1.     1 July 1931.
Intelligence Report, GN-2 Report of 1 June, 1931.  Gen. C. B. Matthews, Jefe Director GN Managua, to Commanding General, 2nd Brigade USMC, Managua, p. 1.    "HEADQUARTERS GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARGUA, MANAGUA, NICARAGUA. ¶ 1 July, 1931. ¶ FROM: Jefe Director. ¶ TO: The Commanding General, Second Marine Brigade, Managua, Nicaragua. ¶ Subject: Intelligence Report, Guardia Nacional, GN-2 Report of 1 June, 1931. ¶ Reference: (a) Letter, Comsperon, A8-2(1), to BC, 2MB. 18 June, 1931. ¶ 1. The Commander Special service Squadron and the Brigade Commander are already cognizant of the status of the RAMIRO MOLLA SANZ, the purpose for which he is supposed to have entered Nicaragua and result of is alleged visit to Sandino’s Headquarters, not only from the information appearing in the GN-2 report of 1 June, 1931, but also from that contained in the Naval Intelligence Department personnel report on Sanz, Serial No. 38031, File No. 108-300, 13 May, 1931, copy of which was sent to both offices. Information was received here some time ago that Sanz would visit Managua and intended to call at Guardia Headquarters. To date he has not appeared. ¶ 2. Mr. J. A. Fagot’s father, Albert Fagot, has been a resident of Cape Gracias and vicinity for many years. He has been in business there and has always enjoyed an excellent reputation. It is understood he is now closing out and will leave Nicaragua permanently. Very little is known of Mr. J.A. Fagot other than what is stated in the GN-3 report. ¶ 3. The statement that several of President Moncada’s former Generals were joining Sandino is purely Sandino propaganda. General Escamilla is at present engaged in road building projects for the Nicaraguan government and is, as far as can be determined, still a friend of and loyal to the President. ¶ 4. The statement relative to Sandino having seventy three military divisions, with at total of five thousand men, is absurd. The average bandit group ordinarily numbers from ten to forty and many of the groups contain hastily inducted men with their machetes. Sandino may have established some sort of a unified organization with the more important leaders, and I believe that totaling all the groups under his so called control would result in less than 600 bandits scattered throughout the country. There are numerous other small groups operating independently of any Sandino movement—they are merely bands of robbers and rob as a means of existence. -1- ¶ [...]"

2.     1 July 1931.
Intelligence Report, GN-2 Report of 1 June, 1931.  Gen. C. B. Matthews, Jefe Director GN Managua, to Commanding General, 2nd Brigade USMC, Managua, p. 2.    "[...] 5. After each contact with bandits, the guardia patrols collect as many of the empty cartridge cases as can be found, and with very few exceptions the cases have proven to be of United States manufacture. There has been no evidence of any German manufactured ammunition. ¶ 6. Sandino has no aeroplane landing field nor any plane. That subject is too ridiculous for serious consideration, although it is quite likely he has circulated such a false report to many countries, including our own, and that many of the unsuspecting people, absolutely in ignorance of the actual conditions of the thickly wooded, mountainous, roadless, sections of the country in which Sandino must hide himself like a rat in a hole, erroneously believing he is a patriot and martyr, give full credence to the report. ¶ 7. It is probable Sandino is getting some financial support from Bolshevistic sources, but it is not believed the sums he receives would finance even minor operations against an organized force. The bandit raids of fincas to replenish their food and clothing supply, from time to time, seems like a suitable argument to disprove his claims of being well supplied from outside sources. An account of an interview with his supposed secretary in Mexico on the subject of money contributions from Bolshevists stated that the Secretary vigorously denied that Sandino ever accepted such offers, excepting on one occasion when one thousand dollars, was sent to him through a Nicaraguan emissary. Further, that upon arrival in camp, the emissary delivered two hundred and fifty dollars to Sandino producing an expense account for the difference of seven hundred and fifty dollars. ¶ 8. The remarks pertaining to Adolfo Cockburn are substantially correct. This man, a Diputado Suplente (alternate Deputy), has long been suspected of crooked dealings and activities with the bandits. His status as a public official makes him immune from prosecution. Unless he is caught red handed in an overt act and the Nicaraguan Congress takes some action, it is feared that his activities will continue without molestation. ¶ 9. Abraham River is an east coast bandit jefe closely associated with the Sandino movement. He makes his living raiding. There seems to be no question of an alliance between Rivera and Cockburn and their “holding out” on Sandino. ¶ 10. Sandino, or any other Nicaraguan outlaw, is incapable of formulating any extensive plan for military operations. As our standards go I not believe he ever has any progressive ideas on the subject. His operations on the east coast were simple ones—Blandon was to take Puerto Cabezas, Rivera Cape ¶ -2- [...]"

3.     1 July 1931.
Intelligence Report, GN-2 Report of 1 June, 1931.  Gen. C. B. Matthews, Jefe Director GN Managua, to Commanding General, 2nd Brigade USMC, Managua, p. 3.    "[...] Gracias, other forces to join Blandon and then the entire force was to move on Bluefields. The first phase of his plan was broken up in the death of Blandon, and his forces were routed. The loss of a leader not only interferes with Sandino’s plans, but apparently causes a complete abandonment of the entire plan. So much for Sandino’s plans. As a matter of interest to the Commander Special Service Squadron, and for his information and retention, I am enclosing Photostat copies of original documents found on the person of Blandon at time of his death which proves conclusively he has been eliminated. ¶ 11. The Eastern Area has always been alert and extremely watchful for reports, rumors and information of bandit activities and regardless of the credibility of the information received, has taken special pains to place it in possession of Guardia Headquarters. The letter was quoted in the report because part of it corroborated and checked up with other similar information on hand here and was not intended to be believed literally, but was published with a view to its use in checking up on other rumors and reports received throughout the country. The GN-2 report of the Guardia Nacional is published primarily for the information and use of the officers of the Guardia Nacional and it has often happened that, by the promulgation of reports, statements and rumors, which in themselves were fantastic and unbelievable officers have been unable to get leads which have helped them to gather military information which otherwise would have escaped their notice. ¶ C.B. MATTHEWS, Jefe Director. ¶ CONFIDENTIAL Third Endorsement 6 July 1931 ¶ HEADQUARTERS, 2d MARINE BRIGADE,MANAGUA, NICARAGUA. ¶ From: The Commanding General. ¶ To: The Commander, Special Service Squadron, Balboa, C.Z. ¶ 1. Returned, inviting attention to the second endorsement. ¶ 2. There is no further information available in this connection. ¶ F. L. BRADMAN"

1 July 1931 (n.d.)
Memo for Mr. Fernald in Reference to the Population of Puerto Cabezas and its Jurisdiction.  William G. Rupprecht, Puerto Cabezas.    "MEMO FOR MR. FERNALD IN REFERENCE TO THE ¶ POPULATIONOF PUERTO CABEZAS AND IT’S ¶ JURIDSDICTION. ¶ The following is the result of my inquiry in reference to the population of Puerto Cabezas and it’s jurisdiction: ¶ Could obtain no information of the Mayor, being told that he would try to have statistics ready for me tomorrow. ¶ Señor Pedro Perez Gallo, a prominent lawyer of Puerto Cabezas informed me of the following, being simply a calculation. He believes that there are approximately 2000 people in Port, including the American Zone, the village of Bilwi, and the Company barracones. His estimate of the Farms district and also the Indian Communities which are dependent on Puerto Cabezas, is that of 7000, making a total of 9,000. ¶ The estimate of Doctor Mongalo is the following: In Port 2000, and in the Farms district and the Indian Communities 6,000, making a total of 8,000. ¶ Dr. Mongalo informed me that it is practically impossible to attempt to take census in Puerto Cabezas, due to the incessant increase and decrease in the Company’s projects. ¶ He states that Puerto Cabezas may be considered as a “moving” city, depending on the resolutions of the Company. ¶ The Indian Communities are thirteen(?) and consist of: ¶ Tuapi, Krukira, Sisin, Yulu, Wawa Bar, Karata, Licus, Lamlaya, Auyapini, Kamla, Boom, and Bilwi. ¶ William G. Rupprecht"

1.     2 July 1931.
Patrol Report, 1st Sgt. Pablo Rivas M., GN# 174, Cabo Gracias a Dios, to Capt. O. A. Inman, Puerto Cabezas, p. 1.    "Cabo Gracias a Dios, Julio 2 de 1931.- ¶ Departamento de Puerto Cabezas ¶ Cuartel General de Puerto Cabezas ¶ Del: Sargento 1º. Pablo Rivas M. No. 174 G.N. ¶ Al: Comandante del Departamento , G.N. Cap. C. A. INMAN.- ¶ La información al respecto es la siguiente: Salí en Comisión el 17 de Junio ppdo. Con dirección hasta Waspook, dilatando de este lugar cuatro días hasta dicho lugar, a diez kilómetros de Waspook me informaron que existía por allí algunos individuos desorganizados del combate que hubo en la línea de Puerto Cabezas, entonces por toda prevención decidí irme por tierra con cinco números a Waspook, mientras el resto de guardias iban sobre el río en un remolcador, a cuatro millas antes de llegar a Waspook noté que en una casa había un individuo armado de un rifle infume sistema Remington, él cuando nos divisó noté que era la guardia y no sé si por decisión quiso ponerse en fuga echando el parque que poseía de su arma al río, y luego poniéndose en fuga, los cinco que patrullábamos disparamos sobre él y quedando él de esto completamente muerto. Algunas personas de ese lugar me informaron que era de apellido Valenzuela y que él amparado a su arma les ordenaban cosas que ellos no creían satisfactorias; pues bien la gente pacífica de ese lugar le declaraban un completo bandolero. El arma fue recogida por mí que es la que le he enviado a esa, un infume sistema Remington. El lugar de lo ocurrido es “Suaven” a CIENTO OCHENTIOCHO millas de este lugar. Esta es la verdad de todo lo ocurrido. Es cuanto puedo [....]"

2.     2 July 1931.
Patrol Report, 1st Sgt. Pablo Rivas M., GN# 174, Cabo Gracias a Dios, to Capt. O. A. Inman, Puerto Cabezas, p. 2.    "[...] informarle hasta hoy.- Quedo de Ud. Su muy Atto. S. S. (signed) Pablo Rivas M.- Sargento 1º. – No. 174 G. N."

3.     2 July 1931.
Patrol Report, 1st Sgt. Pablo Rivas M., GN# 174, Cabo Gracias a Dios, to Capt. O. A. Inman, Puerto Cabezas, p. 3.   "Cape Gracias, 2 July 1931. ¶ Cuartel General. Departamento de Puerto Cabezas. ¶ From: First Sergeant Pablo Rivas M., No. 174, GN. ¶ To: Capt. C. A. Inman, Dep. Comdr. , G.N. ¶ The following is the information requested: I cleared on commission on 17 June 1931 headed to Waspook, four days travel up to that place. At ten kilometers from Waspook I was informed that there were around these places some individuals who were scattered from the contact which took place around Puerto Cabezas for which reason I decided to go by the trail with five men to Waspook while the remainder of the patrol went upon the river in a tug boat. Four miles before the arrival I saw a man standing on a house who was armed with a rifle, model “Smokeless” , system Remington. Then the man saw that the Guardia was approaching he wanted to escape and threw on the river his ammunition and fled away, we, the five of the patrol, fired immediately upon him and he fell dead. Some natives of the vicinity informed me later that he was a man by the name of Valenzuela, who using his arm (the rifle) directed the people to do what he wanted, the natives realized that he was true bandit. I took the rifle and I sent it to that town, is a Remington “smokeless” rifle. The scene of the occurrence is named “Suaven”, distance 188 miles from this place. This is the truth on what occurred and all that I can report. ¶ /a/ Pablo Rivas M., ¶ 1st Sgt., #174, G.N. [...]"

4.     2 July 1931.
Patrol Report, 1st Sgt. Pablo Rivas M., GN# 174, Cabo Gracias a Dios, to Capt. O. A. Inman, Puerto Cabezas, p. 4.   "[...] 2nd Endorsement ¶ DEPARMENT OF NORTHERN BLUEFIELDS ¶ PUERTO CABEZAS, NIC. July 4, 1931. ¶ From: The Department Commander. ¶ To: The Area Commander. ¶ Subject: Patrol report of 1st. Sgt. Rivas. Enclosure: One (1) ¶ Report of 1st Sgt. Rivas dated 2 July, 1931. ¶ 1. Returned. ¶ 2. The information requested in 1st endorsement is covered by enclosure of this endorsement. (signed) O.A. INMAN"

1.  4 July 1931.
Record of Events, Eastern Area, June 1931.  Col. C. A. Wynn, Bluefields, to Jefe Director GN Managua, p. 1.    "4 July, 1931 ¶ From; The Area Commander, Eastern Area. ¶ To: The Jefe Director, Headquarters Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, Mangua, Nicaragua. ¶ Subject: Record of Events, Eastern Area, June 1931. ¶ Reference: General Order Number 140 = 1929 ¶ C. MILITARY OPERATIONS (Continued) the prompt arrest and confinement of a bandit character, at NEPTUNE MINE, by the Noncommissioned officer in charge, and in the enterprise displayed by the Noncommissioned officer in charge of CAPE GRACIA, who, acting on his own initiative, made a patrol of four hundred miles, (400 mi), from CAPE GRACIAS to WASPOOK and return, during which he killed a fully armed bandit character who attempted to escape capture, in the vicinity of WASPOOK. Upon receipt of information from the Jefe Director, during the period that a possible invading bandit column threatened this coast, the Area Commander promptly ordered a detachment embarked on power barge and cleared BLUEFIELDS for EL GALLO the same date. EL GALLO’S combined force is now well prepared to handle any emergency or engage in any contact that may develop. ¶ D. POLICE OPERATIONS. ¶ 1. See Departmental Reports. ¶ 2. General Police Conditions. The Area Commander has pushed forward the general military police of the Area to greater activity during he period. The results of the Area Commander’s policy in this field have been the seizure of several hundred dollars in value of contraband tobacco which had been smuggled into BLUEFIELDS; the closing of gambling and unlawful lottery operations in PUERTO CABEZAS; and a marked decrease in criminal offenses of all kinds throughout the Area. ¶ E. INTELLIGENCE. ¶ 1. The general state of the territory occupied is quiet. The Area Commander has taken adequate military measures to meet any bandit threat that may arise within the boundaries of the Area, of reasonable access. [...]"

2.  4 July 1931.
Record of Events, Eastern Area, June 1931.  Col. C. A. Wynn, Bluefields, to Jefe Director GN Managua, p. 2.    "[...] -5- ¶ Subject: Record of Events, Eastern Area, June 1931. ¶ E. INTELLIGENCE. (continued) ¶ 2. Military situation. There is some reason to believe that a bandit encampment and jumping-off point exists on the COCO RIVER in the Northeastern limits of the Area. The Area Commander does not have sufficient funds, troops and river craft with which to undertake an expedition against this bandit base. In the NEPTUNE MINE vicinity thee are possibly a few scattered, lurking bandit characters, spies and sympathizers. The small, unsupported military garrison at NEPTUNE MINE is not able to undertake extended patrol operations, and round up these lawless elements, but the First Sergeant in charge of the Post has been given instructions to keep vigilantly on the alert, and to take aggressive military action, whenever possible. ¶ 3. Economic Situation. The economic situation is not satisfactory. Poverty, “bad times”, and abnormally small sales and stock turn-over, are reported everywhere. The vessels purchasing their banana cargoes from the independent planters along the ESCONDIDO RIVER, have not put in to the port of BLUEFIELDS for over two months. The discontinuance of work on the MANAGUA-RAMA HIGHWAY, at EL RAMA, and the abandonment of the PEARL LAGOON CANAL project have both added their sum to the general depression and the low point in the economic life of the coast. ¶ 4. Friction between Guardia and Civil population: None, and it can be positively reported that there are many evidences of increased respect for the Guardia throughout the Area. ¶ 5. Political Situation: Quiet. ¶ 6. Weather. Continued rains, and increasing high temperatures. [...]"

3.  4 July 1931.
Record of Events, Eastern Area, June 1931.  Col. C. A. Wynn, Bluefields, to Jefe Director GN Managua, p. 3.    "[...] -6- ¶ Subject: Record of Events, Eastern Area, June 1931. ¶ E. INTELLIGENCE. (Continued) ¶ 7. Roads and Trails. Roads and trails, such as exist in the Eastern Area, are in very poor condition. The RAMA-MANAGUA HIGHWAY work has stopped, and that part of the road constructed near RAMA has been seriously damaged by the rains. ¶ 8. Condition of Telephone and Telegraph Communications. Satisfactory. ¶ F. CONFISCATION OF ARMS. See Departmental Reports. ¶ G. TRAINING. ¶ The recent increase in the officer strength of the Eastern Area has been of very great assistance in the training of troops, particularly in the Department of Northern Bluefields, where they are urgently needed. The Guardia posts on the railroad line in that Department are rapidly being trained to move quickly and effectively. Daily patrols by personnel from KIPLA FARM, MOSS FARM and TOLEDO WYE are made, covering the entire one hundred kilometers of the railroad right of way and most of the nearby farms headquarters and centers of population. ¶ A very marked improvement in the condition and appearance of the troops in BLUEFIELDS has been noted during the past few months. It has been particularly gratifying to note the smart, military appearance of the troops, with their spotlessly clean clothes, uniform carriage, and shining metal work on web equipment. During the several command positions occupied by the Area Commander in other Areas in the Republic of Nicaragua, he has never seen more smartly turned-out body of troops than those in BLUEFIELDS, nor a better military organization than that of the Eastern Area. [...]"

4.  4 July 1931.
Record of Events, Eastern Area, June 1931.  Col. C. A. Wynn, Bluefields, to Jefe Director GN Managua, p. 4.    "[...] -7- ¶ Subject: Record of Events, Eastern Area, June 1931. ¶ H. MISCELLANEOUS. ¶ (a) CIVICOS – The following units of civicos are available for emergency military service in the following towns. They are not under formal enlistment contract: = ¶ BLUEFIELDS 67 ¶ PUERTO CABEZAS 50 ¶ RAMA 21 ¶ EL GALLO 17 ¶ LA CRUZ 20 ¶ NEPTUNE MINE 30 ¶ (b) MUNICIPAL GUARDIA: - BLUEFIELDS, ten (10); PUERTO CABEZAS, ten, (10). Three (3) Municipal Guardia will be enlisted in EL RAMA in the near future. ¶ The Area Commander inspected the Department of Northern Bluefields, PUERTO CABEZAS , during the period. The administration and training of this organization and the Ninth Company is being ably conducted. The Department Commander has employed the services of officers to good advantage, and a wholesome spirit of cooperation and contentment was evident among the entire officer personnel. The general condition of the command was very satisfactory, and in some departments, particularly clothing and barracks inspection, the condition was found to be superior. ¶ During the period the Area Commander has established the publication of a semi-official military gazette of the Eastern Area, a bi-monthly newspaper, with the appropriate name designated as “VIENTOS DEL ORIENTE”, or “THE EAST WIND”. The Area Commander has undertaken this enterprise to augment the morale of the command, to increase the inter-departmental and inter-post understanding, and to knit the entire Area inter-contented (?), composite unit, with an end in view of increased military efficiency of this unusually large Area. The several newspapers, both Liberal and Conservative, of BLUEFIELDS, and the general public at large have been profuse in compliments and congratulations, with the appearance of the first issue of the paper, and the Guardia troops have shown keen interest and appreciation, in their publication. It is believed that the “EAST WIND” will greatly increase the prestige of the Guardia Nacional in the eyes of the public, and produce effective results in the already increasing efficiency of the Eastern Area. ¶ (signed) C. A. WYNN"

4 July 1931.
Radiogram from Gen. C. B. Matthews, Jefe Director GN Managua, to Manuel C. y Bordas, Cabo Gracias a Dios.   "REFERENCIA SU RADIOGRAMA FECHADA 22 DE JUNIO Y MI CONTESTACION FECHADA 24 DE JUNIO PRIMARA TRANSPORTACION DE MANAGUA SERA 14 DE JULIO Y DESUPES DE ESO 28 DE JULIO. SI ESTAMOS ENTENDIDOS Y UD. PUEDE DEPOSITAR EL DINERO ANTES DE 7 DE JULIO, LOS GUARDIAS SERAN ENVIADOS DE MANAGUA 14 DE JULIO. AVISEME. C. B. MATTHEWS, JEFE DIRECTOR. OTTO SALZMAN, By direction."   [English translation included]

10 July 1931.
Letter from Gen. Augusto C. Sandino, Cuartel General del EDSNN, to Gen. Carlos Salgado y Col. Abraham Rivera, Campo de Operaciones Militares de las Columnas No. 2 y No. 6, p. 1.   [SOURCE:  Anastasio Somoza García, El verdadero Sandino, p. 241]   "Señores Jefes Expedicionarios. ¶ General Carlos Salgado P. y Coronel Abraham Rivera. ¶Campo de Operaciones Militares de las Columnas No. 2 y No. 6. ¶ Mis muy distinguidos y queridos hermanos: ¶ Con la intención del deber que tengo para que todos nuestros Jefes Expedicionarios estén ampliamente informados de las condiciones generales de nuestro Ejército me permito remitirles en el sobre de la nota del [...]"

10 July 1931.
Letter from Gen. Augusto C. Sandino, Cuartel General del EDSNN, to Gen. Carlos Salgado y Col. Abraham Rivera, Campo de Operaciones Militares de las Columnas No. 2 y No. 6, p. 2.   [SOURCE:  Anastasio Somoza García, El verdadero Sandino, p. 242.]   "[...] Coronel Rivera, dos cartas que nos llegaron de mi hermano Sócrates y de don José Idiaquea, en las que nos participan de una comisión diplomática que está tratando de entrevistarnos. Les remito los originales para que sean leídos por Uds. Y comentados por todos los Miembros de nuestras columnas No. 2 y No. 6. ¶ En lo que corresponde a este Jefatura Suprema de nuestro Ejército, tiene dispuesto de que SEGÚN LAS PROPUESTAS, ASI SEAN LAS POSIBILIDADES DE QUE SI VUELVEN A SALIR O NO DE NUESTROS CAMPAMENTOS LOS MENCIONADOS DELEGADOS. ¶ Ṹltimamente hemos tenido noticias de que la mencionada delegación viene también compuesta de altas personalidades de los Gobiernos de Guatemala, El Salvador y Honduras, y aún se habla de un parlamento entre México y los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica relacionado con los asuntos de Nicaragua. ¶ Ya veremos en qué para la cosa. ¶ En estos días de tremendas lluvias hemos estado “legajeando” importantísimos documentos de la actuación política y militar de nuestro ejército, para tratar de escribir un libro oportunamente. ¶ Y como he dicho, queriendo que nuestro Jefes Expedicionarios se sientan lo debidamente orientados, hoy me permito envíar dos legajos de esos documentos, para que uno quede en poder del Coronel Abraham Rivera y lo estudie y el otro para que sea remitido al General Adolfo Cockburn, en Saclin, por conducto del Coronel Abraham Rivera. ¶ Para el Gral. Salgado no remito legajo de esos documentos porque el los recibirá de mis propias manos, y en esta vez mis propósito es que los hermanos Gral. Cockburn y el Coronel Rivera, se orienten mejor pues el General Salgado tiene perfecto conocimiento de los documentos acumulados en el mencionado legajo. Sin embargo, pondré siempre personalmente un legajo en sus manos para su archivo personal. ¶ Sinceramente vuestro hermano. ¶ Patria y Libertad ¶ (f) A.C. SANDINO. (Un sello)"

11 July 1931.
Radiogram from US Consul, Puerto Cabezas, to Jefe Director GN Managua.   "According to advises received today via schooner from Prinzapolka a raid was made June 28 by Generals Caracas Salgado and Rivera simultaneously with fifty men on Siumaastricht [Siuna?] and one hundred on Wani [Wuani] coming and returning via Sasa River Casas Viejos and Uli River. Several persons killed but no Americans. About forty refugees reported to be in Prinzapolka.  Bonanza Mine believed untouched.  Rumor that Sandino himself with six hundred men enroute here thought locally probably baseless though possible.  The journey here from region possible in about two weeks. U.S.S. SACRAMENTO arrived here this afternoon."

16 July 1931.
Letter from Gen. Augusto C. Sandino, Cuartel General del EDSNN, to Señor General de Brigada Adolfo Cockburn, Sacklin, p. 1.    [SOURCE:  Anastasio Somoza García, El verdadero Sandino, p. 276.]   "Cuartel Gral. Del Ejército Defensor de la Soberanía Nacional de Nicaragua, Julio 16 de 1931. ¶Señor General de Brigada. Adolfo Cockburn, Sacklin. ¶Muy querido hermano: ¶Con fecha 20 del próximo pasado mes, salió de ese Cuartel General de nuestro Ejército, una Comisión Militar al mando de los hermanos Coronel Perfecto Chavarría y Capitán Francisco Ellis, para ponerse a las órdenes de Ud. En ese Litoral Atlántico. ¶Hoy me permito el gusto de remitir a Ud. Un legajo de importantes documentos y escritos pertenecientes a nuestro Ejército, para que Ud., en su carácter de General de nuestro Ejército, se imponga debidamente del ideal que perseguimos y nuestros esfuerzos por alcanzar la coronación de nuestro triunfo. ¶ También Uds. Pueden hacer que se publique ese trabajo, en la prensa inglesa y de Bluefields, después de algún tiempo que ya la publicación de los mencionados documentos, no sean una revelación de planes y proyec- [...]"

16 July 1931.
Letter from Gen. Augusto C. Sandino, Cuartel General del EDSNN, to Señor General de Brigada Adolfo Cockburn, Sacklin, p. 2.    [SOURCE:  Anastasio Somoza García, El verdadero Sandino, p. 277.]  "[...] -tos allí expuestos. ¶Con mis mejores deseos de que Ud. Sepa apreciar el cariño y sinceridad con que nuestro Ejército le esta tratando a Ud., sinceramente su hermano, ¶Patria y Libertad. ¶(f) A.C. SANDINO.” (Un sello)"

18 July 1931 (1600).
Telegram from American Consul, Puerto Cabezas to Sec. State Henry Stimson, Washington D.C.   "Captain Inman reports that with reconnoitering score Guardia ambushed near Kisalaya on the Coco River afternoon 17th by 40 bandits. Nicaraguan officer wounded and 3 bandits killed. Leader believed to be Caracas; larger group believed to be following coming here Cape Gracias."

1.     21 July 1931.
Confidential Report on Bandit Activities on the East Coast of Nicaragua, Sheridan Talbott, US Consul, Bluefields, to Sec. State Henry Stimson, Washington D.C., p. 1.    "I have the honor to refer to my telegram to the Legation at Managua dated July 30 [sic; NOTE: this must be a typographical error, since this message is dated 21 July & the contents make clear that Talbott is describing events up to July 20] ... relative to the attack on the small Guardia garrison stationed at Rama by discharged workers, and to the bandit activities in the Puerto Cabezas area, and to submit for the Department's information more detailed advice as to the general situation on this Coast.  ¶  Taking advantage of the opportunity offered by the arrival of two hydroplanes of the Marine Corps, which reached this port from Managua on the 16th en route to Puerto Cabezas, I left Bluefields on the morning of the 17th and remained in Puerto Cabezas until Monday, July 20, arriving here about three in the afternoon of that day. As Consul Fernald has not yet officially opened the Puerto Cabezas consulate I considered the journey as an inspection trip  ¶  in ..."

2.     21 July 1931.
Confidential Report on Bandit Activities on the East Coast of Nicaragua, Sheridan Talbott, US Consul, Bluefields, to Sec. State Henry Stimson, Washington D.C., p. 2.    "... in my own district, but he will furnish the Department and Legation with reports regarding bandit activities in the Puerto Cabezas district in the future.  ¶  During my stay in Puerto Cabezas I had opportunities to discuss the general situation in the north eastern section of Nicaragua with officials and employees of the American fruit and lumber company with extensive holdings in that area, and with officers in the American Navy and Marine Corps (Guardia), all with long experience in Nicaragua, and the advice gathered from these sources, officers and civilians in Bluefields as well as my own observations, is the basis of the information contained in the telegram mentioned and in this despatch.  ¶  The commanding officer of the Guardia in Bluefields has been receiving reports from Managua over a period of weeks stating that one of Sandino's principal lieutenants with around two hundred men was operating in the eastern part of Matagalpa with indications of a movement towards the east coast of the country.  About ten days ago the small village of Wauni in north western Prinzapolka was visited by bandits and four men were murdered and a number of stores looted. In addition, there have been repeated rumors to the effect that a general movement of these marauders towards the eastern section of the country was taking place notwithstanding the fact that it is the generally accepted theory that they do not operate during the rainy season.  As the result of this situation and the fight at Logtown in April the Guardia officials stationed in this area have been on the alert to detect ¶ any ..."

3.     21 July 1931.
Confidential Report on Bandit Activities on the East Coast of Nicaragua, Sheridan Talbott, US Consul, Bluefields, to Sec. State Henry Stimson, Washington D.C., p. 3.    "... any evidence of a movement which might indicate a threat to the individuals and interests in this part of the country.  ¶  Upon arrival in Puerto Cabezas I learned that the commanding officer of the Guardia Nacional in that area (a captain in the Marine Corps), with twenty men had traveled by motor boat up the Coco River in an effort to detect any signs of bandit movements in the district around Kisalaya and Saklin, both situated on the Coco River and in a district where concentrations of bandits for expeditions to the south and east may be expected to originate.  On the following morning - July 18 - the planes left Puerto Cabezas, located the detachment of Guardia on the Coco River and learned that they had been fored on from the shore near Kisalaya, and a native lieutenant of the Guardia had been wounded.  The Guardia returned the fire and reported that three of the estimated number of forty men composing the attacking party had been killed.  The detachment of the Guardia returned to Cape Gracias and the commanding officer reached Puerto Cabezas yesterday morning.  In a conversation with him he stated that his observations and reports received indicated a movement of a group of bandidts from the neighborhood of the Waspook River towards Puerto Cabezas.  He, therefore, abandoned his intention of returning on a reconnaissance trip up the Coco River and remained in Puerto Cabezas.  ¶  During a journey over the railway maintained by the American lumber and fruit company I visited an isolated Guardia post commanded by an American Marine officer and situated about fifty miles west of Puerto Cabezas, and  ¶  during ..."

4.     21 July 1931.
Confidential Report on Bandit Activities on the East Coast of Nicaragua, Sheridan Talbott, US Consul, Bluefields, to Sec. State Henry Stimson, Washington D.C., p. 4.    "... during our conversation he stated that he had received information which suggested the advisability of visiting the surrounding country and that he was going out with a patrol that same afternoon.  As an indication of the difficult conditions under which these Americans are serving, I may state that this officer is the only white person in this detachment of twenty Guardia enlisted men.  ¶  The American company mentioned has made a considerable reduction in its personnel within the last few weeks and a number of rumors have reached Bluefields to the effect that they were having difficulty with former employees along the line of their railway, which extends for about eighty or ninety miles west of Puerto Cabezas, and, while there is undoubtedly considerable latent dissatisfaction among the unemployed, there was no evidence of this during my journey over most of the line with one of the officers of the company.  The company has ceased entirely its considerable lumbering activities during the present year, and the banana market in the United States together with disease affecting the plantations has greatly curtailed its production and export of this fruit.  ¶  The two aeroplanes, after their contact with the Guardia detachment on the Coco River, continued their observation work until ordered to return to Bluefields on Monday, July 20.  During their flights, they covered the area between the Coco, Waspook, and Prinzapolka Rivers and the Atlantic Coast and were unable to discover other signs of bandits than an unusual number of small boats anchored in the Coco River at the town of  ¶  Saklin, ..."

5.     21 July 1931.
Confidential Report on Bandit Activities on the East Coast of Nicaragua, Sheridan Talbott, US Consul, Bluefields, to Sec. State Henry Stimson, Washington D.C., p. 5.    "... Saklin, and the fact that no residents of that town were visible during the time the planes were in the vicinity. It may be stated that while the planes have a very great effect on the morale of the bandits, it is very seldom in this stage of the bandit activities that they can be identified when these planes appear.  ¶  On Monday morning (July 20), reports reached Puerto Cabezas of a disturbance in Rama - a small village on the Escondido River about sixty miles west of Bluefields and the point from which an attack on Bluefields might be expected to originate - and on reaching Bluefields that afternoon, I learned that around thirty of the one hundred and thirty five men employed by the Nicaraguan Government in constructing the Rama-Boaco highway had attacked dthe 20 Guardia stationed in Rama on Sunday evening and had killed one and wounded several others.  The men of the Guardia accounted for twelve of the workmen in killed, captured, and wounded.  It appears that this trouble had been brought about by the action of the Government in discontinuing work on the highway and failing to pay the laborers their wages.  ¶  As Rama is at the head of the river transportation route from the interior to Bluefields and was apparently one of the points at which the bandit efforts were directed during the April raids on this coast, as well as the fact that Sandino's lieutenant is operating not far to the west, caused many in Bluefields to interpret the early reports as indicating a bandit attack on Rama and possibly an advance towards this port.  The Guardia commander sent to Rama as reinforcements around ten of ¶ the ..."

6.     21 July 1931.
Confidential Report on Bandit Activities on the East Coast of Nicaragua, Sheridan Talbott, US Consul, Bluefields, to Sec. State Henry Stimson, Washington D.C., p. 6.

7.     21 July 1931.
Confidential Report on Bandit Activities on the East Coast of Nicaragua, Sheridan Talbott, US Consul, Bluefields, to Sec. State Henry Stimson, Washington D.C., p. 7.

1.     21 July 1931.
Report of Contact at Rama, District Commander Capt. Fred Riewe, Rama, District of Siquia, to Col. C. A. Wynn, Bluefields, p. 1.    "DISTRICT OF SIQUIA ¶ GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA ¶ RAMA, NICARAGUA 21 July, 1931 ¶ From: The District Commander. ¶ To: The Area Commander, Eastern Area of Nicaragua. ¶ Via: The Department Commander, Department of Southern Bluefields. ¶ Subject: Report of contact at Rama. ¶ Reference: General Order No. 109 dated 10 September 1929. ¶ 1. In compliance with the above reference I have the following to report: At the approach of darkness, about 1930 19 July, 1931 the cuartel was surrounded by a force of approximately twenty five bandits (about half of them were locally) some of them were positively identified as “Sandinistas”. ¶ 2. The sentry and Sergeant of the guard in front of the cuartel were greeted by a group of two and another group of six or seven with a request for a match. As the request was being complied with, one of the bandits, (Sup Jefe Ildefonso LEJARZA,) with the cry “Sandino”! drew two pistols, fired, killing the sentry. (Raso Usa OLIVA). The other bandits immediately drew concealed knives seriously wounding the Sergeant of the guard and two of the three other unarmed Guardia on the porch of the cuartel. The wounded Guardia together with two more who were in the inside of the cuartel then retreated. ¶ 3. I, seeing the encounter from my position in the third building diagonally across the square from cuartel advanced to the next building as the bandits entered the cuartel and were joined immediately by another group from the west corner of the square and still another from the rear comprised of about seven or eight, these took the Commandancia cuartel with machine gun, rifles and ammunition. 4. I was joined in position by guardia who were on duty in the streets, armed with rifles, one Municipal police and four other guardia and opened fire. Private Boik, off duty, unknowingly entered cuartel, seeing bandits, snatched two rifles from a bandit who he felled with a kick. He then joined me in position. Guardia soon exhausted their only 100 rounds of ammunition. Private Boik, then voluntarily and alone rushed the cuartel under cover of my rifle fire and returned with case of 500 rounds. In about twenty minutes firing from position this ammunition was almost exhausted. The bandits then pushed the machine gun into position to second story porch. I gave orders to take the cuartel. Bandits then retreated in rout over the rear porch dropping all but two of their captured rifles, leaving the guardia in charge of cuartel. [...]"

2.     21 July 1931.
Report of Contact at Rama, District Commander Capt. Fred Riewe, Rama, District of Siquia, to Col. C. A. Wynn, Bluefields, p. 2.    "[...] report of contact at Rama page #2. ¶ 5.- One bandit badly wounded was picked up by guardia patrol about 2300 and another also wounded was captured by patrol before 0500 20 July. Before 0800 July 20, eight additional bandits were captured. ¶ 6. The following were members of the contact with the bandits at Rama on 19 Jul, 1931: ¶ 2nd. Lieut. RIEWE, Fred Cabo VARGAS, Eliseo #2130 ¶ Raso ACDANA, Rodolfo #2485 Raso BOIK, Damainie #2331 CARDOZA, Jesus #3424 GOMES, Leonardo #3282 ¶ LAZAMA, Ramberto #2176 MARINEZ, Salomon #3536 ¶ MEDINA, Gilberto #2177 MENDOZA, Francisco #4512 ¶ OCHOA, Pedro #2894 OLIVA, Usa #2430 ¶ PRESTA, Basolisa #2419 RAMOS, Jose Mariano #3341 RENOS, Sipriano #3227 SALINAS, Juan #4592 ¶ TATHUM, Daniel #4584 ¶ Number of bandits involved, about twenty five. ¶ Casualties: Guardia: Dead. ¶ Raso OLIVA, Usa #2430 ¶ Wounded. Cabo VARGAS, Eliseo #2485 ¶ Raso GOMEZ, Leonidas #3283 ¶ Raso MARTINEZ, Salomon #3556 ¶ Bandits: Dead. ¶ Sup. Jefe LEJARZA, Ildefonso ¶ MATUTE, Enrique ¶ Wounded: GARCIA, Excequiel Ortega INCA, Ramon ¶ Captured: FLORES, Nolberto SUNAGA, Francisco MARTINEZ, Jose M. CRUZ, Juan SAVALVARA, Jose PERALTA , Guerllmo BERNETT, Leonard MEDENA,Lucas ¶ Jefe Sebastian SEQUEIRA , and several others were wounded, who made heir escape when we rushed the cuartel. ¶ Guardia weapons employed in the engagement. Five -5- KragRifles and Three -3- Pistols. ¶ Bandits equipped with. Two pistols, knives and machetes. The bandits took with them two Krag rifles (Guardia property) and two cartridge belts with bayonets. [...]"

3.     21 July 1931.
Report of Contact at Rama, District Commander Capt. Fred Riewe, Rama, District of Siquia, to Col. C. A. Wynn, Bluefields, p. 3.  [digital copy too blurry to read]

1.     21 July 1931.
Patrol Report, from Department Commander Capt. O. A. Inman, Puerto Cabezas, to Area Commander Col. C. A. Wynn, Bluefields, p. 1.   "From: The Department Commander, ¶ To: The Area Commander, Area of the East, ¶ Bluefields, Nic. ¶ Subject: Patrol Report. ¶ 1.- A patrol consisting of Captain O.A. Inman, 2nd. Lieut. Theodore M. Stephenson, 2nd. Lieut. Jacinto Montenegro, twenty enlisted men and one practicante left Puerto Cabezas the night of July 13th. 1931 to reconnoiter the Wanks River and investigate rumors that bandits were concentrating at Waspock for a drive on Puerto Cabezas. The equipment other than service rifles were two Thompson sub-machine guns. The events of each day are set forth below: ¶ Jul. 13.- Cleared Puerto Cabezas aboard U.S.S. “Sacramento” at 12:00 mid-night. ¶ Jul. 14.- Arrived Cape Gracias 7:30 a.m. and enlisted aid of civilians in repairing and equipping water transportation to proceed up river. The only available motor boat transportation was the tug Baldwin and a four cylinder motor boat which had been out of commission for several months. Due to scarcity of gasoline and oil and the heavy consumption of the tug it was thought advisable to try and recommission the motor boat which, after twenty four hours constant labor proved to be impossible with material available. ¶ Jul. 15.- Additional gasoline and what was presumed to be sufficient lub. Oil to reach Waspock was finally obtained and the patrol cleared Cape Gracias for the upper river at 2215 taking five additional enlisted men and one BAR, also the master of the tug Hugh Fagot, an engineer and pilot. ¶ Jul. 16.- Arrived at Saklin 1730 and went into camp with a detachment of ten men and one officer placed in the town. The Indians at the various villages on the lower river would give no information but appeared restless. At Saklin the people over did themselves in assuring us that there was no sign of bandits on the river above us which immediately aroused my suspicion. ¶ Jul. 17.- Tug engine broke down several times. Cleared Saklin for up river at 0910. Attempted to send flank patrol along river bank but due to heavy rains the river trail was impassable. [...]"

2.     21 July 1931.
Patrol Report, from Department Commander Capt. O. A. Inman, Puerto Cabezas, to Area Commander Col. C. A. Wynn, Bluefields, p. 2.    "[...] Jul. 17.- At 1300 one mile below Kisalaya sighted a boat with several men put into the bank in a suspicious manner. On passing found four pit-pans drawn up to bank but no sign of the occupants. Proceeded on to Kisalaya but natives disclaimed any knowledge of the boats having passed. This information we knew was false. Took four of the Indians and two pit-pans to bring boats out to the Tug for examination. On returning found that boats had gotten under way and gone down river. About a mile further down stream and about three hundred yards above the village of Warbam sighted two of the boats pulled under the dense foliage on the bank of the river. The Tug was slowed down and the Indians ordered to bring the boats out to the tug for inspection. As the pit-pans left the side of the tug heavy fire was opened on us from both sides of the river. The fire was promptly returned raking the dense foliage thoroughly. No target was visible. The contact was made at 1415 and lasted four minutes. The fire from the bandits was promptly silenced. The tug proceeded down the river and landed a patrol of fifteen men under Lieutenant Stephenson with orders to proceed back up stream and attempt to gain contact with bandits while the Tug patrolled the river. Lieutenant Stephenson’s patrol returned o the boat at 1810 and reported two contacts with the bandits. The first at Waspam and the second about a mile further up the river. The last contact resulted in a complete scattering of bandits throughout the heavy underbrush. The patrol also inspected the scene of the ambush and reported that the bandits had lost three dead and three wounded. The jefe of the group was seen by the Patrol leader and several of the men at a distance of two hundred yards. He is reported to be about five feet ten inches and to weigh about two hundred pounds; also that he was apparently wounded in the left upper arm. The guide of the group was one Francisco Ellis, the same negro who guided Blandon into Logtown. At 1815 the engineer reported that we were running low on gasoline and that there was hardly enough lubricating oil to reach Cape. Lieut. Montenegro who had been wounded in both arms during the first contact was in severe pain and exceedingly weak from loss of blood. At 1830 the tug got underway from Ulwas and proceeded down river. ¶ Jul. 18.- At 0455 arrived at Cape Gracias. Reported contacts by radio and requested planes to evacuate Lieut. Montenegro and a request to Puerto Cabezas to ship up more gasoline and lubricating oil. ¶ Jul. 19.- Airplane reports indicated possible presence of bandits between the Coco river and Puerto Cabezas. Radioed orders to 1st. Lieut. Livonski to report to Cape Gracias on first transportation. ¶ Jul. 20.- -0900 Lt. Livonski arrived Cape Gracias in plane. 0915I turned over patrol to Lt. Livonski and returned to Pto. Cabezas via plane making a thorough reconnaissance of Coco river as far as Saklin.[...]"

3.     21 July 1931.
Patrol Report, from Department Commander Capt. O. A. Inman, Puerto Cabezas, to Area Commander Col. C. A. Wynn, Bluefields, p. 3.    "[...] 2.-- It is my belief that the bandit group encountered was the first group of a larger movement directed against Puerto Cabezas. The complete routing of that group and the constant presence of airplanes on the river for several days, is believed to have at least temporarily halted any intended movement against this port. It is very possible that another group still remains between the Coco river and Puerto Cabezas. Should such a group be located it is the intention of the Department Commander to utilize the patrol at Cabo Gracias to get behind the group and cut off any possibility of retreat up the Coco river. ¶ 3.- It is my firm belief that Adolpho Cockburn and one Slate (Comandante at Saklin) are in league with the bandits. According to information from Indian messenger of the bandits who was intercepted. Adolpho Cockburn and Slate received a message from the bandits delivered by this man the morning of the day our patrol arrived in Saklin and when questioned both claimed there was no sign of Bandits on the River. ¶ 4.- I wish to bring to the attention of the Area Commander the cool and efficient conduct of every member of the patrol, especially under the trying conditions of an ambush. The prompt and accurate response to all orders resulted in the immediate silencing of the enemy fire and the death or wounding of several of the bandits. I especially desire to commend 2nd. Lieutenant Jacinto Montenegro who was in command of the detail on the after part of the tug. Montenegro was shot through both arms from the Honduranean side of the river in the early stages of the action. He concealed his wounds from his men under a rubber poncho and continued to direct the fire of his men until the action was over. This action especially from a young officer under fire for the first time, is, in my opinion, very commendable. ¶ 5.- It is my opinion that the group encountered was an advance group clearing the way for a larger body to follow. All large pit-pans and boats from Kum to Waspock have been taken up the river to the vicinity of Bocay. Persistent rumors indicate that the bandits are badly in need of supplies especially salt, and it is believed that desperation will cause them to make a raid on Cape Gracias or one of the line commissaries. If their plans were to hit Puerto Cabezas in force I believe they have been, at least , temporarily checked. It is very possible that some still remain to the lower river between Sawa Boom and Kisalaya. Airplanes are endeavoring to locate them. A new road has been cut from Saklin to Sawa boom at which point the main trail from Honduras meets the Coco River. Whether they expect to get reinforcements, supplies or both from Honduras is not known. The patrol has been temporarily left at Cape Gracias for rapid movement up the river in case the planes locate any groups, also to get behind any groups that might attempt a movement from the river towards Puerto Cabezas. (signed) A.O. Inman, Captain G.N., Department Commander."

21 July 1931.
Request for plane transportation to Managua, Col. C. A. Wynn, Bluefields, to Jefe Director GN, Managua.    Request for Monseñor Sola y Farrel, Vicariato Apostólico de Bluefields.  "Reverendisimo Monseñor Sola y Farrel has recently arrived from Spain and is in direct charge of the activities of his church on the Atlantic Coast.  He desires to visit Managua on official business and has requested me to obtain plane transportation for himself and secretary.  ¶  He, as well as the other priests on this coast, have rendered considerable assistance to the guardia in the past, and it is hoped that his request will be approved."

1.  22 July 1931.
Conditions on the East Coast, Area Commander Col. C. A. Wynn, Bluefields, to Jefe Director GN, Managua, p. 1.    "1. There are many indications that conditions on the East Coast are gradually getting worse and that bandit activity will increase.  ¶  2. There are two distinct groups from which trouble may be expected. First, the more or less organized bandit groups; second, the large number of unemployed laborers.  ¶  3. Actual bandit activity may be expected to increase for the reason that this Coast is well stocked with merchandise and provisions. There are many commissaries scattered along the several rivers, which, together with the Chinese and other stores at various points in the interior are easy prey for the bandits. With the evident shortage of food in the Northern and Central Areas, it seems most probable that this Coast will soon become the source of supply for the bandits, if such has not already happened. The recent raids on Wuani and Siuna tends to bear this out. These raids alone netted the bandits between twenty and thirty thousand dollars worth of merchandise and provisions.  ¶  4. The present strength of this Area does not permit protection of the isolated places. Practically all transportation is via water, there being few trails, especially those running North-South. Distances on the Coast are great and it is usually several days to a week before a word is received from the interior of the presence of bandits. Guardia operations are hindered by the lack of both communication and means of transportation.  ¶  5. Internal trouble may be expected from the groups of unemployed laborers. This is especially true at Puerto Cabezas, ..."

2.  22 July 1931.
Conditions on the East Coast, Area Commander Col. C. A. Wynn, Bluefields, to Jefe Director GN, Managua, p. 2.    "... Bluefields along the banana Rivera [sic] The only fruit companies now taking fruit from the Coast are the Standard Fruit Company at Puerto Cabezas and the United Fruit Company at Bluefields.  Both of these companies are limiting their purchases to those from their own farms and the private farms with which they have contracts.  The independent growers have not been able to sell any fruit for two months and there is no indication that this condition will improve in the near future as the Independent Companies which bought and shipped fruit in the past have withdrawn from the Coast.  This leaves several hundreds of growers and laborers without any means of livelihood.  There is no employment to be obtained elsewhere.  Both the Standard Fruit and United Fruit Companies have recently reduced their personnel.  This is especially true at Puerto Cabezas where a large number of men were thrown out of work.  ¶  6. These unemployed laborers must live.  Most of them are willing to work but when there is no work available they will undoubtedly join the bandits or commit robberies independently.  ¶  7. There were some hundred and thirty five laborers employed on the Rama-Managua Road just outside of Rama.  These men gave no trouble so long as they received pay for their work.  When the Government took over this project recently there was immediately apparent a feeling of discontent.  This feeling burst into mutiny Sunday night, July 19th when it became known that the Government had ordered work on the road to cease, and discharged the laborers without pay.  The attack on the Guardia post at Rama resulted.  The Jefe Politico has just informed me that the Government has supplied the funds with which to pay these laborers the amounts due them.  This will have a tendency to quiet them temporarily but as soon as their money is gone, and being without work, they will probably cause more trouble.  ¶  8. Throught the entire Eastern Area are many Sandino sympathizers and this is especially true in Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas.  Should the Guardia at these two places, at any time, be reduced below effective strength, internal disorders on a large scale may be expected. ..."

3.  22 July 1931.
Conditions on the East Coast, Area Commander Col. C. A. Wynn, Bluefields, to Jefe Director GN, Managua, p. 3.

24 July 1931.
Contact Report, 1st Sgt. Victor Perera GN, to Department Commander Capt. O. A. Inman, Puerto Cabezas.    "DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN BLUEFIELDS ¶ GUARDIA NACIONAL DE NICARAGUA ¶ NEPTUNE MINE NICARAGUA. ¶ July 24th., 1931. ¶ To: First Sergeant, Victor Porera. G.N. The Area commander, Bluefields Nic. Dept. Commander, Puerto Cabezas Nic. ¶ Acct.: report. ¶ On the 14th. Date of July at 8:00 a.m. Sergeant Silvestre Colomer, Guardia Nacional, took a trip to (Siuna?) Cuina with two guides, and returned on the (--) date of July at 11:00 a.m.., and reported that on his arrival at Cuina, he immediately gathered the following information, from the people at Cuina. The information was given to him a follows: on the 29th. Dae of June a band of bandits arrived at Cuina, about a hundred & thirty men, headed by Abraham Rivera, they went to Cuina and Wany, robbed all the china-men merchandise from the stores, also murdered two men at Cuina, and two badly wounded by the outlaws so they informed to Sergeant Silvestre Colomer G.N., that after the bandits went away, two of their men was left in the town, which the people from the town killed the two bandits that was left behind. ¶ Also Sergeant Silvestre Colomer reported that on the following day of his arrival at Ciuna, a man went to where he was, and greeted him, and about (--) hours after the man went away, a fellow by the name of Mr. Roals, informed (--) that the man who greeted him was a spy for the bandits , and also informed (--) that there was a number of fifty-eight bandits, still at Wany. After he received the information from Mr. Roals, he immediately proceeded for Neptune Mine. Arrive safe at Neptune. Sergeant Silvesstre Colomer, was well treated by the Superinendent of the Mine. (--) proceeds this date for Bluefields. ¶ Copy. Area Commander, Bluefields Nic. ¶ Dept Commander, Puerto Cabezas Nic. ¶ (signed) Victor Perera, ¶ First Sergeant G.N.¶ N.C.O. In charge Neptune Mine Detach."

1.  25 July 1931.
Letter from "FFM" to Mr. John Brownson, Acting Manager, Foreign Dept., New Orleans LA, p. 1.   NOTE:  This document also appears in the TOP 100, PAGE 71.     "Dear Mr. Brownson:  ¶  The bandit activities in the upper regions of the Prinzapolka and Bambana Rivers just before and at the time of my visit on both may be of interest, and herewith follows what I gathered on both from some of the residents and a few others who had returned from the seat of activities, as well as one or two fugitives whom I met.  ¶  Getting to the village of Tungla, some 115 miles up-stream from the sea, on the Prinzapolka, the noon of the 3rd. Inst., I decided to look over the immediate back lands in the vicinity and so we (I was accompanied by Messrs. Donaldson and Leeming) camped in a hut about a mile down-stream. Friday, Saturday and Sunday nights were spent here and the three following a few miles lower down-stream.  ¶  On coming out of the woods at Tungla on Sunday afternoon at about four o’clock, we learned from the people of the village that news had been brought in by the first one of five men belonging to Tungla who had left Siuna on the 3rd., coming overland, that bandits numbering from eighty to one-hundred-and twenty, including some Wanki Indians had eight days previously visited that town and also Uani, raided the shops and other places, destroyed one building and were bent on general destruction and murder. Two of the village’s inhabitants had been killed and one badly chopped up – this last was not expected to live. After the main force had left with the spoils of their raid, some few of them returned to Siuna, got drunk and started to molest the women folk, and as a result of which two of them (bandits) were killed with machetes by two of the Tungla men. The others of this small gang left to go and consult their leaders, said to be Ramon Rivera – Caracas and others, as to what reprisals should be taken for the loss of two of their number. It was reported more than a week later that the bandits had visited this village a second time, and it was said that they would visit Tungla, but as far as I could gather, there had been no further killings, or destruction of property to the place, nor had Tungla been visited.  ¶  Curiously, it is said that one of the Chinamen’s shops was not cleared out and it was apparently left to continue business. The other Chinamen are reported to have fled and come down to Prinzapolka; some five to my knowledge did so. ..."

2.  25 July 1931.
Letter from "FFM" to Mr. John Brownson, Acting Manager, Foreign Dept., New Orleans LA, p. 2.    "... All the inhabitants of the river at Tungla and lower down, as well as those further up-stream were greatly worried at the reported killings of civilians and the molestation of their women folk, which did not take place in any of those parts on any of their previous raids.  ¶  When returning down the Yauya Creek, the second largest tributary of the Prinzapolka, below Tungla, on the 15th we (Mr. Leeming and the writer) met an old miner, Peterson by name, who was watchman at the La Luz Mine, and who has passed many years in that part of the country. He said that he and his family had had to leave their house and take to the woods just prior to the bandits’ first visit to Siuna and that a man, a member of his household had been one of those killed. He also informed me that the bandits had apparently a complete list of all the inhabitants of any importance both foreign and native in the surrounding country, and that he understood that none of these were to be spared if they got into the hands of the bandits. He mentioned that most of the inhabitants of the villages in that part of the country had been seeking refuge hidden in woods as it was claimed that the bandits were bent on a general destruction of both life and property.  ¶  Later, on the above data (the 15th) returning to Tasbapowni we met a man called Lawrence, about the most intelligent negro member of the Tungla village. He said that the latest reports from around Uani and Siuna were that the bandit gang numbered between three and four-hundred and that they were expected to visit Tungla; so he had fled with his goods and chattels as likewise many of the others, and I might say, that the exodus from this village commenced on the Sunday afternoon that we first learnt of the first raid on the two towns above mentioned.  ¶  Later, on the 17th, I, in company of Mr. Leeming went up the Bambana River getting as far up this as the Walpatera Rapids, on the morning of the 18th inst. While enroute, we called in to see a Mr. Albert Kirkland, whose home is at the junction between the Banacruz and Bambana Rivers. We found him at home, as he had on the Tuesday previously, due to the reported bandit activities, left his post at the Neptune Mine. Having once been in the hands of these people and having escaped, he did not wish to run the risk of being captured a second time and, therefore, wished to get as far out of their reach as possible. While on his journey from the mine he had to pass Tuesday night in the village of Tunkey some 145 miles from the sea at Prinzapolka. Next morning, Wednesday, he was informed by his host that three strangers; unknown to any of the inhabitants of the villages, had made the rounds of same that night winding up their inspection by sitting in front of the house in which he passed the night and were overheard in subdued conversation by his host. That night (Wednesday) a small party of bandits, number unknown, visited the town and raided the few small shops therein. Their number must have been few as it is reported that loot they could not carry away they strewed in the so called streets. Curiously, likewise the Neptune Bodega, which is situated at this village, and said to contain perhaps some $4,000.00 in ..."

3.  25 July 1931.
Letter from "FFM" to Mr. John Brownson, Acting Manager, Foreign Dept., New Orleans LA, p. 3.    "... merchandise was not destroyed, neither was there damage to any property of life there.  ¶  This, of course, was my reason for going no further than to the Walpatera Rapids some two hours from Tunkey, or roughly 15 miles. It was also reported that many of the inhabitants of Tunkey had taken to the woods and other people of the surrounding country had come down-stream to get as far away as possible from the center of activities in this district.  ¶  Up to the time of my leaving this vicinity no trouble had been reported in connection with the Neptune Mine. This mine, I am told, is guarded (10 Guardia and 25 civilian guardsmen with machine guns, etc.). I may also say that some of the shopkeepers of this village (Tunkey) also left for Prinzapolka on the morning after the raid; having taken to the woods on the day previously.  ¶  I learnt from Mr. Kirkland while spending Saturday night in his house that he had received news from the storekeeper of the Neptune Mine’s storeroom that bandits had left for their headquarters, Bocay, with 18 boats, 12 mules and 30 head of cattle. This information, apparently from the mines, was dispatched prior to the raiding of Tunkey.  ¶  It was also reported that the bandits operating in this vicinity and led by the leaders already mentioned plus some others and the Official Executioner of the gang, Julio Castro, are making their headquarters in a village being formed by them at a place called Asa, at the junction of Uli and Asa Rivers, both tributaries of the Prinzapolka. Here, it is said, they have amongst them both women and children and much of the loot gotten in their recent raids. It was reported, or perhaps better rumored, that a party of bandits had left for their headquarters at Bocay on the Wanks River where they can easily get by going up the Uli River from which, with a day’s walk, they can connect with one of the principle tributaries of the river Bocay, emptying a the village of this name on the Wanks.  ¶  It was also rumored that one of their leaders, Pedron, was supposed to be crossing overland from Bocay to the town of Rama on the Escondido. The leader, Caracas, was, I understand, at one time and not so long ago a timekeeper of one of the Farms on the Vance Tract and who, I have heard it said, was one of the principle men mixed up in the trouble that took place in the district in the raids of April past. Shortly after the occurrence alluded to, I am informed, that he passed through the Neptune Mine with two of the Company’s mules. One he left behind, and which is still at the mine; the other he took along with him.  ¶  It is generally reported that the bandits were short of arms and ammunition, and to bear this out, that not a shot was fired in all the raids, with the exception of two at Tunkey.  ¶  Yours very truly,  ¶  Actg. Division Manager  ¶  (written) Nicaragua  ¶  FFM"