HEADQUARTERS, NORTHERN AREA
CAPTURE OF GENERAL MANUEL MARIA GIRON RUANO AND
INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM HIM.
The following excerpt from Lt. Hanneken's patrol
report gives the circumstances under which Jiron
"I sent 8 men with Cpl. Roy Waddle in charge to
the creek in rear of our camp for the purpose of
bathing, instructing the Cpl. to put out 4
sentries while the other 4 bathed, Cpl. Waddle
placed 1 of these sentries, Pvt. Merle W.
Rittenour to guard the trail leading to the
creek and toward our camp. Pvt. Rittenour took
his post in the bushes off the trail, when at
about 1030 he espied a man on a mule coming up
the trail, he called to the men who were bathing
that someone was coming and "to stand by". Cpl.
Waddle and the men immediately armed themselves.
The sentry permitted the man to come along and
when opposite him on the trail he covered him
with his rifle. Cpl. Waddle and the other men
immediately investigated the trail and found
that this man was alone. This man wore a red and
black hat band, a red neckerchief and was armed
with a Colt automatic pistol, (not US
Government), a sheathed machete and a belt with
35 rounds of ammunition. He was escorted to camp
by the 8 men and turned over to the undersigned.
I immediately disarmed him, at the same time he
stated that he was a General, General Jiron."
He was born in Guatemala of a wealthy family, in
1868, being later educated at Guatemala College.
At the age of 2k [sic], he inherited 20,000.00
from an aunt, whereupon, he embarked upon a
period of riotous living, traveling through
various countries and South America for two
years and four months, moved only by a spirit of
adventure and wanderlust. His money gone, he
worked for a short time in the mines,
Esmeraldos, near the head of the Amazon, for a
small "stake" with which he returned home. Being
averse to work he spent the next 17 years in the
rather colorless role of a hanger-on around his
family. He had no career and no particular
ambition. He finally joined the Guatemalan army
in 1907, where he served until 1923, attaining
the rank of Col. He seems to have struck his
In 1923, Jiron secured permission from his
government to join the Liberal Revolution in
Honduras. He fought under Gen. Gregorio Ferrera
with the rank of Gen. until captured and
imprisoned in La Aiba, after the triumph of the
Conservatives. Receiving his release after a
short period of imprisonment, he returned to
Guatemala and was promoted to rank of Gen. in
the army of his own country.
Later, he was appointed Jefe Politico of the
department of Peten, Honduras, in which capacity
he served for two years, 1925 to 1926. Rumor has
it that Jiron wreaked cruel and blood-thirsty
vengeance on his enemies while in office, but he
denies this, describing this administration as a
success. At all events Guatemala swapped
Governments again in 1927, and Jiron engaged
temporarily in the salt business. He became
interested in the Nicaraguan Revolution headed
by Dr. Sacasa, but failed to arrive until after
the Tipitapa Agreement. Landing at Corinto Dec.
8, 1927, he joined Sandino at Chipote on Jan.
18, 1928 -- the same day on which the 11th Regt.
arrived in Nicaragua. He became Chief-of-Staff
of the bandit forces about Aug. 15, 1928.
It is men of Jiron's type who constitute the
head and front of banditry in Nicaragua. He
explains that he joined Sandino because he is
furnished a chance to fight. He has no
recognized creed nor code, and no ambition
except for adventure. Possessed with a likeable
personality and well known to a large number of
prominent figures in Central America. He is
moved by no cause and has no special loyalty to
anyone or anything -- not even to his wife and
children whom he left stranded in poverty.
Jiron was questioned at length by Capt. Geyer,
Lt. Hanneken, and R-2 11th Regt., and gave
information as set forth below: / p. 2 /
STATUS OF SANDINO'S FORCES
AT TIME OF GIRON'S CAPTURE:
Sandino was in camp with his
staff, his mistress and a guard of 28 men, a few
miles Northeast of Murra, on Feb. 2nd. He has
made his headquarters in this general area
continuously since he was forced to leave the
Coco River after his defeat by Capt. Edson at
Llilihuas, on Aug. 7, 1928. By posting lookouts
on high peaks, he keeps himself informed on the
direction of approach of Marine Patrols sent
into the region. With this advantage, he can
easily elude his pursuers by using a network of
new-cut trails through the dense jungles. His
present staff is composed as follows:
(a) Porfirio Sanchez,
Honduran, new Chief-of-Staff, recently
promoted to General. Is uneducated and barely
able to write his name.
(b) Francisco Estrada,
Nicaraguan, Assistant Chief-of-Staff.
(c) Simon Gonzalez, Honduran,
unable to read or write.
(d) Juan G. Colindres, lives
both in Honduras and Nicaragua.
(e) Augustin [Faribundo] Marti,
San Salvadoran, a very capable man who serves as
Secretary. Is a communist and fanatic, allied
with communistic organization in Mexico.
(f) Dr. Mairena Hernandez,
Nicaraguan from Leon.
The following are members of
the guard whose names are recalled:
Gonzalez, San Salvadoran.
Captain Filadelfia Gomez,
Sergeant Lorenzo Blandon,
Nicaraguan from Pueblo Nuevo.
Corporal Leopoldo Tellez,
Nicaraguan from Matagalpa.
Private Alfonso Hernandez, 20
years old, Nicaraguan, Coco River.
Private Francisco Hernandez, 12
years old, Nicaragua, Coco River.
Private Pupiro, countryman of
Sandino from Niquinihomo, Nicaragua, is
Private Vilchez, Nicaraguan.
Captain [Fulgencio] Perez,
Nicaraguan, Ocongohas [Ocongoas] area.
Private Marcelino Rugama,
The other sixteen he does not remember their
Gen. [General Simon
Montoya] and his cousin Col. Montoya [Lt.
Colonel Julian Montoya] have left for
Honduras on Feb. 2, 1929, with a message to
President Colindres asking permission for
Sandino with 30 men to cross that country going
to Mexico, where he intended to buy ammunition.
Both Montoya's stated to Jiron that they would
not return, although they might join Sandino on
his projected trip to Mexico in case that became
Col. Fernando Quintero and
Lt. Col. Carlos Aponte have both quit
Sandino. (A letter signed by Sandino on Jan 21,
1929, verifies this report.)
Sandino has the following troops distributed as
shown below. This does not include Guardias
Civicas of whom there is an unknown number, nor
about 30 men with Ortez not yet reported: / p. 3
Altamirano ------------------------- 30
Jose Leon Diaz
---------------------------- 30 men
----------------------------- 30 men
--------------------------------------- 28 men
------------------- 5 or 6 men
[Miguel Angel] Ortez
-------------------- 30 men
The units of the Guardia
Civica are organized and employed by individual
patrol commanders. Reyes Lopez
has one such unit of 15 or 20 men in the San
Juan de Telpaneca area, and Peralta [Monico
Peralta, Crescencio Peralta, or Ismael Peralta]
as a similar group around La Constancia.
ARMS AND AMMUNITION
3 Springfields and about 200
Krags and Remingtons. Of these, 160 are in
service and others are stored in the vicinity of
Chipote by Capt. Rafael Altamirano
who lives near Monchones, 2 Lewis machine guns,
2 BAR's, and 1 Thompson.
Sandino has a third Lewis gun not in working
order. (It is also known that Ortez and Salgado
each have at least 1 machine gun. Giron states
that they have been obtained independently by
Ortez and Salgado and have not been reported to
Sandino. A bandit group obtained an additional
Thompson in the contact at San Antonio on Jan.
21, 1929. This is a total of 4 machine guns, 2
BAR's, and 2 Thompsons.)
Of the automatic weapons known to Sandino,
Altamirano has 1 Lewis and 1 Thompson; Sanchez
has 1 Lewis; Sandino has 2 BAR's with him. It is
not known what Jefe will get Sanchez's machine
gun, now that he has become Chief-of-Staff.
Ammunition is very limited for Krags and
Remingtons, soldiers being restricted to from 5
to 8 rounds each. Members of Sandino's personal
group have 25 rounds each. There are about 2,000
rounds of Springfield ammunition available for
the machine guns. This amount has been
accumulated by salvaging ammunition lost along
trails by Marines because of broken bandoliers
straps, etc. (Ortez and Salgado are such also
known to have a supply of machine gun ammunition
which was obtained according to Jiron from
sources unknown to Sandino.)
Sandino has about 160 pistols and an adequate
supply of pistol ammunition, which is secured
from Honduras by buying in driblets -- a few
cartridges at a time mostly from Honduran
officers and soldiers.
Secured mostly by robbing
private homes and stores. Saddles, bridles, etc.
are obtained in the same manner. Some articles,
particularly the shoes, are obtained from
Honduras. Ramon Raudales, part
owner of the Ula Ranch and who now lives in
Danli, is the bandit agent for supplies in
Honduras. He is assisted in the work by Col.
Quesada now lame from a wound received in the
Another bandit agent, who serves more or less as
Sandino's banker lives in Tegucigalpa and Danli
-- is a German by the name of Rossner.
/ p. 4 / Sandino sold to him the 28 pounds of
gold from the La Luz and Neptune mines, for
which Rossner advanced him $12.00 per ounce, the
rest he paid when the gold was disposed of
abroad. Some of the money is still due Sandino
of this account, as a messenger was expected to
arrive at the bandit camp from Danli, with
$1,000.00, at the time Jiron was captured, Feb.
3rd. From time to time, Rossner has turned over
to the bandit agent, Ramon Raudales, sums of
money on account for the purchase of supplies.
ARTERIES OF SUPPLY AND
Supplies are run from Danli
to Las Limones "lemon" from where they are
forwarded by 2 men, Ciriaco Shuto (Soto)
and his brother whose given name is unknown,
other bandit agents in this immediate vicinity
who are used on various missions are (1)
Emilio Soto of Puntalitos, (2)
Felix Soto of San Jose; (3)
Juan Soto of Las Limones. These agents
move their cargoes at night when using mules. If
light loads such as money or medicines, are
being carried, they are transported on foot,
moving via little-used trails and often going
through the jungle a few yards from and parallel
to the trail. The route taken from Las Limones
to Murra is either direct of via Santa Barbara,
depending upon reports of the presence of Marine
Patrols. Murra is spy headquarters (area of
Murra), and supplies are easily forwarded from
there to wherever Sandino may be in the general
A second route is: El Chupon (which is Sandino's
headquarters whenever they may be East of
Murra). To Northeast of Bentillo Mountain,
across Coco River about midway between Santa
Cruz and Cua to house of Zeledon
Gutierrez, thence to house of
Santos Vasquez in Virgen, then to La
Constancia where either Peralta or
Abraham Centeno relays messages as far
South as Matagalpa. (Messages are said to go via
Mrs. Sandino [Blanca Arauz de Sandino]
at San Rafael, but Jiron is uncertain
about what, if anything, she has to do with the
The wife of 2 sons of Pedro Altamirano
at present live on Northeast side of Bentillo.
They are important in the bandit system of
information and supply Southward from El
After the elections on Nov.
4th, Sandino expected President Moncada to
summon him to a conference for the purpose of
arriving at an agreement whereby the bandit
chief would lay down his arms. He is still
waiting for the summons. Jiron avers that it is
Sandino's immediate ambition to rule Nueva
Segovia, and he will not voluntarily quit
banditry with anything less. He has discussed
with his Staff various moves in an endeavor to
enlist further support, making decisions and
then discarding them. Among the plans recently
considered by him and mentioned to Jiron are the
(a) To go to Mexico City with a guard of 30 men,
securing permission for passage of this force
through Honduras, Guatemala and San Salvador.
His chief foreign support comes from that
country, and his brother, Socrates, recently
wrote Sandino that he could easily raise money
for an expedition if he would come in person to
Mexico City. He has sent Jose de Paredes
to Mexico with a letter to President Gil, and a
commission composed of Gen. and Col. Montoya to
Honduras with a letter addressed to President
Colindres for this purpose. Paredes left for
Mexico on Jan. 28th while the Montoyas left for
Tegucigalpa on Feb. 2nd. / p. 5 /
(Jiron left Sandino's camp with Gen. and Col.
Montoya on Feb. 2nd, intending to accompany them
into Honduras. He was mule-back while the others
were afoot. In crossing a stream which has cut a
deep canyon, Jiron was forced to make a detour.
He became lost and was captured by a Marine
patrol on the following day. Although he denies
it, the belief seems justified that Jiron was on
a mission to Guatemala similar to the Montoya
mission in Honduras.)
(b) To go to Costa Rica with a guard of about 30
men. As a preliminary to this, Sandino
considered making a foray into the wealthy
Matagalpa area where he could get enough money
and supplies, by robbing the finca owners, to
sustain his force for a considerable time. He
prefers going to Mexico, and his present efforts
are directed toward that end. Failing this,
Jiron believes that Sandino will go to Costa
Rica with whatever he can salvage from the wreck
of his "cause" here.
It is significant that the bandit jefe is
planning to carry an armed guard with him into
whatever country he finally elects to flee to
when the time comes. This is for two reasons:
(a) To form a nucleus for a new force which he
expects to organize and lead back to Nicaragua,
once the Marines have been withdrawn. (b) To
serve for his personal protection and to give
him a certain amount of prestige.
PRESENT ATTITUDE OF CERTAIN
With the exception of
Sanchez, the staff wants to quit. This was made
evident upon receipt of the letters of Gen.
Feland and Adm. Sellers in Dec. About Dec. 30th,
Sandino assembled his various groups at La Luz,
a camp on the slope of Bujona Mt., Northeast of
Quilali, and informed them of his answer to Gen.
Feland. Since then, Gen. Montoya, former
Chief-of-Staff, Col. Montoya, and Cols. Quintero
and Aponte have quit.
Neither Ortez, Altamirano, nor Sanchez will
quit. Ortez has ambitions of supplanting Sandino
and does not cooperate very well. He gets his
ammunition from Honduras, and has recruited and
armed about 30 men which fact he has never
reported to his superior. Jiron believes that
those jefes who do not fear assassination will
soon quit, except the three named above.
METHOD OF AVOIDING MARINE
Sandino keeps with him a
personal guard of about 30 picked men. As stated
elsewhere, he had made his headquarters in the
general region East of Murra since about Aug.
15, 1928. He has cut a net-work of trails in
this area to assist him in escaping from our
patrols, and remains but a relatively short
period in any one camp -- continually
establishing new camps, well hidden from view of
our planes. Once a camp is found by a Marine
patrol, he never uses it again. In addition to
spies who relay reports of approaching hostile
patrols from a distance of several miles,
lookouts are stationed on near-by mountain peaks
and promptly inform him of the direction of
march, numbers, etc. of marines in the immediate
vicinity. With this advantage, Sandino can slip
through the jungle and avoid our patrols, even
though they may get to within a few hundred
yards of his position. According to Jiron, he
has never been forced to flee more than nine
miles since coming to this region five months
ago. / p. 6 /
Captain Holmes was in contact with Sandino's
guard at Chupon on Oct. 15, 1928. Taking 12 men,
he fled Eastward to Oconguas and left Giron
behind to fight a delaying action with 12 men.
The maneuver succeeded although Capt. Holmes
followed him for a number of miles and was
within three miles of his camp when the cache
was found containing 1 machine gun, 23 rifles, 1
typewriter, etc. Near this spot was a second
cache of 90 rifles.
Gen. Montoya was the jefe of
the bandit forces, being assisted by
Quesada [Colonel Carlos Quesada] and
Espinosa [General Luis Espinosa].
Rejada [Lt. Colonel Jose de la Rosa
Tejada] and Lagos [Lt. Colonel
Jose Lagos] were sub-jefes at that time
and handled the two machine guns used in the
fight. Montoya had 48 men most of them Honduran,
with whom he prefers to fight rather than with
Nicaraguans. A contingent of troops came up from
Concordia for the fight but Jiron does not know
whether or not they were included in the number
Moises Gonzalez, owner of
Daraili was a supporter of Sandino at this time
-- his son, who has since surrendered, taking
part in the battle. (Jiron claims that Gonzalez
has broken with Sandino since that time).
At time of fight, Sandino was at San Carlos, a
near-by finca belonging to Molina [Blas
Miguel Molina] of Yali. One bandit was
killed, and two wounded, including Col. Quesada
who was shot through right thigh. In the
afternoon of the day following the engagement,
an airplane killed Col. Espinosa with a bomb
dropped on the latter's house.
Sandino was expecting a loaded ration train to
come from the opposite direction from that being
traveled by the Marine patrol at time of ambush,
and he was much chagrined that the train which
he hit was empty.
The general plan of the ambush called for one
unit to stake position behind the stone wall
running generally parallel to the trail. A
similar unit was placed on each flank in a
retiring position, from where they might advance
and completely surround the Marine patrol.
Ortez commanded this group.
Jiron does not know just how many participated
in the ambush, but believes about 60.
Officially, Sandino knows only that Ortez has 30
men armed with rifles, although he has private
information that this young subordinate has an
additional 30 men with possibly some automatic
Ortez reported to Sandino that he had killed 40
At this time, May 13th-14th,
Sandino was at Garrobo with the supplies which
he had looted from the mines a short time
before. Hearing that Capt. Hunter's column was
approaching from the west, he dispatched Sanchez
with forty-odd men to meet him. Jiron with about
the same number was to support Sanchez while
Sandino with a personal guard trailed along in
the rear. / p. 7 /
Sanchez attacked the Marine patrol from a small
hill -- had position , according to Jiron -- in
the afternoon and was driven off after a short
fight. The contact ended about dusk and the
Marines camped on the captured position during
Jiron, who had one machine gun, ambushed the
trail in one direction from the Marine camp
while Sanchez took up position in the opposite
(Note: Capt. Hunter had been fatally wounded in
the contact of the previous afternoon, and the
Marine patrol was trying to evacuate him. Cpl.
Williamson and one Guardia were killed).
The Marine patrol left camp in the direction of
Jiron's ambush, and another short fight ensued.
Jiron explained with some feeling that his men
were nervous and showed themselves, whereupon,
the Marines attacked with automatic weapons and
drove them from their positions. Two of his men
During the two contacts, Sandino was about one
mile away. He visited the scene about three days
later, and finding two graves, ordered Jiron to
disinter the bodies. The graves of Cpl.
Williamson and the Guardia were then opened --
Sandino finding in a corked bottle the name,
rank, and organization of the former.
Sandino ordered that the bodies of both dead men
be hung by their necks and pictures made of
them. This was done in case of Cpl. Williamson,
but the neck of the Guardia had been broken and
the state of decomposition was such as to make
(At this point in his narrative, Jiron closed
his eyes and shuddered, exclaiming: "I didn't
want to do it; Oh, it was awful. I told the
General (Sandino) that it was barbarous.")
Two weeks later, Jiron passed this spot again
and saw the skeletons of the two men still
LOOTING OF LA LUZ AND NEPTUNE
Sandino designated Jiron as
the jefe to make some important raids, about the
latter part of March, 1928. He decided to
plunder the richest property available to him,
and to make a gesture against all foreigners in
Nicaragua. Jiron was sent first to the Matagalpa
region and then to Pis Pis area. He told Jiron
that General Chamorro's brother owned a finca
near Matagalpa where he kept a large amount of
money in a safe. This money was to be the first
haul of plunder.
There were too many Marine Patrols around the
Matagalpa area to admit of raiding the Chamorro
finca, so Jiron gave up the attempt. He
assembled a column of about 80 men near Coyolar,
with Altamirano commanding the point and Sanchez
the rear guard, and marched on Pis Pis.
Altamirano knows this section better than any
other jefe, and therefore was chosen to head the
formation. It was a long and difficult trek
through the jungle, but they finally arrived at
the La Luz mine where they found only a small
amount of gold. / p. 8 /
(With characteristic Latin mannerisms, Jiron
extended himself on his description of this
exploit. Amid dramatic gesticulations, he waxed
eloquent about the many hazards encountered, and
the masterful way in which he solved all of his
problems. His tired soldiers deserved all they
could get, and he was frankly disgusted to find
such a small amount of well-earned supplies at
the La Luz mine. It was even worse at the Star
Mine [Lone Star], which was not in operation.
However, Altamirano found an American flag in a
house at the Star Mine which Jiron later gave to
Sandino. After getting the name of the
organization to which Col. Williamson was
attached, by opening his grave, Sandino gave
this flag to Dr. Gustavo Machado, his
representative in Mexico, who published a
detailed story of how it had been captured by
the bandit forces.)
Jiron then moved to the Neptune mines where he
seized an important amount of supplies,
including 28 lbs. of gold and 32 mule loads of
clothing and stores. He had been ordered by
Sandino to rob everything of value that could be
carried away, and to destroy the rest. Also, he
had been instructed to bring back to the outlaw
stronghold every foreigner encountered in the
mining region -- both male and female.
Accordingly, he captured Mr. Marshall,
the engineer, but refused to molest a German at
the Star Mine, because he was "unimportant."
(This bandit story of how he looted
$10,000,000.00 American mine is not important
now, except the light which it may shed upon the
"cause" of Sandino, and what may be expected of
him in the future in case the campaign is
abandoned before he is finished. Jiron is a
solder of fortune and sees nothing particularly
wrong about robbing so long as it is done under
the guise of "military operations." Moreover, a
military operation is anything that causes a
disturbance among the people. He was not only
frank about this looting of the mines, but
obviously proud of his accomplishment. He
voluntarily related many occurrences during the
"When I arrived," he went on, "the gold was
there in the boxes, but the process wasn't
finished, so I called one of the management and
asked him how long to finish it, he said forty
hours. I was a little drunk and feeling pretty
good, so I says, to him, "I'll give you twelve
hours to finish it; and if you don't I'll
execute you." So sure enough, the next morning
at eight o'clock -- there was the gold!"
He stated that there were between twenty and
thirty negro women at the Neptune Mine. Asked if
he received any complaints about cases of rape
committed by his men, he replied, "O-O-h, they
were glad to sleep with my soldiers. You
understand, my soldiers gave them combs and silk
stockings and things which we got from the
store." Then he added with a meaning shrug, "and
if these negroes weren't glad to see my soldiers
Laden with 22 loads of loot -- each man carrying
an additional bundle of his own -- the bandit
column started back to Santa Cruz, where Jiron
was to receive instructions regarding place of
storage. It was to go somewhere in the region
East of Chipote. Upon arriving at a point on the
trail about opposite Garrobo, Jiron met a
messenger who informed him that the Marines had
combed the area East of Chipote and destroyed
all supplies. Further, that Sandino was gone to
parts unknown. With this, the bandit pack train
was turned Northward and carried to Garrobo,
where Sandino later arrived. The Hunter contact,
elsewhere described, followed only a short time
afterwards. / p. 9 /
(Our operations East of Chipote, to which
reference is made above, began on Apr. 4, 1928.
It is interesting to recall now that these
operations were originally planned for execution
on a date later than Apr. 4th, the time being
moved up. Had the original plan been adhered to,
it is probable that the bulk of Sandino's loot
from the mines would have been captured or
About two weeks after the
Hunter contact at Zapote, on May 13th, Sandino
moved his headquarters to Wamblan. He
established an outpost under Jiron about two
miles East (down stream) from Llilihuas
(LLILIHUAS), with a second outpost still further
down stream under Montoya.
When information was received that a Marine
patrol was moving up the river, Montoya's
outpost was withdrawn except a few care-takers
for the camp. Jiron was ordered tdo withdraw to
Llilihuas where he was to give battle. He then
had 30 men with rifles and one Lewis machine
gun. Sandino was to support Jiron with about 30
men, equipped with rifles, one sub-Thompson and
two BAR's. Altamirano, with a force of about
equal size, was ordered to block the trail on
North side of Coco River which branches off down
stream from Llilihuas and runs parallel to
river. This was planned to prevent the Marines
from out-flanking the bandit defensive position.
Jiron wanted to place his troops on the South
side of the river where, he claims, there was
better cover, better observation and where the
river current was too swift to admit of landing
from small boats on that side. He had a report
that the Marines were pulling up stream in five
open boats, and he planned to dispose his men in
five groups, permit the boats to slightly pass
the respective positions of his groups and then
open fire. Sandino interfered with his plans and
required him to take up a position on the North
side of the River.
As the Marine patrol appeared down the river,
Col. Juan G. Colindres became excited and showed
himself. Whereupon the Marines immediately
opened fire, drew their boats to shore and
pushed home their attack. For some reason
unknown to Jiron, Sandino, who according to plan
was to support the defensive position, ran.
Jiron found him that night in Wamblan where he
had returned to his mistress, Teresa
Jiron heard firing on his left flank, but
thought it was Altamirano, knowing that he had
been stationed in that direction. He was amazed
to find that Marines were closing on his flank
and rear. His command was shot to pieces and he
narrowly escaped capture, finally reaching
Wamblan that night with one man. Jiron lost
seven known killed and twelve missing. Three of
the missing have been located, but were wounded.
Sandino had not properly reconnoitered the
ground, and did not know that the trail on which
he stationed Altamirano was nearly four miles
from the river at that point. This blunder
dispersed his forces, removed Altamirano from
the scene of action at the critical moment and
gave Jiron a false sense of security on his
flank. There was a bitter quarrel as a result --
Jiron and Sandino blaming each other for the
defeat. After this was patched up, Jiron was
made Chief-of-Staff. / p. 10 /
(1) Sandino keeps a mistress
near his camp, Teresa Villatoro, whom he first
met at San Albino. She was a mistress of another
man at that time, and would be rather
good-looking except that she now has no front
teeth and bears a scar on the forehead from a
wound received at Chipote. She is a native of La
Union, San Salvador. Jiron declares that Sandino
had Gen. Sequiera executed because of his
attentions to Teresa -- the charge of disloyalty
against him being a mere pretense. Because of
increasing danger of capture, Sandino now plans
to send her back to Salvador as soon as he can
get the money.
(2) Lola Matamoros of Telpaneca
was at one time a good friend of the outlaw, she
visited him at Chipote at least once. Jiron is
not certain that the friendship has been broken.
(3) Marshall was kept with Jiron near Llilhuas
until he became ill of dysentery when he was
sent to the only bandit doctor at Wamblan. He
was buried beside a small creek at Wamblan, the
grave being marked by a cross cut in the bark of
a tree nearby. Jiron claims to know the family
of Marshall's wife in Costa Rica.
(4) A group of bandits under Sanchez disinterred
the body of 1st Sgt. Bruce at
Las Cruces performing acts of ghoulish vulgarity
(5) The following are members of the "group"
mentioned in Sandino's "agreement" which he is
now trying to have ratified in Mexico. This
agreement aims at the overthrow of the Moncada
Salvatierra, who is connected with a
print shop in Leon.
(b) Solomon de la Selva,
Sandino's propagandist at Leon.
(c) Dr. Salvador B. Diaz of
(6) Dr. Gustavo
Machado, Sandino representative in
Mexico, is editor of "El Libertador," a paper
published in Mexico, D.F. This [is] the official
organ of the Anti-Imperialist League, of which
Machado is a member. He is also a member of the
so-called "Hands-Off-Nicaragua Committee". He
collected $400.00 for Sandino by selling picture
buttons of the bandit jefe in Mexico City. He
visited the bandit camp at Garrobo last May
where he secured the American flag stolen from
the Star Mine. The flag was then photographed,
which appeared later in his paper with a story
of its having been captured from the Marines.
(7) Sandino received $310.00 in cash from
[Froylan] Turcios of Tegucigalpa. Jiron
does not know the amount of supplies furnished
by this agent.
(8) A Miss Bonilla of Danli,
Honduras, is an agent of Sandino. / p. 11 /
(9) When Carleton Beals,
reporter of the Nation, had his interview with
Sandino in San Rafael, there were between 80 and
90 bandits present in the town. In all, Sandino
then had about 375 men, with two machine guns
and two sub-Thompsons. Beals was anxious to get
any story or complaint against the Marines.
Beals told Jiron that one-half the people in the
United States favors Sandino -- especially the
Democrats. This helped the morale of the
(10) Gen. Sequiera participated in the Liberal
revolution in Honduras in 1924. He once killed a
staff officer of Gen. Chamorro. He was
imprisoned in Honduras while on a mission for
Sandino, but escaped. He was executed by Sandino
shortly before the Edson contact, according to
Jiron, on fake charges of disloyalty -- his
intimacy with Teresa Villatoro being the actual
(11) Capt. Perez [Fulgencio Perez]
and "Chico" Lopez [Francisco
Lopez] are bandit intelligence
officers. Perez has a finca at Oconguas while
Lopez lives near Murra.
(12) A Capt. Altamirano, who
lives on Chipote, is Sandino's Quartermaster,
and has about 90 rifles stored somewhere in the
(13) Marti [Faribundo Marti]
wrote all of Sandino's propaganda for him during
the election period. He also drafted the
(14) Pedron Altamirano is known as a killer,
having murdered 19 men before the Revolution. It
was his force that murdered the election
officials in Pantasma valley as well as those at
San Marcos. Jiron personally heard Sandino
congratulate Altamirano on his work in killing
Dr. Castellon and his party at San Marcos.
(15) Lagos is a Honduran who operated with
Abraham Centeno for a while, and with other
groups. Is a machine gunner. Has quit Sandino
and is now living in Gualistas [Gualisila],
Northeast of Daraili and near the Coco River,
with a former mistress of Molina, of Yali.
(16) Peralta [Crescencio or Monico Peralta] is a
sub-jefe of Sandino, is living in Constancia
where he owns a finca. He organized a unit of
the Guardia Civica there. (He is believed to be
the jefe who attacked a small Marine patrol at
San Antonio, on Jan. 21st.) Mrs. Sandino sends
and received mail through Peralta.
(17) Mrs. Williams of Los Encinos has been
furnishing information to Sandino since he first
began banditry. Her daughter married "Gen."
Echevarria [General Manuel Echevarria], the
Mexican bandit who formerly served with Sandino.
Williams, himself, has often led bandit patrols
and furnished them with animals.
(18) Planes killed 17 mules which had been
"appropriated" by Sandino at Gulke's Camp, while
many others ran away. Those left were stolen by
one of the Maradiaga brothers [Coronado
Maradiaga and Fernando Maradiaga] who ran them
off to Honduras and pocketed the sale money.
(19) Gen. Montoya is from Alanjo, Honduras, has
but little education. He left Honduras about two
years ago after having killed a man in his home
town. / p. 12 /
(20) Col. Carlos Aponte Hernandez
is a communist from Venezuela. He left his
country because of enmity against President
Gomez, going to Cuba where he got into trouble.
He escaped from prison and later joined Sandino.
(21) Filadelfia Gomez of Honduras, a sub-jefe of
Sandino's personal guard, is described by Jiron
as a "Sponger."
(22) Of the 160 men, who are regularly attached
to the bandit forces, only about 40 are
Nicaraguans. There are about 80 Hondurans and
others from all parts of Central America and
Mexico. The Nationality of Sandino's generals is
(a) One Guatemalan -- Jiron
(b) " Honduran -- Montoya
(c) " San Salvadoran -- Diaz
(d) Two Nicaraguans -- Ortez and Salgado
Cols. Sanchez, Gomez,
Gonzalez, and Montoya are Hondurans. Aponte is a
Venezuelan, while others are Nicaraguans.
(23) Col. Francisco Estrada joined Sandino upon
being released from Jail in Managua.
(24) Arturo Fernandez, a
Guatemalan, recently joined Ortez as a machine
(25) Narciso Cruz was a bandit
spy near Quilali was captured and is still held
by the Marines.
(26) Eulalio Flores of
Gusaneras in La Pavona near Pena Blanca
furnished Sandino with two cargoes of foodstuffs
about four months ago.
(27) Guadalupe Rivera of Santa
Cruz was a Colonel under Sandino. His house was
used as a bandit message center. About one month
ago, he sent Sandino two cartons of Camel
cigarettes which the latter threw in the fire
thinking them poisoned.
(28) Saint Gilbert Pierre Charles,
a Haitian, is now with Sandino. He was at one
time sentenced to a long term of imprisonment
for banditry in Haiti, by Capt. Hoadley,
U.S.M.C. (12 yrs. according to memory of Capt.
Geyer). He claims to have escaped, and has now
resumed his "career" with Sandino as his leader.
(29) Padre Morales of Las Vegas
sent Sandino 80 suits of second-hand underwear
about four months ago. He also nursed Sandino
for ten days during Feb. 1928, when the jefe was
ill of malaria in Las Vegas.
L. B. REAGAN
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps,
R - 2
MCRC/Smith, Julian C./Box