1.  December 1932.  Press clippings.  "25 Die in Nicaragua in Rebel Train Raid," New York Times, 28 Dec. 1932.  "Nicaragua Honors Americans in Guard — Promotes Puller to Rank of Major and Lee to Captaincy for Defeat of Rebels," New York Times, Dec. 29, 1932.  "Moncada Fetes Sacasa," New York Times, Dec. 29, 1932.     "25 DIE IN NICARAGUA IN REBEL TRAIN RAID ¶ 70 Guards, Led by Americans, Rout Band of 250, Saving Captured Rail Crews. ¶ AIR CORPS ORDERED HOME ¶ Marine Fliers Leave for Quantico, Va., Jan. 1 and 2 After Four Years’ Service. ¶ By Tropical Radio to THE NEW YORK TIMES. ¶ MANAGUA, Nicaragua, Dec. 27.—A detachment of seventy Nicaraguan National Guardsmen, officered by eight United States Marines, drove off with heavy casualties an insurgent band which attacked a troop train near Santa Lucia yesterday. The crews of two work trains, on the point of being executed by their rebel captors, were rescued. ¶ In an hour’s heavy fighting, twenty-two rebels and three National Guardsmen were killed and three Guardsmen were wounded. The number of insurgent wounded is reported to have been large. ¶ The Guard detachment had been dispatched over the new railroad from Leon to El Sauce to clear the surrounding country of guerrila [guerrilla] bands in preparation for the formal opening of the line by President Moncada at the end of this month. The train was halted near Santa Lucia by irregulars led by the chieftains Umanzor and Benavides. ¶ The Guardsmen went immediately into action, directed by their commander, First Lieutenant Lewis B. Puller, U. S. M. C., a Virginian and holder of the Navy Cross. His aides were National Guard Lieutenants Lee, Stevens, Snyder, Bunn, Pulver, Hays and Lynch, all marines who have won their spurs in the fighting with Nicaraguan insurgents in the past four and one-half years. ¶ The Guardsmen captured fifty-two pack animals and a quantity of rifles, ammunition and supplies. ¶ While the fighting was going on at Santa Lucia, a National Guard patrol led by native officers drove off another rebel group which was harassing work on the railway near El Sauce. ¶ Marine Fliers Ordered Home. ¶ WASHINGTON, Dec. 27.—Twenty-two Marine Corps airplanes with as many flying officers, accompanied by thirty-nine enlisted men who have helped write a brilliant chapter of air accomplishments during the last four and one-half years, were ordered today to evacuate Nicaragua on Jan. 1 and 2, in compliance with plans to withdraw all marine forces from that country as soon as practicable at the end of the current year. ¶ Five amphibian planes were routed via Belize, British Honduras, Havana, and Miami to Quantico, Va., a total flying distance of 2,482.5 miles, much of it over water. The observation and transport planes of the Aircraft Squadrons attached to the Second Marine Brigade will fly by way of Mexico, Texas, New Orleans and on up the Atlantic Coast. The itinerary of the last two squadrons calls for 3,059 miles between Managua, Nicaragua, and Quantico. Established air lines of the Pan-American Airways will be followed by all three flights, and provisions for refueling and overnight stops en route have been arranged. ¶ While the mass movement of the marine planes is one of the most ambitious ever undertaken by the famed “Leathernecks,” it is in keeping with the outstanding achievements recorded by the aviators since they arrived in Nicaragua on March 1, 1927. A survey of these remarkable flights reveals almost every kind of heroism. The Distinguished Flying Cross has been awarded frequently, but many spectacular pilots have never received decorations because the hazards at first encountered soon became “ordinary” to the aviators. ¶ Daring Air Raid on Sandino. ¶ One of the first tales of daring came from Nicaragua in July, 1927, soon after the marine fliers were sent into action. Two planes were fired upon when they discovered the insurgent General Augusto C. Sandino and his band. They returned to their base and led a flight of five planes, heavily loaded with bombs and machine-gun ammunition, back over the rebel camp and with sweeping and diving attacks piled up a casualty list finally estimated at more than 300. ¶ Secretary of the Navy Adams twice wrote letters commending the entire marine aviation personnel on duty with the Second Brigade. ¶ Two flying crews were temporarily “lost,” one fighting its way out from the jungles in two days, while the crew of the other plane, guided by flying companions, required ten days to reach the outside of the jungles. Terrible suffering on each occasion was revealed in letters of commendation to the crews. Two marine fliers were killed during the search for one of the lost crews. ¶ Marine files bulge with records of bravery and hardships, but officials today merely commented: “It will be nice for those fellows to reach their base at Quantico again; they’ve been away so long the United States will look strange.” ¶ MONCADA FETES SACASA. ¶ Nicaraguan President Holds a Reception for Successor. ¶ Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES. ¶ MANAGUA, Dec. 29.—A large reception was held by President Moncada in the Presidential Palace last night in honor of President-elect Sacasa and his family. ¶ Tomorrow the President will open the railroad connecting Leon and El Sauce. Among those invited to attend the ceremonies is Brig. Gen. Randolph C. Berkeley of the United States Marine Corps. ¶ The rebels are reported to have brought up reinforcements with the intention of interfering with the ceremonies. The National Guard is prepared for eventualities. The local press says Sandino has proposed as one essential of peace that his army become the official army of Nicaragua. ¶ NICARAGUA HONORS AMERICANS IN GUARD ¶ Promotes Puller to Rank of Major and Lee to Captaincy for Defeat of Rebels. ¶ By Tropical Radio to THE NEW YORK TIMES. ¶ MANAGUA, Nicaragua, Dec. 28.—It is reliably reported that the rebel chieftain Benavides was killed and his co-leader Umazon [Umanzor] was wounded in the fight with National Guardsmen whose train the rebels ambushed near Santa Lucia Monday afternoon. The bodies of twenty-five rebels were left on the scene of the clash. ¶ President Moncada today promoted Lieutenant Lewis B. Puller, U. S. M. C., to the rank of Major and Gunnery Sergeant William A. Lee to the rank of Captain in the Nicaraguan National Guard. ¶ An American veteran of the War with Spain and the World War, whose name is given as Hill, and a German named Crennel were among the trainmen rescued by the Guard detachment as the insurgents were on the point of executing them Monday. ¶ Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES. ¶ WASHINGTON, Dec. 28.—The Navy Department today gave out the following list of members of the United States Marine Corps who participated in Monday’s clash with Nicaraguan insurgents near Santa Lucia. ¶ First Lieutenant Lewis B. Puller of West Point, Va.; Gunnery Sergeant William A. Lee of Haverhill, Mass.; Sergeant W. W. Stevens of Eudora, Ark.; Corporal Cecil D. Snyder of Lockhart, Tex.; Corporal B. M. Dunn of Chicago; Gunnery Sergeant William F. Pulver of Burlington, Wash.; Corporal Virgil Hays of Inglewood, Cal.; and Pharmacist’s Mate Thomas M. Lynch of Winston Salem, N. C. Lieutenant Puller was a Captain and the others were Lieutenants in the Nicaraguan National Guard."

2.  January 1, 1933.  G-2 Intelligence Report, "Probable Enemy Intentions," Hq. 2nd Brigade, Managua.    "NICARAGUA – Political. ¶ 3020 ¶ Probable Enemy Intentions. ¶ Dr. Juan Bautista Sacasa and Dr. Rodolfo Espinosa were inaugurated as President and Vice President, respectively, of the Republic of Nicaragua on January 1, 1933. ¶ From latest reports it appears that organized banditry has ceased all operations until indirect negotiations with the new administration have been attempted. It is almost impossible to predict just what will be the outcome of such negotiations. From sources in the confidence of the new administration it is learned that Dr. Sacasa intends to have absolutely nothing to do with any agreement with organized banditry and will use all means at his disposal to suppress it by force. On the other hand, there is considerable talk to the effect that an agreement will be made with organized banditry, granting them various concessions and guaranteeing them freedom from molestation if they will lay down their arms. ¶ There is no doubt, however, of the feeling of the property owners and the better class citizens, who are outspoken in their pessimistic predictions for the future. Many of them actually doubted the withdrawal of the Marines up to the very day of the evacuation. The press, generally speaking, is overjoyed with the evacuation of the Marines. The lower classes and persons who do not own any property are also highly elated because of the evacuation. ¶ (Hq. Second Marine Brigade, Managua, Nicaragua, Jan. 1, 1933 – Confidential.)"

3.  December 31, 1932.  Extracts from the report of Major L. B. Puller, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua to the Jefe Director, Guardia Nacional.     "Extracts from the report of Major L. B. Puller, Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua to the Jefe Director, Guardia Nacional De Nicaragua, dated 31 December, 1932. ¶ 1. While proceeding from Managua to El Sauce via train on 26 December, 1932, in accordance with reference (a), the train was ambushed at 1600 near Punta Rieles by a bandit group under the command of Umanzor. This group numbered two hundred and fifty (250) men and were armed with one (1) Lewis Machine Gun, two (2) Browning Automatic Rifles, four (4) to six (6) Thompson Sub-Machine Guns, rifles, pistols, dynamite bombs, and well supplied with ammunition. ¶ 3. The ambush was ill timed and the patrol detrained and went into action, with the loss of one killed and one wounded. Two more men were killed and two more were wounded later on during the fight. Thirty-one (31) bandits were killed and their bodies left on the field. The patrol remained in El Sauce and the vicinity until the afternoon of the 30th. December and reports were brought in to the effect that the bandits have not reformed their group but are traveling north in small groups of about five and many of them are wounded. Positive information was received that the Jefes Umanzor and Morales were wounded and were carried off about the middle of the engagement. The Jefe Benavides and Umanzor’s adjutant were killed. The fire fight lasted one hour and five minutes. The patrol was handicapped by having to guard the train and a shipment of rifles and ammunition during the fight. The bandits scattered and fled in all directions after they were driven from their positions. ¶ 4. The patrol captured 63 riding animals with saddles, bridles and pads, 8 Krag rifles, 1 38 cal. revolver, over 700 rounds of ammunition, blankets, clothing, hammocks and other loot. Reliable information was received that 15 to 20 rifles and many pistols were found by dearches from El Sauce who hid them and failed to turn them over to the Guardia Nacional. ¶ 9. Umanzor did not know that the patrol numbered 64 men and 8 officers and only sent 100 men to begin the fight; in a very few minutes he put his remaining 150 men in. ¶ 10. The conduct of the officers and men in this engagement was exemplary. ¶ /s/ L.B. Puller."

4.  December 27, 1932.  Telegram from NICELECT to OPNAV re "Captain Lewis B. Puller, Lts. William A. Lee, Ward W. Stevens, Cecil D. Snyder, Bennie M. Bun, William F. Pulver, Virgil Hays, Thomas M. Lynch & a patrol of 60 had contact with group of 250 bandits jefes Umanzor & Benavides".     "FROM: NICELECT ¶ ACTION: OPNAV ¶ INFO: MARCORPS COMSPERON ¶ 8627 CAPTAIN LEWIS B PULLAR [PULLER] LTS WILLIAM A LEE WARD W STEVENS CECIL D SNYDER BENNIE M BUN [BUNN] WILLIAM F PULVER VIRGIL HAYS THOMAS M LYNCH AND PATROL OF SIXTY HAD CONTACT WITH GROUP OF TWO HUNDRED FIFTY BANDITS JEFES UMANZOR AND BENAVIDES W SIXTEEN HUNDRED TWENTYSIX DECEMBER W POINT OFF RAILS NEAR SANTA LUCIA ONE SIX NINE DASH TWO EIGHT EIGHT BANDITS AMBUSHED TRAIN UNDER WHICH GUARDIA PATROL WAS PROCEEDING TO EL SAUCE PERIOD FIGHT LASTED OVER ONE HOUR BANDIT CASUALTIES TWENTY KILLED AND INDICATIONS OF MANY WOUNDED GUARDIA CASUALTIES THREE KILLED AND THREE WOUNDED SEVERAL RAILROAD WORKMEN KILLED BY BANDITS CAPTURED FIFTYTWO ANIMALS WITH SADDLES FOUR KRAG RIFLES ONE PISTOL QUANTITY OF AMMUNITION AND MANY MISCELLANEOUS ARTICLES BANDITS WERE ROUTED AND FLED IN DISROUTE TO THE WEST PERIOD ¶ 169-288 ¶ Coordinates to Marine Corps ¶ Map of Nicaragua."

5.  December 28, 1932.  Telegram from Nicaraguan National Guard Detachment.     "FROM NICARAGUAN NATIONAL GUARD DETACHMENT ¶ ACTION OPNAV ¶ INFORM: MARCORPS COMSPERON ¶ 8628 MY 8627 1030 FIVE ADDITIONAL DEAD BANDITS FOUND ON FIELD AND SIX MORE ANIMALS CAPTURED MAKING TOTAL OF TWENTYFIVE KNOWN BANDITS KILLED AND FIFTYEIGHT ANIMALS CAPTURED PLUS OTHER ARTICLES MENTIONED IN PREVIOUS MESSAGE VERY STRONG RUMORS CURRENT THAT UMANZOR WAS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED AND BENAVIDES KILLED 0830"

6.  December 25, 1932.  Press clipping:  "Sandino Offers To End Strife, Sacasa Hears," U.P.      "Sandino Offers To End Strife, Sacasa Hears ¶ Nicaraguan Insurrectionist Reported to Have Submitted Peace Proposal ¶ Would Reform Treaties ¶ Asks National Convention Be Called to Ratify Plan ¶ By The United Press ¶ MANAGUA, Nicaragua, Dec. 24—Are the two former companion revolutionists, President-elect Juan B. Sacasa and General Augustino C. Sandino, about to declare peace and end the insurrectionist turmoil that has kept Nicaragua in an uproar for five years and cost the lives of scores of United States marines and hundreds of Nicaraguans? ¶ Conflicting reports of tentative negotiations between representatives of General Sandino, famed insurrectionist, and President-elect Sacasa were circulated here this week. General Horacio Portocarrera [Portocarrero], one of Sandino’s men, was reported from Mexico City to have begun negotiations with Dr. Sacasa for a Christmas truce that might be extended indefinitely providing General Sandino is given a post in the new government. ¶ Outlines Peace Terms ¶ On the other hand, Dr. Pedro Zepeda, General Sandino’s foreign representative, who is also stationed at Mexico City, declared that his chief would agree to peace only if Dr. Sacasa would (1) reject foreign intervention in Nicaraguan interior affairs, including customs, railroads and banks; (2) reorganize the Guardia Nacional with all officers to be native Nicaraguans; (3) convoke a constitutional convention to make political and social reforms and (4) convoke a national convention for the purpose of reforming or denouncing all treaties since 1915 and also permitting the Sandinistas to continue as an organized army until the terms of peace are carried out. ¶ Fought Side by Side ¶ Dr. Sacasa, who himself has held the rank of general in revolutionary uprisings, has indicated that he will force a quick termination to guerilla warfare in northern Nicaragua by peaceful or warlike means when he assumes office January 1, 1933. Withdrawal of United States marines stationed here on January 2 will leave Nicaragua without foreign armed forces for the first time in many years. ¶ General Sandino fought side by side with Dr. Sacasa, then a general, in the revolt against General Emiliano Chamorro, which ended with the peace treaty of Tipitapa."

7.  December 16, 1932.  G-2 Translation of "Sandino, Honduras and Nicaragua," editorial in La Noticia, Managua, Nov. 29, 1932, Alex A. Cohen, for & in the absence of the Military Attaché, Costa Rica, p. 1.     "G-2 Report. ¶ 3,850-a. ¶ NICARAGUA (Political) ¶ Subject: Status of Relations with Foreign Countries. ¶ Under the caption “SANDINO, HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA”, the following editorial was published in “La Noticia” of Managua under date of November 29, 1932. ¶ “Colindres and Umanzor, commanders of Sandinista forces who were menacing the cities of León and Chinandega, have gone to Honduras to join the revolution against Carías. This notice was furnished us yesterday by the national radio news service. ¶ “This report, if ocrrect [correct], is a source of alarm for Central America, and especially for Nicaragua. Should the revolution win in Honduras, Sandino will be strengthened and Umanzor and Colindres will return to Nicaragua. If, on the other hand, the Honduras revolution is defeated, the Sandinista commanders will re enter Nicaragua with many of the defeated people with their arms. Should anarchy commence to reign in Honduras, the consequences will still be worse. ¶ “A Central American outbreak, of a size which can not yet be appreciated, might be the outcome. El Salvador backs Carías. Rivalries exist between El Salvador and Guatemala. Nicaragua, by no means can remain indifferent, as it will be as much affected as Honduras itself. The fire now being kindled in our sister republic might break out not only with its own smoldering flames, but also with those smoldering in the Segovias. ¶ “This is the moment in which we Nicaraguans are obligated, by instinct, to accept the reality of the very grave problem. The Liberal Party, on which the immediate responsibility for the situation falls, can not pass it up, but should prepare to confront it with valor. The Conservative Party, which has contracted the grave responsibility of peace, also should consider this question for reasons of its own conservation and patriotism. This is the first occasion that the Conservative Party is put on trial for sincere cooperation towards national peace. ¶ “What should we do? ¶ “The reply is not difficult. Let us prepare for the upheaval, if it comes, so it may not catch us unawares. The Government of Nicaragua can not remain with four rifles, so to speak, awaiging [awaiting] what may come with folded arms, while agitators are sowing the seeds of anarchy. ¶ “Central America is menaced and the Government of Nicaragua, as one of the parties first interested to ward off and prevent the conflagration, is the one called upon to initiate in its internal as well as in its foreign relations, a movement of salvation.” ¶ From: M. A. Costa Rica ¶ Report No. 1880 ¶ Date: December 16, 1932. . . . "

8.  December 16, 1932.  G-2 Translation of "Sandino, Honduras and Nicaragua," editorial in La Noticia, Managua, Nov. 29, 1932, Alex A. Cohen, for & in the absence of the Military Attaché, Costa Rica, p. 2.     " . . . G-2 Report. ¶ 3,850-a. ¶ COMMENT ON ABOVE BY OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHÉ. ¶ In the opinion of the writer, there is a good deal of truth in the above editorial. At no time, during the past ten years, have relations between the republics of Central America passed through a stage as critical as the one through which they will pass during the next few months. The following are some of the more important problems confronting the Governments concerned: ¶ 1. Communism. Principally in El Salvador. Smoldering in Guatemala and Honduras and on the increase, although not dangerously as yet in Costa Rica. ¶ 2. Changes in Government. Honduras and Nicaragua. ¶ 3. Revolution. Honduras. ¶ 4. Non-recognition. El Salvador. ¶ 5. Banditry. Honduras and Nicaragua. ¶ 6. Jealousy and Suspicion. Against President Ubico. ¶ 7. Boundary Dispute. Between Guatemala and Honduras. Final decision to be announced shortly. ¶ 8. The Washington Treaties. Move by Costa Rica to denounce Treaties. ¶ 9. The Economic Crisis. Affecting all five republics. ¶ 10. The idea prevalent that Moncada will retain control of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua after January 1st. ¶ 11. A rather indefinite sympathetic alignment along political lines between Honduras and El Salvador (Carías and the Martínez Government) – Conservative – as opposed to Guatemala and Nicaragua along Liberal lines. ¶ What the year 1933 will bring to Central America, no one can foretell. But it appears certain that the guiding hand of the United States will be required on more than one occasion. ¶ Source: As stated and personal observation. ¶ FOR AND IN THE ABSENCE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE: ¶ Alex A. Cohen. ¶ From: M. A. Costa Rica ¶ Report No. 1880 ¶ Date: December 16, 1932."

9.  December 16, 1932.  G-2 Translation of article in Excelsior, Mexico City, December 12, 1932, "Mexico Is Asked Not To Recognize President Sacasa," Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 1.     "G-2 Report ¶ 3850-a ¶ MEXICO ¶ POLITICAL ¶ SUBJECT: Foreign Relations, Etc. ¶ Relations with Foreign Countries: ¶ SANDINO and the Nicaraguan Situation. ¶ 1. Following is translation of an article which appeared in the “Excelsior” of December 12, 1932, entitled “Mexico is asked not to recognize President Sacasa”. ¶ Señor David Rodriguez Galiano, in charge of Foreign Relations of the provisional Government of Nicaragua, presided over by General Colindres and sustained by the forces of General Sandino, has addressed a communication to Señor Téllez, Secretary of Foreign Relations of our country, in which he asks Mexico not to recognize the Sacasa Government. ¶ The communication reads as follows: ¶ “Las Segovias, December 3, 1932. ¶ “Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Mexico, ¶ “Señor Ministro: ¶ “Information from the Capital of Honduras has reached this mountainous region of Nicaragua, of the report given out in that Capital by an ex-officer of General Sanino’s army, José de Parédes, which is untrue, and which is explicable by the manner in which Parédes left the ranks,- almost a deserter. ¶ It is not true, Mr. Minister, that the Provisional Government of Nicaragua, presided over by General don Juan Gregorio Colindres, by appointment of the ‘Ejercito Defensor de la Soberanía de Nicaragua’, is in any difficulty whatever; on the contrary, it is consolidating in the opinion of Nicaragua, although timidly at first,- especially now that it has been discovered that Señor Sacasa signed a secret pact with Admiral Woodward of the American Navy, by which he promised to re-establish American officers in the Guard of this country, with manifest lack of patriotism, which makes impossible all recognition on the part of the free forces of the nation, aside from the fact of the elections carried out by the foreign marines in the section of the Republic under his control. ¶ “Consequently I ask, in the name of the ‘Gobierno Libertador de Nicaragua’ and of the Chief of the Army, General Sandino, that the illustrious Government of Mexico refuse its recognition to the spurious regime about to be inaugurated by Señor Sacasa. ¶ “At the same time, my Government begs to remind you of the well-known case of the disloyalty of Señor Sacasa toward the Republic of Mexico. ¶ “I remain, Your obedient servant, ¶ “David Rodriguez Galiano, Encargado de las “Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Provisional de Nicaragua.” ¶ From: M.A.Mexico. ¶ Report No. 4313. ¶ Date: Dec. 16, 1932. . . . "

10.  December 16, 1932.  G-2 Translation of article in Excelsior, Mexico City, December 12, 1932, "Mexico Is Asked Not To Recognize President Sacasa," Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 2.     " . . . G-2 Report ¶ 3850-a ¶ Robert E. Cummings, ¶ Captain, Infantry (DOL) ¶ Acting Military Attaché. ¶ Per: M.B.Pattin, Clerk. ¶ Source: As stated. ¶ From: M.A.Mexico. ¶ Report No. 4313. ¶ Date: Dec. 16, 1932."

11.  December 15, 1932.  G-2 Report on Current Situation, Alex A. Cohen, Military Attaché, Costa Rica, p. 1.      "G-2 Report ¶ NICARAGUA (Political) ¶ Subject: Current Situation. ¶ The matter of greatest importance in Nicaragua today is the process of turning over the posts in the Guardia Nacional to native officers. ¶ This procedure is a different one at any time but to do it in the field, during active operations, and at a time when the whole country is passing through a change of government, with its attendant difficulties, is hazardous in the extreme. Practically all of the higher offices in the Guardia are being given to politicians and men of influence, who have not received any training in the Guardia under American supervision. Just how long a well-trained organization can survive the influence of untrained or partially trained commanding officers is not a matter of conjecture. Disentegration [Disintegration] and inefficiency will set in immediately. The younger “American trained” officers, will soon become jealous of the higher ranking officers of little or no combat experience. In short, the wonderful work done by the Marines in training the Guardia, in which duty about twenty-five American lives were sacrificed, will soon be wasted. ¶ There are many rumors circulating about, concerning the secret pact said to exist between Ubico and Moncada. These rumors claim that at the last minute Moncada will take personal command of the Guardia and, under pretext of a revolution or of fighting Sandino, will refuse to turn it over to his successor. At the head of the Guardia he can regain control of the country. ¶ Although the Americans retain (in theory) command of the Guardia until it is turned over to President Sacasa on January 1st,--in practice this practically impossible due to the nature of their orders. In effect these orders stated: ¶ “You will evacuate Nicaragua as soon after the inauguration of the new President (January 1st) as practicable, but in any case not later than January 2nd.” ¶ To carry out these orders most of the Americans must actually turn over their commands many days prior to January 1st. If anything breaks between the time the lower commanders turn over and January 1st, it will find the American Guardia commander in command of an organization over which he has very little actual control. ¶ From: M.A. Costa Rica ¶ Report No: 1,869 ¶ Date: December 15, 1932. . . . "

12.  December 15, 1932.  G-2 Report on Current Situation, Alex A. Cohen, Military Attaché, Costa Rica, p. 2.     " . . . G-2 Report. ¶ The Sandino situation is vague and seems to be as far from settlement as ever. President Moncada is against any compromise with the “bandit”, but it is believed that Sacasa will adopt a more conciliatory attitude and endeavor to pursuade [persuade] Sandino, by peaceful means, to lay down his arms. Rumors persist that Sandino is having trouble with some of his chiefs. ¶ The question of trouble breaking out among the different factions, after the Marines leave, has as many different answers as there are people in Nicaragua. The mass of the people seem to think trouble inevitable. This will start when the hundreds of disappointed office seekers begin clamoring to their different chiefs for the spoils of victory. On the other hand the more thoughtful people believe that there exists a sincere desire for peace and tranquility on the part of the more responsible people in the country and that these citizens will be able to keep the ship of state on an even keel. ¶ Source: Personal knowledge. ¶ A. R. Harris, ¶ Major, G.S., M.A. ¶ From: M.A. Costa Rica ¶ Report No: 1,869 ¶ Date: December 15, 1932."

13.  December 11, 1932.  Telegram from American Legation, Tegucigalpa, to 2nd Brigade USMC, Managua, to COMSPERON.     "(COPY) ¶ From: Second Brigade, U.S.M.C., Managua. ¶ To: COMSPERON (Commander Special Service Squadron). ¶ 0012 ¶ The following telegram has been received from the American Legation in Tegucigalpa: ¶ “The following telegram has been sent to the Department December 11, 4 P.M.: Despite the assurances of the Government of Guatemala that it would not allow him to return to Honduras, General Jose Maria Reina arrived yesterday from Chaaperico at Amapala where the military commandant General Andres Garcia went over to the Revolution. This creates a serious situation for Amapala has not been taken by force within the past sixty years and it is now well garrisoned munitioned. There is a large accumulation of merchandise there cosigned to foreign merchants in Tegucigalpa, among it considerable from the United States to P.A. Glougher and Company of which the manager and part owner is George A. Hadie, an American citizen, and also a substantial quantity of dynamite and consignment of equipment for the New York and Honduras RO Mining Company. Mr. A. Hadie and President Majia Colindres have requested that an American warship make a call there. I told them that my government was opposed to sending war vessels to foreign ports except for the protection of American lives and property in imminent danger; that it would not send one to protect merchandise alone and that there are no Americans at Amapala. The President stated that some years ago a warship was sent to Amapala when the island was threatened during a revolution and therefore urged me to ask the Department if it would not make an exception in this case, interests of American and other foreign property. Amapala is a port for American vessels, notably those of the Grace Line and Dollar Line. President states that Reina has asked Sandino for arms but Sandino’s secretary here at Mexican Legation told President Sandino refused. I question reliability of this information. (Pafion) ¶ “Repeated to Comperon [Comsperon], all Central American legations, Panama and North Coast consuls repeat to Comsperon."

14.  December 1932.  Press clippings:  "Sandino Drives Out Insurgent Who Set Up His Own Republic," New York Times (Dec 8); "Sandino Reported Asking Peace Now That Marines Are Leaving," New York Tribune (Dec 21).    "Sandino Drives Out Insurgent Who Set Up His Own Republic ¶ Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES. ¶ MANAGUA, Nicaragua, Dec. 7.—The rebel leader Juan Gregorio Colindres has been attacked and defeated by insurgent troops under Augusto Sandino, according to reliable reports received here today. Colindres recently set up a “republic” in Segovias, Northern Nicaragua, with himself as “President.” ¶ Hitherto Colindres had cooperated with Sandino. He is reported to have escaped after the battle with the latter and to have fled to Honduras, of which country he is a native. ¶ Colindres has been in active rebellion in Nicaragua for months. In July he and another rebel chieftain led an attack on a small patrol of Nicaraguan guardsmen, killing one and wounding three. Last month a state of siege was declared in the Departments of Leon and Chinandega on account of his activities. ¶ Sandino Reported Asking Peace Now That Marines Are Leaving ¶ By The United Press ¶ MEXICO CITY, Dec. 20.—Tentative negotiations for the surrender of General Agustino Sandino, Nicaraguan rebel leader, have been begun by agents for Sandino, reliable Nicaraguan sources said here today. ¶ It was proposed that Sandino abandon his armed campaign soon after Dr. Juan B. Sacasa’s inauguration as President of Nicaragua on January 1, if reasonable terms could be arranged. The offer was submitted to Dr. Sacasa through General Portocarrero, whom Sandino last summer named “provisional president” of Nicaragua, the reports said. ¶ Although Sandino has said he would never recognize an administration voted into office “under the guns of the United States marines,” it was believed that withdrawal of the marines would enable Sandino to represent his surrender as a victory. He had sworn to fight until the last “invader” had left Nicaraguan soil, and the marines are leaving now. Evacuation is expected to be complete by January 2. ¶ If terms are arranged, it is assumed that a government position would be offered to Sandino, and his followers would receive amnesty. Dr. Sacasa is understood here to be determined to end the civil war either by negotiation or force after taking office. ¶ Marines in Nicaragua Since 1926 ¶ The American marines returned to Nicaragua in 1926, after revolutionary disturbances and have dominated the country since. In 1927 Henry L. Stimson, as person representative of President Coolidge, induced all factions except that of Sandino to lay down their arms and agree to abide by the results of an American-supervised election. Sandino and his ultra-patriotic followers have fought intermittently against the marines and the Nicaraguan Guardia Nacional, chiefly in the mountainous north."

15.  December 6, 1932.   G-2 Translation of article in Excelsior, Mexico City, "Sandino Will Not Abandon the Fight" (Dec 3), Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City.     "G-2 Report ¶ 3850-a ¶ MEXICO ¶ POLITICAL ¶ SUBJECT: Foreign Relations, etc. ¶ Relations with Foreign Countries: ¶ SANDINO and the Nicaraguan Situation. ¶ 1. Following is a translation of an article which appeared in the “Excelsior” of December 3, 1932, entitled “Sandino Will Not Abandon the Fight.” ¶ SANDINO WILL NOT ABANDON THE FIGHT ¶ In connection with news items recently published, Dr. Zepeda, General Sandino’s representative in Mexico, has issued the following statement: ¶ “The enemies of Nicaragua’s cause, who have let no opportunity pass to misrepresent the high ideals behind General Sandino’s struggle, attempting to distort what is only the sincere desire of a people to govern themselves, yesterday reported the defender of Nicaragua’s rights as heading a revolution in Honduras, in order to stir up questions of an internal nature; and now they imagine him, not as still in Honduras fighting fantastic battles, but in the Segovian forests busying himself with disarming the brave and invincible General Colindres for a supposed insubordination. ¶ “Those who, first surprised and later astonished at the extraordinary discipline of our army, the cruel tests to which it has been put during six years of fighting and the strict selection which has been carried out in our ranks,- they know that neither General Juan Gregorio Colindres is capable of a censurable act, nor is any member of the now glorious organization capable of thinking for a moment of abandoning General Sandino, when everyone knows there must exist fundamental motives why the supreme chief of our army should refuse to enter into agreements with those who, up to now have only offered public posts and sinecures, forgetting the basic cause for which he has struggled and will keep on struggling while the so-called public men of our country are not seeking a way to guarantee liberty and autonomy of the nation. ¶ “The reports transmitted from Tegucigalpa and attributed to Captain José de Paredes, are incongruous and untruthful. I consider that they slander Captain de Paredes himself, because he, being one of the officers who has most highly distinguished himself on the battlefields, it would not be strnge [strange] that our enemies would wish, with such imputations, to stain the brilliant service-record of this sincere and loyal friend of our fatherland. If it should be true that Captain de Paredes did pass through Tegucigalpa en route to this city, the proper correction will be made in due time, because I am aware that the good name and prestige of this young officer demand that the truth be told concerning the feeling and thought of the “Ejercito Defensor de la Soberania Nacional de Nicaragua”, to which he belongs and to which he has rendered important and valuable services.” ¶ Robert E. Cummings, Capt. Inf. DOL ¶ Acting Military Attaché. ¶ Source: As stated. ¶ C/p ¶ From: M.A. Mexico. ¶ Report No. 4293. ¶ Date: Dec. 6, 1932."

16.  December 2, 1932.  G-2 Translation of article in Excelsior, Mexico City, "Nicaragua is Still Under Yankee Control" (Dec 1), Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City.     "G-2 Report ¶ 3850-a ¶ MEXICO ¶ POLITICAL ¶ SUBJECT: Foreign Relations, etc. ¶ Relations with Foreign Countries: ¶ SANDINO and the Nicaraguan Situation. ¶ 1. Following is a translation of an article which appeared in the “Excelsior” of December 1, 1932, entitled “Nicaragua is Still Under Yankee Control.” ¶ Dr. Zepeda Issues a Statement á [à] propos of the Withdrawal of 300 Marines. ¶ In connection with the latest news from Managua, published exclusively be [by] EXCELSIOR, regarding the 300 American marines who have embarked in the Nicaraguan port of Corinto,- and that General Sandino has sent part of his effectives to fight in Honduras with the revolutionaries there (which is alarming the Managua press),- we approached Dr. Pedro José Zepeda, general representative of the “Ejercito Libertador Nicaragüense”, and in our interview he made the following statement: ¶ “For those who follow closely the unhappy events in my country, the withdrawal of 300 marines has no importance whatever when it is remembered that these are only a part of the 600 which were sent to Nicaragua to exercise greater pressure in the electoral farce of November 6th. Of the Military effectives which have been directly fighting against our army, not a single one of the marines are leaving. Therefore, there is no real reason for rejoicing yet because the people of Nicaragua are still under the iron heel of foreign domination. ¶ “Regarding the alleged participation by General Sandino, or our army, in the internal affairs now agitating public opinion in Honduras, I can emphatically state that the high ideals and purposes of our cause would not permit us to meddle in the domestic affairs of any of the Central American Republics; and General Sandino and the “Ejercito Defensor de la Soberanía Nacional de Nicaragua” would only intervene in defense of the dignity and autonomy of any Latin-American country in case foreign powers attempted to take action in the solution of problems which concern only the nationals of the country itself. ¶ “When, some months ago, General Sandino warned the Government of Honduras to respect the boundary between our countries, it was on the supposition that Honduras was permitting North American forces to cross through its territory and thus attack Sandino’s rearguard. If this has not happened, however, the Government and people of Honduras may rest assured that our supreme chief, General Sandino, and our Army, are and will be, respectful of the sovereignty and integrity of Honduran territory.” ¶ Robert E. Cummings, Capt. Inf. DOL ¶ Acting Military Attaché ¶ Source: As stated. ¶ C/p ¶ From: M.A.Mexico. ¶ Report. No. 4286. ¶ Date: Dec. 2, 1932."

17.  December 1, 1932.  Confidential G-2 Intelligence Report on Sandino Situation, U.S. Electoral Mission, Managua, p. 1.     "NICARAGUA Political. ¶ Sandino Situation. ¶ 3020 ¶ As outlined in the report dated November 1, covering the month of October, the situation existing in parts of Nicaragua on the eve of the national election was disquieting. The populous Departments of Leon and Chinandega were seriously threatened by bandit activities, and particularly by a state of nervous tension prevailing through all classes of the populace. The Guardia Nacional sent the cadets of the Military Academy into these two Departments and all available men were put into the field on active patrolling during the week preceding election day. As a consequence, the bandit groups that had been operating in those Departments moved out and confidence was restored among the people. Election day passed quietly and the voting, though measurably affected by the recent disturbances, was, under the circumstances, highly satisfactory. Out of a registration of 28,536 for the Departments of Leon and Chinandega, 23,801 votes were cast. Though a few small bandit groups have been reported from time to time, no contacts have taken place in these Departments during the month of November. In certain other Departments of the Republic there were several spasmodic demonstrations on the part of the bandits during the five days of November preceding election day. In Nueva Segovia, an attack was made on the town of Jicaro on November 2 and patrols operating in the field had three light brushes with bandit groups. In Jinotega, a group attacked the town of La Concordia on the night of November 2. Scattering shots were fired into the town of San Rafael on the nights of November 3, 4 and 5. A patrol was ambushed on the road from Yali to Concordia on November 3, and a patrol contacted a small group at Biagual on November 3. On the same day, a Guardia patrol from Cabo Gracias had a contact with a bandit group on the lower Coco River. All were relatively minor affairs but sufficient to intimidate many voters and prevent their appearance at the polls on November 6. ¶ On election day, a Guardia patrol contacted a bandit group in eastern Nueva Segovia and a group entered the town of Yali at 9 p.m., but were quickly driven off without any known casualties on either side. Elsewhere no disturbances of any note were reported on election day. The active work of the security forces before and on election day effectively prevented the bandits from exercising any effect on the general results of the election. ¶ Since election day, bandit activity has declined notably. Some minor skirmishes have been reported from the Departments of Jinotega and one from Esteli but with small groups in every case. ¶ Just what position Sandino will take, now that the elections have passed and the Liberals have won by a large margin, has not been made clear by an information so far received. A copy of a proclamation signed by Sandino dated September 15 was secured by the Guardia in Esteli on November 7, in which he stated that under no conditions would he abide by the result of the November elections, and that on the withdrawal of the Marines, he would continue his operations until a new election is held without any American supervision. However, there are recent indications that Sandino is willing to modify his pretentions. ¶ Since the elections the sentiment that was becoming noticeable for an agreement with Sandino, has, in a sense, crystallized. Managua papers of November 19 carried reports of a joint meeting of the Executive Committees of the Liberal and Conservative factions at which it was agreed to send commissions to treat with Sandino. A commission was named to represent each party: Crisanto Sacasa, first cousin of the President Elect, for the Liberals, and Dr. David Stadthagen, for the Conservatives. Presumably these commissioners will be given definite powers and instructions by the Government to treat with Sandino. It appears that informal discussions are now under way as a basis for final negotiations, as several persons, known to be influential in Sandinism, have recently entered Nicaragua, among them Fernando Larias, Manuel Balladares, and Dr. Alejandro Cerda. . . . "

18.  December 1, 1932.  Confidential G-2 Intelligence Report on Sandino Situation, U.S. Electoral Mission, Managua, p. 2.     " . . . Some publicity has been gained by the so-called University students in a movement to send a peace delegation to Sandino. An office has been opened and contributions are being solicited to pay the expenses of a mission to Sandino. ¶ On November 22, the President issued a decree placing the Departments of Nueva Segovia, Esteli, and Jinotega under a state of siege. Reasons for this are not apparent. These Departments are reported as being more tranquil during the last half of November than they have been at any other time in the last two years. ¶ The Guardia Nacional has entered the period of transition from American to Nicaraguan control. The President has made 36 appointments of officers to fill the higher ranks in the Guardia Nacional. Thirty-three have been sworn in during November. These appointments were made from a list of nominees proposed by the President Elect, and are supposed to be evenly divided among Liberals and Conservatives. A Jefe Director with the rank of Major General, 6 Colonels, 8 Majors, and 21 Captains have been appointed. General Anastacio Somoza, a Liberal, and Colonel Gustavo Abauanza, a Liberal, have been designated as Jefe Director and Chief of Staff respectively. The newly designated Jefe Director has already made assignments of the new appointees. All staff Departments, command of areas and departments, and second-in-command in areas and departments will be filled by the newly appointed officers. Already a great deal of dissatisfaction has been manifested among the Nicaraguan officers who have been through the Academy and some of whom are now being promoted to captains. Some of the newly appointed officers in Headquarters Staff have entered on instructional duty at Headquarters. The initial attitude of some of these officers is significant and hardly augurs well for the future. A tendency can be noted toward impatience with American administrative methods and a lack of appreciation of orderly and methodical office management. Such a tendency is not unusual under the conditions -- of a civilian group taking over control of a highly organized military force. However, impatience with an administrative system which they do not understand and which they regard with little sympathy, may easily provoke sweeping changes that will jeopardize the integrity of an organization that is now a highly efficient and capable force. ¶ Some revolutionary activity has been reported from the border sections of Honduras during the month. Several reports have been received indicating a movement of bandit groups from Nicaragua into Honduras presumably to participate in the revolution in that country. As the month closes, rumors are numerous in Managua that the Sandinistas are taking a very active part in the Honduran trouble, that some 600 of them have occupied several border towns such as Danli and San Marcos de Colon, and that the border country across from Nueva Segovia is wholly in the hands of Sandino. The situation on the border country is at the moment obscure and no data is at hand to justify an estimate of the probable effect of the revolution in Honduras on the bandit situation in Nicaragua. ¶ The Marine security detachments in Rivas, Juigalpa, Leon, Matagalpa, and Chinandega were withdrawn immediately after elections day. The Guardia Nacional has discharged practically all the auxiliaries which were enlisted for the electoral period and now is essentially down to the strength of June 1. ¶ The military situation in Nicaragua at the close of November is, on the whole, satisfactory. Banditry has declined very noticeably, the two historic parties appear to be on better terms than in many years; a highly organized, efficient and reasonably adequate military force is in process of being turned over to the Nicaraguan Government and the country is more peaceful than it has been in months. Banditry or Sandinism is not extinguished by any means, but, at the moment, it appears to be more of a political than a military problem for the country. . . . "

19.  December 1, 1932.  Confidential G-2 Intelligence Report on Sandino Situation, U.S. Electoral Mission, Managua, p. 3.   " . . . On November 29, the Secretaria Privada de la Presidencia issued an official declaration as follows: ¶ (Translation) ¶ “With grief, the President has read the various articles of literature, written by Nicaraguan citizens, which eulogize Sandino and his lamentable work. The President considers such literature as subversive and consequently he will prosecute if such writings are repeated in the same form and manner. The Government also will proceed against Sandino agents, who, shielded by the amnesty decree, have entered the country. The President does not wish the so-called Communism for his country nor the war between classes which it represents.” ¶ (Confidential Intelligence Report, U.S. Electoral Mission, Managua, Nicaragua, December 1, 1932.)"

20.  December 1, 1932.  G-2 Intelligence Report on Sandino Situation - Enemy Suppy and Equipment, Hq. Guardia Nacional, Managua.     "NICARAGUA – Political. ¶ 3020 ¶ Enemy Supply and Equipment. ¶ No change has occurred in the source of the bulk of the bandit supply of ammunition, i.e. Honduras. ¶ The bandits were well supplied with ammunition during the last week in October and the first few days of November, but expended the major portion of it in contacts during that time. Since election day (November 6), the larger groups have apparently been practically out of ammunition as they have avoided contact with guardia patrols whenever possible. ¶ The revolution now in progress in Honduras has unquestionably made it extremely difficult for the bandits to obtain ammunition of all types for the reason that it is in demand for local use. ¶ Food is no real problem for the bandits as they continue to live on the country as they operate. They also continue the practice of forcing contributions from property owners upon threats of destruction of property for non-compliance. ¶ Following information was received from one Dr. Alejandro Cerda, who has been residing in Danli, Honduras, for some time past and who now is in Ocotal: ¶ There are thirty thousand .45 cal. rounds of ammunition at the port of “La Union,” Salvador, that the “Sandinistas” intend to buy and who are waiting to have the money ready in order to get them. They were offered at 27 dollars for each one thousand rounds. ¶ General Plata does not help the bandits at all but he remains inactive, possibly due to the fact that he does not receive any orders from President Mejia Colindres. The bandits have been tolerated by the Honduran Government. ¶ They enter and leave the city at any time during the day and night. It is in the city of Danli where they supply themselves with all they need at their camps. This is also the place where they sell all the animals that are robbed in Nicaragua. Generally these animals are sold by agents they have in that city. ¶ (Hq. Guardia Nacional, Managua, Nicaragua, December 1, 1932.)"

21.  November 15, 1932.  G-2 Translations of local press: "The Yankees will leave Nicaragua," La Prensa (Nov 10), "The Policy in the Republic of Nicaragua," El Nacional (Nov 11), "General Sandino intends to keep on Fighting," La Prensa (Nov 14), Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 1.     "G-2 Report ¶ 3850-a ¶ MEXICO ¶ POLITICAL ¶ SUBJECT: Foreign Relations, etc. ¶ Relations with Other Countries: ¶ SANDINO and the Nicaraguan Situation. ¶ 1. Attached hereto are translations of three articles which recently appeared in the local press. These articles (1) “The Yankees will leave Nicaragua”, from “La Prensa[“] of November 10th. (2) “The Policy in the Republic of Nicaragua” from “El Nacional” of November 11th.; and (3) “General Sandino intends to keep on Fighting”, from “La Prensa” of November 14th. ¶ 2. The first article deals with the triumph of the Democrats in the recent Presidential elections in the United States, and predicts a radical change in the relations between the United States and the Republic of Nicaragua. ¶ This article also states that Newton D. Baker, on his visit to Mexico sometime ago, held a number of conferences with Dr. Pedro J. Zepeda, Sandino’s representative in Mexico, regarding the attitude which the Democrats would take toward Nicaragua, if victorious. ¶ 3. The third article is a reply from Dr. Zepeda to the first article, denying that he had an interview with Mr. Baker, and stating that his and Sandino’s attitude towards the problem remained unchanged, and that Sacasa would not be accepted as President, by Sandino, who would keep on fighting in Nicaragua. ¶ 4. The second article, the writer of which is unknown as the article is unsigned, states that the United States Government placed Sacasa in the Government of Nicaragua, without considering Sandino and his “Liberating Army”. ¶ Robert E. Cummings, ¶ Captain, Infantry (DOL[)] ¶ Acting Military Attaché. ¶ Source: Press. ¶ C/p ¶ From: M.A.Mexico. ¶ Report No. 4261. ¶ Date: Nov. 15, 1932. . . . "

22.  November 15, 1932.  G-2 Translations of local press: "The Yankees will leave Nicaragua," La Prensa (Nov 10), "The Policy in the Republic of Nicaragua," El Nacional (Nov 11), "General Sandino intends to keep on Fighting," La Prensa (Nov 14), Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 2.     " . . . Translation ¶ THE YANKEES WILL LEAVE NICARAGUA ¶ The triumph of the Democrats in the recent elections is going to bring about a radical change in the relations between the North American Union and the Republic of Nicaragua, occupied up to now by Yankee Marines. ¶ It is understood to be a fact that President Roosevelt will order the evacuation of Nicaragua as soon as he takes office on March 4th next, if this is not done sooner by President Hoover’s administration at Secretary of State Stimson has promised. ¶ Although this matter is being treated with reserve, we succeeded yesterday in learning that during the visit to Mexico City of Mr. Newton D. Baker, a prominent member of the Democratic party, formerly Minister of War in the Wilson Cabinet and now being discussed for the same post in Roosevelt’s Cabinet,- he held a number of conferences with General Sandino’s representative in Mexico, Dr. Pedro J. Zepeda, regarding the attitude which the Democrats would take toward Nicaragua if they won, and especially with respect to General Sandino. ¶ Although Dr. Zepeda keeps the strictest silence on this subject, and even denies having had conferences with Mr. Baker, yet among the Central American residents of this Capital much satisfaction is being expressed over the triumph of Mr. Roosevelt, because it is taken for granted that the Yankee Marines will withdraw from Nicaragua. ¶ It is also stated that Mr. Baker assured the Sandino elements residing in Mexico City that the United States had abandoned the project of opening the Nicaraguan Canal because in the last defense maneuvers of the Panama Canal by the aerial and naval fleets of the United States, it was seen that that Canal, as well as the one of Nicaragua if opened, could at any time be rendered useless by enemy air fleets. Therefore Uncle Sam, being no longer interested in the military occupation of Nicaragua for defending the interoceanic passage which had been projected, will now order the withdrawal of his troops. ¶ As to Sandino’s attitude, now that things seem to have changed completely for his country, both with the triumph of the Liberals Sacasa-Espinosa, and the evacuation by the Yankees, it is believed among the Central American residents here that, since the Nicaraguan chieftain has been fighting to throw out the Marines, he will now have no reason to continue the struggle as it would no longer be a war of defense of Nicaraguan integrity but civil warfare, fighting against his own brother Nicaraguans. ¶ For this very potent reason, it is taken for granted that General Sandino will suspend hostilities, but it is not believed that he will disband the troops which under his orders would be able to guarantee the most complete tranquility in Nueva Segovia territory, which he has constantly held without the Ynakee [Yankee] Marines being able to dislodge him. ¶ “La Prensa”, November 10, 1932. . . . "

23.  November 15, 1932.  G-2 Translations of local press: "The Yankees will leave Nicaragua," La Prensa (Nov 10), "The Policy in the Republic of Nicaragua," El Nacional (Nov 11), "General Sandino intends to keep on Fighting," La Prensa (Nov 14), Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 3.     " . . . Translation ¶ THE POLICY IN THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA. ¶ There are some countries in the world which, by their geographic position, and above all by their weakness, must permit foreign influences to dominate in their domestic affairs, - affairs which, according to all human and natural laws whould [would] only be aired among themselves. The history of the different peoples presents many examples of this, and in recent years it has fallen to the ill luck of the American Continent to prove our statements. ¶ First it was Panama, whose fatal destiny it was to be placed by nature as a belt of territory between Central America and South America. The consequences are well known to all: in order to save vessels a run of several thousand miles, and particularly to furnish a foreign power with a strategic point on the globe, the dismembered country saw itself deprived of a strip of land along the border of what is now the Panama Canal, and obliged to consent that armed forces of a powerful nation should be stationed on its own soil; in a word, its liberty is very relative. ¶ Later, and as a logical result of the foregoing, Nicaragua, which also possesses most advantageous natural characteristics for joining the two oceans, saw itself deprived of certain liberties inherent in every sovereign nation. It was to be expected; the Colossus could not permit that another nation should gain more favored rights, - and in this we see its point of view, because if not that power, any other nation might do the same with Nicaragua and perhaps would carry its intentions so far as to open another Canal which, if it did not take away the supremacy of the Panama Canal, it at least would diminish its importance as a strategic base in case of war. ¶ Many months ago, and with futile motives, landing forces of the North American Navy encamped in the Republic of Nicaragua (to correct her sons who had been behaving badly). We do not doubt the good intention of the interventor; but we do think that in the present case the celebrated phrase of the “Benemérito of the Americas” could be applied,- “Respect of the rights of other is peace”, and that each country should be allowed to ventilate its domestic affairs as it sees fit. ¶ Now, notwithstanding the recent struggle in the neighboring Republic, elections for its President have been held under the supervision of Admiral Woodward, Chief of the American forces stationed there. Before the electoral campaign, the Admiral invited the future candidates to a banquet in order to advertise to the world that the contestants would dedicate themselves to the policy impressed without any manifest shadow of envy passing over them; that is to say, the Saxon character applied to the Latin race. But Sandino was overlooked, - perhaps owing to pressure of time. The so-called Liberator of Nicaragua, General César Augusto Sandino, was not invited to the feast, although, according to unconfirmed reports, he enjoys great popularity. Naturally, the insurgent chieftain would not attend, because for a patriot it would be painful to see that, as viands are distributed during the dinner, so also is the soil of the fatherland disposed of by an individual, completely foreign to that soil. . . . "

24.  November 15, 1932.  G-2 Translations of local press: "The Yankees will leave Nicaragua," La Prensa (Nov 10), "The Policy in the Republic of Nicaragua," El Nacional (Nov 11), "General Sandino intends to keep on Fighting," La Prensa (Nov 14), Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 4.     " . . . And it was so, in fact. To one of those present, Dr. Juan Bautista Sacasa, fell the choicest slice,- the Presidency of the Republic. To the others present, naturally and by common consent, fell also their portions; but, as the host who is serving in all circumstances keeps the best for himself, the Admiral reserved the desserts for his own country. ¶ And what remained for the Liberating Army? The crumbs of the feast, the left-overs of a land which, not because small on the map, lacked the same symbolism of all the other nations of the globe. The members of that army are visionaries, dreaming warriors, defenders of the right (“derecho”—law?); because they, the deluded, have the tropical jungles of their nations as their only home, and all the privations of a roving army as pay for their patriotism. From the mountain tops they will see their cities like the Promised Land, forbidden to them. And while Sandino’s hosts continue vegetating in the Nicaraguan forests, half-naked and perishing of hunger, the Republic adorns itself to receive its new Executive, and to shortly bid farewell to the American troops which occupy its territory. (This latter – and may we be forbidden our incredulity – we do not yet see very clearly!) ¶ Nicaragua has a new President. – Yes, but it has not changed Masters. What pride of race! Hail to the Monroe Doctrine! ¶ “El Nacional”, Nov. 11, 1932. . . . "

25.  November 15, 1932.  G-2 Translations of local press: "The Yankees will leave Nicaragua," La Prensa (Nov 10), "The Policy in the Republic of Nicaragua," El Nacional (Nov 11), "General Sandino intends to keep on Fighting," La Prensa (Nov 14), Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 5.     " . . . Translation ¶ GENERAL SANDINO INTENDS TO KEEP ON FIGHTING IN THE SEGOVIAS (NICARAGUA) ¶ A propos an item published by “La Prensa” a few days ago on impressions obtained among Central American residents in this metropolis as to what General Sandino’s attitude would be when the Yankee Marines were withdrawn from Nicaragua next January, Dr. Pedro José Zepeda, his representative in México, addresses this paper (“La Prensa”) a letter denying that he had a conference with Mr. Newton Baker when the latter visited this Capital, and stating that General Sandino would continue the fight, as he does not acknowledge Dr. Juan Bautista Sacasa as President of Nicaragua. ¶ Dr. Zepeda’s interesting letter is as follows: ¶ “Señor Director of LA PRENSA, ¶ City. ¶ “Esteemed friend: ¶ “In your issue of November 10th I find an interesting article regarding the international aspect of Nicaragua in which it is made to appear,- in a direct and unjustified manner,- that I participated in a supposed interview sometime ago in this city with Mr. Newton D. Baker, a prominent member of the Democratic Party of the United States, and that at that conference the withdrawal of the North American Marines from my country was agreed upon, in case Franklin D. Roosevelt’s candidacy triumphed in the elections. ¶ “I regret, Señor Director, to be obliged to correct LA PRENSA in this matter, since I am convinced that the article was not published with any malicious intent, as both General Sandino and myself can affirm with the most profound satisfaction that your daily has been one of the champions of the cause of liberty and justice which we have defended. Nevertheless, I take this opportunity to assure you that, no matter what may be said to the contrary, our attitude toward this problem remains unchanged, since neither Moncada, nor Sacasa, nor the well-known Adolfo Díaz can be taken as pledges of guarantee for the national integrity and decorum. ¶ “I purposely do not wish to allude to the electoral farce which has just taken place in my country, because all the world knows that it was a farce unworthy of a nation which takes itself seriously, as does the United States, which, in this very year 1932, appoints ‘great electores’ (‘grandes electores’), and with fixed bayonets, with troops of Marines occupying nearly the entire country, and with its great cruisers training its guns upon ports ungarrisoned and defenseless, on the 7th of November – after carefully concealing the fact of the combats which General Sandino’s brave forces fought on the so-called election day,- sends Admiral Woodward, smiling and rubbing his hands, to tell us that ‘the Nicaraguan people are now fit for democracy’, that ‘there will be no need of supervision of the next elections’, but that he leaves us Dr. Sacasa, ‘elected’ by ‘popular vote’ with a majority of more than 20,000 votes . . . "

26.  November 15, 1932.  G-2 Translations of local press: "The Yankees will leave Nicaragua," La Prensa (Nov 10), "The Policy in the Republic of Nicaragua," El Nacional (Nov 11), "General Sandino intends to keep on Fighting," La Prensa (Nov 14), Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 6.     " . . . over the White House favorite, who has been imposed upon us by the same system on three different occasions. ¶ “By the express instruction of Señor General Sandino, and through your newspaper, I come again before the peoples of Latin America to protest against the unlawful policy of the United States, which, in spite of the armed protest of the Nicaraguan people, has insisted in carrying out an election in every way illegal, as it is well known that in a great portion of the Republic it was physically impossible for the invading forces to compel citizens identified with our cause to go to the polls, and in other sections our troops drove off those attempting to direct the farce, - whic [which] were only too glad to save their own skins. ¶ “To sum up, allow me to confirm what I have so often said before: ¶ “First: That the ‘Ejercito Defensor de la Soberanía Nacional de Nicaragua’ classes as traitors all those who for any reason have treated with the invaders, who have hushed up the assassinations committed by the forces of occupation, or passively accepted the insults of the United States to our dignity of a free people. ¶ “Second: We repudiate before the world the treaties and conventions entered into between the United States and the so-called ‘Governments of Nicaragua’ (Administrations) from 1910 to the present date. ¶ “Third: That the supreme gift of national free-will being incarnate in our army, and believing that no foreign power has the right to intervene in the solution of the internal problems of a free and independent nation, such as the Republic of Nicaragua since 1821, we declare absolutely invalid the acts just carried out by Admiral Woodward, who announces Señor Juan Bautista Sacasa the President-elect of Nicaragua, as this is the express attribute of the Sovereign Congress of the Republic under the Political Constitution of the Nation.” ¶ Respectfully yours, ¶ “Patria y Libertad” ¶ Dr. Pedro José Zapeda [Zepeda], ¶ General Representative of the “Ejercito Defensor de la Soberanía de Nicaragua.” ¶ Señor Jacinto Jiménez M., of the Executive Committee of the “Partido Renovador Autonomista Nicaragüense”, sends us another long letter in which he states that General Sandino will not recognize Dr. Sacasa as President of Nicaragua as he considers him a servile tool of the Government of the United States. That therefore Sandino will continue fighting, as he will not be satisfied with the withdrawal of the Yankee Marines, since the independence of Nicaragua demands the destruction of any indirect system of colonization and development on the part of the United States, making use of those who lend themselves – traitors to their country – to meekly serve the foreign invader. ¶ “La Prensa”, Nov. 14, 1932."

27.  November 15, 1932.  G-2 Translations of local press:  "A Victory for Sandino," El Universal (Nov 4), and "Protest against Intervention," Excelsior (Nov 2), Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 1.   "G-2 Report ¶ 3850-a ¶ MEXICO ¶ POLITICAL ¶ SUBJECT: Foreign Relations, etc. ¶ Relations with Foreign Countries: ¶ SANDINO and the Nicaraguan Situation. ¶ 1. Forwarded herewith are translations of two articles appearing in the Metropolitan press, the one headed “A Victory for Sandino” being taken from the “Universal” of November 4, 1932, while the “Protest against Intervention” was taken from “Excelsior” of November 2nd. ¶ 2. The telegram mentioned in the latter article as having been sent to Ambassador Clark by the “Partido Renovador Autonomista” has not yet been received by him. ¶ 3. These translations are sent to G-2 as of possible interest. ¶ Robert E. Cummings, ¶ Captain, Infantry, DOL ¶ Acting Military Attaché. ¶ Source: Press. ¶ C/p ¶ From: M.A.Mexico. ¶ Report No. 4237. ¶ Date: Nov. 4, 1932. . . . "

28.  November 15, 1932.  G-2 Translations of local press:  "A Victory for Sandino," El Universal (Nov 4), and "Protest against Intervention," Excelsior (Nov 2), Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 2.     " . . . Translation ¶ PROTEST AGAINST INTERVENTION BY THE UNITED STATES ¶ The “Partido Renovador Autonomista” of Nicaragua Addresses a Message of Protest to Ambassador Clark ¶ The “Partido Renovador Autonomista” of Nicaragua, (Mexican Group) has addressed to the American Ambassador, Mr. J. Reuben Clark, Jr., a message protesting against the supervision to be exercised by American Army forces next Sunday (November 6, 1932) during the elections to be held in Nicaragua. A copy of this message and of the resolutions passed condemning the declarations made by Dr. Luís Manuel Debayle, Nicaraguan Chargé d’Affaires in Washington, are as follows: ¶ The Telegram sent to Ambassador Clark ¶ “The ‘Partido Renovador Autonomista de Nicaragua,’ born of the necessity to reconquer and maintain the autonomy of Nicaragua to promote the restoration of its institutions according to the exigencies of its historic evolution, and to constitute the civil wing of the armed movement of liberation headed by General Sandino and his army, addresses you, the official representative of the Government of the United States, in energetic protest against the intervention of your Government in the elections to be held in our country on November 6th. ¶ “Our Party, made up of free men, does not recognize the right of the Government of the United States nor of any other foreign power, to concern itself with the internal affairs of our country, which exclusively pertain to the sovereignty of Nicaragua. ¶ “The ‘Partido Renovador Autonomista’, proceeding in accordance with the declarations made by General Sandino and his army, and which declarations the Party supports, hereby announces that it will repudiate the authorities elected in the farcical elections of November, because the national sovereignty of Nicaragua will once again be outraged by the armed forces of the United States.” ¶ Resolutions Passed ¶ “On October 25, 1932, the Mexican Group of the ‘Partido Renovador Autonomista de Nicaragua’ held a general meeting of protest against the declarations of cringing servilism and submission to Yankee Imperialism made by Dr. Luís Manuel Debayle, Moncada’s Chargé d’Affaires before the American State Department, and passed the following unanimous resolution: ¶ “I. To declare infamous the conduct of Luís Manuel Debayle, and to pronounce him a traitor to his race and fatherland. ¶ “II. To forward this Resolution to all cultural and . . . "

29.  November 15, 1932.  G-2 Translations of local press:  "A Victory for Sandino," El Universal (Nov 4), and "Protest against Intervention," Excelsior (Nov 2), Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 3.     " . . . political groups on the Continent which are lending their aid to the emancipation of our peoples,- and to petition them to adopt a similar resolution so that among all free men of the Spanish-American countries, the said Señor Debayle shall be considered a felon and a traitor,- a worthy imitator of Díaz, Moncada, Sacasa, etc.; and ¶ “III. To forward a copy of this Resolution, signed by all the members of this Mexican Group of the ‘Partido Renovador Autonmista de Nicaragua’ to Señor Dr. Luís Manuel Debayle, as a reply to the declarations which his incurable cretinism prompted him to make in petitioning a lengthening of the period of American Intervention in Nicaragua.” . . . "

30.  November 15, 1932.  G-2 Translations of local press:  "A Victory for Sandino," El Universal (Nov 4), and "Protest against Intervention," Excelsior (Nov 2), Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 4.     " . . . Translation. ¶ A VICTORY FOR SANDINO ¶ Dr. Pedro José Zepeda, general representative of the “Ejercito Defensor de la Soberanía Nacional de Nicaragua” which, in the heroic crusade of the Segovias, has faced the invading forces for the past five years, has given us the following bulletin: ¶ “Notwithstanding the official reports emanating from Managua and Washington that our troops only suffer reverses, I feel it my duty to enlighten your readers as to the manner in which the fighting in Nicaragua is carried on, so they may judge of the gigantic efforts put forth by General Sandino and his men. ¶ “It must be confessed that our troops, which always take the offensive, never give combat to the enemy except when they have every probability of winning, since, as is well known, we lack the sources of supply, and the ammunition used in fighting must immediately be replaced by that seized from the enemy. ¶ “All the world knows that our coasts, on both seas, are completely blockaded by naval units which are constantly patrolling them; that daily from 6 to 12, war planes of the United States Navy fly to the region of the “Heroic Segovias” to sow desolation and death, flinging tons of explosives and large quantities of asphyxiating gases and incendiary bombs. ¶ “In this one-sided manner our struggle has been kept up, and if we are now able to prove that our effectives, in men and ammunition, are greater than ever, it is due precisely to the fact that the guerrilla warfare adopted by our General Sandino has given the most brilliant results, as we are now in position to prevent the electoral farce on November 6th, by which it was intended to place Juan Bautista Sacasa in power, or the celebrated Adolfo Díaz. And both Mr. Stimson and Admiral Woodward, the latter now acting as the ‘Gran Elector’ will be obliged to confess that it was impossible to hold the election, or they will be compelled to select their own favorite candidate to carry on the dreary work of José Maria Moncada. ¶ “To counteract the campaign of false reports, I copy below the bulletin which General Sandino has just sent from the field: ¶ “On October 28th a detachment of 300 men of the forces of the valiant General Juan Pablo Umanzor, laid an ambuscade for the enemy composed of United States riflemen and National Guards. The encounter, which took place twenty kilometers north of the city of Chichigalpa, lasted over six hours, and notwithstanding reinforcements were mobilized from León and . . . "

31.  November 15, 1932.  G-2 Translations of local press:  "A Victory for Sandino," El Universal (Nov 4), and "Protest against Intervention," Excelsior (Nov 2), Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 5.     " . . . Nagorate, an overwhelming defeat was inflicted upon the invading forces, who abandoned the field leaving all their implements of warfare and without time to carry off their dead or wounded. It has been impossible to determine the number of American marines killed in this battle, but it can be safely asserted that all the Yankee officers who took part in the encounter were exterminated, - a report which will certainly be kept from the knowledge of the American people, as their Government is charged with supervising the so-called elections, scheduled to take place on November 6th, and which we shall resolutely nullify by attacking all the sectors where it is attempted to place detachments for the purpose of intimidating and forcibly compelling peasants and laborers to sanction the farce being carried on in support of Adolfo Díaz or Juan Bautista Sacasa.’ ¶ “General Sandino ends by reporting that over 80 of the enemy were killed; and that there were captured 127 rifles, 5 machine-guns, 70 pistols caliber 45, and about 25,000 cartridges. The body of Lieutenant Sotomayor, who commanded the detachment of National Guards, was also found among the dead. ¶ “General Sandino reiterates his intention to go on fighting against either of the two candidates put into office by the guns of the American marines, and that in the few days which remain for Admiral Woodward to announce which is the choice of the White House, there will be fought the bloodiest battles in the history of Nicaragua,- because, after five years of armed protests, we want to reaffirm our intention to give no opportunity to the invading forces to consider that they have any right whatever to intervene in problems which alone concern the Nicaraguan people.” ¶ “EL UNIVERSAL” ¶ Mexico City, Nov. 4, 1932."

32.  November 3, 1932.  G-2 Report on Current Situation, Major A. R. Harris, Military Attaché, Costa Rica.       "G-2 Report. ¶ NICARAGUA. ¶ Subject: Current Situation. ¶ The political pot is boiling in Nicaragua. According to reports received here, all Nicaraguans have ceased to talk or think of anything but POLITICS. Both the Conservatives and Liberals claim victory. Although it is practically impossible to get an unbiased opinion from a Nicaraguan, it is still believed that the Liberals will win by a small majority. ¶ A certain Augusto Estrada Aragón has sued Adolfo Díaz for a sum of money, which he claims Díaz owes him. This action is without doubt a political move, designed to embarrass don Adolfo. ¶ The bandits have infiltrated down into the more settled districts and have been making demonstrations in the vicinity of Chichigalpa, Jinotega and Estelí. This seems part of Sandino’s plan which aims at the embarrassment of the Electoral Mission. However, a rumor, which was published in the Managua papers, states that the bandits are being paid by certain prominent men in the country to hamper the voting in the Liberal districts. ¶ Another article appearing in the Managua newspapers on the current bandit situation follows: ¶ “Persons just arrived from Jinotega state that it is public knowledge there that Pedrón, in a singular act of mountaineer militarism issued a proclamation declaring his total independence from Augusto C. Sandino, distributing this news to all groups under his command. ¶ “In this proclamation Pedrón stated that from September 15th the departments of Chontales, Matagalpa, northern part of Managua, Jinotega and part of the Atlantic Coast, between San Juan del Norte and Prinzapolka will be under his jurisdiction. ¶ “The place where Pedrón issued his proclamation is a place close to El Embocadero, jurisdiction of Bocay, called “El Ideal”. ¶ “It appears that he adopted this decision after visiting Santa Tomás and other places in Chontales the last time, where he had interviews with politicians of this department. ¶ “Pedrón assembled the different forces under his command at “El Ideal” and harangued them, sowing anti-Sandino sentiment.” ¶ Note: (It is a well known fact that Sandino and Pedrón Altamirano have not been getting along well together. Pedrón, however, has been so strong in his own regions that Sandino has not dared to discipline him.) ¶ Source: Press. ¶ From: M.A. Costa Rica ¶ A. R. Harris, ¶ Major, G.S., M.A. ¶ Report No. 1821 ¶ Date: November 3, 1932."

33.  November 1, 1932.  Electoral Mission, Bandit Activities, p. 1 only.       "Immediately after the registration period closed, in early October, bandit activities increased perceptively in the Northwestern corner of Chinandega Department and in other localities near the Honduranian Border. However, the heavy rainfall in these mountainous districts, which continued until the 15th, together with the subsequent renewed activity of the Guardia Nacional (freed from protective duty of the Electoral Mesas, and reorganized into heavy offensive patrols) kept this menace down to a minimum until the latter part of the mouth, when several important contacts were made, principally in Chinandega Department. ¶ With regard to the bandit situation, rumors are rife that between now and election day there will be concentrated attacks on many of the outlying districts and also that the cities of Managua, Leon, Chinandega, Esteli and Granada are menaced. We believe that these reports are greatly exaggerated and purposely so by government authorities, who have not only kept the Press stirred up in regard to such bandit activities but we actually know that Government officials in some Departments have deliberately lied to the President, or by his order, to make it appear that conditions are considerably worse than they really are. I have had several conferences with General Matthews, Jefe Director of the Guardia Nacional, and he concurs in this opinion. Nevertheless, comprehensive plans have been made by the Guardia Nacional to have heavy combat patrols conduct active reconnaissances in the menaced areas between 2 and 8 November for the purpose of reassuring voters and preventing bandit interference with elections, and intercepting passage of bandit groups. ¶ During the early part of the month we received several reports from Nicaraguan[s?] returning from Honduras that there was an impending revolution which would probably break prior to or on the day of the Honduran President elections (30 October); that Government arms and ammunition were being distributed to Sandinistas who had promised to assist the Liberal candidate, Dr. Zuniga Huete; and that between 6 and 10 October the latter has sent twenty-six (26) pack-mule loads of war materials (principally rifles) to be distributed among revolutionists mobilized along the border for the purpose of interfering with the Honduranian elections, or, in case he should be defeated, to start a revolution immediately after the election. The report was also current that, whether or not the services of Sandino were required in Honduras for carrying out the above-mentioned plan; inany [in any] event, the Sandinistas were to recross the border in time to carry out a major offensive against the Nicaraguan elections on 6 November. ¶ We received reports yesterday from Honduras that the Conservatives had won by a large majority and that, so far, no revolutionary activities had been begun by the defeated Liberal candidate who had, on the contrary, requested his adherents to take the results peacefully. Thus, the Sandino threat in Honduras did not eventuate, and it is possible that the war materials above-mentioned are being prepared for Nicaraguan elections on 6 November. It is believed that a Conservative regime in Honduras will materially reduce the traffic in arms across the frontier, thus considerably hampering future bandit activities in Nicaragua. ¶ In addition to the war materials mentioned in the preceding paragraph, it is learned from very good authority that rifles and ammunition have recently come into Nicaragua by way of the Gulf of Fonseca and were landed at Tempicque in northwestern part of Chinandega Department, and also at Tamarindo a small port on the Pacific coast of Leon Department. Information was also received from a reliable source that two Nicaraguan agents of Sandino in Mexico City have been unusually active during the early part of October, collecting arms, ammunition and medical supplies for the purpose of despatching to Sandino, and that the quantities of arms and supplies procured indicated an offensive movement of major importance on the part of the bandit forces."

34.  ca. November 1, 1932.  G-2 Intelligence Summary of Bandit Situation, Nicaragua, p. 1 only.      "NICARAGUA – Political. ¶ 3020 ¶ Bandit Situation. ¶ The bandit supply of ammunition still finds its way into Nicaragua, for the most part, via Honduras. ¶ The bandits unquestionably have obtained an unusually large amount of ammunition this month as evidenced by the contact outside of Somotillo on October 25 and the one at La Pelona on October 27. Reports also indicate the arrival of 400 rifles into Nicaragua from Honduras. This is in keeping with the many reports concerning the bandits’ maximum effort at election time (November 6). They are probably better armed and have more ammunition now than at any previous time. ¶ Food is no great problem for them as they live on the country. Money contributions are still forced from the people in the areas in which they operate. In addition they receive financial aid from various persons in areas in which they do not operate. ¶ The practice of stealing horses, mules and cattle and running them across the border into Honduras and selling them or exchanging them for arms and ammunition still continues. ¶ On October 14 a native returning from Honduras reported that recently 26 muleloads of rifles arrived in Los Manos, and were destined for Nicaraguan Sandinistas in vicinity of Ayote, who were to help out in a revolution in Honduras and then return to Nicaragua with Honduran forces to disturb the elections there. ¶ On October 20 the CO, Jalapa, reported information received that Toribio Tijerino recently made a gift to Sandino of 1,000 hats, 1,000 changes of clothing, 500 pairs of shoes and 3 mule loads of ammunition. ¶ It is reported from fairly reliable source that Sandino forces are receiving an exceptionally large supply of arms and ammunition and other supplies in the immediate future. Shipment is reported to come from Mexico. ¶ Sandino’s main camp is believed to be in vicinity of Oconguas (262-378). Camp consists of 10 houses rather close together, on a loma which is not wooded, and therefore not well hidden; it is surrounded by a net-work of outposts."

35.  November 1, 1932.  G-2 Intelligence Extract on Visit of the Naval Attaché to the Honduran-Nicaraguan Border on 3 Sept, p. 1.     "VISIT OF THE NAVAL ATTACHE TO THE HONDURAN-NICARAGUAN BORDER. ¶ On September 3, 1932, the Naval Attaché proceeded to the Nicaraguan border with a view to observing the conditions in that vicinity relative to the movements of Nicaruan [Nicaraguan] bandits and bandit agents and to view the progress of General Plata (new Comandante of Danlí) in his work of preventing the smuggling of arms to the bandits and the rendering of aid to SANDINO and his followers by residents in HONDURAS. ¶ During this visit the Naval Attaché visited DANLI, PARAISO and SAN MARCOS DE COLON in HONDURAS, and OCOTAL, TOTOGALPA and SOMOTO in NICARAGUA. ¶ General PLATA, although designated as the Comandante of DANLI, has control over all subcomandantes in that section and a small mobile force. The number of men at his disposal are as follows: ¶ Post ¶ Enlisted ¶ Officers ¶ Commander ¶ DANLI ¶ 18 ¶ 3 ¶ Colonel MARCO VACA ¶ MOBILE force ¶ 25 ¶ 1 ¶ Colonel MANUEL ESPINAL ¶ LAS MANOS ¶ 4 ¶ 1 ¶ Captain REYES MENDEZ ¶ SAN MARCOS COLON ¶ 10 ¶ 1 ¶ Colonel PASCUAL MONTOYA ¶ CIFUENTES ¶ 4 ¶ 1 ¶ Captain JESUS MARTINEZ ¶ PARAISO ¶ 4 ¶ 1 ¶ Captain VICENTE SANCHEZ ¶ He is supposed to have twenty police inspectors operating with him but at the time of this visit only four had reported for duty. ¶ PLATA’s force is untrained and poorly equipped, his armament consisting of obsolete single shot Remington rifles and two LEWIS machine guns. Although his mobile force is actively patrolling, it is doubtful if his entire command could accomplish anything should it contact any sizeable group of SANDINO’s forces. The utmost that PLATA can accomplish is to make the shipment of arms to SANDINO difficult and prevent the sale of bandit loot in HONUDRAS. Some indications are that he is working energetically with the object in view of accomplishing this. It would be foolish for him to attempt preventing a large bandit force from crossing the frontier but his presence discourages the free use . . . "

36.   November 1, 1932.  G-2 Intelligence Extract on Visit of the Naval Attaché to the Honduran-Nicaraguan Border on 3 Sept, p. 2.       " . . . of HONDURAS as a refuge. During the visit information was received at OCOTAL, Nicaragua, that a group of bandits, after a contact with the Guardia, had started to enter HONDURAS but had been prevented by PLATA’s force. However, the Naval Attaché doubts that the strength of PLATA’s force had anything to do with keeping the Sandinistas out but the bandits did not care to offend HONDURAS, knowing well that should residents along the border become antagonistic or unfriendly, free movements along that section would become difficult. They will however continue to slip into HONDURAS where they can do so unobserved. ¶ PLATA informed the Naval Attaché that he has several of his men on espionage work and that friendly people have promised to keep him informed of any movement of arms towards Nicaragua. His mobile force is operating along the border south of DANLI. In this manner he is hopeful of getting information that will lead to the capture of arms shipments should there be any passing through that section. Although PLATA’s interest was doubtful due to the failure of the Government to pay him or his officials their salaries, that obstacle has been overcome, at least temporarily, and PLATA is moving his family from SAN MARCOS DE COLON to DANLI. This will have a tendency to keep him in that section which is believed to be the center of the most important area. ¶ The people of DANLI seem pleased with the appointment of PLATA and believe that he will do much to prevent activities of agents of SANDINO. There was no information available indicating that there had been any recent activities but PLATA was investigating a visit to TEGUCIGALPA of ALFONSO IRIAS and RAMON RAUDALES whom he suspected of engaging in SANDINO business. PLATA stated that if his suspicions prove to be true he will have these two individuals removed to TEGUCIGALPA and forced to remain in that city. ¶ On August 20th, General PLATA held a conference at LAS MANOS with Colonel T. E. WATSON, Jefe of the Guardia Nacional at OCOTAL, and the Jefe Politico of the same place. General PLATA stated that the conference was very successful and an agreement had been reached for mutual cooperation in preventing the bandits from receiving aid from HONDURAS. While in OCOTAL, the Naval Attaché was informed by Colonel Watson, that Plata was apparently working with him and forwarding information helpful to the functioning of the Guardia. ¶ The Naval Attaché spent two days in OCOTAL and returned overland to Honduras via TOTOGALPA and SOMOTO. During this time, the workings of the Guardia were observed with much interest. The efficiency and smoothness with which the patrols and organization functions is to be highly complimented. The section through which the Naval Attaché passed is being effectively covered in spite of the limited number of men available. Every facility was extended to the Naval Attaché during his visit to this area. ¶ The Comandante in SAN MARCOS COLON is supposed to have a force of ten men stationed in that place. There were however none observed by the Naval Attaché and a reliable resident stated that actually the Comandante had but two men in active service. The section around SAN MARCOS was very quiet and most of the residents were working their farms and not interested in SANDINO. The people cannot be considered generally as friendly to nor against SANDINO but seem to display no interest; it is doubtful he receives aid thru that part of Honduras. ¶ (over)"

37.   November 1, 1932.  G-2 Intelligence Extract on Translated Editorial, "The Sandinismo Does Not Exist in Honduras," El Pueblo, Tegucigalpa (Sept 29), p. 1.    "THE following editorial from a TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURAS newspaper is quoted for general information: ¶ Translation of an editorial published in “El Pueblo” (local independent daily newspaper) Thursday, 29 September, 1932. ¶ Tegucigalpa, Honduras. ¶ “THE SANDINISMO DOES NOT EXIST IN HONDURAS” ¶ It is characteristic of the human makeup to look for in others the reason for one’s failures. Each time that an artist, writer or a governor fails in one of his works or aspirations, he must find someone or something on which to place the responsibility for such failure. For example the case of GENERAL MONCADA and GENERAL SANDINO in NICARAGUA is typical. ¶ When the government of the brother and neighboring country is unable to terminate “Sandinismo”, they must look around for the means to justify their impotence in the eyes of the world and most especially in those of the NICARAGUANS. And, Oh God. of all the absurd, the lot fell on HONDURAS. ¶ HONDURAS has no factories, neither Naval or merchant Marine forces, her imports come almost entirely in American ships, nor has she railroads on the Nicaraguan frontier; in fact HONDURAS, that has no means of producing arms, nor of purchasing and transporting them, is guilty and responsible for the fact that President MONCADA, the American Marines and the Guardia Nacional, etc[.], etc., have not been able to destroy SANDINO. Really any other excuse would have resulted less rediculous [ridiculous] and above all less comical. ¶ The newspapers of Nicaragua publish constant reports of incursions of the SANDINISTAS into cities and towns of that Republic; almost daily they inform of encounters with the marines and Guardia Nacional and speak of individuals and even officers of the Army who go to join the rebel, without it occuring [occurring] to anyone until now (at least we know nothing of it) to affirm or even say that President Moncada, the American Marines and the Guardia Nacional give their consent to these people to withdraw for the purpose of fomenting and sustaining for their own personal benefits the acts of war of SANDINO. ¶ All that Honduras has received as a consequence of the beligerance [belligerence] of SANDINO is serious damages in the property and lives of her inhabitants, in her security and in her souvereingty [sovereignty]; and even in her commerce and economics. If any Government had the right to take the stand of accuser in view of the damages she has received from the “Sandinismo” it would certainly not be Nicaragua, but instead Honduras. But for the justification of President Moncada before his copatriots and for those who seek in political strife the victory of the interventions and not that of the votes, Honduras is not only being made to suffer the damages from the Sandinismo and assume the responsibility for these damages, but also the obligation falls on her to destroy SANDINO and pacify Nicaragua. ¶ Fortunately such is not the case, no more than could you place upon her the burden of a responsibility which does not correspond to her. In Honduras there does not exist one Honduran who would be converted into an accuser of his country, much less make her bear a guilt for which she is not to blame. And if there were such… then they would not be Hondurans. ¶ (over) . . . "

38.  November 1, 1932.  G-2 Intelligence Extract on Translated Editorial, "The Sandinismo Does Not Exist in Honduras," El Pueblo, Tegucigalpa (Sept 29), p. 2.   " . . . Rodolfo Espinoza of the so-called “Conservador” and “Liberal” parties, respectively. In this connection General Sandino tells me: ¶ “ ‘From the beginning our Army has had only one object, and will only have one until the end, - the restoration of our national independence. The different phases of our struggle do not matter. Therefore our Army disregards the treaties, pacts, and agreements signed behing [behind] the backs of our people, between the Governments of North America and those imposed by them, at the bayonet’s point, against the express will of the Nicaraguan people from 1909 to the present date. ¶ “ ‘This explains why our Army does not recognize, nor never will recognize, any Government of Nicaragua imposed by the super-vigilance of the intervening Government of the United States of North America.’ “ ¶ Following translation of an article in the Honduranian Newspaper, “El Pueblo” of 29th September is quoted:- ¶ “SANDINISMO IS NOT IN HONDURAS” ¶ Sandino, is not in Honduras, but his agents are, who are very well known to Guillen Zelaya, for they are his friends and colleagues: He very well known those that live in Tegucigalpa, those that are in San Pedro Sula and in other towns of the republic, and very especially he knows those that are in Danli, who are the most effective, for they are very near the frontier, in constant communication by means ofrunners [of runners] frequently sent by Sandino to that town. Of all those that Guillen Zelaya knows, only one are we going to name: Dr. Alejandro Cerda, who for some time has been radicated in Danlí, and who is the most active and who secures arms and ammunition in Tegucigalpa, through the authorities who are followers of Zuniga Huete, as Cerda is a fullfledged “Huetista” (belongs to Zuniga Huete, Liberal party). In the Census of DANLI, through his influence and intrigue, he was able to arrange the inscription of a large number of Nicaraguans so that during the elections they may come to vote for Zuniga Huete. In the first fifteen days of August last Cerda came to Tegucigalpa and took to Danli a large quantity of rifles and ammunition, to see that they reached SANDINO, which were taken out of the National Storeroom by government employees who belong to the Zuniga Huete faction. In the same first fifteen days of August, a certain commercial house received from Albion a quantity of .45c pistols with a large quanty [quantity] of ammunition, and another Nicaraguan bought them to sent [send] them to Sandino, by means of the Agent Cerda in Danli. The house that brought these pistols is neither Honduran, nor German nor French. All the Agents of Sandino in Honduras as belong to the Zuniga Huete faction, and at the same time are colleagues of the Post and Journalist Guillen Zelaya. Later on we will give the names of all the Agents of Sandino in Honduras and that of the persons who intervened to withdraw the arms and ammunition from the National Storerooms, to deliver them to Cerda, and also we will give the name of the house that introduce the pistols .45c and to whom they were sold. ¶ A NICARAGUAN WHO BELONGS TO NO PARTY. ¶ (over)"

39.  November 1, 1932.  Extracts from Intelligence Reports of Sept-Oct, p. 5:  Excerpt from report by Maurice G. Holmes.     "That Guatemala is backing Huete; that he believes Carilla will win at the polls. ¶ 4. PERALTA was my first caller this morning, arriving all worked up over the news that one ALFONSO LARA was seen in DANLI, Honduras, as late as October 12 with the view to staging an interview with SANDINO near CIFUENTES as early as possible. SANDINO, he alleged to be somewhere along the CRIQUE DE ORO (250-378) (M.C.Map). LARA represents the national juntas of both political parties in Nicaragua who desire terms with SANDINO to secure peace in this country after our evacuation. RAMON RAUDALES entered Nicaragua about October 11 to arrange the interview. PERALTA further expressed the view that the Guardia Nacional should have a representative at the conference. (He may be sure that they will if they can.) ¶ 5. I give only face value to Nolasco’s dope because I don’t know him well. On the other hand, PERALTA gives out very little dope and believes what he says when he does. AS usual with his race, he is reliable subject to check. The foregoing has been reported verbally to the Area Commander, G.N. ¶ /s/ Maurice G. Holmes. ¶ (Confidential – Headquarters Guardia Nacional, Managua, Nicaragua, November 1, 1932.)"

40.  October 1932.  Excerpt from Guardia Newsletter, with Last Minute Information on contact at La Pelona, Oct. 28 with Umanzor group.     "P E R S O N N E L ¶ Lieutenant Bond from Chinandega to Managua for duty in Law Office. October 22, 1932 ¶ Lieutenant Vogel from Diriamba to Department of Chinandega. October 22, 1932. ¶ Lieutenant Bilbrey from Managua to Diriamba. October 22, 1932. ¶ Lieutenant Buckner from Managua to Central Area on October 24, 1932. ¶ Lieutenant Rabberman from Managua to Ocotal on October 22, 1932. ¶ Lieutenant Mahoney to 2nd Brigade Hospital on October 22, 1932. ¶ Captain Smith to 2nd Brigade Hospital on 22 October, 1932. ¶ T H E – E N D ¶ LAST MINUTE INFORMATION: ¶ LIEUTENANTS BLANCO AND SOTOMAYOR BOTH NATIVE OFFICERS AND COMBINED PATROL OF GUARDIA AUXILIARES AND CIVICOS TOTALLING THIRTY EIGHT MEN HAD CONTACT WITH WELL ARMED GROUP – JEFE UMANZOR ESTIMATED AT 200 OR MORE AT “LA PELONA” (128-264). FIGHT VERY INTENSE AND LASTED FROM 6 TO 11 A.M. OCTOBER 28 UNTIL GUARDIA AMMUNITION EXPENDED. BANDIT CASUALTIES UNKNOWN BUT LIEUTENANT BLANCO ESTIMATES AT LEAST 50 KILLED AND WOUNDED. GUARDIA CASUALTIES UNKNOWN BUT LIEUTENANT SOTOMAYOR AND ABOUT 20 MEN STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR. NO MORE DETAILS AVAILABLE AT PRESENT TIME – 10329. ¶ The MILITARY ACADEMY HAS BEEN DISPATCHED TO CHICHIGALPA AND CLEARED THAT POINT AT 0700 OCTOBER 29 IN PURSUIT OF UMANZOR GROUP."

41.  October 30, 1932.  Press clipping: "Sixty Killed in Five-Hour Battle in Nicaragua; Guardsmen Fight Way Out of Rebel Ambush," New York Times.     "Sixty Killed in Five-Hour Battle in Nicaragua; Guardsmen Fight Way Out of Rebel Ambush ¶ By Tropical Radio to THE NEW YORK TIMES. ¶ MANAGUA, Oct. 29.—At least sixty are believed to have been killed when 100 insurgents ambushed a Nicaraguan National Guard patrol of thirty-eight men yesterday fifteen miles north of Chichigalpa in the Department of Chinandega. ¶ The entire student body of the Military Academy, with its United States Marine Corps instructors, has been rushed to Chichigalpa to round up the rebel band. ¶ The National Guard patrol, consisting of nine enlisted men and twenty-nine volunteers, fought its way out of the ambush after a fierce combat lasting five hours. The patrol is reported to have lost twelve men, including Lieutenant Sotomayor. The toll among the rebels is believed to have been at least fifty. ¶ The rebels were led by the chieftain Umanzor, known as one of their most daring commanders. The guardsmen were in charge of Lieutenants Sotomayor and Blanco, both regarded as excellent fighters. Recently a policy has been adopted of placing native officers in charge of National Guard patrols, in preparation for the withdrawal of the last of the United States Marines, which has been set for February. ¶ The recent recrudescence of rebel activity in the Northern provinces is attributed to a desire to embarrass the government on the eve of the national elections, which are to be held Nov. 6."

42.  October 13, 1932.  G-2 Report, "Sandino Threatens Revolution When Marines Depart," Major A. R. Harris, Military Attaché, Costa Rica, p. 1.     "G-2 Report. ¶ 2,700. ¶ NICARAGUA (Population & Social) ¶ Subject: Public Order & Safety. ¶ Sandino Threatens Revolution when Marines Depart. ¶ The following announcement would seem to indicate that Sandino has no idea of quitting the field when the Marines withdraw. ¶ “To my Nicaraguan compatriots: ¶ “What the gringos are after is the humiliation of our country, as long as they are with us. The conservative candidacy of Díaz and Chamorro is their work because the yankees want an opportunity for renewed dominion for yankee friends. And because they find it more convenient to give the victory to the liberal yanquistas, they ordered Moncada to allow Sacasa to be the candidate, and they pretended to ignore Espinosa’s declarations of yankee dominance. They do not want any manifestations upon their departure, which some are trying to prevent. They even let it be known that, should difficulties occur, and should they be requested, either through Díaz or through Sacasa, to again disembark and occupy the country, even then they will not be disposed to do so. The reason for this is that the campaign of the ARMY DEFENDING THE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY OF NICARAGUA has annihilated yankee power. ¶ “Compatriots: Proceed with dignity and remember than [that] you have been victims, of the yankees as well as of our politicians. He who goes behind these individuals and approaches the ballot boxes watched by the yankees WILL NOT DO ANYTHING BUT RENDER THE MOST LAMENTABLE HOMAGE TO THE FOREIGN BAYONET WHICH IS CASTING ITS LAST INSULTING REFLECTION OVER NICARAGUA. Expecting dignity of Chamorro or of Díaz, or of Espinoza or Sacasa, is, my fellow patriots, the worst foolishness, above all as the CONQUERING ARMY DEFENDING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NICARAGUA is approaching. ¶ Tell the invading admiral who is treating you as cattle – GET OUT: Do your duty. Do not obey a single order of the marines in the election farce. NO ONE IS OBLIGATED TO GO TO THE POLLS, NOR IS THERE ANY LAW WHICH SO COMPELS YOU. Make yourselves deserving and meriting liberty. Let people affiliated with the Liberal Party not believe that a triumph of the conservative ticket will last longer than the time indispensable for its liquidation by this same people together with the ARMY DEFENDING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NICARAGUA. Let the Conservative people not fear a triumph of the Sacasa ticket, because this has hovering over it the punishing hand of this army and it will never enter the presidency in January. ¶ From: M. A. Costa Rica ¶ Report No. 1794 ¶ Date: October 13, 1932. . . . "

43.  October 13, 1932.  G-2 Report, "Sandino Threatens Revolution When Marines Depart," Major A. R. Harris, Military Attaché, Costa Rica, p. 2.      " . . . G-2 Report. ¶ 2,700 ¶ “This is the real situation, my compatriots, and I have given you the way to follow. ¶ Country and Liberty. ¶ Augusto C. Sandino. ¶ General encampment of the Segovias, Sept. 15, 1932. ¶ A true copy of the original. ¶ N. Salinas de Aguilar, ¶ Representative in Costa Rica.” ¶ Source: “La Tribuna” of Oct. 8, 1932. ¶ A. R. Harris, ¶ Major, G. S., M. A. ¶ From: M. A. Costa Rica ¶ Report No. 1794 ¶ Date: Oct. 13, 1932."

44.  October 8, 1932.  Naval Intelligence Report on Visit of Dr. Escolástico Lara (Nicaraguan) to Honduras, Naval Attaché, Tegucigalpa.     "Manuel Balladares (See reference), Fernando Larios, Nicaraguan Sandino Sympathizers, and Dr. Escolastico Lara, Nicaraguan, came to Tegucigalpa on October 3, 1932. ¶ Nothing definite is known relative to the mission of Balladares and Larios except that they are Sandinistas, and Balladares has for several months been desirous of getting into political prominence in Nicaragua, however the association of these three individuals would tend to indicate that they are on the same mission. ¶ Dr. Lara is reported to be in Tegucigalpa enroute to Danlí with the object in view of proceeding from there to a conference with Sandino. The object of this conference concerns a possible agreement between Sandino and the Liberal party of Nicaragua relative to the forthcoming elections. Dr. Lara is reported to have left Tegucigalpa for Danlí on October 6th."

45.  October 1932.  Press clippings.  "Sandino Directs Rebels By Radio — Success in Evading Marines Laid to Short-Wave Set Safe in Jungles," Washington Star (ca. 2 Oct).   "Nicaraguan Rebels Raid Near Managua — Sack Village, Burn Buildings and Carry Off Number of Women and Children — Capital Fears Attack," New York Times (2 Oct).   "Rebel Band Flees Nicaraguan Guard — Looters Burned Voting Records at San Francisco del Carnicero, 20 Miles From Managua," New York Times, (3 Oct).     "SANDINO DIRECTS REBELS BY RADIO ¶ Success in Evading Marines Laid to Short-Wave Set Safe in Jungles. ¶ (Copyright, 1932, by the Consolidated Press Association.) ¶ A secret short-wave radio system has aided Gen. Augustino Sandino, Nicaraguan revolutionist, in evading capture by the United States Marines and in his ambushed attacks upon Marine patrols in the jungles which have taken a heavy toll during the last five years, according to private but authentic advices received here yesterday. ¶ The reports, from a former Sandino aide now in Mexico City, state that Sandino has been using short-wave transmitters and receivers in maintaining contacts with his forces. This system also is declared to have been instrumental not only in spotting Marine patrols, but in smuggling arms, ammunition and food supplies to the bandit and his main contingent. ¶ Seems Basis for Success. ¶ Radio communication seems to be the answer to Sandino’s successful stand against the Marines. In the jungle and mountain fastnesses of Nicaragua no other means of rapid communication is possible. ¶ Sandino has managed to get ammunition and food despite the rigid embargoes enforced by the government and the strenuous efforts of the Marines, placed in the country to maintain law and order and to protect American lives and property. ¶ Similarly, Sandino’s knowledge at different times of the whereabouts of Marine patrols has caused no end of trouble. His men, on dozens of occasions since he began his banditry in 1927, have swooped down in groups of Marines and Guardia Nacionale [Nacional], the official national guard of the country. ¶ Details Are Lacking. ¶ More than a score of Marines have lost their lives in the guerrilla warfare, victims of snipers’ bullets. Sandino’s losses, however, have been far greater. ¶ Details of the type of apparatus used by Sandino are lacking. Engineers believe it is improvised short-wave equipment of low power, which can be trundled about. A short-wave station of only a few watts, they said, can transmit in code several hundred miles during the night. ¶ NICARAGUAN REBELS RAID NEAR MANAGUA ¶ Sack Village, Burn Buildings and Carry Off Number of Women and Children. ¶ CAPITAL FEARS AN ATTACK ¶ Bands Reported Concentrating 15 Miles Away—Guards Kill 31 and Wound Many. ¶ Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES. ¶ MANAGUA, Nicaragua, Oct. 1.—Rebels sacked the village of San Francisco del Carnicero, twenty miles north of Managua, this morning, burned several public buildings and carried off a number of women and children, according to reports to the National Guard here. ¶ The inhabitants of Managua are now in some fear that the capital may be attacked as a result of reports that the rebels are concentrating at Tipitapa, which is on a main highway only fifteen miles from Managua. This fear is increased because the National Guard garrison here is now depleted by the sending of many men throughout the country to supervise the coming elections. Military officials, however, discount these fears. ¶ News of the sacking of San Francisco del Carnicero reached here several hours afterward, because the only means of communication is by boat. A National Guard patrol was sent out immediately to pursue the band. The guard had only two men in the village, as that region has never been molested before. ¶ An unconfirmed reports says a large cattle ranch north of Managua belonging to former President Emiliano Chamorro has been looted. ¶ National Guard patrols have had five encounters with rebel bands in the last four days, in which thirty-one rebels have been killed and more than thirty have been wounded. Two guardsmen were reported killed and three wounded, the wounded including Lieutenant William A. Lee, gun sergeant in the United States Marine Corps, whose home is at Ward Hill, Mass. ¶ Lieutenant Lee was slightly wounded in the head. When the patrol returns to Jinotega he will be transferred to Managua by airplane. ¶ The four principal engagements were two near Agua Carta, one near San Antonio and one near Paso Real. The fifth was in the mountains near Chichigalpa. In the four main encounters a guard patrol led by Captain Louis P. Fuller [Lewis B. Puller?] and Lieutenant Lee clashed with 150 rebels well armed with machine guns, hand grenades and other weapons. ¶ Twenty-seven of the 150 were killed. Four others were killed in the battle near Chichigalpa, where the guards were reported to have suffered no casualties. ¶ The mountain battle lasted an hour, after which the rebels fled to a camp in an extinct volcano. The guard destroyed the camp, but the rebels escaped. ¶ Before the clash the rebels had attacked and looted the plantation of Alejandro Periera and others, destroying valuable machinery. ¶ Tomorrow is the last day for registration for the elections, but there has been on [no] interference so far by the rebels, despite their threats that they would prevent registrations. ¶ REBEL BAND FLEES NICARAGUAN GUARD ¶ Looters Burned Voting Records at San Francisco del Carnicero, 20 Miles From Managua. ¶ MARINE FLIERS WIN PRAISE ¶ Year’s Record Shows 7,139 Hours Flown With One Serious Crash—Fliers in Nine Combats. ¶ By Tropical Radio to THE NEW YORK TIMES. ¶ MANAGUA, Oct. 2.—A Nicaraguan National Guard patrol sent to San Francisco del Carnicero to pursue the rebels who the day before had looted stores and burned government buildings, reported the rebel had fled northward. Their chieftain was recognized as Juan Pablo Umanzor, one of Augusto Sandino’s ablest generals, who on many occasions has pounced down upon unprotected communities. ¶ The rebel group consisted of 150 well-armed men, who attacked the village, only twenty miles from Managua, from all sides, terrifying the inhabitants. Telegraph and telephone lines had been cut in advance and the insurgents were able to loot and burn the village without interference. The National Guard garrison of four men escaped. ¶ After committing their depredations the rebels loaded their loot on mules, destroying the merchandise they were unable to carry off. All election records, including the voting lists, were burned. ¶ The annual report of Captain Francis P. Mulcahy, commanding the United States Marine Corps aviation squadron, shows that 6,316 flights were made during the past year, including 1,816 photographic reconnaissance, liaison and combat flights. Marine corps planes carried more than 650,000 pounds of freight, 4,532 passengers and soldiers and $314,000 in cash to be dropped at isolated places. ¶ The total of hours flown were 7,139. There was one serious crash, in which two aviators were killed. ¶ There were nine aerial contacts with rebels, during which ninety-eight bombs were dropped and 3,050 machine-gun rounds were fired. Marine planes were struck nineteen times by rebel bullets. ¶ Twenty-five flights were made to foreign countries, usually on humane missions connected with earthquakes, hurricans [hurricanes] and epidemics. ¶ The aviation squadron consists of twenty officers and 231 non-commissioned officers. Its officers believe that, considering the difficult conditions, the mountainous terrain and the few landing fields, an unusual record was established. Without the services of the Marines’ planes the Nicaraguan National Guard would have been severely handicapped."

46.  October 1, 1932.  Confidential G-2 Report on Sandino Situation:  Enemy Supply and Equipment, Hq. Guardia Nacional, Managua, Nicaragua.     "NICARAGUA – Political. ¶ 3020(d) ¶ Sandino Situation. ¶ Enemy Supply and Equipment. ¶ Reliable information has been received to the effect that Sandino agents of Honduras, with the connivance of the Honduran Government officials, have recently purchased stolen arms and ammunition taken from the government arsenals in Honduras, to the following amount: ¶ 400 Rifles. ¶ 80,000 to 100,000 rounds of rifle ammunition. ¶ 20 to 50 pistols. ¶ 8,000 rounds of pistol ammunition, cal. 45 ¶ Few Automatic weapons. ¶ Sandino paid 14,000 cordobas for these munitions. The names of the Sandino agents involved in the deal are Alfonso Irias, Torribio Tijerino, Camilo Guillen, Alejandro Cerda, Manuel Arguello, all Nicaraguans, and an American named Edwin E. Huber. The report further states that Angel Zuniga Huete, Liberal presidential candidate (Honduras) is involved in the deal and that the 14,000 cordobas are destined for the Liberal Party’s campaign fund. It is rumored that Sandino has promised to help Huete with a revolution in case he (Huete) is not elected. Most of the above munitions are reported to have been taken from the Arsenal in Tegucigalpa. ¶ (Confidential report fr. Hq. Guardia Nacional, Managua, Nicaragua, October 1, 1932.)"

47.  September 22, 1932.  G-2 Translation of article, "Sandino Will Refuse his 'Visto Bueno' to Servility," El Excelsior (Sept 21), Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 1.     "G-2 Report ¶ 3850-a ¶ MEXICO ¶ POLITICAL ¶ SUBJECT: Foreign Relations, etc. ¶ Relations with Foreign Countries; ¶ SANDINO and the Nicaraguan Situation. ¶ 1. Following is a translation of an article which appeared in the “Excelsior” of September 21, 1932, entitled “Sandino will Refuse his ‘Visto Bueno’ to Servility.” ¶ No Government Arising from Yankee Surveillance will be Recognized by him. ¶ Disavowal of Agreements signed behind the Backs of the Nicaraguan People. ¶ Dr. Pedro José Zepeda, general representative of the “Ejercito Defensor de la Soberanía Nacional de Nicaragua”, in making statements to the press regarding Sandino’s recent activities, gives the following account of the hostilities of his army during the months of June and July, 1932, the reports of which have been heretofore very fragmentary: ¶ “During those months about forty combats were engaged in, whose successes and defeats, with the loyalty which characterizes the invincible leader, have been made known to the Nicaraguan people, that our laborer and peasant masses might comprehend the enormous sacrifice of blood involved in the new effort to reconquer their trampled sovereignty and know how to demand, with more energy and decision, the corresponding responsibilities from the traitors who, headed by Moncada, Sacasa and Chamorro, have trafficked with the liberty and independence of the nation. ¶ “In the latest communication from Sandino’s headquarters in Las Segovias, we learn that column No. 12, commanded by Generals Juan Gregorio Colindres and Ismael Peralta, has received instructions to proceed west, taking as secretary, Dr. Arturo Vega, a young physician of well-known patriotism and talent. This same column, composed of 600 men and 9 machine guns, will be reinforced by another of like strength and commanded by Generals Juan Santos Morales and Juan Pablo Umanzor. These are the troops which, combined, attacked and captured the towns of Sauce (Department of León) and Las Lajas near the city of Chinandega, and carried on the series of combats which took place on the 14th of September when William Walker, the North-American filibuster, was definitely defeated,- and on the 15th of September, the anniversary of our national independence. ¶ From: M.A. Mexico. ¶ Report No. 4162. ¶ Date: Sept. 22, 1932. . . . "

48.  September 22, 1932.  G-2 Translation of article, "Sandino Will Refuse his 'Visto Bueno' to Servility," El Excelsior (Sept 21), Capt. Robert E. Cummings, Acting Military Attaché, Mexico City, p. 2.     " . . . General Augusto Cesár Sandino again declares that the nationalist cause of our country is not interested in the shameful and servile campaign being waged in Nicaragua by the several factions supporting Adolfo Díaz for President of the Republic, and Emiliano Chamorro for Vice-President; and still less in the campaign for Juan Bautista Sacasa and Rodolfo Espinosa of the so-called ‘Conservador’ and ‘Liberal’ parties, respectively. In this connection General Sandino tells me: ¶ “ ‘From the beginning our Army has had only one object, and will only have one until the end, - the restoration of our national independence. The different phases of our struggle do not matter. Therefore our Army disregards the treaties, pacts, and agreements signed behind the backs of our people, between the Governments of North America and those imposed by them, at the bayonet’s point, against the express will of the Nicaraguan people from 1909 to the present date. ¶ “ ‘This explains why our Army does not recognize, nor never will recognize, any Government of Nicaragua imposed by the super-vigilance of the intervening Government of the United States of North America.’ ” . ¶ Robert E. Cummings, ¶ Captain, Infantry, DOL ¶ Acting Military Attaché ¶ Source: As stated. ¶ C/p ¶ From: M.A. Mexico. ¶ Report No. 4162. ¶ Date: Sept. 22, 1932."

49.  September 19, 1932.  Naval Intelligence Report on Visit of the Naval Attaché to the Honduran-Nicaraguan Border," Naval Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 1.     "On September 3, 1932, the Naval Attaché proceeded to the Nicaraguan border with a view to observing the conditions in that vicinity relative to the movements of Nicaraguan bandits and bandit agents, and to view the progress of General Plata (new Comandante of Danlí) in his work of preventing the smuggling of arms to the bandits and the rendering of aid to Sandino and his followers by residents in Honduras. ¶ During this visit the Naval Attaché visited Danlí, Paraiso and San Marcos de Colon in Honduras, and Ocotal, Totogalpa and Somoto in Nicaragua. ¶ General Plata, although designated as the Comandante of Danlí, has control over all subcomandantes in that section and a small mobile force. The number of men at his disposal are as follows: ¶ Post ¶ Enlisted ¶ Officers ¶ Commander ¶ Danlí ¶ 18 ¶ 3 ¶ Colonel Marco Vaca ¶ Mobile force ¶ 25 ¶ 1 ¶ Colonel Manuel Espinal ¶ Las Manos ¶ 4 ¶ 1 ¶ Captain Reyes Mendez ¶ San Marcos Colon ¶ 10 ¶ 1 ¶ Colonel Pascual Montoya ¶ Cifuentes ¶ 4 ¶ 1 ¶ Captain Jesus Martinez ¶ Paraiso ¶ 4 ¶ 1 ¶ Captain Vicente Sanchez ¶ He is supposed to have twenty police inspectors operating with him but at the time of this visit only four had reported for duty. ¶ Plata’s force is untrained and poorly equipped, his armament consisting of obsolete single shot Remington rifles and two Lewis machine guns. Although his mobile force is actively patrolling, it is doubtful if his entire command could accomplish anything should it contact any sizeable group of Sandino’s forces. The utmost that Plata can accomplish is to make the shipment of arms to Sandino difficult and prevent the sale of bandit loot in Honduras. Some indications are that he is working energetically with the object in view of accomplishing this. It would be foolish for him to attempt preventing a large bandit force from crossing the frontier but his presence discourages the free use of Honduras as a refuge. During the visit information was received at Ocotal, Nicaragua, that a group of bandits, after a contact with the Guardia, had started to enter Honduras but had been prevented by Plata’s force. However, the Naval Attaché doubts that the strength of Plata’s force had anything to do with keeping the Sandinistas out but the bandits did not care to offend Honduras, knowing well that should residents along the border become antagonistic or unfriendly, free movements along that section would become difficult. They will however continue to slip into Honduras where they can do so unobserved. ¶ (Continued on Page Two------- . . . "

50.  September 19, 1932.  Naval Intelligence Report on Visit of the Naval Attaché to the Honduran-Nicaraguan Border," Naval Attaché, Tegucigalpa, p. 2.     " . . . Plata informed the Naval Attaché that he has several of his men on espionage work and that friendly people have promised to keep him informed of any movement of arms towards Nicaragua. His mobile force is operating along the border south of Danlí. In this manner he is hopeful of getting information that will lead to the capture of arms shipments should there be any passing through that section. Although Plata’s interest was doubtful due to the failure of the Government to pay him or his officials their salaries, that obstacle has been overcome, at least temporarily, and Plata is moving his family from San Marcos de Colon to Danlí. This will have a tendency to keep him in that section which is believed to be the center of the most important area. ¶ The people of Danlí seem pleased with the appointment of Plata and believe that he will do much to prevent activities of agents of Sandino. There was no information available indicating that there had been any recent activities but Plata was investigating a visit to Tegucigalpa of Alfonso Irias and Ramon Raudales whom he suspected of engaging in Sandino business. Plata stated that if his suspicions prove to be true he will have these two individuals removed to Tegucigalpa and forced to remain in that City. ¶ On August 20th, General Plata held a conference at Las Manos with Colonel T. E. Watson, Jefe of the Guardia Nacional at Ocotal, and the Jefe Politico of the same place. General Plata stated that the conference was very successful and an agreement had been reached for mutual cooperation in preventing the bandits from receiving aid from Honduras. While in Ocotal, the Naval Attaché was informed by Colonel Watson, that Plata was aparently [apparently] working with him and forwarding information helpful to the functioning of the Guardia. ¶ The Naval Attaché spent two days in Ocotal and returned overland to Honduras via Totogalpa and Somoto. During this time the workings of the Guardia were observed with much interest. The efficiency and smoothness with which the patrols and organization functions is to be highly complimented. The section through which the Naval Attaché passed is being effectively covered in spite of the limited number of men available. Every facility was extended to the Naval Attaché during his visit to this area. ¶ The Comandante in San Marcos Colon is supposed to have a force of ten men stationed in that place. There were however none observed by the Naval Attaché and a reliable resident stated that actually the Comandante had but two men in active service. The section around San Marcos was very quiet and most of the residents were working their farms and not interested in Sandino. The people cannot be considered generally as friendly to nor against Sandino but seem to display no interest; it is doubtful he receives aid thru that part of Honduras."