of some 120 men to the service. On the detachment falls the criticism and they suffer from the ill-will engendered by the policies of the State Department. ¶ As you may know the Customs are administered by an American appointed and paid by Nicaragua on the recommendation of the State Department. A High Commissonier [Commissioner] and the Manager of the Railroad are in like position. ¶ All these get handsome salaries, and in addition are three or four subordinates, also well paid. The Bank management is in the hands of Englishmen and aliens; as is that of the Ultramar. In Managua the No. 1 and 2 men of both Bank and Ultramar are English, in Matagalpa, a single German is branch manager for both, in Bluefields the branches are in charge of a Mexican and a German respectively, in Leon a Nicaraguan and an Englishman hold the positions. Reports from the bank are therefore liable to be influenced by self-interest and nationality. ¶ While I recognize the fact that policies, such as that employed here, are the province of the State Department, it does seem to me that that Department should recognize our difficulties and by full publicity of the acts of its agents render innocuous such criticism as is now rampant. An investigation by disinterested men conversant with business and banking methods, with a full report, would, it seem to me, clarify the atmosphere. At least it would show why there has been, as far as I am told, no advance in the ten years we have been dabbling in Nicaraguan affairs, beyond the fact that Government officials are more assured in getting their pay, and there has been peace. ¶ The country is poor as Job’s turkey. A number of travelling men I have spoken to say that in other countries of Central America they can collect on their debts, in Managua there is nothing doing. Every now an [and] then a number of poor devils are arrested in the night and made soldiers, “recruiting” . . . "

March 7, 1922.  Letter from Unknown, American Legation, Managua, to "My dear Cole," p. 2.  " . . .  it is called, sent to the Honduran border and come back clamoring for pay when there is no pay. The other day a lot of ammunition had to be moved; the police seized every bull-cart in Managua and sent it to the magazine. They had about a hundred and could have used less than half that number. Result transportation at a standstill for 24 hours. ¶ The whole arrangement here seems half-hearted and without definite system. If these bankers and customs men want to take employment under the Nicaraguan Government, I cannot see why they should have a guard of marines to protect them while drawing fat salaries. If the United States wants to really improve conditions here, let it really use the power the presence of the marines give and tell these mountebanks in government where they get off. ¶ I hope never to see the place again. My stay here has been more or less of a nightmare. It is no pleasant sight to see a detachment of so fine a service as the U.S.M.C. so far in the muck. To know absolutely they were guilty of an atrocious act, and have to dig and dig to get any definite proof, butting your head against a stone wall of silence on the part of the marines, and getting hopelessly entangled in the mass of conflictive native testimony. It has been most disagreeable and extremely sad, I dream of the damn thing. ¶ As to the letter that has brought about this effusion do with it what you will. It does not seem to be quite the thing for an official report, it can only be taken as a showing of what might be called the atmosphere, a definite report could only be made after an investigation into the whole business, which I am far from being able to make. There are more pressing troubles on my hands. Having gotten it off my chest I leave to you its future destination, and do not over much care whether this be the waste-basket or the archives. ¶ I flatter myself that on leaving the marines will be better off than on my arrival. Told the Minister of War we wanted our own athletic field etc., so extended our part of the Campo de Marte from 5 to 12 acres out of a total enclosed area of 18 acres, and took in an orchard where they can run a garden. Told the Minister of Gobernacion that marines were entitled to the benefits of exterritoriality and hence not subject to arrest; that his cops would keep their hands off and stop beating them up, we would do our own arresting. Carpenter has been fine, gets the Government band once a week for a concert and fills them up on lemonade and sandwiches; has a lot of […] "

1.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 1.  "CONFIDENTIAL REPORT ¶ on ¶ POLITICAL CONDITIONS ¶ in ¶ NICARAGUA & HONDURAS. ¶ Submitted by Lieut-Colonel J.K. Tracy, ¶ U. S. Marine Corps. March 24, 1922." 

2.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 2.  "INDEX. ¶ PAGES. ¶ Political conditions. ¶ 1-12 ¶ General political situation Nicaragua and Honduras. ¶ 1-2 ¶ Par. 2. ¶ Political parties Nicaragua. ¶ 2 ¶ “ 3. a,b. ¶ “ “ Honduras. ¶ 2 ¶ “ 4. a,b. ¶ “Emigrados” Nicaragua and Honduras. ¶ 2 ¶ “ 5. ¶ Disturbing elements against the government of Honduras in Nicaraguan territory. ¶ General Ernesto Alvardo. ¶ 2-3 ¶ “ 6. a. ¶ Ramon Turchio’s Band. ¶ 3-4 ¶ “ 6. b. ¶ General Felix Pedro Pinal. ¶ 5. ¶ “ 6. c. ¶ Solis’ Band of Revolutionists. ¶ 5-6 ¶ “ 6. d. ¶ General Jefferies, (American). ¶ 6 ¶ “ 6. e. ¶ “Chico” Martines Fumes. ¶ 6 ¶ “ 6. f. ¶ Action of Nicaraguan authorities in suppressing movements against Honduras from Nicaraguan territory. ¶ 6 ¶ “ 7. ¶ Disturbances against Nicaraguan government initiated in Honduranean [Honduran] territory. ¶ 7-8 ¶ “ 8. ¶ Disturbing elements against government of Nicaragua in Honduranean [Honduran] territory. ¶ Conception Peralta Cruz. ¶ 8 ¶ “ 8. ¶ Nicaor Espinosa. ¶ 8 ¶ “ 9. ¶ Carlos Lagos, Minister of War, Honduras. ¶ 8 ¶ “ 9. ¶ “ “ “ “ “ “ ¶ 9 ¶ “ 10. ¶ “ “ “ “ “ “ ¶ 9 ¶ “ 11. ¶ President of Honduras. ¶ 9 ¶ “ 11. ¶ Nicaraguan Troops. ¶ 9-10 ¶ “ 13. ¶ Honduras Troops. ¶ 10 ¶ “ 14. ¶ Treatment of civilians by troops. ¶ 10 ¶ “ 15. ¶ Treatment accorded Americans both countries. ¶ 10-11 ¶ “ 16. ¶ Treatment accorded foreigners other than Americans. ¶ 11 ¶ “ 16. a. ¶ Reasons for respect accorded to Americans. ¶ 11. ¶ “ 16. b. ¶ Appendix 1. ¶ Notes on certain Military features of the Republics of Nicaragua and Honduras. ¶ Military Forces, Nicaragua. ¶ 13 ¶ “ 1. ¶ Military Forces, Honduras. ¶ 13-14 ¶ “ 2. ¶ Character of terrain and people along border between Nicaragua and Honduras. ¶ 14 ... "

3.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 3.  " . . . Pages. ¶ Roads and Trails. ¶ Nicaragua. ¶ 14 ¶ Honduras. ¶ 14 ¶ Telephones and Telegraph, Nicaragua and Honduras. ¶ 15 ¶ Notes on existing maps of Nicaragua and Honduras. ¶ 16 ¶ Boundary disputes between Nicaragua and Honduras. ¶ 16 ¶ Population along Frontier. ¶ 16. . . . "

4.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 4.  " . . . Agosto 26, 1921. ¶ Sr. Leaube Alfaro. ¶ Encargado en Limay. ¶ Sirvase organizar resquardo en la grecia segun las facultades que el general Peralta le ha conferido. ¶ Concepcion Peralta Cruz. ¶ TRANSLATION. ¶ August 26, 1921. ¶ Mr. Lionte Alfaro: ¶ In charge of Limay. ¶ Take the necessary measure to organize a patrol for the Grecia mines according to the authority that General Peralta has conferred upon you. ¶ Concepcion Peralta Cruz. ¶ Exhibit I. . . . "

5.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 5.  " . . . CONFIDENTIAL ¶ American Legation, ¶ Managua, Nicaragua. ¶ March 24, 1922. ¶ From: Lieutenant-Colonel James K. Tracy, U.S.M.C. ¶ To: Major-General Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. ¶ Subject: Political conditions in the Republics of Nicaragua and Honduras. ¶ Reference: (a) Your 8606-1330 (Dec. 1921) ¶ (b) Your 8607-1602 (Feb. 1922) ¶ Enclosures: ¶ 1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b) I left Managua, Nicaragua, on February 14, 1922, and covered the border between the Republics of Nicaragua and Honduras, from Chinandega to Ocotal on the Nicaraguan side, and from Tegucigalpa to Choluteca on the Honduranean [Honduran] side, returning to Managua, Nicaragua, on March 17, 1922. I took with me as interpreter and translator, Mr. F. Walker, a former corporal of the marines. The trip was made on mule-back with the exception of a few stretches where automobiles and railroad could be used. The total distance covered was about 400 miles. Both the Governments of Nicaragua and Honduras assisted me as best they could and the local officials appeared to be willing to supply me with such information as they had. The people were very friendly and showed no hesitancy in airing their views concerning the two Governments. The tendency of both the officials and citizens to exaggerate, and even to deliberately falsify events, has been carefully discounted in this report and almost all the information contained herein was only accepted after it had received verification from more than one source. ¶ 2. The political situation of Nicaragua and Honduras is complicated by the fact that in both countries the people at large are more loyal to one of the two parties – conservatives and liberal[s] – than they are to their own country. That is, the conservatives and liberals of both countries are so strongly affiliated that for the sake of their party they would turn against their own country. Within these parties there are many factions which at times become so bitter against one another that they would sacrifice anything to overcome their party opponents. . . . "

6.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 6.  " . . . 3.a. In Nicaragua the Conservative Party consists of the rich white element, and the most ignorant class, in other words, it is a party made up of the very highest and the very lowest elements. Nepotism in this party is carried to the “n”th degree and all of the important political offices are held by members of a small group of families from Managua, Granada and Rivas. Along the border this party has only one strong hold – the town of Ocotal. ¶ 3.b. The Liberal Party in Nicaragua consists of the middle class and includes most of the lawyers and doctors. This party is extremely strong along the frontier with the exception of the town of Ocotal already mentioned, and has also a majority in the town of Leon, the largest city in Nicaragua. ¶ 4.a. In Honduras party divisions are not so marked. The Conservative Party consists of the same elements as in Nicaragua but it is numerically small. ¶ 4.b. The Liberal Party of Honduras is in the majority in that country but is divided into many groups who follow some particular leader and his dictates rather than that of the party. ¶ 5. In both countries there is a very strong opposition party to the present Governments and the leaders of these movements gather together small bands on the frontier of their country and receive the moral and sometimes the physical support of the officials of the country other than their own. These revolutionists are called “emigrados” and as this term cannot be readily translated, they will so termed hereafter. The expression “emigrado” includes all persons who have been expelled from a country for having created political disturbances and in addition includes many individuals who have been guilty of civil crimes. It is these “emigrados” that keep both Nicaragua and Honduras in a continual state of unrest and they are the nucleus from which are formed the serious revolutionary movements. ¶ 6. Starting from the south on the Nicaraguan side the following are the principal disturbing elements that are a continual menace to the present Honduranean [Honduran] Government. ¶ (a) At Campusano, Nicaragua, 20 miles north of Chinandega, Nicaragua, there is a Honduranean [Honduran] named General Ernesto Alvarado. This man is from the northern coast of Honduras and during the early part of the term of the present President of Honduras, controlled one of the districts on that coast and grafted to such an extent that he was put out of government office. The proceeds of his graft he has invested in . . . "

7.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 7.  " . . . the place called Campusano, an old Zelaya property, some 20 miles east of the frontier line of Honduras. This property consists of about 90,000 acres on which he has some 3000 head of cattle. He speaks English fairly well and has with him an American woman from New Orleans whom he introduced to me as his wife. During his regime on the north coast in governmental capacity, he was a hard drinker and extremely fond of dress having ordered uniforms from the United States that cost $3,000.00. He is now working very hard on his ranch and not drinking, and claims he is no longer interested in the politics of Honduras which fact he was extremely anxious to impress upon me. He asked me to inform the President of Honduras when I saw him, of what I had seen of Campusano, Nicaragua, in order that the Honduranean [Honduran] authorities might know his status. He does not appear to have much of a following in the part of Honduras through which I passed, this, however, does not include the north coast from which part he comes. While at his house I saw 10 Nicaraguan Government rifles and upon inquiring Alvarado admitted to me that these had been supplied to him during February of this year, by the “jefe politico” (an official who is practically governor in each department and who is appointed by the President) of Chinandega, Nicaragua, named Perfecto Tijerino, for the purpose of protection against any marauding bands who might appear from Honduras to molest him. This man Tijerino, I was informed by the officials in Honduras, including the President of the country, was the one Nicaraguan official whom they considered to be giving the greatest assistance to those who were preparing revolutionary movements in Nicaragua against Honduras. Alvarado is, I believe, a very ambitious man and one who would seek the first opportunity to force himself on Honduras as President should the slightest opportunity present itself. His wife, who is a very forceful and intelligent woman, admitted this ambition on the part of Alvarado to me. ¶ (b) Some 50 miles north of Campusano, Nicaragua, in the district of Cinco Pinos, Nicaragua, there is a band of some 20 or 30 alleged Honduranean [Honduran] “emigrados”. Their methods during the raids which they make on Honduranean [Honduran] territory are such, that I believe them to be more of the bandit type rather than real revolutionists. This band is fully armed with rifles and makes its headquarters north of Cinco Pinos, Nicaragua, in some very unaccessable [inaccessible] mountains, the places being called Plan Grande and the Caves of El Falcon. The leader of this band called Ramon Turchio, is a man of very little intelligence and a very heavy drinker. Other members of the band are as follows: ¶ Gilberto Zelaya from Choluteca, Honduras ¶ Fernando Abendino from Choluteca, Honduras . . . "

8.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 8.  " . . . Julio Abendino from Choluteca, Honduras ¶ Pedro Flores “ San Marcos, Honduras ¶ Rafael Vasquez “ San Marcos, Honduras ¶ Pablo Ramos ¶ Juan Matamoras ¶ Octavio Vargas ¶ Carmito Solgardo ¶ Ernesto Duarte ¶ Juan Valladares ¶ Pedro Carranjo ¶ The names of the members of this band and the location from which they operate, are common property along the border, and the fact that Nicaraguan Government officials in that district have not long ago broken up or captured this band, can only be explained by an unwillingness to do so. While at Cinco Pinos, Nicaragua, on the 17th of February, the local Nicaraguan commander, Colonel Buenvente, with 35 armed soldiers, made an excursion after this band; but as he returned with only one Honduranean [Honduran], a Dr. Benitis, who was released as soon as I left the district, I do not believe that Colonel Buenvente had the slightest intention or desire to interfere with the operation of Turchio’s band. The following are the raids which this band of Turchio, operating from Nicaraguan territory, has made on Honduranean [Honduran] towns and places: ¶ (B.1) January 29, 1922, they raided the store of the German, Siercke, at the American mine at Cacamuyá, Honduras, and stole material from this store valued at $100.00. In this raid Nicaraguan Government forces actually assisted and took part. These forces consisted of 14 soldiers led by Colonel Cajina. This action on the part of Cajina was repudiated by the Nicaraguan Government and he is now out of the service and at large, his present whereabouts I have been unable to ascertain. The fact that Cajina and Nicaraguan Government soldiers actually took part in this raid, is evidenced by a telegram which one of the Nicaraguan army generals sent to the Honduranean [Honduran] officials stating that Cajina’s actions were a disgrace to the Nicaraguan arms. ¶ (B.2) February 4th – San Antonio de Flores was raided. ¶ (B.3) February 10th – Triunfo was raided. ¶ (B.4) February 28th – Jayacayan was raided and among other articles, clothing, food, money and animals were stolen. ¶ (B.5) March 11th – Cacamuyá, Honduras, was raided. No considerable amount of money was obtained however, as the bandits were driven away from the store of the German, Siercke, by the superintendent of the Cacamuyá mines, an American named Samuelson. This band is still operating and making raids whenever and wherever it pleases in the district referred to. . . . "

9.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 9.  " . . . (c) Some 10 miles farther north, near a place called El Rhine, Nicaragua, is a Honduranean [Honduran] “emigrado” whose name is General Felix Pedro Pinal. He is a man of considerable property, almost white, very intelligent and of excellent character. While I do not think he is at present an active participant in the revolutionary movement against the Honduranean [Honduran] Government, he is evidently recognized as one of the biggest of the Honduranean [Honduran] “emigrados” on the Nicaraguan frontier. He admitted to me he was in correspondence with Solis (described in next paragraph) and further showed me a report he had received from one of the Honduranean [Honduran] “emigrado” generals, concerning a recent battle which they had had with the Honduranean [Honduran] Government forces. This man Pinal, made a very favorable impression on me and appeared to be of a much higher type than any of the officials of the present Honduranean [Honduran] Government whom I have met. ¶ (d) About 25 miles farther north, in the district surrounding the town of Santa Maria, Nicaragua, the strongest band of Honduranean [Honduran] “emigrados” had been operating up until March 10, 1922. This band was commanded by General Rufino Solis, a lawyer of about 30 years of age, very intelligent but lacking military experience. From a conversation I had with this man, I was convinced that he is a visionary man who believes that his mission is to free his countrymen, the Honduraneans [Hondurans], from what he considers to be the misrule of the present Government of Honduras. He has a fine, honest face but lacks force and I do not believe that he will ever become an important element in the affairs of Honduras. This band, referred to in the first part of this paragraph, consist of about 80 armed men. During the early part of the month of March 1922, they raided at will, the towns of Paraiso, Duyure, San Antonio de Flores and Morolica, all in Honduras. These raids have been conducted in a very orderly manner, the money they received was taken from the stores of the German, Siercke, already mentioned, and receipts given therefor and the people at large not molested. About 3:00 p.m. of March 9, 1922, at Diraqui, Honduras, which is 10 miles south of Santa Maria, Nicaragua, on the border between Nicaragua and Honduras, some 150 Honduranean [Honduran] Government troops from Yuscaran, Honduras, had an engagement with 28 of Solis’ band and the Government troops were defeated. At about 5:00 p.m. of the same day, General Mendosa arrived with reinforcements consisting of 200 men from San Marcos, Honduras. This combined force defeated the revolutionists who were driven over the frontier to Nicaraguan territory. The next day, March 10th, 1922, . . . "

10.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 10.  " . . . Reyes of the Nicaraguan Government armed forces from Ocotal[,] Nicaragua, captured Solis and 14 others. Solis is now in Managua the capitol of Nicaragua, under police surveillance. The remainder of this band is now under command of Felix B. Vasquez. Whether the capture of the leader, Solis, will discourage this band and break it up, cannot as yet be foretold. ¶ (e) In addition to the people mentioned on the frontier, there are in Managua, Nicaragua, under police surveillance of a not very strict character, several Honduranean [Honduran] “emigrados” who are awaiting an opportunity to start a revolution in Honduras. One of these, named General Jefferies, is an American citizen well known for his participation in all Central American revolutions since 1896. This man is now about 60 years of age and while his name is continually mentioned in Nicaragua, I could find little evidence in Honduras that he had any following to speak of or that he was considered of any great importance. He is reliably reported to have stated in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, that – referring to Americans in general, - all the men were “sons of bitches” and all the women “whores”, at a time when he was having some difficulty over certain legal procedures in the United States. I consider this man’s power to be very limited. He appears to me personally to be a blow-hard and a very undesirable type of American citizen for these countries. ¶ (f) In addition there is in Managua, Nicaragua, a Honduranean [Honduran] “emigrado” named “Chico” Martines Fumes. His name is a by-word in Honduras and along the frontier and it was repeatedly stated to me that should he appear on the boundary of Honduras he could gather together a thousand armed men over night. The fear of this man was denoted by the continual reports brought to me by the highest Honduranean [Honduran] Government officials and that they were certain he was on the frontier. These reports were as official as they could be in character but were all false as I ascertained later by communicating with Managua, Nicaragua, and typifies the unreliableness of even the best information obtainable in these countries. He is a man of little education but has the appearance of being very forceful and honest. ¶ 7. In general, I am under the impression that the movements against the Honduranean [Honduran] Government which are initiated on Nicaraguan territory, are honestly opposed by the President of Nicaragua. However, many of the highest Nicaraguan officials in the departments along the frontier are so inactive in suppressing these movements, that I am lead to believe that they may be actually supporting these movements as is alleged by the Honduranean [Honduran] Government. . . . "

11.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 11.  " . . . 8. On the Honduranean [Honduran] side of the frontier there is at present no activity against the Government of Nicaragua. The people are too much occupied in fermenting and preparing for the revolution against the present Honduranean [Honduran] Government. Some six months ago a very serious raid was organized on Honduranean [Honduran] territory against the Nicaraguan Government; that it gained any real force and became serious, was due to the fact that many Nicaraguans who were not “emigrados” joined the revolutionary forces after it had started. This movement was organized in the middle of August 1921, at San Marcos, Honduras, a town located a few miles from the frontier. For eight days before the movement had started, the leaders openly made all preparations in the town of San Macros, Honduras, and gathered together what Nicaraguan “emigrados” they could find. The local Honduranean [Honduran] authorities not only did nothing to prevent this movement but actually went so far as to openly assist in its organization. The Commandante of Arms at San Marcos, Honduras, Colonel Carmilo Carcarmo, who is still in office, actually threatened Francisco Mendosa, a Nicaraguan employee in the store of a foreign firm at San Marcos, Honduras, to make trouble for him if he did not join in the movement. The manager of this firm went to Choluteca, Honduras, and reported the matter. The action of Colonel Carmilo Carcarmo was repudiated by the Honduranean [Honduran] Government officials, but no other action was taken against this man. The leader of the band which was being organized at San Marcos, Honduras, was named Teofilo Jimenez, a Guatemalan; he is now in San Salvador. About August 21st, 1921, this band went to San Juan de Limay, Nicaragua, and there gathered together some 150 discontented local Nicaraguans. They proceeded to La Grecia mine, some three miles to the east of Limay, and there disarmed the Nicaraguan Government forces and demanded and obtained from the store of a man named Castellano, several hundred dollars. They returned a few days later and obtained more money. These revolutionists did not, however, molest the personnel or the property of the Grecia mine. This band was increased in size by the joining of many Nicaraguans, and marched north to Somoto Grande, Nicaragua, where they were defeated by Colonel Alvarez, commandant of the district, a big black negro from Rivas, Nicaragua, sometime later, and driven over the frontier, back to the town of San Marcos, Honduras, where they were very well received and fed by the Honduranean [Honduran] Government. Their rifles were taken away from them at this time, but as these same arms later disappeared from San Marcos, it seems only fair to assume they were returned to these Nicaraguans. Among the members of this band that participated in the affair near the . . . "

12.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 12.  " . . . Grecia mine, are the following with the names of the towns from which they come: ¶ Lazaro Guevara [from] Esteli, Nicaragua. ¶ Alejandro Torres [from] Leon, Nicaragua. ¶ Rafael Sandobal [from] Limay, Nicaragua. ¶ Francisco Montenegro [from] Managua, Nicaragua. ¶ Antonio Maldonado [from] Limay, Nicaragua. ¶ Julio Bugamo. [from] Pueblo Nuevo, Nicaragua. ¶ Augustin Galifano [from] Limay, Nicaragua. ¶ Jose Maria Barantes [from] Somoto Grande, Nicaragua. ¶ Eduardo Herrera [from] Triapo, Nicaragua. ¶ These men, and many other whose names I was unable to ascertain, returned to their homes in Nicaragua where they now are. Upon inquiry of Colonel Alvarez, above mentioned, as to what action had been taken against these men and others of the same type, he informed me that no proceedings had ever been taken against them. I asked him if the Government located in Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, had been informed and he told me they had and all details were understood. It is quite possible, that the men whose names I have given, although they acted as common bandits, were considered by the Government of Nicaragua to come within the immunity, which, after the date of this Grecia mine affair was granted to all revolutionists. One of the members of this band was Concepcion Peralta Cruz, a Nicaraguan “emigrado” living in Honduras. This man went so far as to authorize the organization of a revolutionary guard at the Grecia mine (see exhibit 1, the original of this order.) This man Peralta is now an officer in the president’s guard at Tegucigalpa, Honduras. ¶ 9. Another member of this band was Nicaor Espinosa, a Nicaraguan “emigrado”, who was chief of staff of Jimenez. This Espinosa told to very reliable informants of mine, both white men, one in Nicaragua and one in Honduras, that before the raid on the Grecia mine, he went to the President of the Republic of Honduras to request help and that the President of Honduras refused to assist him in any way. Espinosa then went to Carlos Lagos, Minister of War of Honduras and also a brother-in-law of the President of that Republic. Espinosa said that Lagos informed him that he would supply arms and assist him in his revolutionary movements against the Republic of Nicaragua. I have endeavored in every possible way to check up this information regarding Lagos but I have been unable to establish with any certainty, the truth of this statement of Espinosa. However, it is certain that Espinosa was, and still is, in the confidence of Lagos. . . . " 

13.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 13.  " . . . Espinosa now lives in San Marcos, Honduras, where he is under a mild sort of police surveillance, and is constantly in communication with Lagos and has acted as agent for this minister of war in the matter of distributing buttons with the picture of Lagos upon them, about the countryside. I endeavored to interview Espinosa while in San Marcos, Honduras, but was unable to do so as he left town immediately upon hearing that I wanted to see him. This was the only individual with whom I was unable to obtain an interview upon request and is in itself an [a?] proof that Espinosa had something serious to conceal. ¶ 10. Carlos Lagos is a short, white man with light hair of about 50 years of age. His sister, Dona Anita, is the wife of the President of Honduras. Unquestionably Lagos desires to make himself president of that Republic and it is believed that he will use the armed forces at his command in order to overcome the law which prohibits a minister of the President’s cabinet from being a candidate for that office. Lagos is universally hated along the border of Honduras and it is against him, and the fear that he may become President, that the revolution is directed. ¶ 11. The President of Honduras, Sr. don Rafael Lopez Gutierrez, is a rather simple old man of about 60 years of age, and who is reputed to be under the control of his wife, Dona Anita. The President is very well liked by the people with whom I talked in Honduras. Were he to remove from office his Minister of War, Carlos Lagos, the Republic of Honduras would probably be free from all revolutionary trouble. ¶ 12. There are in the service of the Honduranean [Honduran] Government, several Nicaraguan “emigrados” of considerable force and intelligence, most notably is Horacio Aquirre of Leon, Nicaragua, the private secretary to the President of Honduras. ¶ 13. During my trip on the frontier, I had a very good opportunity to observe the military forces of both countries. The Nicaraguan forces were undisciplined and of a very low type and many of the rifles carried by these men were broken and unserviceable. The officers appeared to exercise little or no control. No one, neither officers nor men, made any pretense of wearing a uniform or even a distinguishing mark, in fact the only military uniform I saw on the Nicaraguan side of the frontier, was a Honduranean [Honduran] uniform worn by General Ernesto Alvarado, when he escorted me from his place, Campusano, . . . "

14.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 14.  " . . . Nicaragua. Desertion among the soldiers was very common, these deserters often taking with them their rifles. On the night of February 16, 1922, at Somotillo, Nicaragua, in a force of 50 men, 5 deserted. At San Juan de Limay, Nicaragua, the commanding officer of a Nicaraguan Government force named Colonel Alvarez, informed me that in 10 days his force had been reduced from 35 men to 16 men on account of desertion. These desertions were due to the fact that the soldiers were not paid or were only paid in part. ¶ 14. In Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras, the government forces were well uniformed and appeared to be well organized as is the case in Managua, the capital of Nicaragua. Away from the capital of Honduras, the soldiers and officers were as bad as those of Nicaragua, the only difference being that in Honduras most of the soldiers were paid and at least wore some part of the uniform. The lack of discipline, however, was more noticeable than in Nicaragua. While I was in San Marcos, Honduras, the commanding general, General Mendosa, was insulted and even threatened by both his officers and men, but no action was taken against them. The soldiers and officers were drunk all day and night, and promiscuous firing in the streets was almost continuous. I am led to believe that this condition is probably worse in other parts of Honduras in view of the fact that General Mendosa was by far the best officer that I saw among the Honduranean [Honduran] Government troops. On March 10th, 1922, while I was in San Marcos, Honduras, a report came in that the town was about to be attacked. The streets were filled with soldiers running in every direction, with and without arms, some seeking cover and some few others, notably the Texiguat indians [Indians] from the town of that name, under the command of Colonel Sanchez, who took station behind some rock parapets. I know that 14 soldiers deserted the town at this time with their arms and I believe many others did likewise. That night, bursts of fire broke out on several occasions and single shots were fired every few minutes. The enemy at this time, it later developed, was 20 miles away. ¶ 15. The soldiers both of Honduras and Nicaragua, are more feared by the country people than by the revolutionists or bandits. They go through the towns looting and pillaging as they please and their officers seldom give receipts for property requisitioned. ¶ 16. The treatment accorded to American citizens throughout that part of Nicaragua and Honduras where I passed, has been excellent, neither the government forces, the revolutionists nor the bandits have molested either the personnel or the property of Americans with the exception of a few mounts which have occasionally been taken by the revolutionary forces. In all cases however, these animals have soon been recovered upon presen- . . . "

15.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 15.  " . . . tation by the Americans to the officers in charge of the troops who took the mounts. ¶ 16.a. This respect shown to American citizens is not accorded to all citizens of other foreign countries in Nicaragua and Honduras. Several instances were brought to my notice in which the property of foreigners other than Americans, had been destroyed or stolen by Government forces and by revolutionists; the claims for reimbursement of this damage are still unadjusted. The implicit trust and faith in the protection which the American flag accords to anyone under it, was very well illustrated to me while in San Marcos, Honduras, during a time when fighting between the governmental and revolutionary forces was going on all about the town. In San Marcos, Honduras, there is an American citizen named John Abadie, born in Santa Barbara, California. He, in common with all the other foreigners in this town, kept his country’s flag continually flying over his house. He informed me that every night his place was occupied by, from 15 to 50 natives of the town, who came there to sleep for protection. On one evening he informed me, a town policeman slept there. He has in his house at present, some 50 or 60 boxes containing property of various Honduranean [Honduran] citizens of the town of San Marcos, Honduras, who have placed them there for safe-keeping. ¶ 16.b. This respect which is shown towards the personnel and property of American citizens in Nicaragua and Honduras, is due in part to the fact that most of the Americans who have settled in these countries, are above the ordinary type in intelligence and that all their dealings with the natives of these countries are honest and fair. In addition, there undoubtedly exists a universal feeling that should American citizens or their property be molested, the United States Government would intervene and take over certain functions of the governments of Nicaragua and Honduras. The bug-bear of intervention of the United States Government in the affairs of these two countries, is feared by most of the leaders and by those who exert the greatest influence over the mass of people. In the large cities of Nicaragua and Honduras, and particularly with those natives who can speak English and from whom perhaps many opinions are formed, there exists a feeling and desire for interference by the United States Government in the affairs of these two countries. The majority of the citizens of Nicaragua and Honduras, however, are bitterly opposed to any intervention on the part of a foreign power, in the affairs of these countries regardless of the material benefits which would accrue, and would probably forget party strife and all band together in opposition. ¶ CONCLUSIONS ¶ (a) Along the frontier of Nicaragua and Honduras, there is little or no governmental control, and the formation of revolutionary movements against . . . "

16.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 16.  " . . . either of these governments, can be readily carried on in the territory of the opposite country. ¶ (b) The maintenance of large army forces along the border is causing extremely heavy drains on the financial resources of both countries, particularly Honduras, where I estimate the present cost of its border army to be $2,000.00 a day. ¶ (c) Under the present conditions it appears probable that the disorders that are now occurring will continue indefinitely, or until some change in the present form of control of the armed forces of these two countries, takes place. ¶ (d) As has already been stated, it is believed that the revolutionary movements in Honduras will assume serious proportions at any moment. In Nicaragua, for the time being at least, there appears to be no concerted movement against the established Government. ¶ (e) Practically all of the disturbances which are now occurring in the Republic of Honduras, and some of which are felt in Nicaragua, may be laid at the door of Carlos Lagos, Minister of War of Honduras. ¶ (f) The power of the governing parties, both in Nicaragua and Honduras, is based upon their control of the armed forces of those countries and without their soldiers these governments could not maintain themselves even for a short time. In Honduras, particularly, in order to keep these armed forces satisfied, they are permitted great license which is one of the greatest causes of dissatisfaction among the people. Were these armed forces properly officered and disciplined, they could be greatly reduced in number and the supervision they would receive would cease to make them a cause for discontent. . . . "

17.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 17.  " . . . APPENDIX 1 ¶ Notes on Certain Military Features of the Republics of Nicaragua and Honduras. ¶ 1. The military forces of the Republic of Nicaragua consist of some hundred men in the capital which are well uniformed and of excellent appearance. These men act as the personal guard for the President and garrison, the fort called the “Loma”, situated on a hill some half mile to the south of the capital. Their officers are untrained and do not appear to have much force. ¶ In addition, as occasion arises, the government organizes detachments of soldiers for special duty. These detachments consist of ununiformed men of the lowest class who are given rifles and sent out without training under officers who exercise little or no control. These hastily organized forces are only armed mobs which cause much discontent among the people as they are often only partially paid and commit many acts of brigandage. ¶ In August 1921, the Government of Nicaragua purchased from the United States Government, the following military equiptment [equipment]: ¶ 10,000 Krag Rifles ¶ 6,000,000 Rounds of ammunition for same ¶ 50 Lewis guns ¶ 1,000,000 Rounds of ammunition for same ¶ 6 Field pieces, 3” ¶ 600 Rounds of ammunition for same ¶ 2 Aeroplanes ¶ This equiptment [equipment], with the exception of the aeroplanes, has been divided between the towns of Managua and Granada, but it has never been generally issued for use. The aeroplanes are still in their original boxes. The matter of engaging an aviator has been delayed due to the lack of funds. ¶ 2. The military forces of the Republic of Honduras consist of a well organized presidential guard in Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras, and of small detachments in all towns (the number of the latter I was unable to obtain but estimate it to be not over three hundred men. The government figures are probably larger as the pay-rolls are generally padded.) ¶ All these forces are armed with old rifles, mostly single shot “Remingtons”. At the present time the soldiers are being paid and uniformed. No attempt is made to either train or discipline these forces except the Presidential Guard referred to. The officers are openly threatened and abused by their soldiers. Drunkenness is almost universal and abuses of the inhabitants continually practiced. The number of officers in the Honduranean [Honduran] army is all out of proportion to the number of enlisted men. At Choluteca, the army paymaster told an . . . " 

18.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 18.  " . . . Appendix 1 ¶ […] American informant of mine, that out of the two hundred names on his payroll, one hundred and sixty men were officers, this latter number probably included non-commissioned officers. ¶ Character of the country along the southern border between Nicaragua and Honduras. ¶ 1. On the Pacific side of the divide of both Honduras and Nicaragua, a great part of the country is pasture land or very open forests. There is little thick brush and no jungle. For some twenty miles north of the Bay of Fonseca, the land is level and in the rainy season almost impassable. Water, except in the larger rivers, is of a doubtful character. ¶ To the north of this plane, the country is very mountainous and broken. The climate excellent and the rains not very heavy in the wet season. Here the mountains are covered with open pine forests or large pastures. Good water can be obtained most everywhere. Sanitary camp sites are available and good beef cattle can be obtained. ¶ The people of the lowlands are not particularly warlike and would probably not resist very strongly any armed forces sent against them. In the mountains, the people are of much better physic and accustomed to continuous revolutions and more resistance might be expected from them. In Honduras particularly, this might be expected from the indians [Indians] from Texiguat, who have the reputation of being the best fighting men in that country. ¶ Roads and trails. ¶ Nicaragua ¶ 1. In the dry season motor transportation of a light sort might get some thirty miles to the north of the railroad at Chinandega, and from Leon as far north as Limay. Pick and shovel work might have to be done. The trips referred to, could be done in daylight during the dry season. Bull carts can go as far north as Ocotal. All other transportation would have to be done by pack animals of which there are plenty available, mostly mules. ¶ Honduras ¶ 2. From Amapala, the port of Honduras on the Bay of Fonseca, small gasoline boat transportation is available over the shallow water to San Lorenzo. From San Lorenzo there is a fine automobile road to the capital of the country, Tegucigalpa, and a truck of seven tons capacity can make the eighty-five mile trip in one day. From San Lorenzo, motor transportation can generally get through to Choluteca, except during the rainy season when the roads are so muddy as to make them impassable, and the crossing of the Choluteca River becomes a problem even for mounted men. From Choluteca north there are no roads and pack animals must be used. . . . "

19.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 19.  " . . . Appendix 1. ¶ Lines of Communication. ¶ In both countries there exists a very good telephone and telegraph system. Telephones connect only a small number of the very largest towns, but the telegraph system is very extensive. The official maps of both countries, however, note lines and offices of the telegraph system in places where they do not exist. ¶ Exhibit 2 contains notations indicating the lines which actually exist in the parts of Nicaragua and Honduras covered in this report. ¶ English messages are fairly accurately transmitted over the lines by the operators. . . . "

20.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 20.  " . . . APPENDIX 2. ¶ Attached hereto, (Marked Exhibit 2) is a sketch of the district covered while on the duty reported upon herein. ¶ The best maps obtainable in Nicaragua and Honduras, including an official map issued by the government of Nicaragua made in 1921, were found to be so inaccurate as to be of little or no service. These maps are very faulty in the location of many towns; they contain many notations of telephone lines and offices where they do not exist, and the spelling of the names of many villages is very inaccurate. ¶ The Boundary between Nicaragua and Honduras is in dispute in several places, but there is no place along the border where the local inhabitants have not adjusted this matter among themselves and cheerfully accepted one or the other of the Governments. This boundary as accepted by the local inhabitants has been noted on the sketch hereto attached, by a dash and cross dash line: ---‘---‘---. ¶ The route taken during the time covered in this report is noted by a dotted line: ---------. ¶ The number of the people living in the immediate vicinity of most of the locations mentioned is noted below and can be taken as a fairly accurate indication of the denses of the population in that locality. ¶ Nicaragua, (Commencing at the southern portion of the boundary): ¶ Chinandega 10,000 ¶ Campusano 50 ¶ Somotillo 500 ¶ Sauce 500 ¶ Las Pilars 40 ¶ Achuapa 175 ¶ Cinco Pinos 200 ¶ San Francisco 150 ¶ San Juan de Limay 400 ¶ Potasti 10 ¶ El Rhoine 5 ¶ Somoto Grande 1,200 ¶ Cyote 10 ¶ Totogalpa 250 ¶ Ocotal 1,400 ¶ Macuelizo 150 ¶ Ocoona 25 ¶ Coyolar 50 ¶ Santa Marie 60 ¶ Jicaro 25 ¶ Honduras. (Commencing at the southern portion of the boundary): ¶ Choleteca [Choluteca?] 6,000 ¶ San Lorenzo 375 ¶ Cacamuya 25 ¶ Jayacagan 25 ¶ Banquito 20 ¶ San Marcos 500 ¶ Duyure 20 ¶ Oropoli 100 ¶ Guinope 750 ¶ Yuscaran Several Thousand. ¶ Paraiso 30 . . . "

21.  March 24, 1922.  "Confidential Report on Political Conditions in Nicaragua & Honduras," Lt. Col. J. K. Tracy, U.S.M.C., p. 21 (end).  " . . . Note. The orders directing the duty reported upon herein do not call for any recommendations and the following memorandum has been prepared as a distinct and separate part of this report. ¶ Memorandum. ¶ Conditions as outlined in this report and as observed by me in Nicaragua and Honduras are causing large government deficits and increasing discontent among the people. ¶ While many of the causes which make for these conditions cannot be corrected, the main issue, which is the armed governmental forces, appears to be susceptible of change by placing the control or at least the direction of these forces in the hands of disinterested persons-notably military officials of the United States. ¶ Both governments, particularly Honduras, realize that they are in danger of being overthrown, and it appears very possible that a request for such direction or control of their armed forces could be obtained at the present moment from these governments. ¶ Organizations similar to those at present in control of the military forces of Haiti and Santo Domingo would bring the quickest and best results, but it is not believed that either the government of Nicaragua or Honduras would be willing to surrender sufficient power to permit of such organizations. ¶ As a substitute it is suggested that certain of the personnel of the U. S. Marine Corps be detailed by the President of the United States and commissioned by the Presidents of Nicaragua and Honduras as officers in the armed forces of those governments, in sufficient number so that the actual instruction and control could be carried on by this personnel. There is no military material in either country to work from and a complete reorganization would be necessary. ¶ In order to make such an arrangement successful the following should be inserted in any agreement. 1st. That the control of such forces as are detailed to these governments by the United States be directly under the Presidents of these Republics. 2nd. That the disbursment [disbursement] of all funds in connection therewith be under the control of such personnel. 3rd. That the rules and regulations for the control of the armed forces be formulated by and inforced [enforced] under the direction of such personnel. ¶ J.K. Tracy."

February 4, 1924.  Letter from Dr. Rosendo Chamorro, Granada, to U.S.M.C. Major John Marston, Managua, p. 1.  "Dr. Rosendo Chamorro. ¶ Granada, ¶ Nicaragua, C. A. ¶ 4 de Febrero de 1924 ¶ Señor Mayor John Marston ¶ U S Marine Corps. ¶ Managua. ¶ Muy apreciado señor y amigo: ¶ En ocasion de la muerte del señor Presidente de la Republica, don Diego Manuel Chamorro, en cuya administracion tuve el honor de colaborar como Ministro de la Gobernacion, Policia, Gracia, Justicia, y Cultos, recibi de Ud. una muy atenta y amable carta de pesame, cuyos conceptos de estima y amistad para con migo, fueron confirmados por su apreciable misiva de año nuevo. ¶ Un poco de balsamo pusieron en la profunda herida que la muerte de Diego me causara, los altos elogios que de él hacia Ud. en su carta de pesame; pues ella me puso de manifiesto el elevado concepto en que le tuvieron las personas de recto criterio y amplio corazon, que le juzgaron con absuluta imparcialidad. ¶ Permitame en esta ocasion, señor Mayor, expresarle mis mas efusivas gracias en su caracter de Jefe de la Guardia de la Legacion Americana, por la disciplina, moderacion y cordialidad, de que dio pruebas el Cuerpo de Marinos en sus relaciones diarias, durante el tiempo en que yo estuve al frente del Ministerio de Gobernacion y Policia, y que hablan tan . . . "

February 4, 1924.  Letter from Dr. Rosendo Chamorro, Granada, to U.S.M.C. Major John Marston, Managua, p. 2.  ". . . alto de sus dotes de hombre de mando y disciplina. ¶ Haciendo votos porque Ud. permanezca mucho tiempo entre nosotros, para satisfaccion de sus amigos que le apreciamos como Ud. se lo merece, y deseandole en compañia de su digna señora esposa, un feliz año nuevo, me es muy grato suscribirme de Ud. su muy atento servidor y fectisimo amigo."

February 9, 1924.  Letter from U.S.M.C. Major John Marston, Managua, to Dr. Rosendo Chamorro, Granada, p. 1.   "THE MARINE DETACHMENT, ¶ AMERICAN LEGATION, ¶ MANAGUA, NICARAGUA, ¶ 9 February, 1924. ¶ Doctor Rosendo Chamorro, ¶ Granada, Nicaragua, C.A. ¶ My dear Doctor Chamorro: ¶ Your very courteous letter of February 4th has been received and I thank you for the sentiments that you have expressed therein. ¶ I have always considered you one of my very best friends in Nicaragua and not only that, but as a good friend of the American people. I am leaving Nicaragua next Saturday. My orders detaching me from my present duty arrived in the last mail. Upon this occasion permit me to express my heartfelt thanks for all you have done for me personally, both as my personal friend and as Minister of Gobernacion. You have been of material assistance in aiding me to make this post an efficient one and I do not know how I can ever express my full appreciation of your interest. ¶ In leaving Nicaragua I wish you and all your good people the greatest success in maintaining a free and liberal government and that your country will permit . . . "

February 9, 1924.  Letter from U.S.M.C. Major John Marston, Managua, to Dr. Rosendo Chamorro, Granada, p. 2.  " . . . my own country, the United States of America, to assist you in every possible way in achieving that end. ¶ In saying farewell to you I feel that I am leaving behind a very dear friend and it is my heartfelt wish that I can return some day to renew the pleasant associations that I have found in this country. ¶ Mrs. Marston joins me in most affectionate regards to Mrs. Chamorro and yourself and also to your son Rosendo and his wife who so delightfully entertained us in Granada last week. ¶ JOHN MARSTON, ¶ Major, U. S. Marine Corps."

February 11, 1924.  Letter from J. A. Urtecho, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Managua, to U.S. Minister John E. Ramer, Managua (translation).  "TRANSLATION ¶ REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA ¶ MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ¶ Diplomatic Section ¶ No. 100 ¶ NATIONAL PALACE. ¶ Managua, February 11, 1924. ¶ Excellency: ¶ The Government has notice of the early return to the United States of Major John Marston, Chief of the American Marines attached to the Legation under your distinguished charge. ¶ In view of this, and as an accomplishment of an act of justice, I desire to record in this letter the entire satisfaction both of the Government and of our Nicaraguan society with the distinguished military and social personality of Major Marston who has enforced, without resorting to extreme measures, the most efficient discipline in the detachment of American Marines which he commands, with the result that, during his command of this military force, there has not been recorded a single instance of disorder or of any conflict with the authorities of the Republic. ¶ Furthermore, Major Marston, inspired by the existence of the close cordiality existing between our countries, has successfully encouraged this same feeling in the minds of his Marines, and has impressed all Nicaraguans with the sentiment that he is not only a military commander but also an attache of your Legation who follows and cultivates with laudable sincerity and efficiency, the same sentiments and ideas of Your Excellency, which are characterized by good wishes and loyal friendship for Nicaragua. ¶ Let this be a testimony of the high appreciation of that distinguished officer and gentleman, Major Marston, who knows so well how to combine his obligations as friend and soldier, in form worthy of being recorded for the people and Government of Nicaragua. ¶ Permit me, on this occasion, to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest and most distinguished consideration. ¶ (signed) J. A. URTECHO. ¶ To His Excellency Mr. John E. Ramer, Minister ¶ of the United States of America to Nicaragua – ¶ Legation. ¶ C O P Y"

February 18, 1924.  "Report of visit to the Honduran frontier."  Captain Thomas E. Burke, U.S.M.C., to the Secretary of the Navy, Washington D.C., p. 1.  "UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS ¶ THE MARINE DETACHMENT, ¶ AMERICAN LEGATION, ¶ MANAGUA, NICARAGUA, ¶ 18 February, 1924. ¶ From: Captain Thomas E. Bourke, U. S. Marine Corps. ¶ To: The Secretary of the Navy. ¶ Via: The Major General Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps. ¶ Subject: Report of visit to the Honduran frontier. ¶ 1. A party consisting of four enlisted men and myself with side arms left Managua at 1:15 p.m. February 6th, 1924, and arrived at Chinandega at 5:00 p.m. the same date. We were delayed at Chinandega until 9:00 a.m. February 7th due to the fact that all animals available had been taken over by the Nicaraguan Government forces. Left Chinandega at 9:00 a.m. February 7th and arrived Somotillo at 2:00 p.m. February 8th. ¶ 2. The Honduran rebels had been informed the night before of our probable arrival by the Nicaraguan Government. About five hundred rebels were on the outside of the town to meet us. They conducted us to their headquarters where a conference was held with the leaders of their party. They informed us that there were about fifteen thousand Hondurans assembled in Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua ready to join in the revolution. They reported that vicious outrages had been perpetrated by the Honduran Government on followers of Carias. It was reported that the Government forces fired into crowds of Conservatives who were trying to vote on election day. In Tegucigalpa sixty-two were killed in this manner. They also stated that convicts all over Honduras have been released and armed to protect the present Government. These convicts have had no regard for the lives and property of the Conservatives. ¶ 3. In Somotillo it is estimated that there were about fifteen hundred Honduran rebels gathered. Few arms except pistols and machettes [machetes] were in evidence, but it is thought that rifles were put out of sight when they learned of our proposed arrival, due to the fact that small parties of armed men with rifles were met making their way to the border over the trail followed by our party. . . . "

February 18, 1924.  "Report of visit to the Honduran frontier."  Captain Thomas E. Burke, U.S.M.C., to the Secretary of the Navy, Washington D.C., p. 2.  " . . . ¶ 4. The leaders of the rebels appear to be men of education and ability and seem to be animated by patriotic motives. They seemed to be very pleased of the interest that we showed in their affairs. In fact when the marine party left Somotillo they all gathered on the outside of the town and yelled, “Long live America.” ¶ 5. There was no evidence in Somotillo of any arms or supplies having been shipped by the Nicaraguan Government to the Honduran revolutionists. ¶ THOMAS E. BOURKE. ¶ Copy to Major General Commandant."

1.  April 3, 1924.  "Inspection of Marine Detachment, American Legation, Managua, Nicaragua."  Major General Joseph H. Pendleton, U.S.M.C., to the Major General Commandant, Washington D.C., p. 1.  "HEADQUARTERS U.S. MARINE CORPS ¶ Washington, April 3, 1924. ¶ From: Major General Joseph H. Pendleton, U.S. Marine Corps. ¶ To: The Major General Commandant. ¶ Subject: Inspection of Marine Detachment, American Legation, Managua, Nicaragua. ¶ Reference: (a) Orders of MGC, dated January 18, 1924, 0753-1&2, AN-87-acd. ¶ 1. In obedience to reference (a), I disembarked from the USS ARGONNE at Corinto, Nicaragua , on the morning of February 16, 1924, and proceeded by rail to Managua where I inspected the personnel and materiel of the Marine Detachment, American Legation. ¶ 2. The total strength of the Marine Detachment on the day of the inspection 16 February, 1924, was 5 officers and 114 men. The enlisted strength was distributed as follows:- ¶ 84 men in ranks ¶ 14 men on guard ¶ 2 men in sick quarters ¶ 2 men legation orderlies ¶ 1 Commanding Officer’s orderly ¶ 4 men on saluting battery ¶ 2 messmen ¶ 1 man on watch in sick quarters ¶ 2 men on watch in radio station ¶ 1 man on watch at water sterilizer ¶ 1 man on watch at corral ¶ 3. The inspection of the command was very satisfactory. The men were clean and neat in their appearance and their arms and accoutrements in excellent condition. The khaki clothing was somewhat varying in shade, depending upon the number of times that it had been washed, but all uniforms were in good condition and of good fit. The men were well set up and evidenced the effect of regular drill and excellent dispipline [discipline]. . . . "

2.  April 3, 1924.  "Inspection of Marine Detachment, American Legation, Managua, Nicaragua."  Major General Joseph H. Pendleton, U.S.M.C., to the Major General Commandant, Washington D.C., p. 2.  " . . . 4. The barracks are ideally constructed for use in the tropics and I recommend that the plan of these barracks be carefully studied by the Quartermaster’s Department, as, in my opinion, they would be, with possible slight changes, as satisfactory for semi-permanent use as could be constructed; and I believe in the course of time would prove most economical. ¶ 5. Part of the old quarters of the Campo del Marte are also used as barracks and they have been as thoroughly overhauled and repaired as possible. They are cool and well ventilated. ¶ 6. The toilet facilities are ample and sanitary and were in exceptionally good police when inspected. There are seven flush toilets, and an eight foot urinal. Also toilets are supplied in the guard room and in officers’ and non-commissioned officers’ quarters. ¶ 7. A new laundry is operated by native Nicaraguans, and performs very satisfactory service. ¶ 8. The baker supplies the command with bread of very good quality. ¶ 9. The guard room was comfortably convenient and well policed. The guard of the day consists of ¶ 1 Sergeant ¶ 3 corporals ¶ 1 musician ¶ 9 privates ¶ 10. There are three sentry posts. ¶ 11. Drills are held daily from 7 a.m. to 8 a.m., close and extended order. One period per week is devoted to ordnance, of which there is at this post, the following:- ¶ 2 3-inch landing guns ¶ 4 heavy Browning machine guns ¶ 12 light Browning automatic rifles ¶ 3 Stokes mortars ¶ A supply of ammunition for these guns is on hand ample for any probable emergency. . . . "

3.  April 3, 1924.  "Inspection of Marine Detachment, American Legation, Managua, Nicaragua."  Major General Joseph H. Pendleton, U.S.M.C., to the Major General Commandant, Washington D.C., p. 3.  " . . . 12. The sick bay is well constructed for tropical use, the health of the command excellent. There are twenty beds available and expansion in emergency is easily possible. ¶ 13. The store rooms were in good police; the stock was well cared for and is maintained in ample quantity and proper proportions for service at this station. ¶ 14. Public animals appeared to have been properly cared for; as also the vehicles, horse drawn and motor propelled. ¶ 15. Between June 1, 1922, and the date of inspection, February 16, 1924, the following construction work changed considerably the appearance as well as the comfort and usefullness [usefulness] of the post:- ¶ Tiled ditches throughout the Campo del Marte ¶ Magazine and gun shed ¶ Moving picture pavilion ¶ 3 tiled tennis courts ¶ A machine gun nest built for educational purposes, but incidentally commanding the surrounding area which might possibly be seized and used against the detachment. ¶ Water system consisting of a well, pumping plant and tank, and firemains. ¶ Sewerage disposal system of flush toilets, septic tank, and sewer line to city sewer three-fourths of a mile long. ¶ Galleys and mess halls have been rebuilt and a galley store room added. ¶ A new laundry built. ¶ The Lejeune Club, and addition to the Post Exchange ¶ Gasoline dispensar [dispenser]. ¶ Pistol range. ¶ Sick Bay. ¶ Rifle Range. ¶ Barracks building thoroughly overhauled and repaired. ¶ Store rooms and entire Quartermaster compound overhauled and rebuilt. ¶ Electrical system rebuilt, new transformer installed. ¶ Street lights established. ¶ Intercompound telephone system installed. ¶ Corral rebuilt. ¶ 2 handball courts built. ¶ The porches of quarters 1 & 2 repaired. . . . "

4.  April 3, 1924.  "Inspection of Marine Detachment, American Legation, Managua, Nicaragua."  Major General Joseph H. Pendleton, U.S.M.C., to the Major General Commandant, Washington D.C., p. 4.  " . . . Additional barracks buildings constructed, of concrete and tile, before referred to. ¶ 16. The funds allotted to the construction of the foregoing were expended most wisely with the result that the enlisted men and two officers of the command are housed comfortably. Supplies, equipment, and public animals are properly sheltered and facilities are available for instruction and amusement which have greatly increased, and tend to maintain in a high degree, the efficiency and contentment of the whole detachment. In my opinion the results obtained reflect excellent judgement and foresight displayed by the Commanding Officer, Major Marston, in planning the improvement of the post, and untiring attention to details of construction by the Post Quartermaster, Captain McClean, both of whom are deserving of, and I recommend be given, the commendation of the Major General Commandant. Also I will note as deserving of much credit, the services of Quartermaster Sergeant W.V. Harris, who is deservedly held in high esteem by the Commanding Officer and Post Quartermaster. After noting the character of his work, I concur in the recommendation of the Commanding Officer and Post Quartermaster that Quartermaster Sergeant Harris be made a Quartermaster Clerk when the opportunity comes. ¶ 17. The Post Exchange is well managed and carries an ample and varied stock for the use of the command. The stock on hand February 1, 1924, is valued at $6,687.30; cash on hand $1,158.12. ¶ 18. The Barber, shoemaker, and tailor pay ten per cent to the post exchange, and stand all expenses. ¶ 19. The Lejeune Club, an extension of the Post Exchange, has a library of 500 books with an average circulation of 300 volumes per month, writing and game tables, phonograph and piano. ¶ 20. In addition to the Club within the limits of the compound, there is maintained by the enlisted men of the command, under the careful supervision of the Commanding Officer, a club in the City of Managua, which would be considered a creditable establishment if conducted for and by commissioned officers. The Commanding Officer exercises careful supervision over this club and I was informed by all of the officers at the post that the effects of this institution had proven excellent. During all the time that it had been running, there has never been a particle or [of?] disorder or disturbance in the club; but, on the contrary, the enlisted men of the command take a pride in the institution and make it not only respectable but commendable. . . . "

5.  April 3, 1924.  "Inspection of Marine Detachment, American Legation, Managua, Nicaragua."  Major General Joseph H. Pendleton, U.S.M.C., to the Major General Commandant, Washington D.C., p. 5.  " . . . 21. During my visit to Managua I had the opportunity of talking with the American Minister, Mr. J.E. Ramer, and with a number of prominent Nicaraguan officials, and I am glad to say that a high opinion of officers and men of the Marine Corps stationed in Managua was held by all with whom I came in contact. I believe that Major Marston by his broad-minded and diplomatic conduct, and by the excellent discipline he has maintained in his command, has succeeded in establishing and maintaining a most cordial relation with the officials and citizens in private life in Nicaragua. I earnestly recommend that a letter of commendation, for his services in this regard, and for the neergy [energy], good judgement, and tact which he has displayed, be written to Major Marston by the Major General Commandant. ¶ J.H. PENDLETON. ¶ Copy to: Major Marston, M.B. Quantico, Va. ¶ The Commanding Officer, Marine Detachment, American Legation, Managua, Nicaragua, C.A."

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