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Declaration of GN Private Juan Echevarría on Telpaneca mutinies, 6 & 21 October 1929

     This eyewitness account of the "Second Telpaneca Mutiny" of October 21, 1929 sheds important light on one of the war's most widely-discussed episodes. The background to the mutiny is complicated, rooted in the First Telpaneca Mutiny of October 6, 1929, when about 2:00 a.m., a group of disgruntled Guardia enlisted men, led by First Sergeant Fernando Larios (Jr.) shot and killed Guardia Second Lieutenant Lewis H. Trogler (a sergeant in the Marine Corps).  Larios's father was a leading Conservative who had just been exiled by the Liberal Moncada administration. 

     The events of the two mutinies, and the reasons behind them, were discussed and debated in the newspapers, in Marine & Guardia mess halls, and in public conversation for years afterward. Of the ten Guardia mutinies from 1927 to 1932, the Telpaneca mutinies became the most notorious and well-remembered.  (Photograph of three of the Telpaneca mutineers under detention, n.d., Oct. 1929; handwritten on rear:  "Telpaneca Mutinees under arrest in Honduras, from Col. Farquhaision [?] thru Brigade."  US National Archives)
 Replica Watches
     The episode highlights a key issue in Segovian political life during these years: the tenuous nature of political identities and allegiances.  The mutineers clearly did not put much stock in their identity as Guardia, or in their organization, or in their superior officers.  In Echevarria's telling, the soldiers mutinied because their commanding officer, Lt. Trogler, refused them permission to attend a town dance.  Furious, Sgt Salinas killed him, locked the two other Marines (Lts. Levonski and Rimes) in the jailhouse, looted the houses and stores, and hightailed it out of town forcing the narrator, on pain of death, to do his bidding. It's a fascinating blend of fact and fabrication.  Other sources offer different versions of events.
 
     The leader of this second mutiny, Sergeant Adrian Salinas, went on to become an important Sandinista jefe.  The Sandinistas repeatedly tried to persuade their countrymen in the Guardia to abandoned their units and join the Defending Army.  They met with some success, but not nearly what was needed to turn the tide of the war decisively in their favor.   (Illustration:  front page of El Comercio, Managua, 30 October 1929, reporting on the mutiny in Telpaneca)
Patek Philippe Replica  
     Additional sources on the events of the two Telpaneca mutinies are included after Private Juan Echevarría's statement, including legible versions of the above newspaper and subsequent stories from El Comercio.
 

 

CUARTEL GENERAL, DEPARTAMENTO DE LEON
GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA
LEON, NICARAGUA
 
18 de Septiembre de 1930

DECLARACION DEL RASO JUAN ECHEVERRIA, #2293, G. N., DESERTOR DE TELPANECA, 21 de Octubre de 1929.
 
     El Teniente Rimes me llevaba preso a Telpaneca en ruta al Ocotal. Yo estaba preso con los rasos Juan José Baltodano, José Moya, y José Maria Tenorio, en la bartolina de la Guardia de Telpaneca. El dia siguiente han llegado el Sargento Salinas, Carlos Cedeño, Horacio Lacayo, y Enrique Sánchez, a sacarnos de la bartolina donde estabamos prisioneros, para meter presos a los Tenientes Rimes y el Teniente Levonski. Delante el Teniente Rimes y el Teniente Levonski, nos ha mandado el Sargento Salinas a equiparnos de nuevo. Y como nosotros le dijimos a él que no nos metiamos porque no sabiamos que pasaba allí, entonces nos ha contestado él que el que no quisiera meterse iba a ser fusilado allí no más junto con los Tenientes. Entonces nosotros hemos tenido que hacerle caso, como estabamos prisioneros, tuvimos que obedecerle. A esas horas ellos nos han mandado de retenes en contorno del pueblo, para que no dejaramos salir a ningún particular ni a ningún guardia y que el Guardia que llegara allí y se opusiera que lo tiraramos. Entonces ha salido el Sargento Salinas con toda la Guardia a las cuatro de la tarde encabezando como Jefes Adrian Salinas, Carlos Cedeño llevaba el sombrero del Teniente, Enrique Sánchez, Alberto Toledo, Horacio Lacayo, quien fue muerto por la policía de Tegucigalpa. Enrique Sánchez se encuentra ahora en Tegucigalpa, en el Pueblo de Comayagüela, Carlos Gaboardi, está en Puerto Cortez, y las máquinas las ha entregado Alejandro Plata en Tegucigalpa en el Cuartel de San Francisco. A nosotros nos capturaron en Danlí, donde nos ha enseñado un telegrama del Jefe Director de la Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, que tenian orden de captura, para todos los guardias sublevados de Telpaneca, y de recoger las armas. Entonces nos ha dicho a los tres que teníamos que ir a entregar las armas y como yo me encontrera enfermo le dije que no podia ir yo, y se ha llevado a Gaboardi y a García al Valle del Nanci donde los ha colgado de los dedos gordos para que dijesen donde estaban las armas, como ellos se opusieran a no decir, los ha querido fusilar allí no más, pero quizo la suerte que en esos momentos un ayudante de Alejandro Plata tropezó con dos máquinas escondidas. Son las únicas que han hallado, porque ellos no sabian adonde estaban las armas tampoco, porque el Sargento Salinas, Carlos Cedeño, Horacio Lacayo, Enrique Sánchez, y Alberto Toledo, nos han mandado adelante de toda la guardia, despojándonos allí no más de las armas y se han quedado escondiéndolas, estando toda la Guardia como una legua distante. Ya de allí nos fuimos sin armas y dentramos a Danlí, donde nos hemos desapartado. Quedándonos solos Gaboardi, García y yo, los demás se fueron hasta Tegucigalpa, donde han permanecido durante todo este tiempo libremente.
 
     Nosotros nos fugamos de Tegucigalpa y fuimos a varias partes de Honduras, en cuanto salimos nosotros de allí y de la Penitenciaria de Tegucigalpa, Gaboardi se fué hasta Puerto Cortez, García se desapartó de nostros, y yo he venido luchando para venirme para acá a presentarme, porque en mi conciencia creo no tener delito, porque he sido impulsado por las armas.
 
     Nosotros nos dimos cuenta de la sublevación hasta como a las siete de la mañana del día que se fueron los guardias, cuando vinieron allí a la bartolina a abrir la puerta para meter a los Tenientes. De mí pueden dar una declaración el Teniente Rimes, y el Tieniente Levonski, que yo no me he portado mal con ninguno de ellos en ninguna parte del camino. Yo me habia ido del Jícaro y me habian capturado en Pueblo Nuevo, el Teniente Torrez y nos ha ido a dejar él a Palacagüina, donde he llegado el Teniente Rimes con diez números que iba para Telpaneca y de Telpaneca se iba ir él al Ocotal. Entonces el Teniente Torres nos ha entregado a él, para que nos llevase al Ocotal, y como el tenia que pasar por Telpaneca. Alli en Telpaneca nos ha entregado a la Guardia como prisioneros. El día siguiente a las siete de la mañana han llegado Salinas, Cedeño, Sánchez, Lacayo y Toledo y cuando nos sacaron de la bartolina que nos han contado que ellos habian hecho eso con los Tenientes, porque el practicante que comía donde la concinera de los Tenientes sabía hablar el Inglés y les habia odio en su platica a los Tenientes, que llegaba el Teniente Rimes con esos diez numeros a relevar diez de los que estaban en Telpaneca que habian sido los mas interesados en la muerte de Trogler. Entonces ellos para no esperar que los fueran a mandar prisioneros, habian ido a prender a los Tenientes donde ellos estaban tomando café. Los más interesados eran Sánchez, Salinas, Cedeño, Toledo y Lacayo. Nos contaron que ellos le habian pedido un permiso al Teniente Trogler para hacer un baile, y como ellos se alistaronde todo y el Teniente Trogler el día que iba a ser el baile, les ha dicho que ningún guardia salia a la calle. Entonces ellos se han puesto muy enojados con el Teniente, y han dispuesto a la una de la madrugada poner en linea de fuego a toda la guardia disparando como si fuese que el enemigo estaba entrando el pueblo, entonces se han ido Lacayo, Cedeño y Toledo, a despertar al Teniente y le han dicho, "Teniente, levántese que el enemigo esta entrando a la población". El Teniente se ha levantado envuelto en una frezada, cuando el ha salido afuera, Horacio Lacayo le ha disparado y le ha matado.
 
     Horacio Lacayo y Enrique Sánchez andaban paseandose en las calles de Tegucigalpa el 24 de Diciembre de 1929, cuando los ha encontrado la policía, queriéndolos registrar. Entonces Enrique Sánchez ha sacado la pistola que el andaba adentro de la camisa y la ha amperado dentro del paraguas. Luego lo registraron y no le encontraron nada. Entonces la Policía pasó a registrar a Lacayo, en lo que la Policía pasó a registrar a Lacayo, Enrique Sánchez se ha metido en una cantina, dejando alzada la pistola. Horacio Lacayo como se viera solo no se dejó registrar y siguió caminando para atrás, desenvolviendo la pistola y haciendole disparos a la Policía. Se les ha corrido desde el puente de Guaserisque hasta el ovelisco, allí le ha salido el resto de la policía y le han hecho unos disparos y le han quitado la escuadra, después que le quitaron la escuadra, le han pegado tres balazos mas, quedando muerto Lacayo.
 
     /s/   Juan R. Echevarria

M30.09.18. RG127/209/3

Ancillary Documents on the Telpaneca Mutinies, 6 & 21 October 1929

1. Julian C. Smith, History of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, unpublished mss., Marine Corps Research Center, pp. 111-115.

Telpaneca (First)
 
At about 2:00 a.m., on October 6, 1929, Second Lieutenant Lewis H. Trogler, G.N. (Sergeant, USMC), Commanding Officer of the Guardia Nacional garrison at Telpaneca, Nueva Segovia, was shot to death in the town of Telpaneca by mutinous members of his command. The mutiny had been carefully planned and involved the entire garrison, although some were unwilling participants.
 
A written agreement had been drawn up by First Sergeant Fernando Larios, hijo, as leader, and five others, and signed by them on October 3rd, providing that Lieutenant Trogler, who was the only officer serving in Telpaneca, was to be killed, and, as circumstances permitted, all other North American officers, as a sign of their opposition to the "American occupation" of Nicaraguan territory. All other members of the garrison of twenty-three enlisted, signed the document, either voluntarily, or through fear for their personal safety if they refused. In each case a seal was placed opposite the signature, made from the blood of the respective individual, obtained by cutting and squeezing his thumb. Some of these signers had not read the document and had no knowledge as to its contents.
 
It appears that First Sergeant Larios, and one of the other conspirators who was a corporal, had been recommended for reduction by Lieutenant Trogler, and that both knew of this. Larios was undoubtedly the prime mover, and there is a strong probability that he was actuated also by other personal and political motives. He had been a Conservative prior to joining the Guardia, and his father Fernando Larios, padre, a leader of the Conservative element, had been exiled only shortly theretofore by the Liberal Government. His antipathy for North Americans had not been revealed previously, but became apparent by his actions during the signing of the pact of blood and during the subsequent mutiny. It was related by witnesses that he gleefully viewed the body of Lieutenant Trogler, and that he refused permission to civilians who desired to hold a wake over it. Several letters were found in the possession of Larios which boldly stated his hatred of foreigners.
 
There was dissatisfaction among some of the enlisted members of the command over a dance given by Lieutenant Trogler for the civilian population of Telpaneca on the night of October 5th. No Guardia was invited, and it has been said that Lieutenant Trogler had stated that the guardias were of a lower social status than his intended guests, and that on this account he had not invited them to participate. Some were disgruntled because they had been sent by Lieutenant Trogler to carry chairs from other houses to the scene of the party, and they believed that they should not have been so employed: that in so doing they were being utilized in the capacity of servants. A concerted effort was made by various guardias to induce the civilians not to attend the fiesta, intimating that some untoward event might occur there.
 
It was planned by the mutineers to simulate a bandit attack and to kill Lieutenant Trogler as he was returning to his quarters from the fiesta. To make it appear true in case of an investigation, men were stationed at various points throughout the town, with orders to open fire when they heard firing going on. That afternoon a civilian agent of First Sergeant Larios reported to Lieutenant Trogler, in accordance with Lario's instructions that a bandit attack on the town would take place that night. It does not appear that Lieutenant Trogler took any extraordinary precautions that night as to the security of the town.
 
Because of the fact that he returned from the dance about 1:30 a.m., in company with a prominent civilian, Lieutenant Trogler was not fired upon at that time. However, soon after reaching his quarters the simulated attack commenced, and weapons were trained and fired upon the doorway of the officers' quarters, through which Lieutenant Trogler emerged and safely ran across the street to the barracks. He then started in the direction of the church plaza where some of the defensive works were located, doubtless with the intention of directing the defense, when he was struck and killed.
 
Throughout the balance of the night sporadic firing took place, but it has been definitely established that no bandits attacked Telpaneca that night, and that the simulation of an attack was planned and carried out as a smoke-screen to hide the real purpose of the mutineers, the killing of Lieutenant Trogler. Having accomplished this object, no attempts were made to loot or commit other violence, and no one of the command deserted.
 
Proof of the complicity of First Sergeant Larios in the plot to mutiny was lacking at the time, but a strong suspicion rested upon him, and he was soon transferred to Ocotal, the Area Headquarters station. He was relieved by Sergeant Adrian Salinas, but his influence was to be felt within a short time in a second mutiny at Telpaneca. He was later tried before a general court-martial and convicted, when the investigation of the Second Telpaneca mutiny brought to light the facts as to the first.

Telpaneca (Second)

 

Following the death of Lieutenant Trogler, Second Lieutenant Charles J. Levonski, G.N. (Sergeant, USMC), was assigned to duty as Commanding Officer, Guardia Nacional, at Telpaneca, and assumed command. He was a capable, energetic and likeable officer, and the morale of the command seemed to improve. For two weeks he observed nothing which indicated to him that the men would not remain loyal.
 
Rumors were received from Ocotal by the men to the effect that First Sergeant Larios had been executed as a punishment for his part in the mutiny of October 6th. This was untrue but was believed by some of them. A newspaper published in Managua, La Prensa, at this time carried an article on the subject of the infliction of the death penalty upon members of the Guardia Nacional guilty of certain acts, and was read and discussed in Telpaneca. It should be remembered that practically the entire command at this station remained unchanged, and that they had just recently participated in a mutiny following the signing of the Larios Pact of Blood, and had treacherously murdered their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Trogler. Unrest and a feeling of apprehension lest they be discovered and awarded the death penalty, filled the minds of the men.
 
A fatal error was made in not relieving at least fifty percent of the command and replacing them with other men of known integrity, immediately after the death of Lieutenant Trogler, as a matter of precaution if for no other reason, and especially as, even at that time, the circumstances surrounding the affair, with its "bandit attack" which everyone doubted, and other inconsistencies that pointed to mutiny, were sufficiently evident to warrant such action, particularly when one considers the isolated location of Telpaneca in the mountains, the lack of communications and the impossibility of bringing prompt relief in case of necessity. It was not until October 20th that a patrol under the command of Second Lieutenant James C. Rimes (Sergeant, USMC) arrived at Telpaneca via Palacaguina with ten replacements for the station. The patrol was composed of seventeen enlisted, all but two of whom were recruits.
 
The rumors of the execution of First Sergeant Larios and discussion of the newspaper article on the death penalty, brought to the minds of enlisted men and civilians in Telpaneca the thought, which soon became a thoroughly believed conviction, that the ten men ordered replaced and transferred were going to Ocotal to be executed for their part in the recent mutiny.
 
It was established later that one of the members of Lieutenant Rimes' patrol carried a letter from First Sergeant Larios in Ocotal to Sergeant Salinas, who had relieved him as Acting First Sergeant at Telpaneca, and who had previously served with him and was a good friend of his. This letter was not recovered, but it is known that Salinas announced to various of his men, following the second Telpaneca mutiny, that Larios would join the column of mutineers on the trail near Santo Domingo, between Telpaneca and San Juan de Telpaneca, and that Salinas and his group waited for him at this point until it became evident to them that he was not going to arrive.
 
It is highly probable that Larios' letter also contained plans, or suggestions, for another mutiny of the garrison at Telpaneca, and it may have been he who suggested the idea of the intended execution of the ten men being transferred, in order to induce Salinas and the others to carry out his plans for this mutiny, a continuation of his pact of blood scheme to kill North American officers and to demonstrate opposition to the presence of these officers in Nicaragua.
 
At any rate Sergeant Salinas, who theretofore had been a mild mannered company clerk, seemingly trustworthy and incapable of becoming the leader of a revolt (he had been Captain Burwell's sole body-guard on numerous pay trips earlier that year to the outlying stations of the Department of Managua and Carazo), held a meeting of various members of the command about 12:30 a.m., October 21st, and formulated plans for a mutiny. Salinas named himself as a colonel.
 
At 6:50 a.m., that same morning while Lieutenants Levonski and Rimes were about to have breakfast, they were surprised by six armed guardias, three having entered the house via the front door and three from the rear. Lieutenant Rimes was not armed; Lieutenant Levonski was disarmed, and both were taken prisoner, marched to the Guardia brig and confined. Expostulations on the part of the officers were silenced with threats of immediate death if they continued talking.
 
Lieutenant Rimes had intended clearing for Ocotal with his patrol at 7:30 a.m., had given the necessary orders for the movement, and,, before going to breakfast, had noted that the men were getting themselves and the animals ready. These men knew nothing about the plans of the mutineers, and were as much surprised at the events which transpired as the two officers. Some attempted to leave town, but were apprehended, and all were forced, through fear of death, to stand watches and to accompany the group when they cleared town later that day.
 
The mutineers at once placed sentinels over all trails leading out of town, also machine guns, destroyed the radio set and threw it into the river, and ordered the inhabitants to close their doors and not to leave their homes. Groups then looted the principal stores and private residences for money and merchandise, and secured animals upon which to carry their stolen goods. Guardia Nacional funds, and the cash, clothing and jewelry of the officers was taken, and all Guardia property, including machine guns, automatic weapons, grenades, ammunition, etc., was gathered together to be taken along. The services of various male civilians were impressed for the loading of the pack animals, and later for help in the crossing of the Rio Coco just below town, in boats.
 
About noon two Marine Corps planes passed over Telpaneca and made a drop of official and personal correspondence. The aviation panels at the station had been permanently laid out, and one of the mutineers, dressed in Lieutenant Rimes' uniform, recovered the drop, so that there was nothing apparent to the pilots that anything irregular was going on.
 
During the entire day the two officers remained in confinement, without food and hourly expecting to be taken out and shot. A record of events and some of their thoughts, written by them, was later found on the cell wall.
 
About 5:00 p.m., the officers were removed from confinement, and taken, with hands tied and lead-rope around their necks, to the river. They were accompanied by all members of the mutinous group, including both the regular garrison and Lieutenant Rimes' patrol, the cargo and animals. At this time they begged the mutineers to shoot them at once, for they feared torture. The crossing of the river was completed at about 7:00 p.m., and many bulky articles were left behind at this point, due either to haste and lack of direction or to insufficient animal transportation. However, all machine guns, automatic weapons and ammunition were taken.
 
The column continued the march all night, and at daybreak arrived at the Polanco ranch near Santo Domingo Valley. A number of the men who did not wish to accompany the mutineers were able to escape during the night, and did so. The following day others deserted the column as the opportunity presented itself. Lieutenants Levonski and Rimes were told by Salinas that they were going to be killed. Salinas, however, was courteous at all times, stood at attention when addressing them, and shared his food and drink with them.
 
One of the men agreed to assist the officers to escape, but lost heart and disappeared from the column alone. Later, about 8:00 p.m., Levonski and Rimes found a favorable moment when an accident to a cargo caused a halt and a separation of the force into two groups. They escaped and rushed precipitously up a side trail and into the brush, becoming separated almost immediately. Levonski sprained his ankle, but both encountered some of the loyal men, and with them returned to Telpaneca, Rimes arriving first.
 
Practically all of the personnel papers of Lieutenant Rimes' patrol, and a few of the original Telpaneca garrison, reported in either Telpaneca or at Palacaguina. The balance continued on and made their way to Honduras, where the arms and ammunition were confiscated, and the men jailed temporarily. They were not returned to Nicaragua.

2.   Excerpts from Roswell Winans, USMC, Patrol Report, Apali, Nic., 28 Oct 1929, RG127/212/1.

... 6. No information at San Juan on our return. Night of the 26th Lt Hooper obtained information to the effect that a man who had been in Telpaneca at the time of the mutiny was out in the country a mile. He was brought in Sunday morning his statement follows:
 
Name Lucio Nulgado - was impressed as a guide at Telpaneca to guide the mutineers to San Juan. The officers were captured Monday at 0700. The people of the town worked all day packing animals with loot. They forced various people to give up about $1000.00 in cash. From 0700 to 1300 all doors were required to be closed. They crossed the Coco at the lower crossing, Mutineers and loot in a boat - swimming the animals. Cusuli trail - decided to go to Santo Domingo. Officers were walking arms tied down to their sides -- necks connected with a rope. They were in the center of the column. Lucio the civilian with them. Went to Santo Domingo -- then to Potreros -- took them all night to get to Potreros -- arrived at 0600 -- Lola Matamoros house is at Potreros -- let him go at Potreros -- returned toward Telpaneca he staid Tuesday night at the house of Adan Melgara. He saw one of the officers returning with some of the Guardia to Telpaneca and heard that the other one had been released also and had returned with more men. He saw them at 1300 Wednesday. The jefe in charge of the mutineers was Salinas -- the second jefe, Navarro -- third jefe was Sedeno. The reason they went so slow the first night was that they had so much cargo. They were twelve hours getting to Potreros -- three hours normal travel from Telpaneca -- they were not drinking -- though they took whiskey from the town -- they had no intention of killing the officers at the time but were taking them to Honduras, the reason that some of them turned back was that even when they left Telpaneca, they were unwilling to go. The guide from Potreros -- he did not know but was probably one of the Polanco brothers, of whom there are three and each of them has a house there. Probably their trail would be via Barillal-Jamisco-Suscallon-Ula. He could give no satisfactory reason why he did not promptly report the movements of the mutineers, but it is believed that he was so glad and grateful to get away with his life as they would just as well have killed him, that he did not wish to make a report or was afraid to. ...

RG127/212/1

3.   Gen. D. C. McDougal to Capt. Wm. W. Scott, Charges and Specifications in the Case of Fernando Larios, First Sergeant, Number 45, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, 3 Dec. 1929, RG127/198/1.

... 1. The above named man will be tried before the Consejo de Guerra General of which you are the Judge Advocate, upon the following charges and specifications. You will notify the president of the court accordingly, inform the accused of the date set for his trial, and summon all witnesses, both for the prosecution and the defense.
 
CHARGE I. (acquitted) [ Premeditated murder of First Lt. Lewis H. Trogler]
 
CHARGE II. (guilty) [ Mutiny against Trogler on Oct 5, 1929 ].
 
CHARGE III. (acquitted) "... did, on or about Oct. 3, 1929, in the Guardia Barracks at the said Telpaneca, use provoking, reproachful, and intimidating words, gestures, and menaces toward Corporal Francisco Miranda, #1863, Guardia Nacional, serving at the Guardia Barracks aforesaid, by saying to the Corporal Francisco Miranda ... "anyone who does not sign this paper with his own blood with go to Eternity," or words to that effect ... [ remainder of specifications not proved ]

RG127/198/1

4.  Newspaper Accounts.   Below appear JPEG images of El Comercio, Managua, with stories treating the Telpaneca mutiny.  Click on thumbnails to view full images.  (As is apparent, the newspapers from the Hemeroteca Nacional Rubén Darío in Managua are badly deteriorated and not all the text is legible; in addition, only select copies exist, meaning that not every day is covered.)

 

El Comercio, Managua, 30 October 1929, p. 1.

El Comercio, Managua, closer-up image of headline, 30 October 1929, p. 1.

Yet another image of the same top-half of p. 1 of 30 Oct. 1929.

"Se Presentaron en Palacagüina Veinte de los Guardias Nacionales que se Fueron de Telpaneca," El Comercio, Managua, 1 November 1929, p. 1.

"Extradición de los Guardias Insurrectos que se Internaron en Honduras," El Comercio, Managua, 8 November 1929, p.1.

 


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